II.
Though an improvement of moral is by no means as easy to bring about in an army as that of its material condition, the officers who were most in touch with our men were convinced that it was done in our case. It may possibly be a peculiarity of the Russian soldier that he possesses latent moral strength of the kind which is developed slowly, and not destroyed by any trials to which the individual is subjected; but to those who made a study of the war it appeared perfectly clear that our men showed an increasing spirit of stubborn determination as the campaign progressed. In the early fights before the battle of Liao-yang—at Te-li-ssu and Ta-shih-chiao—we withdrew after comparatively small losses. At the latter fight two army corps, and at Yang-tzu-ling one corps, retired, though they together did not collectively lose as many men as the 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment alone lost in the battle of Mukden. At Liao-yang our men fought better than in the previous fights; on the Sha Ho they showed a better spirit than at Liao-yang; while at Mukden many units showed a still further improvement. We were all convinced, therefore, that in a defence of, or an offensive advance from, the Hsi-ping-kai position, the men would fight even better than at Mukden, for the improvement in spirit shown by our troops had been progressive and steady. They had learned much, particularly during their long stay in direct touch with the enemy on the Sha Ho. Even the reserve units, which failed in the early fights, fought with great bravery and steadiness at Mukden. To prove this, it is only necessary to recall the exploits of the 71st and 54th Divisions, the later arrived reserve units of the 55th and 61st Divisions at Mukden, and of many regiments of the 10th, 17th, and 1st Army Corps. The regiments of the 4th Siberian Corps and the East Siberian Rifles, indeed, were an example throughout the war.
The Tsar, in his Order to the army and fleet of January 14, 1905, predicted this improvement in the moral of the troops, notwithstanding their reverses, with great foresight. His belief in the spirit of the army was expressed in the following memorable words:
“Though we may be sore at heart on account of the disasters and losses that have befallen us, do not let us be discouraged. By them Russia’s strength is renewed, and her power increased.”
As operations continued we made corresponding progress in our tactics. We learned how to attack and make use of the ground, and how to employ artillery, and learned by heart the lesson of keeping strong reserves in hand [at the Hsi-ping-kai position the reserve of the 1st Manchurian Army alone consisted of eighty battalions]. We also learned how to obtain intelligence of hostile forces. At the close of the war our knowledge of the Japanese dispositions was more complete than it had ever been; indeed, we had accurate information of the exact whereabouts, not only of their main bodies, but also of many individual units. (This was chiefly obtained from prisoners.)
We received as reinforcements 300,000 regular soldiers then with the colours, most of whom had volunteered for the front, and the 1905 recruits. These young soldiers were ready to face any danger; they arrived in the highest spirits, and their cheerfulness and evident keenness to see some fighting did one’s heart good. The older reservists were mostly employed on duties in the rear. As a result, volunteers were always forthcoming for the numerous raids and reconnaissances made by the 1st Manchurian Army from the Hsi-ping-kai position, or for any other adventurous work. The mainspring of the improvement in our spirit, however, was the more careful selection made of the officers appointed to command units. Many of these now began to display military qualifications of a high order. The fighting round Mukden had produced generals of a calibre upon which we could have fully relied in any subsequent battles. As regards the general question of the readiness of the 1st Manchurian Army for renewed fighting after the Mukden battle, I concluded my report on this force as follows:
“With the occupation of the Hsi-ping-kai position the army found itself confronted with a great work.
“No map of the neighbouring country existed, and the little information we had of the enemy was chiefly remarkable for its absolute vagueness. There were no roads to the rear, no local depôts for the supply of the army, and no fords over the Sungari River, which was a standing menace, as the usual Spring floods were still ahead of us.
“The co-ordinated and willing efforts of all ranks, however, soon changed all this. The fortified line of works from Hsi-ping-kai Station to the village of Kung-chu-ling became practically invincible, and the order was given to use it as a place d’armes and accumulate strong reserves there. In May there were eighty battalions in reserve behind the left flank; practically one-half of the five army corps was located here.
“A two-verst[54] map was made, showing not only the country in our rear, but the strip of ground right up to the enemy’s positions.
“By means of reconnaissances and the employment of spies, we gradually sifted our inaccurate intelligence till our information was correct. We were able first to locate the disposition of the enemy’s armies, then of his divisions, and, finally, of small units.
“The services to the rear were carried out with similar energy; roads were laid out, the Sungari was bridged, and storehouses were built.
“At the beginning of July the army was almost ready to advance; the only thing lacking was the equipment for light railways for horse traction. Without this it was impossible to advance in any great strength.
“During the last few months a horse railway was laid to Ya-mu-tzu, and the carriage of supplies for a forward movement was thus assured.
“A connected series of reconnaissances were carried out in order to gain knowledge of the ground in front.
“The army was brought almost up to full strength by the drafts and new units which had joined.
“In August it was quite ready for battle, and its now recuperated and reinforced veteran corps waited the order for a forward movement in complete confidence.”
General Bilderling, who commanded the 2nd Manchurian Army (which suffered the most heavily at Mukden), finishes his report on this army as follows:
“The army occupied the Hsi-ping-kai position, shattered and disorganized by the battle of Mukden; but it has recovered with extraordinary rapidity. With the arrival of the young soldiers and reservists, all the units have been brought up to full war strength, and it is only in the officers that there is still a great deficiency. The mounted units have been reinforced by fresh squadrons and by horses from the artillery reserve; the guns and waggons which were lost or had become unserviceable have been replaced. Every division has been strengthened by mounted and dismounted machine-gun sections, and howitzer batteries have been formed; a light railway for horse-draught has been laid along the whole length of the position and in rear of it; and, profiting by recent experience, the troops are now thoroughly proficient in all exercises and manœuvres. Thus the army, by reason of its numbers, material composition, and training, has become really better prepared for hostilities at the close of the war than it was at the beginning, and again constitutes a menace to the enemy.”
