INDEX


[1]. “From Sail to Steam,” p. xiv.

[2]. “From Sail to Steam,” p. 55.

[3]. See pp. [328]–341.

[4]. Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, U. S. Naval Institute, January–February, 1915, p. 2.

[5]. “La Maîtrise de la Mer,” Auguste Moireau, Revue des Deux Mondes, October, 1902.

[6]. “Of Kingdoms and Estates.”

[7]. “The Revival of Naval History,” Contemporary Review. November, 1917. While the term “political pamphlet” suggests the influence of the book abroad, it is obviously inappropriate in describing its purpose and method of treatment.

[8]. “The Kaiser’s Dreams of Sea Power,” Archibald Hurd, Fortnightly Review, August, 1906.

[9]. “From Sail to Steam,” p. 303.

[10]. “Captain Romeo Bernotti,” letter to the editor, April 25, 1918.

[11]. “A Great Public Servant,” The Outlook, January 13, 1915.

[12]. “From Sail to Steam,” p. 288.

[13]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 1–2, 8–10.

[14]. “Naval Administration and Warfare,” Objects of the Naval War College (1888), pp. 193–194, 233–240.

[15]. In a preceding passage the author shows that American naval thought has been preoccupied with problems of material.—Editor.

[16]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 25–59. Mr. S. G. W. Benjamin has pointed out (N. Y. Times Book Review, Feb. 2, 1902) that it was in the preface and opening chapter of this book, “comprising only eighty-nine pages, that Captain Mahan brought forward his famous presentation of the theory about the influence of sea power on empire.” The present selection includes the major part of the first chapter.—Editor.

[17]. For the author’s later opinion on the need of a navy, see pp. [355]–357.—Editor.

[18]. Written before 1890.—Editor.

[19]. By a base of permanent operations “is understood a country whence come all the resources, where are united the great lines of communication by land and water, where are the arsenals and armed posts.”

[20]. “Naval Administration and Warfare,” pp. 199, 206. For the distinction drawn, see also pp. [4], [12].—Editor.

[21]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 31–53.

[22]. An interesting instance of the method and forethought which cause German naval development of all kinds to progress abreast, on parallel lines, is found in the fact that by the time the three Dreadnoughts laid down in 1911 are completed, and with them two complete Dreadnought squadrons of eight each, which probably will be in 1914, the Kiel Canal will have been enlarged to permit their passage. There will then be a fleet of thirty-eight battleships; including these sixteen, which will be stationed, eight in the North Sea, eight in the Baltic, linked for mutual support by the central canal. The programme contemplates a continuous prearranged replacing of the present pre-Dreadnoughts by Dreadnoughts.

[23]. See map on page [278].

[24]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 130–163.

[25]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 166–167. For illustration and further discussion of strategic lines, see “General Strategy of the War of 1812,” in this volume, pp. [229]–240.—Editor.

[26]. “The Problem of Asia” (1900), pp. 124–127.

[27]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 266–272.

[28]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 277–280.

[29]. “Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812,” Vol. I, pp. 284–290.

[30]. “History of the United States,” Vol. VIII, chap. VIII.

[31]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” p. 138.

[32]. This immunity of enemy property in neutral ships, guaranteed by the Declaration of Paris in 1856, has been to a large extent nullified in recent practice by extension of the lists of contraband, to say nothing of the violations of all law in submarine warfare.—Editor.

[33]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 303–304, 356–367, 381–382.

[34]. “Naval Administration and Warfare” (1903), pp. 5–11.

[35]. “Naval Administration and Warfare” (1903). pp. 26–31.

[36]. “Naval Administration and Warfare” (1903), pp. 46–48.

[37]. These bureaus are seven in number: Yards and Docks, Navigation, Ordnance, Construction and Repairs, Steam Engineering, Supplies and Accounts, and Medicine and Surgery. The Chief of Naval Operations, whose office was created in 1915, stands second to the Secretary and acts as his expert professional adviser, with the specific task of co-ordinating the work of the navy, preparing plans, and directing operations in war. He is, ex officio, a member of the General Board of the Navy, created in 1900, which serves as an expert advisory body.—Editor.

