Reserve (or Depôt) Troops.
The reserve or depôt troops should be developed and given an organization which will permit of the wastage in units, both in officers and men, being made good from them immediately after a battle or during a long series of battles. Each infantry regiment should have its reserve (depôt) battalion, which should be formed on mobilization at a strength of 40 per cent. of the combatant establishment of a regiment—i.e., at 1,600 men.[42] Of these, 400, or 10 per cent. of the regiment’s strength, should be in the theatre of war. This number should be formed into one company, and should constitute the reserve depôt company of its particular regiment, and be continually feeding it. With every division these companies should be organized together into a reserve battalion of 1,600 men for the immediate replacement of casualties in the regiments of the division. All wounded and sick who are not sent to the base should be attached to this battalion till they are passed as fit. After great battles this reserve would be depleted, and would require filling up from the base depôt. The establishment of the other arms should be kept up to strength by a parallel arrangement. The casualties amongst non-combatants are less, but in their case a reserve is necessary, distinct from the combatant reserve, to make good their wastage. It should be mainly composed of 2nd Category reservists and those of the convalescent combatants not considered fit enough for the ranks.
The war shows very clearly the immense importance of rapidly repairing the wastage in units directly after an action. The Japanese succeeded in doing this, with the result that they were greatly superior to us in numbers. It was more important for us to be able to replace casualties by drafts than to receive reinforcements, and it would have made us stronger. For instance, with five troop trains available in the twenty-four hours, a complete army corps with its baggage and parks took twenty days to reach the front, and increased our strength by some 25,000 rifles. If drafts had been sent up during those twenty-days instead of an army corps, we should have received 90,000 to 100,000 men. In place of cavalry, baggage, artillery, parks, and a small number of infantry, we should have got a large number of the latter. It was infantry we wanted, for in our big battles it was the infantry that suffered so heavily. The number of guns per 1,000 rifles was too large, and the amount of transport and baggage was prodigious, with the result that the 10,000 to 12,000 rifles left in corps resembled an escort to the artillery, parks, baggage, etc.,[43] more than anything else.