| | | PAGE |
| Introduction | [v] |
| | | | |
| PART I |
| NAVAL PRINCIPLES |
| 1. | The Value of Historical Study | [3] |
| 2. | “Theoretical” versus “Practical” Training | [8] |
| | | A Historical Instance | [8] |
| | | What is Practical? | [10] |
| 3. | Elements of Sea Power | [16] |
| 4. | Definition of Terms: Strategy, Tactics, Logistics | [49] |
| 5. | Fundamental Principles | [50] |
| | | Central Position, Interior Lines, Communications | [50] |
| | | Concentration | [60] |
| 6. | Strategic Positions | [68] |
| | I. | Situation | [69] |
| | II. | Military Strength | [70] |
| | III. | Resources | [74] |
| 7. | Strategic Lines | [75] |
| | Communications | [75] |
| | Importance of Sea Communications | [76] |
| 8. | Offensive Operations | [79] |
| 9. | The Value of the Defensive | [87] |
| 10. | Commerce-Destroying and Blockade | [91] |
| | Command of the Sea Decisive | [98] |
| 11. | Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean | [100] |
| 12. | Principles of Naval Administration | [113] |
| | Opposing Elements | [113] |
| | The British System | [118] |
| | The United States System | [122] |
| 13. | The Military Rule of Obedience | [125] |
| 14. | Preparedness for Naval War | [128] |
| | | | |
| PART II |
| SEA POWER IN HISTORY |
| 15. | A Nation Exhausted by Isolation | [137] |
| | France under Louis XIV | [137] |
| 16. | The Growth of British Sea Power | [141] |
| | England after the Peace of Utrecht, 1715 | [141] |
| 17. | Results of the Seven Years’ War | [147] |
| 18. | Eighteenth Century Formalism in Naval Tactics | [155] |
| 19. | The New Tactics | [159] |
| | Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780 | [159] |
| 20. | Sea Power in the American Revolution | [164] |
| | Graves and De Grasse off the Chesapeake | [164] |
| 21. | The French Navy Demoralized by the Revolution | [171] |
| 22. | Howe’s Victory of June 1, 1794 | [175] |
| 23. | Nelson’s Strategy at Copenhagen | [184] |
| 24. | England’s First Line of Defense | [191] |
| 25. | The Battle of Trafalgar | [196] |
| | “The Nelson Touch” | [200] |
| | The Battle | [208] |
| | Commerce Warfare after Trafalgar | [223] |
| 26. | General Strategy of the War of 1812 | [229] |
| | Results of the Northern Campaign | [235] |
| 27. | Lessons of the War with Spain | [241] |
| | The Possibilities of a “Fleet in Being” | [241] |
| 28. | The Santiago Blockade | [250] |
| 29. | “Fleet in Being” and “Fortress Fleet” | [256] |
| | The Port Arthur Squadron in the Russo-Japanese War | [256] |
| | Divided Forces | [269] |
| 30. | Rozhestvensky at Tsushima | [276] |
| | | | |
| PART III |
| NAVAL AND NATIONAL POLICIES |
| 31. | Expansion and Over-Sea Bases | [285] |
| | The Annexation of Hawaii | [285] |
| 32. | Application of the Monroe Doctrine | [288] |
| | Anglo-American Community of Interests | [288] |
| 33. | Changes in the United States and Japan | [296] |
| 34. | Our Interests in the Pacific | [299] |
| 35. | The German State and its Menace | [302] |
| | The Bulwark of British Sea Power | [306] |
| 36. | Advantages of Insular Position | [309] |
| | Great Britain and the Continental Powers | [309] |
| 37. | Bearing of Political Developments on Naval Policy and Strategy | [317] |
| 38. | Seizure of Private Property at Sea | [328] |
| 39. | The Moral Aspect of War | [342] |
| 40. | The Practical Aspect of War | [348] |
| 41. | Motives for Naval Power | [355] |
| APPENDIX |
| | Chronological Outline | [359] |
| | Academic Honors | [360] |
| | Published Works | [361] |
| | Uncollected Essays | [362] |
| | References | [362] |
| INDEX | [365] |