CHAPTER III. STUART'S RAID—THE ENEMY IN FRONT OF HARRISBURG—MEADE'S PLANS.
At dawn of day on the 29th, Stuart's command, after riding all night, reached the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and commenced disabling it, so far as the limited time at their disposal would allow, by burning a bridge at Sykesville and tearing up a portion of the track at Hood's Mill. They remained at the latter place during the day to rest, but started again in the afternoon, and reached Westminster about 5 P.M. At this place they were gallantly attacked by the 1st Delaware Cavalry, which Stuart says was driven off after hard fighting and pursued some distance toward Baltimore, adding very much to the panic there. At night the head of his column halted at Union Mills, half way between Westminster and Littlestown. It may as well be stated here that Stuart found himself greatly embarrassed by attempting to hold on to the long train he had captured at Rockville. It lengthened out his column to such an extent that it became difficult to defend all parts of the line without scattering and weakening his command. As Kilpatrick's division was waiting to intercept him at Littlestown, this consideration became a matter of considerable importance. Gregg's division also moved in the morning to head him off at Westminster, but owing to the roads being very much blocked up by our infantry and trains marching in that direction, Gregg did not succeed in reaching his destination until some hours after Stuart had passed.
At night two brigades of Buford's division of cavalry covered the left flank of the Union army near Fairfield, with one brigade at Mechanicstown. The First and Eleventh Corps were at Emmetsburg, the Third and Twelfth at Middleburg, the Fifth Corps at Taneytown, the Second Corps at Uniontown, and the Sixth Corps at New Windsor.
The advance of the rebel cavalry under Jenkins were now within sight of Harrisburg, and skirmishing only four miles from the town. Jenkins' object was to make a thorough reconnoissance in order to ascertain the best positions to be taken for an attack. There was a perfect exodus from the city. All business was suspended, too, in Philadelphia, and the authorities there busied themselves in hastening the work on the fortifications in the suburbs of the city. They were active enough now, and large numbers were enrolled. Pleasonton, who was under general orders to guard the flank nearest the enemy, directed Buford on the 29th to occupy Gettysburg the next day, and hold it until the Army of the Potomac came to his relief. He realized the importance of the position to the future success of our arms.
Hill's corps was at Fayetteville on the 29th, but one division, that of Heth, was thrown forward on that day to Cashtown, within eight miles of Gettysburg. The object of the movement was to join Ewell at York, and co-operate with him in the destruction of the railroads on the other side of the Susquehanna, etc. This plan, as I have already stated, was suddenly changed on the evening of the 28th, when Lee found his communications endangered, and now all the advanced troops under his command turned back to concentrate at Gettysburg. Longstreet left Chambersburg and marched to Fayetteville, leaving Pickett's division behind to guard the trains. Early received the order to return in the afternoon of the 28th, recalled Gordon's brigade from Wrightsville, and made preparations to start the next morning. Rodes' and Johnson's divisions left Carlisle and marched on Gettysburg; the former by the direct route, and the latter by way of Greenwood, to convoy the trains full of stolen property.
A number of partisan skirmishes took place during the day, which were creditable to our troops, particularly that at McConnellsburg, to the west of Chambersburg.
The raid against Richmond ended by the return of Colonel Spear's regiment to the White House. Hooker had urged that General Dix assume command of all his available troops, march against Richmond, and plant himself firmly on Lee's line of communication, but his recommendations were slighted by Halleck. There was much disappointment in the North at this failure to make a serious attack on the rebel capital, for it was generally believed that it might have been captured by a coup de main.
On the 30th General Meade advanced his army still nearer the Susquehanna. At evening his extreme left, the First Corps, was at Marsh Creek, on the Emmetsburg road, while the extreme right, the Sixth Corps, was away off at Manchester. The intermediate corps were posted, the Eleventh at Emmetsburg; the Second at Uniontown; the Third at Taneytown; the Fifth at Union Mills, and the Twelfth at Frizzelburg. General French moved from Harper's Ferry with the bulk of the garrison and occupied Frederick. The First Corps was ordered to Gettysburg, but General Reynolds halted it at Marsh Creek, as the enemy were reported to be coming from the direction of Fairfield.
Meade now resolved to take up a defensive position on Pipe Creek. He threw out his forces as before in a fan shape, but any corps encountering the enemy was expected to fight in retreat until it reached the new line, where all the corps were to assemble. This line as laid out was a long one, extending from Manchester to Middleburg, a distance of about twenty-five miles. Falling back to fight again, is hardly to be commended, as it chills the ardor of the men; nor is it certain that Lee would have attacked the intrenchments at Pipe Creek. If he found them formidable he might have preferred to fight on the defensive with two corps, while the Third Corps took Harrisburg, and broke up the railroad lines to the west, or marched directly against Philadelphia; or, as Pipe Creek did not interfere with his communications in any way he might have chosen to let it severely alone, and have kept on depredating in Pennsylvania, after capturing Harrisburg. This would have forced Meade sooner or later to attack him.
