ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. II.

[GENERAL KUROPATKIN REVIEWING HIS TROOPS]Frontispiece
OPPOSITE PAGE
[ GENERAL LINIEVITCH]18
[ GENERAL BARON KITEN NOGI]40
[ GENERAL GRIPPENBERG]100
[ FIELD-MARSHAL MARQUIS IWAO OYAMA]206

MAPS

[SKETCH-MAP OF MANCHURIA], SHOWING MAIN PLACES
  ALONG RAILWAY SOUTH OF HARBIN		27
DIAGRAM SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE [THEATRE OF WAR]
  RELATIVELY TO RUSSIA AND JAPAN		34
SKETCH-MAP OF AREA CONTAINING THE BATTLE-FIELDS
  OF [LIAO-YANG, THE SHA HO, HEI-KOU-TAI, AND MUKDEN],
 SHOWING SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PLACES MENTIONED		At the end
MAP OF THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS
  [SOUTH OF MUKDEN]		At the end

THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE
JAPANESE WAR

CHAPTER IX
REASONS FOR OUR REVERSES (continued)

The insufficient tactical preparation of our troops—
Measures taken to improve it.

I have touched upon the fact of how our want of tactical training was shown up in the Crimean and second Turkish Wars. Especially conspicuous was the inability of our senior commanders—relying as they usually did upon quite inadequate information as to the enemy’s strength and dispositions—to co-ordinate the operations of the different arms towards one end, and their ignorance of where to deliver the main attack. The minor part played by our cavalry and our comparatively great power of defence were also remarked. Finally, attention was drawn to the fact that our lack of the power of manœuvre compelled us to place superior numbers in the field against the Turks, a course which had not formerly been necessary.

After the war of 1877–78 we set to work to study our weak points, in order to eliminate our faults. Much must have been accomplished since then, for the tactical training of the army at the beginning of the recent war was undoubtedly of a higher standard than it was twenty-five years ago. Still, in some matters we had not progressed, while in others we had actually gone back. The duty of training the troops rests with commanding officers of all ranks, and the responsibility for this extends right up to those in command of military districts. Although the same drill-books and manuals are used by the whole army, there is considerable variety in the way that the tactical instruction is imparted, owing to the diverse views held by the district commanders. I have taken part in many manœuvres, and was in command of the army at the grand manœuvres at Kursk in 1902, and I noted down what I considered to be our principal failings in this respect. In October, 1903, I submitted a report on the subject to the Tsar, in which my conclusions on certain points were as follows:

“1. Staff Work with the Main Army and with
Detached Columns at the Grand Manœuvres.

“Generally speaking, the staff work cannot be characterized as entirely satisfactory. The principal reasons for this were the somewhat unhappy selection of the officers appointed to be chiefs of the different staffs, the poor organization of the staffs themselves, due to a limited personnel and to an insufficient supply of the means of communication [telegraph and telephone equipment] for both the troops and staffs, and the neglect to arrange proper intercommunication between units by making use of mounted orderlies, automobiles, or cyclists. Intelligence of the enemy as well as of the disposition of other units was always received late by those whom it concerned, because the cavalry was badly organized, and could not carry out its orders properly.

“The amount of writing done by the various staff-officers was colossal. They worked the whole evening and all night; their effusions were lithographed or printed, and were sent off in all directions; but the orders were rarely received by the troops in proper time. At the manœuvres of the Warsaw Military District in 1899, cases came under my notice of general officers commanding divisions receiving the order to move in the morning two hours after the time appointed for them to start.

“In many instances staff-officers with troops seemed ignorant of how a reconnaissance should be carried out, and consequently did not gauge the dispositions of the enemy’s forces with sufficient accuracy. This reacted in turn on the dispositions made by the chief commanders, more particularly in their employment of the reserves (Kursk manœuvres and those at Pskoff and Vlodava). Similarly, they did not know how to arrange for the maintenance of touch along the front and to the rear, a defect which caused a delay in the receipt of orders and information which was quite avoidable.

“2. Work of the Cavalry at Manœuvres.

“The increased importance now attached to the strategic or independent duties of cavalry has, in my opinion, acted detrimentally upon the cavalry work with the troops. The spirit of the strategic rôle was in most cases not properly grasped, and the chief idea of the masses of mounted troops of both sides appeared to be to meet each other. They therefore neglected to furnish the commanders of their sides with the information of the enemy, so necessary before an action, and left the infantry without their co-operation during the actual combat; this was the same whether they were acting in attack or defence. Long-distance patrols often did useful work, but owing to the lack of proper means for the quick transmission of the information collected, it reached the troops to whom it might be useful after the enemy’s dispositions had been changed. The near patrols did not work in with the long-distance ones. Our mounted troops were frequently allowed to lose touch with the enemy at night under the pretext that the men and horses required rest, and the employment of a dozen troopers was grudged after dark, when by day whole divisions and corps were futilely marched and countermarched, and sent upon duties which were not always in accordance with the general idea of the operations.

“The cavalry work should be more strictly in co-operation with that of the other arms than it is at present, and all officers in command of mounted units should remember that their rôle is auxiliary, and largely consists in assisting the General in command to come to a proper decision by the completeness and accuracy of the information they send back; that the cavalry should help the commanders, firstly, to frame a plan of action, then to crush the enemy on the field of battle.

“3. Attack and the Defence.

“Here again information was wanting. When commanders made up their minds either to attack or to stand on the defensive, they were never able to feel, from their information of the enemy and the locality, that they thoroughly knew what they were doing, or that it really was in accordance with the spirit of the general idea. We were strong in the defence, but we rarely delivered a soundly conceived or executed attack. In the attack column commanders did not always take pains to obtain enough accurate information as to the dispositions and strength of the enemy, so as to be able to appreciate the situation properly and draw up a reasoned plan of battle, to select the direction of the main attack, to allot the troops for it, and take steps to deceive the enemy as to its precise direction. When they had massed sufficient first-line troops for the main attack, they did not also move up the reserves of all arms.