[38]. “Retrospect and Prospect,” pp. 258–259, 270–272.

[39]. “The Interest of America in Sea Power” (1896), pp. 192–200.

[40]. Bombardment of undefended ports, towns, etc., is forbidden by Convention IX of the Hague conference of 1907, with the broad concession, however, that depots, store houses, and all constructions that serve military purposes may be destroyed.—Editor.

[41]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon History” (1660–1783), pp. 197–200. Admiral Mahan’s major historical works treat consecutively the history of naval warfare from 1660 to 1815; and his essays and shorter studies cover subsequent wars. The selections in Part II are arranged in chronological order.—Editor.

[42]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 63–67.

[43]. An interesting proof of the weight attributed to the naval power of Great Britain by a great military authority will be found in the opening chapter of Jomini’s “History of the Wars of the French Revolution.” He lays down, as a fundamental principle of European policy, that an unlimited expansion of naval force should not be permitted to any nation which cannot be approached by land,—a description which can apply only to Great Britain.

[44]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 323–329. By the Treaty of Paris, 1763, England secured Canada, all French possessions east of the Mississippi, and Florida; she also retained Gibraltar and Minorca, and gained ascendancy in India.—Editor.

[45]. See Annual Register, 1762, p. 63.

[46]. Campbell, “Lives of the Admirals.”

[47]. These remarks, always true, are doubly so now since the introduction of steam. The renewal of coal is a want more frequent, more urgent, more peremptory, than any known to the sailing-ship. It is vain to look for energetic naval operations distant from coal stations. It is equally vain to acquire distant coaling stations without maintaining a powerful navy; they will but fall into the hands of the enemy. But the vainest of all delusions is the expectation of bringing down an enemy by commerce-destroying alone, with no coaling stations outside the national boundaries.

[48]. “Types of Naval Officers,” pp. 14–17.

[49]. A celebrated French admiral, in command at the battles of Beachy Head (1690) and La Hogue (1692).—Editor.

[50]. The most famous of these were issued in 1665 by the Duke of York, afterward James II, who was then Lord High Admiral. They were revised but not greatly altered in 1740 and again in 1756.—Editor.

[51]. Byng’s offense, for which he was sentenced to be shot, occurred in an action with a French squadron off Minorca in 1756.—Editor.

[52]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 377–380.

[53]. De Grasse, whose victory over Graves off the Chesapeake forced the surrender of Cornwallis, was afterward defeated by Rodney in the famous battle of the Saints’ Passage, April 12, 1782. Three days earlier, De Grasse had neglected an opportunity to attack in superior force.

While the battle of the Saints’ Passage is more celebrated, the action here described better illustrates Rodney’s merits as a tactician. In his later years Rodney wrote that he “thought little of his victory of the 12th of April,” and looked upon this earlier action as “one by which, but for the disobedience of his captains, he might have gained immortal renown.”—Mahan, “Types of Naval Officers,” p. 203.—Editor.

[54]. The black ships, in position A, represent the English ships bearing down upon the French center and rear. The line v r is the line of battle from van to rear before bearing down. The positions v´, r´ are those of the van and rear ships after hauling up on the port tack, when the French wore.—Editor.

[55]. In a severe reprimand addressed to Captain Carkett, commanding the leading ship of the English line, by Rodney, he says: “Your leading in the manner you did, induced others to follow so bad an example; and thereby, forgetting that the signal for the line was at only two cables’ length distance from each other, the van division was led by you to more than two leagues distance from the center division, which was thereby exposed to the greatest strength of the enemy, and not properly supported” (Life, Vol. I, p. 351). By all rules of tactical common-sense it would seem that the other ships should have taken their distance from their next astern, that is, should have closed toward the center. In conversation with Sir Gilbert Blane, who was not in this action, Rodney stated that the French line extended Your leagues in length, “as if De Guichen thought we meant to run away from him” (Naval Chronicle, Vol. XXV, p. 402).