On the night of the 30th Ewell's corps had reached Heidlersburg, nine miles from Gettysburg, with the exception of Johnson's division, which was at Greenwood. Rodes' division had marched direct from Carlisle by way of Petersburg. Longstreet with two divisions was at Fayetteville; the other division, that of Pickett, was left at Chambersburg to guard the trains. Hill's corps had reached Cashtown and Mummasburg, except Anderson's division, which was still back at the mountain pass on the Chambersburg road.
Stuart, ascertaining that Early was no longer at York, and not knowing that the army was concentrating on Gettysburg, turned toward Carlisle. He had bivouacked half way between Westminster and Littlestown, but having ascertained that Kilpatrick was waiting for him at the latter place, attempted to avoid the encounter by going through cross roads to Hanover. He found Farnsworth's brigade of cavalry there, however, and charged their rear, driving them back and capturing some prisoners and ambulances. The 5th New York made a counter-charge under Major Hammond and drove him out again. He claims to have taken the town by the aid of Hampton's brigade, which arrived in time to reinforce him. Custer's brigade then came up from Abbotstown. The battle lasted until night, when Stuart gave up the contest and retreated, leaving Kilpatrick in possession.
Part of his cavalry also attacked the 5th and 6th Michigan regiments at Littlestown, but were repulsed. He then, having no time to spare, kept on his way toward York to find the army he had lost. He passed within seven miles of Ewell's column on its way to Gettysburg, and neither knew that the other was near. Had they effected a junction it would have saved the rebel cavalry a long, fruitless, and exhausting march, which kept them out of the battle on the first day. It was one of those accidental circumstances which seemed to favor us in this campaign, while almost every incident at Chancellorsville was against us.
Finding Ewell had left York, Stuart turned and marched on Carlisle, which he found occupied by our troops. He demanded the surrender of the place under a threat of bombardment. General W. F. Smith, one of the heroes of the Peninsula, was not to be affected by menaces; and Stuart, whose time was precious and who had no ammunition to spare, turned off in hopes of reaching Gettysburg in time to take part in the battle. He arrived there on the afternoon of the 2d, with horses and men worn out by their extraordinary exertions; on their way whole regiments slept in the saddle. This force when it reached the field found Robertson's, Jones', and Jenkins' brigades, and White's battalion ready to join it.
By evening Meade was fully apprised, by telegrams and Buford's scouts, that the enemy were concentrating on Gettysburg. He knew that Reynolds at Marsh Creek was only about six miles from Hill at Cashtown, but he sent no orders that night. He simply stated that the enemy were marching on Gettysburg, and he would issue orders when they developed their intentions. Thus the opposing forces were moving in directions that would necessarily bring them in contact, and a fight or retreat was inevitable.
Reynolds had the true spirit of a soldier. He was a Pennsylvanian, and, inflamed at seeing the devastation of his native State, was most desirous of getting at the enemy as soon as possible. I speak from my own knowledge, for I was his second in command, and he told me at Poolesville soon after crossing the river, that it was necessary to attack the enemy at once, to prevent his plundering the whole State. As he had great confidence in his men, it was not difficult to divine what his decision would be. He determined to advance and hold Gettysburg. He directed the Eleventh Corps to come up as a support to the First, and he recommended, but did not order, the Third Corps to do the same.
Buford, with two of his cavalry brigades, reached the place that night, but not without considerable difficulty. He left Fountaindale Gap early in the morning and attempted to move directly to his destination, but he came upon Pettigrew's brigade of Hill's corps, and was obliged to fall back to the mountains again. Later in the day he succeeded, by going around by way of Emmetsburg. Before evening set in, he had thrown out his pickets almost to Cashtown and Hunterstown, posting Gamble's brigade across the Chambersburg pike, and Devin's brigade across the Mummasburg road, his main body being about a mile west of the town.
While these great movements were going on, some minor affairs showed great gallantry on the part of partisan officers. Captain Ulric Dahlgren made a raid upon the rebel communications, capturing some guns and prisoners, and gaining very important information which will be referred to hereafter.
The two armies now about to contest on the perilous ridges of Gettysburg the possession of the Northern States, and the ultimate triumph of freedom or slavery, were in numbers as follows, according to the estimate made by the Count of Paris, who is an impartial observer, and who has made a close study of the question:
The Army of the Potomac under General Meade, 82,00 men and 300 guns.
The Army of Northern Virginia under General Lee, 73,500 men and 190 guns.
Stuart had 11,100 cavalry and 16 guns.
Pleasonton had about the same number of cavalry, and 27 guns.