CHAPTER X. BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION (FLEETWOOD).
The 8th of June was a day of preparation on both sides. Pleasonton was engaged in collecting his troops and getting everything in readiness to beat up the enemy's quarters the next morning, and Stuart was preparing to cross for the purpose of either making a raid on the railroad, as Pleasonton states, or to take up a position to guard the right flank of the invading force as it passed by our army. Major McClellan, Stuart's adjutant-general, asserts the latter. Pleasonton's information was founded on captured despatches, and on interviews held by some of our officers with the Confederates under a flag of truce.
The four batteries of Jones' cavalry brigade moved down near the river opposite Beverly Ford on the 7th, to cover the proposed crossing. They were imperfectly supported by the remainder of Stuart's force. Jones' brigade was posted on the road to Beverly Ford, that of Fitz Lee* on the other side of Hazel River; that of Robertson along the Rappahannock below the railroad; that of W. H. F. Lee on the road to Melford Ford, and that of Hampton in reserve, near Fleetwood Hill—all too far off to be readily available. In fact, the batteries were entirely unsuspicious of danger, although they were a quarter of a mile from the nearest support and there was only a thin line of pickets between their guns and the river.
[* A familiar abbreviation for Fitz Hugh Lee, adopted in the rebel reports.]
In the meantime Pleasonton's three divisions, "stiffened"—to use one of Hooker's expressions—by two brigades of infantry, stole down to the fords and lay there during the night, quietly, and without fires, ready at the first dawn of day to spring upon their too-confident adversaries and give them a rude awakening.
Pleasonton in person remained with Buford's division—the First— which was lying near Beverly Ford with Ames' infantry brigade.
The other two divisions, the Second, under Colonel Duffie, and the Third, under General Gregg—supported by Russell's infantry brigade, were in bivouac opposite Kelly's Ford.
As each commander is apt to overstate the enemy's force and underrate his own, it is not always easy to get at the facts. Pleasonton claims that the rebels had about twelve thousand cavalry and twelve guns. Major McClellan of Stuart's staff, puts the number at nine thousand three hundred and thirty-five men, on paper, and twenty guns; but states there were nearly three thousand absentees.
General Gregg estimates the Union cavalry at about nine thousand men and six batteries, but—as will be seen hereafter—a third of this force was detached toward Stevensburg, and their operations had little or no effect on the general result. The batteries do not seem to have been brought forward in time to be of much service.
At daybreak Pleasonton's troops began to cross; Buford's division and Ames' infantry at Beverly Ford; the other two divisions, under Gregg and Duffie, with Russell's infantry at Kelly's Ford, six miles below. Each division was accompanied by two light batteries.
Pleasonton's plan was founded on the erroneous supposition that the enemy were at Culpeper. He used the infantry to keep the lines of retreat open, and directed the cavalry to rendezvous at Brandy Station. They were to arrive there at the same time, and attack together. Duffie's column was to make a circuit by way of Stevensburg. Unfortunately, Stuart was not at Culpeper, but at Brandy Station; that is, he occupied the point where they were to rendezvous, and the plan therefore appertained practically to the same vicious system of converging columns against a central force. What happened may be briefly stated as follows: The First Division, under Buford, came upon the enemy between Brandy Station and Beverly Ford. A battle ensued at St. James' Church, and as their whole force confronted him, and they had twenty pieces of artillery, he was unable to break their line. After fighting some hours he was obliged to turn back with a portion of his command to repel an attempt against his line of retreat. Gregg next appeared upon the scene, and succeeded in getting in Stuart's rear before the rebel general knew he was there. Buford having gone back toward Beverly Ford, as stated, Gregg in his turn, fought the whole of Stuart's force without the co-operation of either Buford or Duffie. It can hardly be said that Duffie's column took any part in the action, for he did not reach Brandy Station until late in the day. And then, as the rebel infantry were approaching, Pleasonton ordered a retreat.
For the future instruction of the reader it may be well to state that every cavalry charge, unless supported by artillery or infantry, is necessarily repulsed by a counter-charge; for when the force of the attack is spent, the men who make it are always more or less scattered, and therefore unable to contend against the impetus of a fresh line of troops, who come against them at full speed and strike in mass.
Stuart's headquarters were twice taken by Gregg's division, and a company desk captured with very important despatches, but the enemy had the most men, and most artillery near the point attacked, and therefore always regained, by a counter-charge, the ground that had been lost.
Stuart claims to have repulsed the last attack of Pleasonton against Fleetwood Hill, and to have taken three guns, besides driving our cavalry back across the river.
Pleasonton claims to have fully accomplished the object of his reconnoissance, to have gained valuable information which enabled Hooker to thwart Lee's plans; and to have so crippled the rebel cavalry that its efficiency was very much impaired for the remainder of the campaign; so that Lee was forced to take the indirect route of the valley, instead of the direct one along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, behind his cavalry as a screen; his original intention having been to enter Maryland at Poolesville and Monocacy.