The 3rd Manchurian Army, which, under the command of General Batianoff, formed a reserve for the 1st and 2nd Armies, and contained corps which had arrived latest and had not been in action, was also a large and reliable body of men.
Of course, there is a skeleton in every cupboard, and naturally in such a large force as the three armies constituted there were weak spots. Thus, there were to be found amongst the men, and even the officers, a certain number of poor-spirited creatures who disbelieved in the possibility of victory. But even such characters would have plucked up their spirits and done good service at the first success.
From the moment I joined the army in Manchuria, I invariably told every unit that I met or reviewed that the war could only end after we had been victorious; that till then none of us would be allowed to return home; and that victory was certain when sufficient reinforcements reached us. And belief in these facts sank into the hearts of officers and private soldiers. Both before and after Mukden, I more than once heard the men themselves—particularly those in hospital—say that they could not return home till the enemy had been defeated. “The women will laugh at us,” were their words. Another important factor, and one which the Russian especially values, is constant and affectionate care for his bodily needs and his health. For anyone who has not been on active service it is difficult to appreciate how troops who have been disorganized and badly shaken by hard fighting can regain heart if they suddenly find hot food ready for them. A night’s rest, a full stomach, ammunition replenished, a quiet calling of the roll, and the calm demeanour of their officers—all assisted to make our splendid soldiers once more ready for the fray. As regards the army’s moral generally, I should mention that the nearer our men were to the enemy, the better were their spirits and the fewer the carping comments and criticisms which always do so much harm; there was no time to read the papers. When I visited the advanced units of the 1st Army (those of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Siberians, and of the 1st Army Corps commanded by Colonels Prince Trubetski, Tikhomiroff, Redkin, and General Kashtalinski), I found universal keenness to advance. The men were well looked after, discipline was strict, and the attitude of both men and officers was one of quiet and steady determination. But in proportion as the distance from the advanced lines increased, and direct touch with the enemy was lost, there was time for talk and gossip. It was on the lines of communication (particularly at Harbin) that drunkenness and gambling took place, besides other forms of dissipation that disgraced the army. It was here that the white-livered brigade collected, leaving the front under any excuse even when fighting was in progress, and, indeed, what else could be expected of them? It is much to be regretted that some of our pressmen judged the army by what they saw at Harbin, and that we were judged by this standard even in Russia. Many officers and others in authority who had failed to pass the “ordeal by fire” lived on in Russia, and from them a correct opinion as to the self-sacrifice and devotion of the army and its readiness to continue the war could hardly have been expected. Unfortunately for us, also there happened to be on the Committee of Imperial Defence two general officers who had been at the front. One had left it; the other had been deprived of his command of an army corps. Clearly, such men as these could not have much assisted this new and important body to insist on the necessity of continuing the struggle.
A step taken by me to raise and to maintain the spirit of the army was the rapid promotion of those officers who had most distinguished themselves in the field. We obtained a number of our best senior regimental officers by promoting captains, and, what is more important, we appointed many distinguished officers to the command of regiments without regard to their lack of seniority, or to the fact that some of them were only lieutenant-colonels. In a very short time these commanding officers improved their regiments almost beyond recognition, and fully proved how important a careful selection is in war. By promoting to Major-General those colonels who had most distinguished themselves on service, we began to get at the head of brigades leaders who were worthy of every confidence, and offered a splendid selection from which to choose divisional and corps commanders.
A further step which I took to woo victory was to enforce the humane treatment of the Chinese population of Manchuria. I, and those immediately under me, insisted on their being protected (as far as war conditions permitted) from unnecessary hardships, and on their property being guarded, and I made a point of their being promptly paid in cash for everything they brought in. This assisted us considerably in getting supplies, and, notwithstanding the great hardships we ourselves occasionally suffered, I invariably insisted on these relations being maintained. Consequently, not once was I forced to have recourse to requisitioning supplies or transport, nor had I to use force to get local labour. The results surpassed all my expectations, for, in spite of the great efforts made by the enemy to raise the Chinese population against us, and in spite of the unfriendly feeling towards us of many of the Chinese authorities themselves, the mass of the people appreciated our attitude, remained quiet, and, by freely bringing in their products, saved us from hunger. Although they might have easily kept us in a perpetual state of alarm by killing isolated officials, attacking small detachments, destroying the telegraphs and the roads, they—with very few exceptions—lived on peacefully in the theatre of war, in some instances even joining with us in fighting the Hun-huses.
Thus, besides the plan of campaign for carrying on the war—in which the possibility of retiring even behind Harbin was foreseen—the principal means taken by me to secure victory were:
1. To instil in all ranks a firm belief that the war could only be brought to a close with victory, and that till victory had crowned our efforts not one of us would return home.
2. To foster a constant fatherly endeavour on the part of all in authority to attend, as far as the exigencies of the Service permitted, to the comfort and preserve the health of the troops.
3. To assist in all ways the readiness and preparation of the troops, particularly by accelerating, irrespective of mere seniority, the promotion of the most distinguished of the officers.
4. To maintain a uniformly humane attitude towards the Chinese population of Manchuria.