“In particular, we did not know how to conduct the advance, and then deliver the assault with proper preparation by artillery and rifle fire. Many commanders seem, unfortunately, to be wedded to the idea of carrying out a continuous advance without making any use of the rifle. If we ever encounter an enemy, such as the Germans, who systematically train their troops to advance under cover of their own heavy rifle-fire, we shall be worsted, for in peace we often advance almost without firing a rifle to a range of 1,000 or even 800 paces of the position.

“The guns also frequently ceased fire at the same critical period—i.e., when their attacking infantry are nearing the enemy. My inquiries as to the reason for this were usually met with the reply that their ammunition was expended. If the absolute necessity for keeping in hand a considerable number of rounds for the assistance of the decisive infantry attack is not realized now that we have quick-firing guns, our artillery will in war become useless at the very moment when its co-operation is most vital.

“In defence we are better than in the attack, and we know how to make the most of the fire effect of both guns and rifles. The ranges in front of a position are usually measured and clearly marked. But proper use is not made of reserves. We do not, as we should, throw them into the firing-line, so as to increase the volume of fire after the enemy’s main attack has developed, nor do we launch them in a fierce counter-attack after he has come within decisive range. The reserves are often kept in mass, and thrown against the attack without any supporting rifle-fire. Many regiments and brigades told off as reserves to a defensive position go through the whole manœuvres without firing a single round.

“4. The Revival of the Column Formation in the Attack.

“Other European armies are now doing everything possible to minimize the murderous effect of modern rifle and artillery fire on themselves, and are, at the same time, endeavouring to develop their own fire to the utmost, both in the attack and defence; indeed, the Germans, in their efforts to this end, have gone the extreme length of deploying all their troops—sometimes even to the sacrifice of their reserves—in long thin lines. We, on the other hand, judging by the last manœuvres, are going to the other extreme, for our decisive attack is delivered almost without any fire preparation, and with men massed in quarter column!

“If a stop is not put to the increasing density of our attack formations, we shall suffer for it heavily. It is all the more dangerous for us, as we do not assist our assaulting infantry properly with supporting gun and rifle fire.

“5. The Work of the Artillery.

“Artillery positions were in most cases skilfully chosen, but the fire discipline was often bad. As batteries can only carry a limited number of rounds in the field, it is vital that the gunners should be taught to economize every round; this is, of course, particularly important with quick-firing guns. But we often fired more rounds than were necessary: fire was opened too hurriedly, at quite unimportant targets, with the result that, at the critical moment of the attack, batteries had to signal that they were in action, for all their ammunition had been expended.[1]

“6. The Work of the Sappers.

“The bloody lessons of Plevna and Gora Dubniak put fresh life into our military engineering, which lasted for a certain time after the Turkish War. Our sappers became skilful at constructing trenches and redoubts, and the other troops were also trained in field-works, and began to like entrenching themselves. But a reaction soon set in. This was largely due to General Dragomiroff, who did much to bring about a return to the old order of things, when it was held that everything was decided by the bayonet. He was quite opposed to the use of cover, and carried his orders on this subject to the height of absurdity, even forbidding his men to lie down while advancing to attack!

“To dig oneself into the ground means labour, and takes much time. Moreover, instructions used to be issued that all trenches dug had to be filled in again, and all redoubts dismantled. This at once limited the scope of trench-work in the army. The entrenching tool, which after the Turkish War had been valued next to cartridges and biscuits, was relegated to the mobilization store, and never brought out for use or even for inspection. At many manœuvres the men were not practised at all in the fortification of positions; at others the alignment of trenches was traced only. While giving the sapper units full credit for their excellent training, I cannot but express my fear that they specialize far too much in a mass of detail, and ignore the fact that their main duty in war is to co-operate in every way with the infantry, both in strengthening defensive positions and in the attack of them.

“7. Criticism by Commanders.

“It is gradually becoming the custom to omit all criticisms[2] at grand manœuvres. Mistakes, therefore, pass unnoticed, are repeated, and tend to become chronic. I remember some very instructive manœuvre criticisms made by General Gurko, and I have listened with interest and advantage to others made by General Roop. Discussions after the operations are always held in the Kieff and St. Petersburg Military Districts, but nowadays some officers in command of districts neither make any remarks themselves when present at manœuvres, nor expect them to be made by the officers commanding sides or the other seniors. Orders issued after a long period—though they may enumerate the various points noticed—and the reports eventually printed of large concentrations and manœuvres, are comparatively useless for instruction. To be of use, criticisms must be made by the commanders, and made on the spot.

“It is, however, important to realize how rare the power of good criticism is. The remarks usually made are either quite colourless or too highly pitched. Some of our most capable general officers also seem peculiarly ‘unlucky’ in the way they manage unnecessarily to hurt the feelings of commanding officers by their harsh way of putting things. They forget that to lower the prestige of a senior in the presence of his juniors always produces a bitter harvest, especially in war. They forget the infinite variety of the conditions of different tactical situations, and that at peace manœuvres there is no need for one side to win or lose. Again, independent action, though certainly not wrong in itself, is often put down as a mistake and adjudged to be wrong because the senior commander has his own opinion in the matter. Such narrow-minded criticism deprives officers in command of units of the spirit of independence, of initiative, and of the desire for responsibility. Instead, they try to discover the fads of the officer in command, in order to ‘play up’ to them.

“8. Conclusion as to the Tactical Instruction of our Troops.

