An Enquiry into an Origin of Honour; and the Usefulness of Christianity in War

I take it for granted, that a Christian is not bound to believe any Thing to have been of Divine Institution, that has not been declared to be such in Holy Writ. Yet great Offence has been taken at an Essay, in the First Part of the Fable of the Bees , call'd An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue; notwithstanding the great Caution it is wrote with. Since then, it is thought Criminal to surmise, that even Heathen Virtue was of Human Invention, and the Reader, in the following Dialogues, will find me to persist in the Opinion, that it was; I beg his Patience to peruse what I have to say for my self on this Head, which is all I shall trouble him with here.
The Word Morality is either synonimous with Virtue, or signifies that Part of Philosophy, which treats of it, and teaches the Regulation of Manners; and by the Words Moral Virtue, I mean the same Thing which I believe Every body else does. I am likewise fully persuaded that to govern our selves according to the Dictates of Reason, is far better than to indulge the Passions without Stop or Controul, and consequently that Virtue is more beneficial than Vice, not only for the Peace and real Happiness of Society in general, but likewise for the Temporal Felicity of every individual Member of it, abstract from thee Consideration of a future State, I am moreover convinced, that all wise Men ever were and ever will be of this Opinion; and I shall never oppose Any body, who shall be pleased to call this an Eternal Truth.
Having allow'd and own'd thus much, I beg Leave to make a short Grammatical Reflection on the Sounds or Letters we make use of to express this rational Management of ourselves: For tho' the Truth of its Excellency is Eternal, the Words Moral Virtue themselves are not so, any more than Speech or Man himself. Permit me therefore to enquire which Way it is most probably, they must have come into the World.
What the Great Men of Rome valued themselves upon was active and passive Bravery, Warlike Virtue, which is so strongly express'd in the Words of Livy: Et facere & pati fortia Romanum est. But besides the Consideration of the great Service, All Warriours received from this Virtue, there is a very good Reason in the Nature of the Thing it self, why it should be in far higher Esteem than any other. The Passion it has to struggle with, is the most violent and stubborn, and consequently the hardest to be conquer'd, the Fear of Death: The least Conflict with it is harsh Work, and a difficult Task; and it is in Regard to this, that Cicero , in his Offices , calls Modesty, Justice and Temperance, the softer and easier Virtues. Qui virtutibus bis lenioribus erit ornatus, modestia, justitia temperantia, &c. Justice and Temperance require Professors as grave and solemnn, and demand as much Strictness and Observance as any other Virtues. Why lenioribus then; but that they are more mild and gentle in the Restrain they lay upon our Inclinations, and that the Self-denial they require is more practicable and less mortifying than that of Virtue itself, as it is taken in it proper and genuine Sense? To be Just or Temperate, we have Temptations to encounter, and Difficulties to surmount, that are troublesome: But the Efforts we are oblig'd to make upon our selves to be truyly Valiant are infinitely greater; and, in order to it, we are overcome the First, the strongest and most lasting Passion, that has been implanted in us; for tho' we may hate and have Aversion to many Things by Instinct, yet this is Nothing so generally terrible, and so generally dreadful to all Creatures, rational or not rational, as the Dissolution of their Being.