FOOTNOTES
[1] For hallado, as Avana (above) for Havana, an (lower down) for han, avito for habito, &c.
[2] This ought, probably, to be 3000.
AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT TOOK PLACE AT SAN JUAN DE
PUERTO RICO, IN THE INDIES, WITH THE ENGLISH
FLEET UNDER THE COMMAND OF FRANCIS DRAKE
AND JOHN HAWKINS, on the 23rd NOVEMBER 1595.
(The Translation of the preceding document.)
General Sancho Pardo y Osorio having taken his departure from the Havana for Spain on the 10th March of this year, in command of the Capitana of the main-land fleet, under convoy of the armed fleet of Don Francisco de Coloma, and having, in the course of the gale which blew in the chops of the Channel on the 15th of the same month, in latitude 23° 30´, found himself without a main-mast, and with tiller broken, while the ship, leaking much, and separated from the others, was no longer in a condition to prosecute the voyage, for the purpose of saving the lives of the three hundred people who were on board, as well as two millions of gold and silver belonging to His Majesty and to private individuals; with the advice and consent of the supercargo, Martin Vomero de Caamaño, and of the pilots and other persons of most experience on board, made for Puerto Rico, where he arrived, by a miracle, on the 9th April, and there he landed the bullion, and deposited it in the fortress of the town. The aforesaid general despatched immediately first and second advices to His Majesty, making known his arrival, in order that instructions might be sent to him as to what he should do. And it appears that Divine Providence (to whom many thanks are due), for its secret ends, permitted the orders, which might have come beforehand, to arrive just at the time to save not only the bullion, but the island itself, and perhaps all the Indies, as will be seen further on.
A few days after the aforesaid letters were despatched, the governor of this island, Colonel Pedro Suares, received those of His Majesty, whereby he was informed that a great fleet was fitting out in England for the purpose of seizing on this island in the course of the winter, as it was thought that at that season the inhabitants would be less upon their guard. When the general and the aforesaid supercargo learned the contents of these despatches, they joined in consultation with the governor and Francisco Cid, captain of the infantry of this garrison; and having taken into consideration and discussed the precautionary measures which ought to be adopted for the safety of the place and of His Majesty’s treasure, in order that, if the enemy should come, it might be out of his power to make himself master of the whole, they all agreed on reconnoitering the positions and accessible points from which the enemy might approach, so as to throw people ashore; and also that the general should give orders for planting some of the guns of his ship in the positions which he judged best, and for laying the vessel athwart the channel of the port, so that she might be sunk on the arrival of the enemy, and thus bar the entrance; as this was the quarter where there seemed most likelihood of attack and most risk, and where it was necessary to keep the people well on the watch. These arrangements being made, the general remained in expectation of His Majesty’s order to proceed on his voyage.
On the 13th November of this year, there arrived at this port, Don Pedro Tello de Guzman, with the five frigates of His Majesty, in order that General Sancho Pardo should embark in them His Majesty’s bullion, and so proceed to Spain, the post of Admiral of his fleet being filled by the aforesaid Pedro Tello, who, after having delivered his despatches, related to the aforesaid general, how, coming here in the course of his voyage, they had fallen in with two English ships at the island of Guadaloupe, which had parted company from the English fleet; and how his Admiral, Gonzalo Mendez de Canço, had captured one of them and sunk her, after taking the Englishmen out of her; and that he, the aforesaid Don Pedro, going in pursuit of the other vessel, discovered nine sail of the enemy’s fleet, and as soon as he descried them he tacked about and continued his voyage: and that the aforesaid English prisoners had stated that thereabouts, on the southern side of the island of Guadaloupe, the Queen of England’s fleet was lying at anchor and preparing launches; that it consisted of five-and-twenty ships, six of them Queen’s galleons of eight hundred tons burden, and two more of the same size belonging to private parties, the whole being divided into two squadrons, having for generals, Francis Drake and John Hawkins; the former, with his lieutenant in command on shore, Sir Thomas Baskerville, directing the course to be taken, and the proceedings on land; and that the armament amounted to three thousand infantry and ten thousand five hundred seamen well supplied with guns; and that they were coming direct to Puerto Rico, as appeared also from the instructions which were taken from the captain of the aforesaid English ship, in which he was ordered, in case he should part company from the fleet by any mischance, to proceed to Puerto Rico, where they would wait for him ten days, and after that, would leave orders for him where he was to go, without further revealing their intentions; and that in consequence of all this, the aforesaid Don Pedro came, fearing that the enemy might have preceded him and already got possession of the island; and since they had not yet come, he held it for certain that they would be down upon the port the next day; and accordingly it lay with the general to order his departure as it might seem expedient.