“Although the opinion of the generals in command of military districts in all matters pertaining to military training should, and do, carry great weight, yet there must be some limit to individual action. It is impossible, for instance, to permit each of them to train the troops in his command entirely in accordance with his own views as to what is most important in war; for the instruction of attack and defence should not be carried out on entirely different lines in the different districts. Yet this is more or less what has been done. We at headquarters are partly to blame, owing to the delay in the publication of the field-service manuals and the instructions for the combined training of all arms. As an example of what I refer to: General Dragomiroff has trained the troops under him in the Kieff Military District to attack according to a system of his own, of which the soundness is open to doubt. If some of his theories are carried out in war, they will result in heavy loss, and therefore their inculcation in peace seems entirely wrong. His order that the skirmishers escorting artillery should be on a line with the guns themselves would only cause the premature silencing of the latter; and another, that the lines of skirmishers advancing to attack should not lie down when halted, is simply impossible of execution. When bullets are flying, a line lies down of its own accord as soon as it halts, and quite rightly so, as men get cover more easily when lying than standing. And now, following General Dragomiroff’s example, in the Vilna Military District General Grippenberg has begun to act according to his own theories, and depart from the textbook. In his District Orders this year,[3] in which were published his criticisms on the work done at manœuvres, he recommends that infantry in close order should receive cavalry with independent fire[4] instead of with volleys. He insists, also, that when a line is advancing by short rushes, these rushes should begin from the flanks.

“Unfortunately, much that I saw when inspecting the troops in the different districts and on grand manœuvres led me to the conclusion that the tactical training, especially in command, of officers commanding units, from regiments upwards, is neither sound nor uniform.”

My strictures on the peace tactical training of the army were, unfortunately, only too well confirmed during the war.

The theatre of war in Manchuria presented many peculiarities of climate, topography, and inhabitants. It was unlike any of the “probable” theatres of operations we had studied, and was, therefore, quite new to the troops who came from European Russia. The Japanese were not only new and practically unknown foes, but the nature of the information that we did possess about them tended to show our great superiority, and therefore incited us to contempt. The existing edition of our “Field Service Regulations” was obsolete, and the revised edition was still in the Press. Special instructions, therefore, had to be issued, in order to assist our troops to grapple with the entirely strange conditions under which they were placed. These were compiled and printed under my direction, and distributed to officers in command of all units, from companies and squadrons upwards, and to all chief staff-officers. In them I emphasized the necessity of getting to know something about the enemy, enumerated their strong and weak points, and drew attention to their patriotism and traditional indifference to death. I stated that their strong points predominated, and that in the Japanese we should find a very powerful opponent, even when reckoned by European standards. I continued:

“It is most important that in the first engagements, in which they will certainly be in superior strength, we should not give the Japanese the satisfaction of victory, for that will only still further elevate their spirit.

“No particular or new tactics need be adopted against our present enemy, but we must not repeat the mistakes in manœuvring which cost us so dear in the Turkish War of 1877–78.”

I then mentioned the causes of our reverses at Plevna, and commented in detail on the most important. After capturing Nicopolis, our troops moved on Plevna in ignorance of the strength and dispositions of the enemy. As far as obtaining this information was concerned, our cavalry was not well handled. In the first fight at Plevna (July 20, 1877) we attacked with too few men and in detail. We did the same in the fights of July 31 and September 12, but to an even greater extent, and the attacks were carried out in too dense a formation, were not sufficiently prepared by fire-effect, and our own numerous cavalry and that of the Roumanians did practically nothing. The attacks on September 10 and 11, 1877, failed because our troops were badly distributed and untrained. I attached an appreciation of the work of our troops in the Turkish War as follows:

“In this war the staff work was not always successful. The troops often received orders too late, and time was wasted waiting for their receipt before commencing a move. Units arriving at night on the positions allotted to them did not always find the officers who should have been waiting their arrival to guide them. Officers in command of troops were often not informed by the staff as to the enemy’s strength and dispositions, or as to our own neighbouring columns. Lack of information was the principal cause of our disasters; we sometimes attacked in entire ignorance of the enemy’s strength and dispositions, and even partially so of our own.

“As an example of what our troops can do in an attack may be quoted the capture of Kars; it is a very instructive case. Though the weak field-works of Plevna resisted our efforts for five months, at Kars neither strong parapets nor deep ditches could check our onslaught. Our gallant Caucasians advanced on the fortress by night; they were well led, and always had a body of scouts skilfully thrown out in front, and they captured strongholds that had been termed ‘impregnable’ with great bravery.

“In the defence our troops have always fought well. Let us remember the defence of the Shipka Pass, and imitate it.”

After a short review of our errors in the Turkish War, I enumerated those which were still noticeable in our peace manœuvres.

As operations developed the enemy’s peculiarities became as well known as our own, so I was able in August, September, October, and December, 1904, to issue supplementary instructions.

Notwithstanding the number of our cavalry, and what our scouts had been able to do, we had not ascertained the general dispositions and strength of the enemy. The information brought in by spies was exaggerated and unreliable. The result was that, when we had carried out any offensive operations, we had advanced without knowing anything of the enemy. My instructions ran:

Instructions issued in August.

“In our attacks we have started the advance too rapidly, without strengthening positions already occupied, and without full artillery co-operation, and we have stopped the action at a period when we still had large numbers both in the general and regimental reserves. In retirements we have withdrawn to positions previously occupied by us without having taken steps to hold our ground on any of them, which preparation would not only have greatly assisted the retirement itself, but, what was far more important, would have enabled us to renew the attack.

“Another point is, that many of our defensive positions have not corresponded to the numbers, when extended, told off to defend them. Nevertheless, the enemy’s frontal attacks, even if we hold quite chance positions, usually fail, and we have been obliged to abandon our ground owing to the turning movements which their superior numbers have made possible.

