The works of Richard Hurd, volume 5 (of 8)

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Ita, si potuero, stylo moderabor meo, ut nec ea, quæ supersint, dicam, nec ea, quæ satis sint, prætermittam. Augustin. C. D. l. xvii. c. 1.
LINCOLN’S-INN, MARCH 2, 1772.
Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man: but holy men of God spake, as they were moved by the Spirit of God.
The argument from prophecy, in support of the Christian revelation, would be thought more conclusive, at least would be more distinctly apprehended, if men could be kept from mixing their own prejudices and preconceptions with it.
The general question may be expressed thus—“Whether the predictions in the Old and New Testament do not appear to have been so far, and in such sense, fulfilled, as to afford a reasonable conviction, that they came not , as the text speaks, by the will of man, but from the Spirit of God .”
In examining this question, the predictions themselves cannot be too diligently studied, or too cautiously applied: But, while this work is carrying on, we are still to suppose, and should not for a moment forget, that they may be, what they manifestly claim to be, of divine suggestion; I mean, we are to admit, not the truth indeed, but the possibility, of such suggestion, till we can fairly make it appear that they are of human contrivance, only.
It will not be denied, that the tenour of Scripture, as well as the text, clearly asserts the divine original and direction of the prophecies. A just reasoner on the subject will, therefore, proceed on this supposition, and only try whether it be well founded. He will consider, whether the construction of the prophecies, and the application of them, be such, as may accord to those pretensions; and will not argue against them on other principles, which they do not admit, or suppose. All this is plainly nothing more than what may be expected from a fair inquirer, and what the rules of good reasoning exact from him.