When the general, Sancho Pardo, heard the statement made by the aforesaid Don Pedro Tello and his admiral, Gonzalo Mendez; and inasmuch as that news reached him when he was confined to his bed by an illness under which he had been suffering some days, he sent word to the Bishop and to the Governor, requesting them to come to him to meet the captains of the frigates,—Marco Antonio Becerra, head of the company of fusileers; and Pedro de Guia, of the order of St. John; and Domingo de Ynsaurraga; Francisco Gomez, captain of this garrison; the supercargo, Martin Vomero de Caamaño, and Juan de la Vera, purser of the frigates. These having all met together in his house, the general laid before them and submitted for their consideration the account which he had of the enemy, and the best means that offered for the security of the island and the bullion, supposing that the enemy’s fleet was as great, and to be expected as soon as was said; and that the frigates absolutely required to have their rigging repaired and to take in wood and water, which, with embarking the bullion, would cause a delay of eight days at the least; and considering that, whether they were so occupied or not, the enemy by reason of the information which that other ship that was seen could give him, that these frigates were coming for the treasure, which was now known to be here, might hope to seize it on the passage, or to make himself master of the country and to fortify himself in it, with a view to the conquest of all the Indies, whence would ensue to His Majesty great injury and loss of reputation.
All were of one mind in thinking that the place ought to be strengthened with the guns and crews of the ships, and that the Capitana de Tierra Firme and another ship belonging to Pedro Milanes, should be sunk in the channel of the port, to shut the entrance, and that the bullion should not be moved from the fort until it was seen what turn affairs would take, as it appeared to be safer there, and in a position also, whence (if, for our sins, it should be so ordered) it might be more easily thrown into the sea, so that the enemy should not get it; and having thus resolved, they proceeded to carry into execution with great alacrity and zeal, night and day, every possible measure of defence.
General Sancho Pardo, as a person of great experience, and who had seen and examined the position and approaches of the place, assured Don Pedro Tello and the others who came with him, that the loss of the place was out of the question if our people were only willing to fight and do their duty, and that it was only necessary to take good care of the port, so as to prevent the enemy’s fleet running into it at once; and that, for that purpose, it were as well to sink the two ships which had been agreed on, and on top of them, the frigates with their bows towards the sea to bar the entrance, and that with this precaution the place was quite safe and also the treasure of His Majesty, who, herein, would be well served, and in whose name he called on them to attend to their several duties; and accordingly Don Pedro Tello took under his own charge the defence of the port.
The Bishop offered to say mass the next day, and to preach a sermon to the people, as he did in fact, exhorting them, in a Christian manner, to the service of God and of their king; and he persevered in the performance of this office night and day, visiting the posts where the people were stationed, placing a priest at each of them, and animating his hearers with much zeal.
The same day, the governor and general despatched a barque with advices to St. Domingo, that the inhabitants of that island might set and keep themselves on the watch; so that if the enemy were to go there, as was heard and was written to the President, the information might be immediately forwarded to Cartagena and Sancta Maria.
All the people of the island were immediately mustered, and some of those belonging to the frigates were landed, being thought necessary for the defence of the posts. The whole amounted to ten thousand three hundred souls, of whom seven hundred were fighting men, besides the eight hundred belonging to the frigates and the Capitana of the main-land, and the rest of the garrison, and foreigners, including, also, fifty on horseback with lance and buckler; the whole of whom were distributed in the following manner:
| In the curtain of the Morillo [battery], Captain Pedro de Guia, of the order of St. John, with a hundred and fifty soldiers | 150 |
| In the curtain of the Cabron, Alonso de Vargas with a hundred soldiers | 100 |
| At the bridge and Boqueron, Ensign Pedro Vazquez with a hundred and fifty soldiers | 150 |
| In the frigates, three hundred men under the command of Don Pedro Tello | 300 |
| At the mouth of the river Bayamon, Captain Otega with fifty soldiers | 50 |
| 750 |
The rest of the people occupied the Morro and the esplanade, under the command of Captain Marco Antonio de Veçerra and the governor, who led the cavalry; each of them to advance with his party to whatever point seemed to require his presence, or to stand in need of succour.
