Artillery
We have learnt by experience that skill in the employment of guns is more important than their number. Under modern battle conditions, when the position of a battery cannot be seen, a great deal of ammunition is fired during the artillery duel without any result. Two to four well-concealed guns cleverly moved from one position to another can hold their own with a brigade of artillery, and, if they can only range on the enemy’s guns first, rapid fire gives them the power of inflicting heavy loss. Our keenest and most experienced gunners got on to the enemy on many occasions with great effect, but as a rule our artillery did little damage. One occasion when very ineffective results were obtained by us was at Hei-kou-tai, where, in our endeavour to get possession of San-de-pu, we fired 70,000 rounds into every square,[46] except the one which actually contained the village. Our immense expenditure of ammunition also emphasized how carefully the question of the right proportion of guns in a force must be considered. In this war, owing to the great delay in sending up drafts to repair wastage, we were often actually handicapped by having too many guns! We frequently had to fight with divisions containing only some 6,000 to 8,000 men in the four regiments and the full forty-eight guns—a proportion of six to eight guns per 1,000 rifles, which is far too many. And our guns were literally an embarrassment, especially when they had run out of ammunition. Even assuming that we shall be able (as I have suggested) to place in the field regiments with a strength of 4,000 rifles, I consider it will be quite sufficient if we maintain the proportion of guns at forty-eight per division, or three guns per 1,000 rifles. The fire from quick-firing guns is nowadays quite powerful and effective enough for four guns to be considered a tactically independent fighting unit; but the formation of batteries of such a size is expensive, and requires too many men. It appears to be preferable, therefore, to abandon the artillery divisional organization, and return to the former twelve-gun battery, dividing it into three companies, each of which would be in a tactical sense independent. The 48 guns—i.e., four batteries—with an infantry division, would then be organized into an artillery regiment under the command of the divisional general. Each company would be commanded by a captain, the battery by a lieutenant-colonel, the regiment by a colonel.
We found that for mutual and smooth co-operation in battle it is most important that batteries should operate as far as possible with the same regiments of infantry. Close touch is established, and each arm unselfishly supports the other. I often heard the expression, “our battery,” “our regiment,” and in these simple words a deep, underlying sentiment was expressed. Each battery should be capable of acting independently of the artillery regiment to which it belongs. For hill warfare mountain artillery should be allotted to infantry in the same proportion as I have suggested for field artillery.
Our gun proved an excellent weapon; but our shrapnel, which was very effective against objects and troops in the open, was of no use against invisible targets, earthworks, and mud walls. Our artillery fire against villages held by the enemy, therefore, produced very little result. I consider that a new pattern of shell should be introduced with thicker walls and a heavier bursting charge; but even then the effect of such light projectiles as our field-guns fire will not be great against the earthworks which are nowadays so quickly thrown up on positions. To prepare the way for the assault on such fortifications, and to obtain any speedy result in attacking defended localities, we must have field howitzers of a modern type. They should be organized in regiments of two batteries (twenty-four howitzers), and attached to a corps as corps artillery. Finally, it is essential that every army should have a light siege-train to assist in the capture of strongly defended posts and heavy works.
The organization of park units was well conceived, but the vehicles were unsuited to the Manchurian roads. I am afraid to express an opinion in favour of a further increase of mobile parks, because we were so overburdened with baggage of different kinds. I think it is preferable to improvise local parks at railway-stations and junctions, as we did in Manchuria.
Small-arm ammunition rarely ran short, but there was often a great lack of gun ammunition, and after the battles of Liao-yang, the Sha Ho, and Mukden, our reserves for filling up battery and park stocks were exhausted. The average expenditure of rifle ammunition worked out as follows: For a whole-day battle for one battalion, 21,000 rounds, with a maximum of 400,000; an hour’s fighting for one battalion, 1,700, with a maximum of 67,000. The total reserve taken with a four-battalion infantry regiment was 800,000. The average expenditure per quick-firing field-gun in a one-day battle worked out at 55 rounds, with a maximum of 522; an hour’s fighting, 10 rounds, with a maximum of 210.
In the earlier fights the work of the artillery varied a good deal, and was not very successful; but as they gained experience, many batteries fought splendidly, not only against guns, but against rifle-fire. Compared with the work of our artillery in 1877–78 (in the European theatre of operations), we have made considerable progress in skill, and the very heavy losses in killed and wounded in many batteries prove that our gunners know how to die. The horse artillery work depended entirely on the commanders of the cavalry units to which the batteries were attached, and when these commanders really meant fighting the batteries did good work. As a proof of this, it is enough to recall the gallant conduct of the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery attached to Mischenko’s Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade. This battery and its young commander were known to the whole army; more than once it successfully fought several of the enemy’s batteries, and yet its losses were insignificant. Sometimes our cavalry leaders were unnecessarily anxious to retire, as was the case in the cavalry of the 2nd Army at the battle of Mukden, when the two batteries which were with it lost only two men wounded and one missing in eleven days’ fighting. One six-gun battery was sufficient for four mounted regiments of such strength as we had. As said above, there should be one artillery regiment of four batteries (48 guns) with each infantry division, or a total of 144 guns for the three divisions. These three regiments would be organized in a brigade. There should also be one regiment of 24 howitzers with each corps.