“In attacking, especially among hills, the infantry must wait so that the assault may be prepared by fire, in order to get breath or to give time for the co-operation of a turning movement. There is also another and involuntary reason for halting—namely, the enemy’s fire. Owing to this, units halt, or, what is worse, begin to retire without orders; what then usually happens is this: A few men begin to trickle back from some company that has come under a particularly hot fire; they are followed by their own company, which is in turn followed by the companies on either side, even though the latter may perhaps be holding strong ground. Such a moment is, indeed, critical, and unless some brilliant officer appears who possesses the secret of rallying retreating men and succeeds in making the company hold its ground, the action is lost. But besides setting a personal example to the men, a commanding officer must at once push forward some of his reserves to stop the rot among those retreating. The most important thing at such a crisis is the example set by the officers or the steadiest men, particularly by Cavaliers of the Order of St. George.[5] A company commander’s example is everything to his company. Therefore, however deserving he may be in peace, a company commander who does not display personal gallantry in action should be instantly removed from his command.

“The most effective method of guarding against a sudden emergency either in attack or defence—and this is particularly true in hilly country—is to have in hand a strong reserve, and not to make use of it too lightly. This we have not done in recent actions; we have told off weak reserves, and used them up too quickly. Whole regiments have sometimes been sent in support where two companies or a battalion would have been ample.[6]

“In all kinds of operations officers in command must keep the forces on either flank, as well as their seniors, informed of everything that happens. We are, unfortunately, not accustomed to do this. Before an action the smallest details are reported, but as soon as an action begins we become so preoccupied with the fight that the most obvious duties are forgotten. Chief staff-officers of all grades will in future be held responsible for the frequent transmission of reports during an action.”

The special attention of commanding officers was also called to the necessity for providing their men with hot food during action, and to the excessive expenditure of ammunition in our fights.

Instructions issued during September.

The following were the main instructions given by me while preparing for an advance after the fighting in August:

“It is a regrettable fact that so far, whenever we have taken the offensive, we have met with reverse. Owing to our lack of information, to which I have already drawn attention, instead of delivering a confident attack according to a clearly-thought-out plan, we have acted in a half-hearted manner. We often deliver our main attack too soon, and regardless of the enemy’s intentions. Instances have occurred where we have detailed attacking columns as small as a battalion; in others we have operated without any definite plan of action. Finally, there have been cases where not enough determination has been shown in pressing forward to the objective.”

The importance of gaining even slight successes over the enemy’s advanced troops at the beginning of a forward movement, the fact that in the attack of positions turning movements should always be made in combination with frontal attacks, and the advantage of pushing on energetically when once an advance had commenced, were all points specially noted. The necessity of holding on determinedly to every yard of ground gained was accentuated, and leading units in a frontal attack were warned not to deliver the assault until the synchronous turning movement had been fully developed. Every use was to be made of fire-effect of every sort. I wrote:

“A glaring case of that lack of co-operation from which we suffer so much was the fight of September 2,[7] when the left column began the action far too soon, and therefore finished by retiring in disorder. This had the worst results on the success of the whole operation.

“I must again remind all ranks of the great necessity for economizing ammunition, especially gun ammunition. At Liao-yang we used up in two days our special artillery reserve of more than 100,000 rounds. The conveyance of gun ammunition to the front is very difficult, and batteries which have expended theirs become mere dead-weight to the army.”

GENERAL LINIEVITCH.

The peculiarities attendant on operations in a country covered with such crops as kao-liang were also reviewed in detail:

“Any men leaving the ranks in action under pretext of accompanying or carrying away wounded men will be severely punished.

“Companies and squadrons must be as strong as possible for an attack. To this end the most strict precautions must be taken to limit the number of men employed on extraneous duties and for transport work. The Cossacks are not to be employed as orderlies and escorts by the officers under whom they may be temporarily serving. Sound horses in possession of sick Cossacks should be taken from them, and made over to those who are horseless, but fit for duty.

“It is to be regretted—and I have more than once commented on it—that commanding officers do not pay proper attention to the order that the soldier’s emergency biscuit ration, carried on the person, should remain untouched. This reserve ration is constantly being eaten, and no steps are taken immediately to replace it. Many commanding officers calmly allow the whole of the men’s portable reserve to be consumed under the pleasing conviction that it is the duty of someone else to bring up fresh supplies to the regimental commissariat.

“The above instructions only touch on a few details of field-work. The main guide for action is the ‘Field Service Regulations,’ but these cannot, of course, meet every case which may arise in the entirely new circumstances under which we are now operating. I expect commanding officers of all ranks, therefore, to show greater initiative in the performance of their duties.”

My instructions issued in October included remarks on our offensive operations during the end of September. Amongst other things, I said:

“I still notice faults in the method of conducting attacks. Thick lines of skirmishers are too closely followed by the supports and reserves. The formations have generally been ill adapted to the ground, and have been such as to form an excellent target. If this close-order formation had been assumed in these cases just before a bayonet charge, then, despite the heavy sacrifices entailed, there would have been some point in it, because of the additional force and impetus given to the assault; but it was adopted when the attack was still at long range, and so caused useless and heavy loss. We should in such cases imitate the Japanese, and do what we used to in the Caucasus—make every use of cover. Every effort must be made to reconnoitre well, in order that advantage may be taken of every fold of the ground, and of every stick and stone, and the attack may be enabled to advance as close as possible to the enemy with the least possible loss. The way to do this is for individual men, or groups of men, to advance by short rushes till the attacking units are able to collect. On open ground, if the attacking infantry has to wait for the artillery preparation, it should entrench itself as rapidly as possible.

“In retreating, the movement to the rear of large masses together afforded the enemy a splendid target, for which we suffered. Again, to avoid unnecessary loss in retirement, portions of a position have often been stubbornly held until a withdrawal could be effected under cover of darkness. If the portion of ground on either side happens to have been already abandoned, and the Japanese are sufficiently mobile to make use of it, such isolated defence of any one section of a position might cost very dear. We must learn how to retire by day—by the same methods as laid down above for the attack (by rushes), and avoid close formations in doing it.

