On War
The Germans interpret their new national colours—black, red, and white—by the saying, “Durch Nacht und Blut zur licht.” (“Through night and blood to light”), and no work yet written conveys to the thinker a clearer conception of all that the red streak in their flag stands for than this deep and philosophical analysis of “War” by Clausewitz.
It reveals “War,” stripped of all accessories, as the exercise of force for the attainment of a political object, unrestrained by any law save that of expediency, and thus gives the key to the interpretation of German political aims, past, present, and future, which is unconditionally necessary for every student of the modern conditions of Europe. Step by step, every event since Waterloo follows with logical consistency from the teachings of Napoleon, formulated for the first time, some twenty years afterwards, by this remarkable thinker.
What Darwin accomplished for Biology generally Clausewitz did for the Life-History of Nations nearly half a century before him, for both have proved the existence of the same law in each case, viz., “The survival of the fittest”—the “fittest,” as Huxley long since pointed out, not being necessarily synonymous with the ethically “best.” Neither of these thinkers was concerned with the ethics of the struggle which each studied so exhaustively, but to both men the phase or condition presented itself neither as moral nor immoral, any more than are famine, disease, or other natural phenomena, but as emanating from a force inherent in all living organisms which can only be mastered by understanding its nature. It is in that spirit that, one after the other, all the Nations of the Continent, taught by such drastic lessons as Königgrätz and Sedan, have accepted the lesson, with the result that to-day Europe is an armed camp, and peace is maintained by the equilibrium of forces, and will continue just as long as this equilibrium exists, and no longer.
Whether this state of equilibrium is in itself a good or desirable thing may be open to argument. I have discussed it at length in my “War and the World’s Life”; but I venture to suggest that to no one would a renewal of the era of warfare be a change for the better, as far as existing humanity is concerned. Meanwhile, however, with every year that elapses the forces at present in equilibrium are changing in magnitude—the pressure of populations which have to be fed is rising, and an explosion along the line of least resistance is, sooner or later, inevitable.
Carl von Clausewitz
On War
TRANSLATED BY COLONEL J.J. GRAHAM
Contents
1. INTRODUCTION.
2. DEFINITION.
3. UTMOST USE OF FORCE.
4. THE AIM IS TO DISARM THE ENEMY.
5. UTMOST EXERTION OF POWERS.
6. MODIFICATION IN THE REALITY.
7. WAR IS NEVER AN ISOLATED ACT.
8. WAR DOES NOT CONSIST OF A SINGLE INSTANTANEOUS BLOW.
9. THE RESULT IN WAR IS NEVER ABSOLUTE.
10. THE PROBABILITIES OF REAL LIFE TAKE THE PLACE OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE EXTREME AND THE ABSOLUTE.
11. THE POLITICAL OBJECT NOW REAPPEARS.
12. A SUSPENSION IN THE ACTION OF WAR UNEXPLAINED BY ANYTHING SAID AS YET.
13. THERE IS ONLY ONE CAUSE WHICH CAN SUSPEND THE ACTION, AND THIS SEEMS TO BE ONLY POSSIBLE ON ONE SIDE IN ANY CASE.
14. THUS A CONTINUANCE OF ACTION WILL ENSUE WHICH WILL ADVANCE TOWARDS A CLIMAX.
15. HERE, THEREFORE, THE PRINCIPLE OF POLARITY IS BROUGHT INTO REQUISITION.
16. ATTACK AND DEFENCE ARE THINGS DIFFERING IN KIND AND OF UNEQUAL FORCE. POLARITY IS, THEREFORE, NOT APPLICABLE TO THEM.
17. THE EFFECT OF POLARITY IS OFTEN DESTROYED BY THE SUPERIORITY OF THE DEFENCE OVER THE ATTACK, AND THUS THE SUSPENSION OF ACTION IN WAR IS EXPLAINED.
18 A SECOND GROUND CONSISTS IN THE IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
19. FREQUENT PERIODS OF INACTION IN WAR REMOVE IT FURTHER FROM THE ABSOLUTE, AND MAKE IT STILL MORE A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITIES.
20. THEREFORE, THE ELEMENT OF CHANCE ONLY IS WANTING TO MAKE OF WAR A GAME, AND IN THAT ELEMENT IT IS LEAST OF ALL DEFICIENT.
21. WAR IS A GAME BOTH OBJECTIVELY AND SUBJECTIVELY.
22. HOW THIS ACCORDS BEST WITH THE HUMAN MIND IN GENERAL.
23. WAR IS ALWAYS A SERIOUS MEANS FOR A SERIOUS OBJECT. ITS MORE PARTICULAR DEFINITION.
24. WAR IS A MERE CONTINUATION OF POLICY BY OTHER MEANS.
25. DIVERSITY IN THE NATURE OF WARS.
26. THEY MAY ALL BE REGARDED AS POLITICAL ACTS.
27. INFLUENCE OF THIS VIEW ON THE RIGHT UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY HISTORY, AND ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORY.