ARTILLERY PLANTED.
Besides the frigates well armed, without which there were the aforesaid seventy pieces of cannon planted with good gunners at each post, and for chief commander of the forts of the Morro and the Morillo de Sta. Helena, the Admiral, Gonçalo Mendez de Canço.
On the 15th of the same month intelligence arrived from the governor of Canary, despatched to the governor of this island, to make it known that the enemy’s fleet had passed by the former place, and having landed some people for the purpose of watering, they had been forced to retreat with the loss of five-and-twenty men, and had gone off towards the Indies; and the same messenger stated, that in passing by the island of St. Martin, he had seen the armada, of five-and-twenty sail, lying at anchor.
Immediately, on the same day, the general, Sancho Pardo, sent the same despatch to the governor of the Havana, and wrote to him to forward the information to New Spain to General Pedro Melendez, who was on that coast with his fleet. These precautionary steps having been taken, and the people being all eager to combat the enemy, the general held a council, at which were present, Don Pedro Tello; the admiral, Gonçalo Mendez; and the captains, Marco Antonio Veçerra, Pedro de Guia, and Domingo de Ynsaurraga, with the supercargo Martin Vomero de Caamaño; and having taken into consideration whether it were expedient to embark the bullion in two of the frigates, so that if the enemy should place himself before the port, these being lighter, might effect their escape by night, the other three following them in the rear, in order that, if any attempt were made upon them, they might stay behind fighting while the two continued their voyage; it was decided by the majority of votes, that the bullion should not be removed from the place where it was lying, because the removal of it would tend to dispirit the people, who were fired with the thought of defending it: seeing their expectations foiled, they would be dispirited, and His Majesty would lose the place and his reputation, which was to be valued much more highly than the bullion: and what it behoved them to do, was to face the enemy, trusting in God for the victory. When the general saw how the majority inclined, he gave orders to Don Pedro Tello to get the frigates ready with all convenient despatch, that the bullion might be embarked whenever it was found expedient to do so; the enemy, it was supposed, would afford indications of his intentions, if he had such, of watching for it outside; and he directed that a caravel should cruise on the look out, about fifty leagues off the land. This was done accordingly, and the bullion remained as it was, which was the prudent course.
Wednesday the 22nd of the same month (November), at break of day, the enemy’s fleet was descried on the horizon, with twenty-three sail and a pinnace. The six queen’s galleons of eight hundred tons, and two ships of the same size, and the rest, vessels of three hundred tons and of one hundred and fifty and less, and forty launches, came sailing in close order. Immediately every one snatched up his arms and ran to his post with great alacrity, and well disposed for combat. There was but little wind, and so the fleet advanced but slowly till it entered the breeze. The pinnace came first and some boats with white signal-flags sounding the coast. One of them having come in front of the Boqueron battery, a gun was fired at it which made it stand off to sea, and they immediately hoisted other coloured flags and passed out; and in the afternoon the whole fleet came and cast anchor in front of the curtain of the Cabron, where no one had ever seen a ship ride before, nor was it known that there was good anchorage till after the departure of the enemy, when the general sent to have the place sounded, and from twenty to thirty fathoms clear water were found there. From what was learned, it appears to have been his intention to land a force under the fire of his artillery, imagining that he should find us unprepared, and seeing no reason to believe that such a step would meet with resistance; wherein he was mistaken.
The fleet having arrived in the place above-mentioned, our people fired at it several pieces of artillery from the Morrillo and the curtain of the Cabron, so that some of the shot took effect on them, for it was known afterwards, that they killed John Hawkins, the general of one of the squadrons, and two of the principal gentlemen who accompanied him, besides other people; and that they carried away the table at which Francis Drake was eating, the ball striking a gentleman who was with him, and who, it is known, will not escape.