“I and other senior officers have noticed during an action hundreds and thousands of unwounded men leaving the ranks, carrying wounded to the rear. In the fights of October 12 to 15[8] I personally saw wounded men being carried to the rear by as many as nine others. This abuse must be put down with the utmost rigour, and until an action is over only the stretcher-bearers should take wounded to the rear.

“The Japanese are fortifying the positions along our front, converting villages, knolls, and hill-tops into strong, defensible points, and strengthening their positions with obstacles. These positions should be carefully studied, their strong points noted, and in every section of our line a plan of possible operations against the corresponding portions of the enemy’s position should be made. The early organization of the artillery preparation of any attack on these selected points is important.

“Detachments of sappers and scouts should be sent ahead of the assault to destroy the obstacles round fortified villages, which should be well shelled. Till the assault is made the advance should be under cover, and if the leading troops find they are not strong enough to capture the point on which they have been directed, they must hold on to a point as near to the enemy as possible, in order to press forward again when reinforced.”

Finally, in my instructions issued in December, 1904, I recapitulated the most important points brought out by our recent experiences, such as—

“1. The necessity, in order to avoid loss, for our attack formations to be better adapted to the ground.

“2. Economy in artillery ammunition.

“3. The more intelligent employment of rifle-fire, and the necessity for volley-firing at night.

“4. The great value of night operations.

“5. Proper communication between all senior commanders.

“6. The necessity for the mutual co-operation of all arms, and the maintenance of touch in battle.

“The surest road to success is the determination to continue fighting, even when the last reserve has been exhausted, for the enemy may be in the same, if not in worse plight, and what is not possible in daylight may be accomplished at night. Unfortunately, in recent fights, some commanders even of large forces have confessed themselves unable to carry out the operation entrusted to them, at a moment when they still had in hand big reserves which had not fired a shot.”

Of course, as soon as our disasters began, the papers started to accuse our troops of insufficient training, and they were not far wrong. In the first place, most of the men were reservists who had forgotten a great deal. In the second, this war was our first experience of smokeless powder, of quick-firing artillery, of machine-guns, and of all the recent developments in means of destruction, and much was strange and unexpected. Our preconceived notions were upset, and we were baffled by the deadly nature of indirect artillery-fire, by the new attack formations—when advancing infantry is rarely visible, and one man at a time crawls up almost unseen, taking advantage of every inch of cover. Our troops had been instructed, but what they had learned varied according to the personal idiosyncrasies of this or that district commander. The stronger the officer commanding a district, the less did he feel bound to abide by the authorized method of instruction and training laid down in the existing drill-books. General Grippenberg was no exception to this. In spite of the regulation as to the use of volleys for repulsing night attacks; in spite of war experience which in every way confirmed the necessity and value of volley-firing; in spite of the Commander-in-Chief’s instructions on this point, he made up his mind some days before a battle to re-teach the force under his command. He ordered the employment of independent fire at night. His “Instructions for the Operations of Infantry in Battle” [signed by him on January 4, 1905], printed and issued to the troops, aroused consternation and amusement throughout the army. In this book it was actually laid down that volleys were only to be resorted to if the enemy suddenly appeared at close quarters, and that immediately after a volley a bayonet attack should be made. While condemning the method in which our troops operated at the Ya-lu, he, in the above “Instructions,” gives a recipe for action whereby two of our battalions might destroy a Japanese division. After a summary of the amount of small-arm ammunition expended, he said:

“If our two battalions had been deployed and had opened rapid independent fire, the Japanese division would have been destroyed, and we should have won the day.”

Such a simple matter did General Grippenberg consider the annihilation of a Japanese division! But a few days later, when he moved against the Hei-kou-tai position with a strong force of 120 battalions, his own prescription proved to be valueless. In the first few days, when he was opposed by not more than two divisions, he was unable to take San-de-pu, got his troops into confusion, gave the enemy time to bring up strong reinforcements, and retired—to St. Petersburg.

As to the attack formation adopted by the troops arriving from Russia, the 41st Division had in particular been taught to work in very close formation, and not taught to make use of the ground. It came from the Vilna district, which was commanded before the war by General Grippenberg. Our gunners also arrived at the front with only one idea of artillery tactics—to place their batteries in the open and make use of direct fire. For this we paid dearly in our very first fight.

CHAPTER X
REASONS FOR OUR REVERSES (conclusion)

Particular difficulties of the strategic situation—Defects in organization and personnel—Absence of a military spirit in the army, and lack of determination in carrying operations to a finish—Breakdown of our organization under the strain of active service.

It is the duty of every Headquarter Staff to work out all possibilities, and, regardless of existing international relations, to provide for war in every probable quarter. Accordingly, our general line of operation in case of war with Japan had been duly drawn up in conjunction with the staffs of the Pri-Amur and Kuan-tung districts, and had been approved. The following is an extract from the paper dealing with the subject:

“Taking advantage of her military position—for she will be more ready for war than we are, and will therefore possess in the first period of the campaign a great numerical superiority both by sea and land—Japan can afford to define her objectives only generally. She may (1) confine her attention to the occupation of Korea, and not take the offensive against us (which will most probably be the case); or (2) occupy Korea and also assume the offensive—

“Should Japan decide on the first alternative, then, taking into consideration the number of reinforcements we shall need, and the adverse conditions under which they will have to be conveyed to the front, we shall be forced at first to allow her to seize Korea—without retaliative action on our part, if only she will confine herself to occupying that country, and not develop plans against Manchuria and our territory. Should she choose the second alternative, we should be obliged to fight, and ought at once to make up our minds not to end the war until we have utterly destroyed her army and fleet. In view, however, of her numerical superiority and greater readiness during the first period of the struggle, we shall have to assume a generally defensive rôle. Any troops we may have within the theatre of operations should as far as possible keep clear of decisive actions, in order to avoid being defeated in detail before we can concentrate in force.

