The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2) / Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East

by A. N. Kuropatkin

Second Phase.

The first report of large bodies of Japanese infantry appearing near Ka-liao-ma, on the left bank of the Liao, was received on February 28. News came in also of the enemy moving along the right bank, and of the appearance of their columns at Hsin-min-tun. It was essential to take immediate steps to meet them on the way to Mukden in their turning movement. I thought it was possible, by using the positions of the 3rd Army as a pivot of manœuvre, and withdrawing its right flank on to the line Ling-shen-pu–Shua-lin-tzu–Lan-shan-pu, to leave[90] for the defence of the section between the 3rd Army and the Hun Ho, and of that on the right bank, a total of forty-eight battalions, and to transfer on to the right bank the remainder of the 2nd Army (forty-eight battalions), and, after reinforcing them with twenty-four battalions of the 16th Corps and thirty-two battalions collected from the 3rd and 1st Armies, to detail them for operations against Nogi. The command of the troops collected on the right bank of the Hun was entrusted to Kaulbars, and I pointed out to him several times the particular importance of rapid and energetic action against the turning movement which threatened Mukden and our communications.

The first units sent from the main reserve at Mukden to the west were:

1. Towards Kao-li-tun, on the river, to operate against the wide turning movement along the River Liao, a brigade of the 41st Division under Birger.

2. To Sha-ling-pu, the 25th Division, under General Topornin, commanding the 16th Corps.

3. Simultaneously the 2nd Brigades of the 9th and 31st Divisions were concentrated under the command of Topornin, south of the 25th Division, on March 2.

The successive arrangements made by Kaulbars, in view of the enemy’s advance—already commenced on the right of the 2nd Army; the abandonment of Ssu-fang-tai; the withdrawal of troops from the right bank; the relief of corps that had been engaged, and the retention of troops which had already started towards Mukden, not only disclosed to the Japanese the possibility of free movement along the right bank of the river, but delayed the arrival on the western front of reinforcements from the 2nd Army. General Topornin therefore received no support either on March 2 or 3; still, he successfully continued on March 3 the attack commenced the day before on the village of Sha-ling-pu. However, in view of the turning movement that had now become quite clear against our right flank, Kaulbars ordered a retirement—though the enemy were in no way pressing us—to the western Mukden fortifications. The troops took up a line fronting on Ma-tuan-tzu–Wu-kuan-tun, and, in spite of the orders given, did not occupy either the old railway embankment or the fortified position west of Lin-min-shan-tzu. This direct withdrawal towards Mukden placed our troops in a very disadvantageous position, and enabled the enemy both to continue their turning movement, and make it wider and more dangerous. Immediately after our retirement from Sha-ling-pu, they moved forward quickly and enveloped our western front, and, moving on March 3 across on to the main Hsin-min-tun road, began to threaten Mukden from the north. Birger’s brigade, which had now returned from Kao-li-tun, fell back on Hu-shih-tai station.

The protection of Mukden on the west and north was placed under Kaulbars, and was undertaken by units joining the general reserve.

1. The composite divisions of three regiments of the 17th Corps under De Witte took up the fortified position at Khou-kha[91] on the morning of March 3.

2. A force of seven battalions under Colonel Zapolski was sent to Hu-shih-tai station.

3. The 10th Rifle Regiment was concentrated at siding No. 97.

4. Eighteen battalions of the 1st Siberians came up as a reserve to these on March 3.

The concentration which I had ordered of the units of the 2nd Army on the right bank of the Hun was taking place extremely slowly. Indeed, some regiments which had already assembled had been sent back to the left bank. When I reached Mukden on the 3rd, I impressed on Kaulbars the necessity of not losing any time, and told him to attack the following day, but gave him a free hand as to the direction of attack. He did not carry out the order, owing to the concentration of his army on the right bank not having been completed. Meanwhile, in the early hours of March 4, the important hamlet of Ssu-hu-chia-pu was evacuated by the 2nd Army, and at the same time Ivanoff withdrew the 15th Division from the position behind the Hun and the right flank of the 3rd Army, which he had been told to defend, without fighting. The latter thus became exposed. A brigade of the 5th Siberians and nine sotnias of cavalry, which had remained on the right bank near Tung-chen-tzu, were moved across to the left.

