A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812

BY CHARLES OMAN
M.A. Oxon., Hon. LL.D. Edin. FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY CHICHELE PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID, OF THE ACADEMY OF LISBON AND OF THE ACADEMY OF SAN LUIS OF SARAGOSSA
Vol. V Oct. 1811 – Aug. 31, 1812 VALENCIA CIUDAD RODRIGO BADAJOZ SALAMANCA MADRID
WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1914
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY HUMPHREY MILFORD M.A. PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY
The campaign of 1812 cannot be called the greatest exhibition of military genius in Wellington’s career: that distinction must be given to the campaign of 1813. But it included the battle of Salamanca, the most skilfully fought and the most decisive of all his victories, ‘the beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes.’ And its earlier episodes, the two sudden strokes which ended in the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Badajoz, deserve the closest attention, as showing a marvellous power of utilizing opportunities, and solving time-problems of the most complicated sort. We shall see how Wellington, in face of an enemy whose whole force was far superior to his own, so conducted his operations that he had success in his hands before the French armies could concentrate to overwhelm him. He would have been victorious in 1812 even without the assistance that was given him during the early months of the year by Napoleon’s misguided orders from Paris, and in the summer by Soult’s repeated and deliberate refusal to co-operate with King Joseph and Marmont for the general welfare of the French cause in Spain. The limits of his success were largely extended by those adventitious circumstances, but even without them he must have achieved great things by force of the combinations which he had prepared.
The reader will find that I have devoted a good deal of space to the precise working out of the effect of Napoleon’s successive dispatches to Marmont, with reference to the time at which each was received, and the influence which it had on the Marshal’s movements. I am bound to say that careful study has convinced me that Marmont’s justification of his own actions from January to May, written in the fourth volume of his Mémoires , is in the main fair and sensible, and that his criticism of his master’s orders is as sound as it is lucid. Napier held the reverse opinion, but his arguments in support of it are unconvincing: he is set on proving his idol infallible at all costs, in this as in so many other cases.