[56]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 387–391, 397.

[57]. Now Cape Haitien, Haiti.—Editor.

[58]. Bancroft, “History of the United States.”

[59]. With the reinforcement brought by De Grasse, Lafayette’s army numbered about 8,000; the troops brought by Washington and Rochambeau consisted of 2,000 Americans and 4,000 French.—Editor.

[60]. The action itself is more fully described in Mahan’s “Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence,” from which the diagram on page [167] is taken. In the diagram, a a indicates the positions of the two fleets when De Grasse came out of the bay; b b, the positions when the order to engage was given; f, Graves’s flagship, and h, Hood. Having approached the enemy with his twelve leading ships, Graves gave the order to bear down and engage, though he still kept the signal for “line ahead” flying. Whether through inability or misinterpretation of orders, the rear under Hood failed to get in range.

Hood afterward criticised his superior severely on the grounds, (1) that the fleet was not brought into proper position to engage, and (2) that, upon engaging, the “line ahead” signal should have been hauled down. He interpreted this signal as meaning that no ship could close beyond a line through the flagship and parallel to the enemy line.

Graves next day issued a memorandum to the effect that the line ahead was a means to an end, not an end in itself, and “that the signal for battle should not be rendered ineffective by strict adherence to the former.” The confusion was such as frequently arose in this period of transition from one system of tactics to another.—Editor.

[61]. “Types of Naval Officers,” pp. 35–37, 41.

[62]. Chevalier, “Mar. Fran, sous la République,” p. 49.

[63]. Nap. to Decrès, Aug. 29, 1805.

[64]. Troude, “Batailles Nav.,” Vol. III, p. 370.

[65]. Commodore de Rions, a member of the nobility, who was imprisoned at Toulon and afterward fled from the country.—Editor.

[66]. “Types of Naval Officers,” pp. 308–317. The “Glorious First of June” is one of the most important naval actions in the wars of the French Revolution, and illustrates the work of an officer who stood in his own day conspicuously at the head of his profession. The selection is interesting also as showing that, when it suited his purpose, Admiral Mahan could write with notable ease and pictorial vigor.—Editor.

[67]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,” Vol. II, pp. 42–47. The campaign is treated more fully in “The Life of Nelson,” Vol. II, p. 70 ff.—Editor.

[68]. Nelson’s Letters and Dispatches, Vol. IV, p. 295.

[69]. Nelson’s Dispatches, Vol. IV., p. 355.

[70]. Nelson’s Dispatches, April 9, 1801, Vol. IV, pp. 339, 341.

[71]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,” Vol. II, pp. 117–120.

[72]. Ibid., p. 106.

[73]. See “Naval Chronicle,” Vol. X, pp. 508, 510; Vol. XI, p. 81; Nelson’s Dispatches, Vol. V, p. 438.

[74]. Pellew’s “Life of Lord Sidmouth,” Vol. II, p. 237.

[75]. Nelson’s Dispatches, Vol. IV, p. 452.

[76]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,” Vol. II, pp. 184–197, 199–202, 356–357.

[77]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire”, Vol. II, p. 181.

[78]. Napoleon to St. Cyr, Sept. 2, 1805.

[79]. Napoleon to Decrès, Sept. 15.

[80]. Ibid., Sept. 4.

[81]. Nelson’s Dispatches, Vol. VII, p. 80.

[82]. The following account of Nelson’s arrival and his plan of battle is taken from the fuller narrative in “The Life of Nelson,” Vol. II, pp. 339–351.—Editor.

[83]. Inserted by author.

[84]. Here the narrative is resumed from “The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire.”—Editor.

[85]. Fyffe’s “History of Modern Europe,” Vol. I, p. 281.

[86]. To the King of Wurtemburg, April 2, 1811; “Corr.,” Vol. XXII, p. 19.