The enemy perceiving how much loss he sustained from the shore, sent the pinnace with a pilot, a native of the islands and a mulatto by race, who is said to be practically well acquainted with these coasts, with five boats to the port, to reconnoitre it and to sound close to the mouth formed by the islet, which is called Goat Island, which lies towards the west; and when it was sounded, one of the boats returned with information to the fleet, which immediately weighed anchor, at five o’clock in the evening, without having fired a cannon or even a musket during all the whole time that it was there, and ran out to sea, where it stood off and on that night till the following day.
Thursday following, at eight o’clock in the morning, the whole fleet came and anchored on the windward side of the small island where they had been sounding the day before, close to the port; and this was another new anchorage not known hitherto, and having six fathoms over shoals, where a vessel might be easily lost in any bad weather. There the fleet anchored, the weather being favourable, and beyond the reach of our artillery; and the same evening two boats were sent to sound the shore by the river Bayamon as far as the Carivelo stockade, and to examine these shoals in order to see if it were possible to land a force in that quarter; and in one of the boats, which was covered closely with an awning, was Francis Drake, as was subsequently learned.
When Don Pedro Tello, who had charge of the port, saw the pains the enemy was taking, and perceived that an attack was about to be made that very night on the stockade of the Carivelo, by forcing it with boats, so as to land a body of men, he sent to the general to acquaint him with what was going on, and to ask for a reinforcement to resist such an attempt; and the general ordered that in the evening Captain Augustin de Candecho should proceed thither with thirty soldiers, and that at night there should be fifty soldiers under the command of the supercargo, Martin Vomero de Caamaño, with orders that if the enemy’s force should prove superior, he should retreat with his men in boats to the frigates, in which their forces were to be concentrated.
The same Thursday, 23rd, St. Clement’s day, at ten o’clock at night, when it was quite dark, the enemy commenced an attack on the port with twenty-five boats, each carrying fifty or sixty men well armed, with the view of burning the frigates, as was afterwards seen, and they all entered close up to the platform of the Rock [battery], ranging themselves under the fire of the artillery; and from what was learned afterwards, it appears that Francis Drake came in one of them to the mouth of the port to place the rest. Dark as it was, the boats were seen, and instantly the guns from the Rock and from the fort of Sta. Helena began to play as briskly as possible. Most of the boats attacked the Capitana, the Texeda frigate, setting fire to her at the bow, and throwing into her a quantity of fire-pots and shells, while ours succeeded in extinguishing the flames before they had done any damage, the fight being carried on with cannon, musquetry, and stones.
At the same time they set fire to the Sta. Ysabel and Magdalena frigates, and to the Sancta Clara, which was extinguished; but the third time that the Magdalena frigate, of which Domingo de Ynsaurraga was captain, took fire, it was impossible to extinguish the flames, as the ship took fire at the stern and burned furiously; and all that could be done to maintain a footing on board, was done by the aforesaid captain and the people with him, until the ship was just burnt down and twelve men were killed by the enemy’s musquetry, besides as many more burnt. And the aforesaid captain made his escape by swimming through the midst of the boats and reached the frigate Sancta Ysabel, which was under the command of Captain Juan Flores de Rabanal in place of Captain Pedro de Guia, who had charge of a post on land, and there he lent his assistance in every manner possible. The battle lasted for an hour, the most obstinately contested that was ever seen, and the whole port was illumined by the burning frigate in a manner favourable for the rest, who could thus see to point our artillery and that of the forts, with which, and with the musquetry and the stones thrown from the frigate, they did such effect, that the enemy, after about an hour, during which the combat lasted, as I have said, retreated with the loss of nine or ten boats and more than four hundred men, besides many more wounded; while on our side, the only loss was that of the frigate and forty men killed or burnt, besides a few wounded by the musquetry. It was a fine sight to see how the frigates fought, and how capitally they were backed by the artillery of the forts, particularly that of Sta. Helena, which was in an advantageous position for playing on the boats.