“The numerical superiority of the Japanese fleet will probably prevent our squadron from any major active operations, and it will have to confine its action to the comparatively modest task of delaying the enemy’s landing as much as possible. The defence of our own possessions should be carried out by the forces in the Southern Ussuri and the Kuan-tung districts, which are formed for that particular object, and based on the fortresses of Vladivostok and Port Arthur. All the remaining troops, except those allotted to the line of communications and to maintain order in Manchuria, should be concentrated in the area Mukden-Liao-yang-Hsiu-yen. As the Japanese advance, these troops, while delaying them as much as possible, will gradually be compelled to retire on Harbin. If it becomes evident in the first period of the campaign that the whole Japanese effort is being directed against us in Manchuria, then the force which would be concentrated first of all in the Southern Ussuri district (1st Siberian Corps) would be transferred there.”

Sketch Map of MANCHURIA

The two years succeeding the date on which this paper was written saw great alterations in the strength, dispositions, and readiness of our military and naval forces in the Far East. There was also considerable change in the political conditions in Manchuria and in Northern Korea in consequence of the active policy which we had begun to assume. It was therefore found necessary in 1903 to consider a revision of the above scheme in accordance with these altered conditions. During those two years our strength in the Far East had grown by the increase in our land forces and fleet, and the improved efficiency of the railways. We have already seen what was done to improve the latter. It will suffice to say here that, instead of the twenty waggons available over the whole Chinese line in 1901, the War Department in 1903 received seventy-five in the twenty-four hours, and hoped, on the strength of promises made, to have five through military trains by the beginning of 1904. The fleet, which in 1901 was considered inferior to the Japanese, was, at the end of 1903, stated, on the authority of the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeieff, to be so strong that any possibility of its defeat by the Japanese was inadmissible. But in those same two years Japan had not been idle, and had been unceasingly increasing her naval and military forces. In consequence of this the relative local strengths of the two nations were still much the same in 1903 as they had been in 1901, and it was thought prudent to adhere to the same general plan of operations as had been drawn up and approved two years previously. To give an official opinion of that time, I quote an extract from a memorandum I submitted to the Tsar on August 6, 1903:

“In the report which will be sent in from the Headquarter Staff, the conclusion arrived at after a careful appreciation of the resources of both nations is the same as that reached two years ago—namely, that in the event of war with Japan, we should act on the defensive; that the concentration and general distribution of our troops should remain the same; that although we may move troops on to the line Mukden-Liao-yang-Hsiu-yen, we cannot hold our ground in Southern Manchuria in the first period of the war if that region be invaded by the whole Japanese army. We should therefore still count upon Port Arthur being cut off for a considerable period, and in order to avoid defeat in detail, should withdraw towards Harbin until reinforcements from Russia enable us to assume the offensive. But I may add that, while accepting the same plan of operations as we did two years ago, we can now have far greater confidence in the issue of a struggle. Our fleet is stronger than the Japanese, and as reinforcements will arrive now more quickly than they could have formerly, it will take less time for us to be in a position to advance.”

In a memorandum by the Chief of the Headquarter Staff, submitted to me on February 12, 1904—i.e., a few days after the enemy had attacked our fleet at Port Arthur—General Sakharoff described the Japanese intentions as follows:

“The Japanese plan appears to be—

“1. To inflict a crushing blow upon our fleet so as to paralyze its activity once and for all, and thus guarantee freedom of movement to their transports. To attain this end they have not hesitated to attack us before the declaration of war (vide the night operations of February 8 and 9). The transfer to them by the British of Wei-hai-wei also has given them an advantageous naval base right on the flank of any operations undertaken by our squadron.

“2. To capture Port Arthur in order to attain the same object—the destruction of our fleet.

“3. To advance on and capture Harbin, so as to isolate the Pri-Amur district from the rest of Russia, and to destroy the railway.”

Our hopes as to the promised improvement of the railway were unfortunately not realized, while our fleet, damaged by the enemy’s onslaught before the declaration of war, was not only weaker than the enemy’s, but failed even to perform the modest task expected of it in 1901. Consequently the concentration of our troops was a far slower business than we thought it would be, while the Japanese, having gained command of the sea, threw the whole of their army on to the continent. Thus, gaining the initiative on land as well as on the sea, and fired as they were with immense patriotism, the enemy commenced the war superior to us morally as well as materially. However, though the task before us was one of extreme difficulty, our resources were immensely superior to the enemy’s, and the moment when we should become completely ready for the struggle was only postponed. Notwithstanding the unfavourable conditions under which we started, after fifteen months’ fighting we were holding the Hsi-ping-kai positions, and, although we had not actually assumed the offensive, we had by no means retired as far as Harbin, which had been accepted as a possibility in the original scheme. If we had only possessed the determination necessary to carry this scheme right through, we ought not to have ended the war until we had utterly defeated the enemy. Therefore, whatever we did accomplish can only be looked upon as preparatory to the decisive struggle. One of the assumptions of our original scheme of operations was that, if a strong Japanese force invaded Southern Manchuria, we should not be able, in the first period of the war, to hold it. In the event the whole Japanese army invaded that area, but the opposition shown by our troops at Liao-yang, on the Sha Ho, and at Mukden, was so effectual that, though the enemy gained possession of the greater portion of Southern Manchuria, they did not reassume the offensive against us for six months. The difficulties which the Japanese surmounted in advancing from Ta-shih-chiao to Tieh-ling cannot be compared to those which would have faced them, in the three defensive lines which we had constructed on the way to Harbin,[9] had they attempted to drive us to that place. I reiterate what I have so often said in the preceding chapters: though the war was brought to an end, the army was not beaten. Of the great force which lay ready on the Hsi-ping-kai position in August, 1905, one-half had never been under fire. Further on I will explain how it was that we never acquired the material and moral superiority necessary to defeat the enemy during the fifteen months that the war did last.

