Steps to augment the Combatant Element in our Infantry.
Amongst the causes of our disasters has been mentioned ([Chapter VI].) the small number of rifles per company we had in action as compared with the Japanese. We often had more battalions than they, but fewer men. The various reasons for this I have already enumerated. To lessen the number of subsidiary duties which take men away from the fighting-line of the regular army, we must create cadres for the troops of the rear services; we must also arrange that the casualties are quickly made good from the reserve troops, which should be kept up permanently and closely connected with the regular troops. (Every regular regiment should have one reserve or depôt battalion.) To augment the numbers fighting compared with the numbers fed, and, in particular, to increase the number of men in the firing-line, we must bring up the combatant establishment of our companies from 220 to 250 rifles. With 220 rifles on the roll of a company, we were never able to put even 200 in action; and in bringing the strength of these units up to 250, we must take steps to see that they all really can take the field. According to the “War Establishments,” a line infantry regiment has an establishment of 3,838 combatants and 159[39] non-combatants (total 3,997), which gives 235 rifles per company. But in this number are included 35 bandsmen, 33 drummers, 1 bugler, 3 regimental quartermaster-sergeants, 1 sergeant-major of the non-combatant company, 5 baggage non-commissioned officers, and, moreover, another 240 (15 per company) detailed for supply work, etc. Excluding these, 3,520 combatants are left, which gives 220 per company; but experience has shown that there is much leakage from this number.
The peculiarities of Manchuria necessitated the employment of men on duties that would have been quite unnecessary, or less necessary, in a European war. Thus, in addition to the authorized transport, we had pack transport, which swallowed up fifty men per regiment. The large herds of cattle with regiments required twenty-four men to look after and guard them. There were nine regimental butchers. Two or three donkeys were told off to each company. (Indeed, they were of such great use in taking water and ammunition up into the firing-line that I consider they should be included in the establishments of troops in European Russia.) In each company one man was told off to these animals. The number of officers on the regimental rolls included those who had been wounded and were away convalescent, and many of these took their orderlies with them on leaving the front. The expenditure in these orderlies alone amounted to more than 100 men. For the special pack transport which was formed for the scout sections for carriage of ammunition and supplies, thirteen men per regiment were required. Judging by the experience of the war, I consider the following duties ought to be allowed for in every regiment in addition to the establishment of 159 non-combatants:
| Company clerks | 16 | |
| Mess caterers | 18 | |
| Officers’ mess cooks | 4 | |
| Men’s cooks | 18 | [40] |
| Butchers and cattle guard | 12 | |
| Officers’ grooms | 27 | |
| Transport drivers with scout sections | 13 | |
| Instructors | 4 | |
| Stretcher-bearers | 128 | |
| Baggage guard | 48 | [41] |
| With water donkeys | 16 | |
| Officers’ orderlies | 80 | |
| Sergeant-major of non-combatant company | 1 | |
| Transport driver non-commissioned officers | 5 | |
| Despatch riders | 20 | |
| Bandsmen | 35 | |
| Drummers | 33 | |
| Reserve in case of sickness and wounded | 13 | |
| Total | 491 |
All these must be classed as non-combatants. Adding to these the prescribed establishment of 159 non-combatants, we shall get a total of 650 with each regiment of four battalions. They should all be armed, and be ready to fight either in the advanced lines or with the baggage.
The value of machine-guns is now so great that we cannot afford to be without them. In my opinion, each company should have one gun, and six men should be detailed to carry it and its ammunition. Thus, there would be 100 men with the machine-guns in a regiment (including four reserve men). The scout sections also did such useful service in the recent war that we ought certainly to have dismounted and small mounted scout sections in each regiment. This would take up 200 more men. Finally, the strength of every company, exclusive of all these extras, should be fixed at 250 rifles, which would make 4,000 in the regiment. The strength of a regiment would, therefore, total as follows:
| Combatants (in sixteen companies) | 4,000 |
| Scout sections | 200 |
| Machine-gun sections | 150 |
| Non-combatants | 650 |
| Total | 5,000 |
The present establishment of a four-battalion regiment is 3,838 combatants and 159 non-combatants; total, 3,997. Therefore a total increase of 1,003 per regiment is desirable. Including fifteen men in every company for supply duties, the authorized non-combatant element works out at:
| Non-combatants | 159 |
| Bandsmen, drummers, buglers | 69 |
| Regimental quartermaster-sergeants | 3 |
| Sergeant-majors and baggage | |
| non-commissioned officers | 6 |
| For supply duties | 240 |
| Total | 477 |
Fixing the total number of non-combatants required at 650, I thus add to the expenditure authorized by existing establishments 173. These, including stretcher-bearers, would never go into action. Thus, the addition necessary to bring the fighting element of a regiment up to 5,000 comes out as follows:
| Increase of thirty rifles per company | |
| (so as to have 250 instead of 220) | 480 |
| Scout sections | 200 |
| Machine-gun sections | 150 |
| Total | 830 |
This increase would greatly add to its present strength.