Friday 24th. Considering that the enemy would assuredly repeat his attack at night, and endeavour to land his forces, the people on our side never ceased, from the dawn of day, to prepare for resistance, planting cannon at some passes on land, as was done, for example, in the whole of the Tejar, where the governor commanded, with Captain Marco Antonio and the people forming the company of guards. Captain Guia, who previously kept guard in the Morrillo, now took his station in the curtain of Sancta Catalina with fifty arquebusseers; in the curtain of the Friars, close to the fortress, were two other pieces with thirty soldiers, under the command of the supercargo, Martin Vomero, and on every side numerous trenches were dug and defences constructed, every one working spade in hand, and not a single negro to assist, for the people round about had sent off all their slaves to the mountain, with their effects and women, as soon as the enemy appeared.
However, about eight o’clock in the morning, as soon as the land breeze sprang up, the enemy’s fleet weighed and stood to sea, endeavouring to get to windward of the port, and continued on this course till evening; and Don Pedro Tello perceiving that the object was to run at once into the port, went ashore to explain to the general his apprehension that the enemy was about to bear down directly on the place: that the two ships which had been already sunk did not completely close up the entrance to it, and that it was expedient to sink two frigates in the part that still remained open, inasmuch as the complete barring of the entrance and the security of the port were quite as important as the two frigates, for many reasons, and for the good of His Majesty’s service.
General Sancho Pardo immediately held a council with the governor and other officers, and they decided that one frigate should be sunk in the channel, in case that a ship belonging to Pedro Sedeño, which was lying there laden with merchandise, and another of less size, should prove insufficient; that these should be sunk immediately, just as they were, as there was not time to unload them, and that the frigate should be sunk whenever Don Pedro thought proper.
At four o’clock in the afternoon the enemy came running down with the breeze towards the port, and Don Pedro Tello, believing that he was making directly for it, sank the two vessels of Sedeño and Juan Diaz de Sancta Aña, and also the Texeda frigate, without being able, owing to the short time allowed, to take out of them all the provisions and guns, although a part was saved; and thus the entrance of the channel was completely closed, and about vesper time the enemy came to anchor between the Rock and Goat island, where he had lain at anchor the night before.
The circumstance that the fleet anchored, and nearer than before to the port, tended to confirm the suspicion that the enemy meant to attempt that very night to finish the burning of the frigates, and to land people. Don Pedro Tello, therefore, with the consent of the governor, had the three frigates brought back to the interior of the port, and they were placed in the Tejar with a guard to secure them; but he had no fears about the landing of a force, seeing the spirit which animated our people, and that all the posts and landing-places were well entrenched and strengthened. The removal of the frigates took place at night, when the enemy could see nothing, and consequently the next morning he concluded that they had been all sunk. The night passed off quietly, without any effort on our part to shew that we were well on the watch.
Saturday the 25th, as soon as daylight appeared, the enemy sent seven or eight boats to reconnoitre the port, and all the shore as far as the Boqueron. These kept at a distance from land, beyond the reach of our guns; and about ten o’clock they returned to the fleet, which remained at anchor in the place above-mentioned.
The same day, about two o’clock in the afternoon, our caravel, which had gone to look out for the enemy eight days before, came in sight, and as soon as it was seen by our people, they fired a gun from the Boqueron to warn it to bear up without approaching the port; and some boats from the fleet followed it as far as the Playa de Cangrejos (crab ground), where it ran ashore, and part of the cavalry hastened forward to assist the crew; and Francisco Gonçalez, who was the pilot and captain of the caravel, scuttled her, to prevent the enemy’s carrying her off; and so the boats went away, and returned to the fleet without making a prize.
The same Saturday, at night, the whole fleet made sail without being seen, and stood out to sea; and when we found in the morning that it had disappeared, people were sent by land westwards along the coast to ascertain whether it was seen or had passed that way, as was supposed, and was going to St. Domingo.
On Monday news arrived from Arracibo, fourteen leagues from this port, that the fleet had passed by on its course. The same day the general despatched another messenger to San German, who returned within six days with the information that the enemy’s fleet was lying in the Butiro de la Azucar on the other side of San German, and that they had landed five companies of pikemen and musqueteers, who were collecting supplies of meat, wood, and water, and made four boats in as many days to carry their supplies.