During March 4, which was thus lost to us for offensive operations, Nogi continued his turning movement, which was now becoming enveloping and dangerous. Accordingly, after discussing the matter with Kaulbars, I ordered him on the 5th to concentrate sufficient troops for the purpose, and to attack the enemy’s left, and I again emphasized the fact that our main chance of success lay in the rapidity and energy with which he struck. In an order of the 2nd Army of March 5, a force of forty-nine battalions was organized to make the attack under the command of Gerngross. Here again the concentration was too slow, and the right column only moved out from the line Sha-ho-tzu–Khou-kha about 2 p.m. Its right flank might have been strengthened by a brigade of the 41st Division with Zapolski’s column, and the left flank by sixteen battalions of the 25th Division. We therefore might have contained the enemy on the Yang-hsin-tun–Hsiao-sha-ho-tzu line with a force under Tserpitski, and have attacked with a mass of seventy-seven battalions.

Kaulbars, alarmed at Tserpitski’s exaggerated reports as to the nature of the attacks made on his left by some three divisions, moved a brigade from Gerngross’s force behind the left flank, sent another on to the left bank of the river, and stopped Gerngross’s attack till such time as the result of Tserpitski’s action should be known. The net result of these proceedings, of the late commencement of the operations, and of their half-hearted nature, was that, although we met with no opposition, on the 5th we moved our right only on to the line Pao-ta-tun–Fang-hsin-tun–San-chia-fen; and so another day was lost. In accordance with my orders for energetic action, the advance of the right was continued on the 6th, but it was carried out with less men than on the previous day (thirty-three battalions), without energy or cohesion, and met with determined opposition at the village of Liu-chia-kan. Then, before the whole of Gerngross’s force had become engaged, Kaulbars stopped the advance, and gave orders to take up the defensive. That day we got possession only of Tsuang-fang-chih. In short, notwithstanding the great strength of the 2nd Army, with its reinforcements of more than fifty battalions, on March 4, 5, and 6—the three most important days—we moved our right only a few miles forward, and took to defensive measures even on the western front.

Owing to the ill success of the operations of the 2nd Army on March 5, I issued orders to all the armies to send back their divisional baggage along their respective lines of communication towards the north of Mukden. On the 5th the Japanese began a series of attacks on our northern and western fronts. On the left flank of our west front they were everywhere repulsed by Tserpitski and Hershelman, whose forces amounted to forty-nine battalions. In the centre of the western front they won a partial success, on March 7 compelling units of the 25th Division to retire temporarily from Wu-kuan-tun. But on the northern front, which was the most dangerous for us, they won great successes, on the 7th and 8th getting possession of several villages. From there they repeatedly attacked our northern force of twenty-five battalions under Launits, which was holding the line Ta-heng-tun–San-tai-tzu–Kung-chia-tun. At the same time their columns moved still farther to the north, and threatened Hu-shih-tai station. To protect this, I despatched a force of six battalions of the 4th Siberians to Tsu-erh-tun under Colonel Borisoff. To secure our retirement to Tieh-ling, in case we should not succeed in beating off Nogi’s army, on the evening of March 7 I gave orders to the 1st and 3rd Armies, who were too far forward, to retire early on the 8th to our fortified positions south of Mukden—at Fu-liang and Fu-shun. With their retirement and the concentration of the whole of the 2nd Army on the right bank it became possible to allot forty-eight battalions from the 1st and 3rd Armies to operate against Nogi, and to collect seventeen battalions into the reserve of the 2nd Army. Of these reinforcements, General Artamonoff’s force of ten battalions alone arrived under my command on the 8th.