28. RESULT FOR THEORY.
1. THE FIRST CONCEPTION OF THE “ART OF WAR” WAS MERELY THE PREPARATION OF THE ARMED FORCES.
2. TRUE WAR FIRST APPEARS IN THE ART OF SIEGES.
3. THEN TACTICS TRIED TO FIND ITS WAY IN THE SAME DIRECTION.
4. THE REAL CONDUCT OF WAR ONLY MADE ITS APPEARANCE INCIDENTALLY AND INCOGNITO.
5. REFLECTIONS ON MILITARY EVENTS BROUGHT ABOUT THE WANT OF A THEORY.
6. ENDEAVOURS TO ESTABLISH A POSITIVE THEORY.
7. LIMITATION TO MATERIAL OBJECTS.
8. SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS.
9. VICTUALLING OF TROOPS.
10. BASE.
11. INTERIOR LINES.
12. ALL THESE ATTEMPTS ARE OPEN TO OBJECTION.
13. AS A RULE THEY EXCLUDE GENIUS.
14. THE DIFFICULTY OF THEORY AS SOON AS MORAL QUANTITIES COME INTO CONSIDERATION.
15. THE MORAL QUANTITIES MUST NOT BE EXCLUDED IN WAR.
16. PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY OF A THEORY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR.
17. FIRST SPECIALITY.—MORAL FORCES AND THEIR EFFECTS. (HOSTILE FEELING.)
18. THE IMPRESSIONS OF DANGER. (COURAGE.)
19. EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF DANGER.
20. OTHER POWERS OF FEELING.
21. PECULIARITY OF MIND.
22. FROM THE DIVERSITY IN MENTAL INDIVIDUALITIES ARISES THE DIVERSITY OF WAYS LEADING TO THE END.
23. SECOND PECULIARITY.—LIVING REACTION.
24. THIRD PECULIARITY.—UNCERTAINTY OF ALL DATA.
25. POSITIVE THEORY IS IMPOSSIBLE.
26. MEANS LEFT BY WHICH A THEORY IS POSSIBLE (THE DIFFICULTIES ARE NOT EVERYWHERE EQUALLY GREAT).
27. THEORY MUST BE OF THE NATURE OF OBSERVATIONS NOT OF DOCTRINE.
28. BY THIS POINT OF VIEW THEORY BECOMES POSSIBLE, AND CEASES TO BE IN CONTRADICTION TO PRACTICE.
29. THEORY THEREFORE CONSIDERS THE NATURE OF ENDS AND MEANS—ENDS AND MEANS IN TACTICS.
30. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ALWAYS ATTEND THE APPLICATION OF THE MEANS.
31. LOCALITY.
32. TIME OF DAY.
33. WEATHER.
34. END AND MEANS IN STRATEGY.
35. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ATTEND THE APPLICATION OF THE MEANS OF STRATEGY.
36. THESE FORM NEW MEANS.
37. STRATEGY DEDUCES ONLY FROM EXPERIENCE THE ENDS AND MEANS TO BE EXAMINED.
38. HOW FAR THE ANALYSIS OF THE MEANS SHOULD BE CARRIED.
39. GREAT SIMPLIFICATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED.
40. THIS EXPLAINS THE RAPID GROWTH OF GREAT GENERALS, AND WHY A GENERAL IS NOT A MAN OF LEARNING.
41. FORMER CONTRADICTIONS.
42. ON THIS ACCOUNT ALL USE OF KNOWLEDGE WAS DENIED, AND EVERYTHING ASCRIBED TO NATURAL TALENTS.
43. THE KNOWLEDGE MUST BE MADE SUITABLE TO THE POSITION.
44. THE KNOWLEDGE IN WAR IS VERY SIMPLE, BUT NOT, AT THE SAME TIME, VERY EASY.
45. OF THE NATURE OF THIS KNOWLEDGE.
46. SCIENCE MUST BECOME ART.
3. WAR IS PART OF THE INTERCOURSE OF THE HUMAN RACE.
4. DIFFERENCE.
OBSERVATION.
1. POSSIBLE COMBATS ARE ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS TO BE LOOKED UPON AS REAL ONES.
2. TWOFOLD OBJECT OF THE COMBAT.
3. EXAMPLE.
4. WHEN THIS VIEW IS NOT TAKEN, THEN A FALSE VALUE IS GIVEN TO OTHER THINGS.
ITS DECISION
1.—Theatre of War.
2.—Army.
3.—Campaign.
1.—Division.
2.—Combination of Arms.
3.—The Disposition.
1.—Living on the inhabitants, or on the community, which is the same thing.
2.—Subsistence through exactions enforced by the troops themselves.
3.—By regular requisitions.
4.—Subsistence from Magazines.
1.—Conception of Defence.
2.—Advantages of the Defensive.
1.—Landwehr (Militia).
2.—Fortresses.
3.—The People.
4.—The National Armament,
5.—Allies.
1. A mountain system as a battle-field.
2. The influence of mountains on other parts of the country.
3. Mountains considered in their aspect of a strategic barrier.
4. Mountains in their relation to the provisioning of an army.
