XI
COMMON-SENSE AND DIVORCE LAW REFORM
"Those whom God hath joined together let no man put asunder."
In view of what I have said[I] about our marriage and divorce laws, several people have asked what I should actually propose in the way of reform, and I am glad to take the opportunity of a new edition briefly to answer this question.
[Footnote I: See Chapter V.]
I do not wish to see reform take the line of a longer list of "causes" for divorce, such, for example, as drunkenness, insanity, imprisonment for life, and so on. I should prefer to abolish these lists altogether, and to bring all divorce cases under some form of "equitable jurisdiction," each case being decided on its merits.
It should be the business of the court to decide whether the marriage desired to be invalidated has in actual fact any validity or reality at all; and to declare the couple divorced if it has not. In such courts men and women (or a man and a woman) should act together as judges.
It will be urged that to decide such a question is beyond the power of any human judgment; but I submit that in fact such decisions are being given every day. A judge who grants a judicial separation is deciding that a marriage has ceased to be real or valid, and he divorces the couple a mensa et thoro, though leaving them without the power to marry again. He actually "puts them asunder" more rigidly than a divorced couple. Since this is possible, it cannot be impossible for him to decide that the marriage must be wholly dissolved, with freedom of re-marriage to other partners; though such a decision, being even more grave, should not be reached without certain safeguards.
These safeguards should include that teaching about marriage on which I have insisted throughout the whole of this book. Young people should know what sex is and involves: what marriage is: how necessary to the welfare of the race, their children and themselves are fidelity and love. They should know that unless they believe that their love is indeed for life they ought not to marry. They should understand that to fail here is to fail most tragically.
If, nevertheless, a man and woman believe that their marriage is a complete and hopeless failure, their claim to be released from it should not be granted in haste. A period of years should in any case elapse before divorce can be obtained, and every effort should be used to reconcile the two, to remove any removable cause of difficulty, to convince them of the possibility of making good, by loyalty, unselfishness and a deep sense of responsibility, even an incomplete and desecrated bond.
If, however, it is clear that for no worthy consideration can they be induced to take up again the duties and responsibilities of marriage—if they remain immovably and rationally convinced that their marriage is not a real marriage—they should be released. And this because it is not moral but immoral, not Christian, but unChristian, to pretend that a marriage is real and sacred when it is not.
If there is one quality more striking than another in the teaching of Christ, it is His emphasis on reality. It is in this that the height and depth of His morality stand revealed. We do no service—we do a profound dis-service—to morals when we admit that a marriage is so utterly devoid of reality that the best thing we can do for a "married couple" is to separate them from each other altogether—set them apart—free them from each other's "rights"—break up their home—and yet maintain the legal lie that they are still a married couple.
It will be asked how the interests of the children can be safeguarded. The interests of children are best safeguarded by the education and enlightenment of parents. They cannot be wholly saved if, after all, their parents have ceased to love or respect one another, for nothing the law can do will make up to them for that which is every child's right—a home ruled by love and full of happiness. The best that can then be done is to rescue them from the misery of a home full of unhappiness and hatred, and to assign them to the parent who, in the judgment of the court, is best fitted to care for them.
Let me add that, while I hold that the persistent and unconquerable conviction of two people that they ought to be divorced ought ultimately to entitle them to it, this should not be the case if one only of two married people seeks release. In this case, the decision should be entirely with the court.
To those who feel that not only our Lord's words but also the interpretation put upon those words by the Church is of supreme importance, the following statement will be of interest: "It is quite arguable that relief may be granted on the grounds that what is impossible cannot be done. It may be shown on the one hand that to such and such a person it is morally impossible to live with such and such another person, and on the other hand that it is morally impossible to live without marriage. In such instances there is room for the exercise of our 'dispensation from the impediment of the legamen' (bond). This is the practice of the Eastern Church, which allows the innocent party to re-marry, and also grants relief in cases of incurable insanity."
With regard to the Western Church, "Divorce and subsequent re-marriage in pre-Reformation days were only allowed on grounds existing before the contract was entered into. (There seems good reason for the belief that our Lord's words as recorded by St. Matthew refer to prenuptial unchastity.) But in spite of this apparently narrow restriction there were fourteen grounds on which a marriage could be declared null and void before the Reformation, and it was constantly being done. Canonists and Theologians taught that the full and free consent of parties was essential to marriage—which teaching obviously would enable a very wide view of the subject to be taken."[J]
[Footnote J: From a "Memorandum on Divorce," published in The Challenge,
July 5, 1918.]