In the diary I kept when in Japan[10] I drew a diagram, with explanatory notes, to illustrate the Japanese question and show the possibility of our being able to defend our interests in Manchuria and Korea by force. I reproduce the diagram[11] and the notes in extenso:

“This diagram shows Japan’s comparatively favourable situation with regard to the theatre of operations. Her base—indeed, her whole country—is only about 600 miles by sea from our shores, and 135 from Korea.

“Our territory in Asia is so vast and so thinly populated that we shall be compelled to make European Russia, which is 3,400 to 6,000 miles distant, our base. For a protracted war with Japan it is evident that the single-line Siberian Railway will not suffice; we shall be obliged to lay a second track, and to increase the number of trains in the twenty-four hours. Also, as it runs for a considerable distance along the Chinese frontier and through Chinese territory, it cannot be relied on in the event of war with both China and Japan together.”

We were glued to the railway, and could not move away without risk of being left without supplies. Our field artillery and heavy four-wheeled transport carts were unable to travel over most of the hill roads. The summer rains made the movements of the army, with its heavy baggage trains and parks, extremely difficult; teams of twenty horses were harnessed to guns, and even empty carts had to be man-handled.

DIAGRAM SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE THEATRE OF WAR
RELATIVELY TO RUSSIA AND JAPAN.

But of all our difficulties, the complete command of the sea obtained by the Japanese right at the beginning of the war caused the greatest. With their three armies they cut off Port Arthur, and began an advance from an enveloping base against our army, which was still tied to a railway-line. Our southward advance for the relief of Port Arthur was threatened by Kuroki’s army based on Korea. Any movement against him was out of the question, especially for those corps which had arrived from Russia, as they were quite unused to hilly country. Our communications through Manchuria were only weakly defended, and might be cut at any moment by the Chinese, while those further west were liable to interruption (bridges destroyed, strikes, frost, etc.). The feeding of the army depended on local resources, which a hostile population could easily conceal, carry away, or even destroy; and as the amount of supplies obtained from Russia was extremely small and uncertain, the army might very easily have been starved. The chance actions at the Ya-lu and Te-li-ssu, in which our most reliable troops were worsted, still further improved the enemy’s moral, and lowered ours.

With the absence of a proper military spirit among our troops, and the evil influence of the many seditious manifestoes against the war circulating amongst them; with the unsteadiness shown by many units in the first fights, and with all the other defects above mentioned, a great numerical superiority was necessary—I must speak perfectly plainly—in order to defeat an enemy worked up to a pitch of fanatical excitement. But we did not obtain this superiority until it was too late—when we were waiting on the Hsi-ping-kai position, and negotiations for peace were being carried on at Portsmouth. Up to December we were fighting with what seemed a fairly large force, according to a tally of battalions; but these were greatly under strength, for in the most important early period of the war—from May to October inclusive—we lost very many men, and received but few drafts. In many cases the Japanese battalions were twice as strong as ours. While all our actions were hampered by insufficient information regarding the enemy, the intelligence we received as to what was happening in our rear—in Mongolia and in the Manchurian provinces—was so alarming as to compel us to detach a large force to protect our communications. Again, when the enemy became complete masters of the sea, we had to detail sufficient troops to guard against a landing in the Vladivostok and the Ussuri districts. All these things combined to complicate our position and give the enemy the initiative at the start, and right manfully did their whole nation strive to seize their advantage. Their land communications were safe; their sea communication with their base was quick and sure. We, on the contrary, could only put in the field a fraction of our land forces, and, till we could concentrate sufficient men for an offensive, were tied down to a definite course of action. We had—

1. To make certain of and protect the concentration of the reinforcements which were arriving, so as not to allow them to be destroyed as they came up.

2. To take steps to relieve Port Arthur.

3. To maintain order in our rear, and to guard the railway.

4. To feed the army—mainly on local supplies.

5. To guard the Ussuri district.

Had the Japanese got possession of our communications, a catastrophe unprecedented in military history might have resulted. Without any victory in the field, the mere destruction of the railway in our rear, combined with the cutting off of local resources, would have threatened us with starvation—and disaster. Such were the unfavourable conditions under which we fought for fifteen months, and our army was not only not completely defeated, but grew in strength, while our communication with Russia gradually became better secured and more efficient. We had always recognized the possibility of being driven back to Harbin and beyond; but this never happened, and we held on to Hsi-ping-kai. The situation could only have been improved in one way—by a rapid concentration of sufficient troops for, and an assumption of, an offensive all along the line. While these troops were collecting, each fight—quite independent of its actual result—would have really helped us if it had at all weakened the enemy. But our departure from our accepted plan of operations began at the commencement of the war, when, instead of fighting a rearguard action, General Zasulitch got seriously engaged against the whole of Kuroki’s army at the Ya-lu, and was defeated.