The general having received this intelligence, and thinking it likely that there might be some artifice in the enemy’s movements, who perhaps might be lying in wait hoping to catch the two frigates, or intending to return upon Puerto Rico when they should be gone and the place weakened, in order that he might seize it, and execute his design of fortifying himself in it, seriously deliberated as to what should be done, and determined that the frigates should not quit the port till it was known for certain that the enemy had passed Point de la Aguada; and that Captain Juan Flores de Rabanal should go seventy or eighty leagues to the north with a patache to look out, while the bullion was in the meantime embarking. In eight days he returned, without having seen anything.
The 9th of December intelligence was brought from San German that the enemy’s fleet had gone away southwards.
On the 11th of the same month there arrived at this place Lope Sanchez, boatswain of the Magdalena frigate, and four seamen of the same, who had been taken in the water by the enemy’s boats, the night the frigates were set on fire. These men had been put on shore in the Butiro de la Azucar, with a letter of Francis Drake to the governor here, of which the following is a copy:—
Letter of Francis Drake to Colonel Pedro Suarez, Governor of Puerto Rico.
“Understanding that your lordship is a gentleman of rank and a soldier, I write this letter to give you to understand that whenever I have had an opportunity of dealing with the Spanish nation, I have treated it with much honour and clemency, liberating the individuals belonging to it, not a few, but many in number. So, at the time when our people set fire to the frigates, certain Spaniards were saved from the fury of the flames, who, as conquered enemies, experienced from us no ill-treatment, but the usage of honourable war.
“From them it has been learned that the capitana of Don Pedro Tello took a small vessel of our fleet, having on board twenty-five Englishmen, or more, treating them well, and as might be expected in fair war. I myself still cherish my former sentiments; but having another affair, strong deeds are done, which never entered my mind. But as there are in this place soldiers and gentlemen, I have no doubt that my people will fare well, and will obtain their liberty for the sake of honourable war: this I hope, and shall do the like myself. I remain at your lordship’s service in all things, bating the cause which is to be maintained as that of the flag of her sacred Majesty the queen of England.
“Francis Drake.
“The 23d November 1595, English style.”
From the information given by the aforesaid boatswain and the other seamen, who had gone with the enemy for eight days, it was ascertained that the latter had departed thence towards the S. or S.S.W., and that they were going to St. Domingo and thence to Panama, for they said that they were going where there was a quantity of gold and silver; and the same thing might also be inferred from the number of boats they took with them for an armament.
These men confirmed also the death of John Hawkins, and testified as to the regret occasioned thereby, as well as to the heavy loss which the enemy sustained. Thus, as a boat was passing one day from the flag-ship to one of the other galleons, it was struck, and nearly every man in it was wounded. They stated that the enemy complained much of the damage done by the stones thrown from the frigates; and that the loss was so great, that when Francis Drake held a council the day after the battle, to determine whether they should renew the attack, there was not one who agreed with him in favour of that proposition, especially as these men had told them that our force was much greater than it used to be; and that Drake was amazed when he learned how few people were on board of the frigates the night of the fire, and plucked his beard [with vexation] for not having taken the treasure and the place, not letting himself be seen those two days; complaining of John Hawkins, who did not allow them to pursue the three frigates from the island of Guadaloupe, as soon as it was known that they had taken the vessel and were making for Puerto Rico; intimating that in that case we should not have had the opportunity of fortifying the place, as was done in the eight days which they spent in the delay of preparing boats, and watering.
All this has been so ordered by God, to whom we owe many thanks, since by His means, besides obtaining such a victory, with so small a force as that which on our side resisted the efforts of so powerful an armament, in defence of the place and two millions of treasure, important services have resulted to his Majesty, and a general gain to private individuals.
In the first place, as far as can be learned, it was the enemy’s intention to maintain this force, which he might easily do at small cost, for the pirates of all nations who frequent these seas, would gather about him, and would aid him in defending the position; and it would then be necessary to fit out an expedition expressly to retake the place, since the port has a decided advantage, and from thence much injury may be easily done to the islands and coasts which are to leeward.
In the second place, this enemy, who up to this time has never met with any resistance at sea, has here had his head broken; since, as has been related, one of the two leaders died, with four hundred of his followers, and a great many were wounded.