[87]. “Sea Power in its Relations with the War of 1812,” Vol. I, pp. 295–308; Vol. II, pp. 121–125.

[88]. Kingsford’s “History of Canada,” Vol. VIII, p. 111.

[89]. Drummond to Prevost, Oct. 20, 1814. Report on Canadian Archives, 1896, Upper Canada, p. 9.

[90]. Ibid., Oct. 15.

[91]. Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 14, 1814. Report on Canadian Archives, 1896, Lower Canada, p. 36.

[92]. “Travels,” J. M. Duncan, Vol. II, p. 27.

[93]. “Life of Brock,” p. 193.

[94]. Smyth, “Précis of the Wars in Canada,” p. 167.

[95]. The United States Secretary of War.—Editor.

[96]. December 17, 1813. Captain’s Letters, Navy Department.

[97]. “Lessons of the War with Spain” (1899), pp. 75–85.

[98]. Ibid., p. 157.

[99]. In this number is included the Emperador Carlos V, which, however, did not accompany the other four under Cervera.

[100]. “Lessons of the War with Spain” (1899), pp. 184–191.

[101]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 383–401.

[102]. The Kobe Chronicle, February 25, 1904; an English newspaper published in Japan.

[103]. “Naval Administration and Warfare,” Retrospect upon the War between Russia and Japan (March, 1906) pp. 167–173.

[104]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 416–420.

[105]. “The rise or fall of the Empire depends upon to-day’s battle. Let every man do his utmost.”—Editor.

[106]. “The Interest of America in Sea Power,” Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power (1893), pp. 51–54.

[107]. “The Problem of Asia” (1900), pp. 133–144.

[108]. “The writer has been assured, by an authority in which he entirely trusts, that to a proposition made to Great Britain (at the time of the Spanish-American War) to enter into a combination to constrain the Use of our power,—as Japan was five years ago constrained by the joint action of Russia, France, and Germany,—the reply was not only a passive refusal to enter into such combination, but an assurance of active resistance to it, if attempted.”—Mahan, “The Problem of Asia” (1900), p. 187.—Editor.

[109]. “Retrospect and Prospect” (1902), pp. 15–17.

[110]. “The Interest of America in International Conditions,” The Open Door (1910), pp. 198–202.

[111]. “The Interest of America in International Conditions” (1910), pp. 38–46.

[112]. The Mail, April 20, 1910.

[113]. “The Interest of America in International Conditions” (1910), pp. 161–164.

[114]. “Retrospect and Prospect,” Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies (1902), pp. 151–170.

[115]. “Naval Strategy” (1911), pp. 104–112.

[116]. Since this was written, a new Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Japan, operative for ten years, has been signed—July 13, 1911. By its terms either Power will be released from its military obligation to the other, as against a third with which it may have a treaty of general arbitration, such as that framed between Great Britain and the United States.

[117]. Since these words were written such formal announcement has been made by a member of the British Cabinet, Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on May 23, 1911. The Mail, May 24, 1911.

[118]. “Some Neglected Aspects of War” (1907), pp. 171–191.

[119]. The Napoleonic Wars, the War of 1812, and the American Civil War. For the effect of commerce warfare in these struggles, see pp. [91]–99.—Editor.

[120]. Vol. I, pp. 146–148.

[121]. The “Times” of October 14, 1905.

[122]. Indirect, I presume.

[123]. “Some Neglected Aspects of War,” The Peace Conference and the Moral Aspect of War (1899), pp. 45–52.

[124]. Lest this be misunderstood to be an allusion to the recent measures of Japan in Korea, I renew here the caution that in this article all references to the Peace Conference are to that of 1899.

[125]. “Some Neglected Aspects of War,” The Hague Conference and the Practical Aspect of War (1907), pp. 75–80, 90–93.

[126]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 445–447.


TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

  1. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in spelling.
  2. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed.
  3. Re-indexed footnotes using numbers and collected together at the end of the last chapter.