In May, when the 3rd Siberian Division[12] had alone arrived at Liao-yang (besides the troops of the Pri-Amur Military District), the Viceroy, fearing for the fate of Port Arthur, instructed me to assume the offensive towards the Ya-lu against Kuroki’s army, or southwards for the relief of the fortress of Port Arthur. But the inadequate force with which General Shtakelberg pushed forward, owing to ignorance of the fact that the Japanese were in superior strength, got drawn into a serious engagement at Te-li-ssu, and was defeated. With the arrival of all the units of the 4th Siberian Corps and one division of the 10th Army Corps, it seemed possible to contain Kuroki’s army, to concentrate fifty to sixty battalions rapidly in the direction of Ta-shih-chiao, and to attempt to hurl back Oku to the south. It seemed as if our army had a splendid chance of operating on interior lines. The enemy was strung along three lines of advance—Dalny, Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao (Oku); Ta-ku-shan, Hsiu-yen, Ta-ling, Hai-cheng (Nodzu); Ya-lu, Feng-huang-cheng, Fen-shui-ling, Liao-yang (Kuroki). We occupied the central position—Liao-yang, Hai-cheng, Ta-shih-chiao—with advance guards thrown forward on to the Fen-shui-ling heights. We might have been able, by containing two armies and deceiving the enemy by a demonstration, to strike the third army in force. A blow delivered at Kuroki or Nodzu did not promise success, owing to our lack of training in, and unpreparedness for, hill warfare [we had no mountain artillery, our baggage was heavy, and we were uncertain of receiving supplies, owing to the insufficiency of transport material]. The only other course was to strike at Oku, who was based on the railway, but such an operation was risky, because Kuroki and Nodzu might have driven back our screens and fallen on our communications. On June 26 and 27, when only one brigade of the 31st Division of the 10th Army Corps[13] had arrived at Liao-yang, the Japanese on the eastern front (Kuroki and Nodzu) themselves took the offensive and seized the passes (Fen-shui Ling, Mo-du Ling, Da Ling) on the Fen-shui-ling heights. We opposed them in insufficient strength, and did not even make them disclose their numbers. The troops of the eastern force withdrew towards Tkhavuop, and General Levestam’s force to Hsi-mu-cheng. Our screens were thus situated as follows: on Kuroki’s line of advance, only two marches from Hai-cheng; on Oku’s line of advance at Ta-shih-chiao, four marches from Liao-yang.[14] Our position was critical, particularly if the information we had received as to the Japanese collecting in considerable force to operate against Hai-cheng was confirmed. Still, if we were able to strike a rapid blow at Oku, we might rob the enemy of the initiative, and after forcing back Oku’s army, have fallen on Nodzu. After we had driven back these troops, Kuroki’s position would have been so far forward and so far separated from the other groups that the danger of his breaking through to Liao-yang would have been minimized. But for such decisive operations the first requisite was the concentration of sufficient troops for offensive operations against Oku.

GENERAL BARON KITEN NOGI.

At the end of June we had altogether available against the three Japanese armies 120 battalions, and were inferior to the enemy both in the number of battalions and the number of men. Our position was made worse by an epidemic of dysentery which broke out amongst the troops at Ta-shih-chiao, and swept off a considerable number of men. The Krasnoyarsk Regiment[15] was the greatest sufferer, having as many as 1,500 men down with the disease at the end of the month. But the main thing which delayed any advance on our part was the rain, which made all moves difficult, and some places absolutely impassable for transport. It was even difficult to convey supplies to our various stationary forces over distances of less than a march. In spite of the lack of pack-saddles, wheeled transport had to be given up for pack transport, and not even pack-animals could do more than seven to eleven miles in the twenty-four hours. On the Liao-yang–Lang-tzu-shan road things were still worse, for the bridges over the mountain streams had been carried away, and communication between the eastern force (3rd Siberian Corps, under Count Keller) and Liao-yang was interrupted for some time. Far, therefore, from being ready to advance, the officers commanding the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps found the greatest difficulty in rationing their troops, and on June 29 asked that they might be withdrawn towards the positions near the railway at Ta-shih-chiao, and that the country east of the line might be left to the cavalry, with a few infantry units in support.[16]

General Count Keller was persistent in his demands that communication should be maintained between his force and Liao-yang, but we had neither the material, the means, nor the time to comply with his wishes, which would have meant the laying of a light railway and the strengthening of the road bridges. As I feared that the Japanese might make a fresh forward movement on Hai-cheng, I ordered thirty-nine battalions to concentrate near Hsi-mu-cheng on June 29. The short march from Hai-cheng was accomplished on the 28th with great difficulty through a sea of mud, and on the 29th Hsi-mu-cheng was temporarily cut off by the mountain streams in flood. The feeding of the troops collected there was found to be so difficult that as soon as it was known that the enemy, instead of advancing, had retired towards the Fen-shui Ling (Pass), certain units were ordered to return to the railway. Taking advantage, on July 18, of the screen formed by a portion of the 17th Army Corps, we attempted to advance against part of Kuroki’s army in the hope of forcing our way forward and gaining a partial success. For this Count Keller had under his command forty-three battalions, but the attempt failed. He stopped the action before any large number of our troops had become engaged. On the 29th Oku’s army took the offensive; we had to evacuate Ta-shih-chiao and Newchuang after a feeble resistance, and allowed Oku and Nodzu to join hands. When on July 23 I inspected  the units of the 10th Army Corps, who were holding the position near Hu-chia-tzu, I found out how absolutely incapable of operating in hilly country the troops newly arrived from Russia were. Before sending them forward, it was necessary to train them in hill fighting, and to provide them with pack transport. On July 31 all three Japanese armies advanced, and we concentrated after a series of battles round Liao-yang. Here, in spite of our resistance, the three armies were able to join hands. Their attacks on the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho were repulsed, but owing to the unfortunate nature of our operations on the right bank, the conditions became so unfavourable to us that I was obliged to order a retirement to Mukden. The withdrawal was conducted without the loss of a single gun or transport cart, while the enemy lost in men more heavily than we did. In the detailed accounts I have given in the first three volumes of the operations at Liao-yang, on the Sha Ho and at Mukden, our difficulties and the causes of our defeats are explained. The course of events showed that our original scheme of operations was quite a correct forecast, for in it the probable necessity of retiring towards Harbin had been foreseen. Indeed, matters at Liao-yang, on the Sha Ho, and especially at Mukden, might have been very much worse for us than they were, and might have necessitated our retirement on Harbin early in October, 1904, when, as a matter of fact, we remained in Southern Manchuria.

Clausewitz has truly laid down that an army should be inseparably connected with its base, but our base was Russia, more than 5,000 miles away. The way that this one difficulty alone was overcome will perhaps be eventually appreciated at its true worth. The very complicated attendant circumstances demanded great and patient efforts on the part of the whole nation in order to turn them to our advantage. Our reverses were explicable, and even in our defeat we exhausted our enemy, while ourselves increasing in strength. It was inevitable that a different complexion would have been put on the face of things as soon as circumstances became more favourable to us.