Thirdly, we have thus saved two millions worth of gold, silver, and cochineal, with which the queen might equip and maintain a force to give us further trouble.
Fourthly, the delaying of the enemy in these islands till the 3rd December, allowed time for warning those places for the safety of which fears might be entertained, by means of the despatches which were sent, as has been stated, to St. Domingo and the Havana, whence others were forwarded to Carthagena and New Spain, so that we may now hope that all is safe.
The last, and not the least consideration, is, the spirit which our people have shewn, and the renown which they have won, proving the inferiority of the enemy; and, on the other hand, the hold on opinion which the latter have lost, and in which consists to a great extent the secret of good or ill-success. And since the beneficial results of this affair are so many, his Majesty ought to return thanks to those who took part in it, in order that the lookers-on may be encouraged to serve him on like occasions.
This affair having passed over as here related, and the general having received information that the enemy was gone on, and that provisions were scarce, a quantity of them having been lost on this occasion, and the poverty of the island being such that the deficiency could not be made good, and that it was necessary for him to abridge his delay as much as possible, gave orders to collect the guns with the utmost despatch from the several posts on land, and to embark the treasure in the frigates; and with these, one ship, and a patache, in which were embarked part of the crews and artillery of the two lost frigates, he left Puerto Rico with good weather on the 20th December 1595.
The Instructions given by F. Drake to the captain of the Francis, one of the vessels of his fleet, which was taken at the island of Guadaloupe.
The Instruction and Order to be observed by the whole fleet, which departs from the port of Plymouth on the 29th August 1595.
1. In the first place, omit not divine worship, and let this order be observed twice a-day, unless no opportunity offers.
2. Secondly, great care must be taken to keep company and to come to speak with your admiral twice a-day; and if you cannot do it more than once, yet let it be done every day; and take great care to observe every order given you, and to be always in company, as the weather shall allow.
3. And should it happen that any ship or small vessel, through stress of weather or other cause that may be, parts company, they must look for us first of all in the island of Bayona, on the coast of Galicia, and the fleet will wait till it is time to proceed and you shall have found us; and thence, if you should not find us, you shall go to Puerto Sancto, and there you shall wait for us three days; and should we not be there, you shall make for the island of Guadaloupe (a small island near Dominica towards the north-east), where we will stay three days, and will leave some signal that you may know what course we shall have taken, which shall be for Puerto Rico; there we will stay ten days.
4. If in the course of this voyage you meet with any foul wind or bad weather, you must take in all sail at night till morning, unless you see that one of your admirals carries sail, in which case you shall do the same.
5. And if foul wind or bad weather should come on at night, your admiral will hang out two lanterns, one above the other, and the height of a man asunder, that you may steer by them.
6. And if we should all shorten sail over night on account of the weather, and it be necessary to make sail the same night, you must show, before we make sail, a single lantern with a light at the bow, and another at the fore-top.
7. You shall keep no light in any of the ships, but only the light in the binocle, and this with the greatest care that it be not seen, excepting the admiral’s ship; and to avoid the danger of fire, you must not bear about any candle or light in the ship, unless in a lantern; and neither more nor less, you must take the greatest care with the fire in the galley.
8. No vessel, square or cutter-rigged, should go ahead of the admiral at night, particularly in rough weather; or get under the lee of large vessels, in tacking from side to side.
9. And if any vessel of the fleet should lose, through mischance, a main-mast, or yard, or any of the water vessels, or anything else of importance, they shall fire one or two shots, according to the necessity of the case, that the other vessels may afford them speedy assistance; and take care that no vessel quit that which is in distress till the required succour be given.
10. Should any vessel of the fleet lose her course, and fall in with another of the fleet, the signal shall be to hoist and lower topsails three times; and the other vessel shall do the same for recognition.
11. You must not permit any gambling in the ship, with cards or dice, by reason of the numerous quarrels usually resulting from that practice.
12. You must take the greatest care to save the provisions, following your own discretion in this matter till you receive another order for your guidance.
13. Finally, in order that you may be better able to keep company, you shall see a light at the admiral’s stern once or twice.
Francis Drake.
FINIS.
RICHARDS, PRINTER,
100, ST. MARTIN’S LANE.