The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey

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BY DENTON LORING GEYER B.A. University of Wisconsin, 1910 M.A. University of Wisconsin, 1911
THESIS Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
1914

THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH AS DEVELOPED BY PEIRCE, JAMES, AND DEWEY.

This thesis attempts to trace the growth of the pragmatic doctrine of truth through the works of its three most famous advocates in America.
An examination of Peirce’s initial statement of pragmatism is followed by a discussion of his objections to the meaning put upon his doctrine by his would-be disciples, and his resort, in order to save himself from these ‘perversions’, to a renaming of his theory. Some evident contradictions in his different principles are pointed out.
The changing position of William James is then followed through magazine articles and books appearing successively during a period of about thirty years. One finds here a gradually but continually widening divergence from the rationalistic theories, which culminates finally in the much-quoted extreme statements of the book ‘Pragmatism’. The few subsequently published references to truth seem to consist largely of defenses or retractions of the tenets there set forth. As has been so often said, William James was too sympathetic toward the doctrines of other men to maintain a consistent doctrine of his own. His best work, like that of the higher literary type to which he approached, was to transcribe and interpret the feelings of other men. His genius lay in the clearness with which he could translate these ideas and the lucid fashion in which he could cut to the heart of ambiguities in them. With the highest and most sincere admiration for the spirit of James’ labors in philosophy and psychology, the writer is unable to find there permanent contributions to the solution of the particular problem which we have before us here, the problem of truth. In his splendid protest against all static theories, he seems to have accepted pragmatism for what it was not rather than for what it was. It was not a cut-and-dried system leaving no room for individuality, and that this was one of his strongest reasons for accepting it is shown by his asking again and again: “If this (pragmatism) is not truth, what is?” He was attempting to find a theory—almost any theory, one thinks sometimes—which would serve as an alternative to the older doctrines so incompatible with his temperament.