History of Dogma, Volume 2

by Adolf von Harnack

ADDENDA.

I. THE PRIESTHOOD. The completion of the old Catholic conception of the Church, as this idea was developed in the latter half of the third century, is perhaps most clearly shown in the attribute of priesthood, with which the clergy were invested and which conferred on them the greatest importance.[²⁵⁹] The development of this conception, whose adoption is a proof that the Church had assumed a heathen complexion, cannot be more particularly treated of here.[²⁶⁰] What meaning it has is shown by its application in Cyprian and the original of the first six books of the Apostolic Constitutions (see Book II.). The bishops (and also the presbyters) are priests, in so far as they alone are empowered to present the sacrifice as representatives of the congregation before God[²⁶¹] and in so far as they dispense or refuse the divine grace as representatives of God in relation to the congregation. In this sense they are also judges in God's stead.[²⁶²] The position here conceded to the higher clergy corresponds to that of the mystagogue in heathen religions, and is acknowledged to be borrowed from the latter.[²⁶³] Divine grace already appears as a sacramental consecration of an objective nature, the bestowal of which is confined to spiritual personages chosen by God. This fact is no way affected by the perception that an ever increasing reference is made to the Old Testament priests as well as to the whole Jewish ceremonial and ecclesiastical regulations.[²⁶⁴] It is true that there is no other respect in which Old Testament commandments were incorporated with Christianity to such an extent as they were in this.[²⁶⁵] But it can be proved that this formal adoption everywhere took place at a subsequent date, that is, it had practically no influence on the development itself, which was not legitimised by the commandments till a later period, and that often in a somewhat lame fashion. We may perhaps say that the development which made the bishops and elders priests altered the inward form of the Church in a more radical fashion than any other. "Gnosticism," which the Church had repudiated in the second century, became part of her own system in the third. As her integrity had been made dependent on inalienable objective standards, the adoption even of this greatest innovation, which indeed was in complete harmony with the secular element within her, was an elementary necessity. In regard to every sphere of Church life, and hence also in respect to the development of dogma[²⁶⁶] and the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, the priesthood proved of the highest significance. The clerical exposition of the sacred books, with its frightful ideas, found its earliest advocate in Cyprian and had thus a most skilful champion at the very first.[²⁶⁷]

II. SACRIFICE. In Book I., chap. III., § 7, we have already shown what a wide field the idea of sacrifice occupied in primitive Christendom, and how it was specially connected with the celebration of the Lord's Supper. The latter was regarded as the pure (i.e., to be presented with a pure heart), bloodless thank offering of which Malachi had prophesied in I. 11. Priesthood and sacrifice, however, are mutually conditioned. The alteration of the concept "priest" necessarily led to a simultaneous and corresponding change in the idea of sacrifice, just as, conversely, the latter reacted on the former.[²⁶⁸] In Irenæus and Tertullian the old conception of sacrifice, viz., that prayers are the Christian sacrifice and that the disposition of the believer hallows his whole life even as it does his offering, and forms a well-pleasing sacrifice to God, remains essentially unchanged. In particular, there is no evidence of any alteration in the notion of sacrifice connected with the Lord's Supper.[²⁶⁹] But nevertheless we can already trace a certain degree of modification in Tertullian. Not only does he give fasting, voluntary celibacy, martyrdom, etc., special prominence among the sacrificial acts of a Christian life, and extol their religious value—as had already been done before; but he also attributes a God-propitiating significance to these performances, and plainly designates them as "merita" ("promereri deum"). To the best of my belief Tertullian was the first who definitely regarded ascetic performances as propitiatory offerings and ascribed to them the "potestas reconciliandi iratum deum."[²⁷⁰] But he himself was far from using this fatal theory, so often found in his works, to support a lax Church practice that made Christianity consist in outward forms. This result did not come about till the eventful decades, prolific in new developments, that elapsed between the persecutions of Septimius and Decius; and in the West it is again Cyprian who is our earliest witness as to the new view and practice.[²⁷¹] In the first place, Cyprian was quite familiar with the idea of ascetic propitiations and utilised it in the interest of the Catholicity of the Church; secondly, he propounded a new theory of the offering in the cultus. As far as the first point is concerned, Cyprian's injunctions with regard to it are everywhere based on the understanding that even after baptism no one can be without sin (de op. et cleemos. 3); and also on the firm conviction that this sacrament can only have a retrospective virtue. Hence he concludes that we must appease God, whose wrath has been aroused by sin, through performances of our own, that is, through offerings that bear the character of "satisfactions." In other words we must blot out transgressions by specially meritorious deeds in order thus to escape eternal punishment. These deeds Cyprian terms "merita," which either possess the character of atonements, or, in case there are no sins to be expiated, entitle the Christian to a special reward (merces).[²⁷²] But, along with lamentationes and acts of penance, it is principally alms-giving that forms such means of atonement (see de lapsis, 35, 36). In Cyprian's eyes this is already the proper satisfaction; mere prayer, that is, devotional exercises unaccompanied by fasting and alms, being regarded as "bare and unfruitful." In the work "de opere et eleemosynis" which, after a fashion highly characteristic of Cyprian, is made dependent on Sirach and Tobias, he has set forth a detailed theory of what we may call alms-giving as a means of grace in its relation to baptism and salvation.[²⁷³] However, this practice can only be viewed as a means of grace in Cyprian's sense in so far as God has accepted it, that is, pointed it out. In itself it is a free human act. After the Decian persecution and the rearrangement of ecclesiastical affairs necessitated by it, works and alms (opera et eleemosynæ) made their way into the absolution system of the Church, and were assigned a permanent place in it. Even the Christian who has forfeited his Church membership by abjuration may ultimately recover it by deeds of sacrifice, of course under the guidance and intercessory coöperation of the Church. The dogmatic dilemma we find here cannot be more clearly characterised than by simply placing the two doctrines professed by Cyprian side by side. These are:—(1) that the sinfulness common to each individual can only be once extirpated by the power of baptism derived from the work of Christ, and (2) that transgressions committed after baptism, inclusive of mortal sins, can and must be expiated solely by spontaneous acts of sacrifice under the guidance of kind mother Church.[²⁷⁴] A Church capable of being permanently satisfied with such doctrines would very soon have lost the last remains of her Christian character. What was wanted was a means of grace, similar to baptism and granted by God through Christ, to which the opera et eleemosynæ are merely to bear the relation of accompanying acts. But Cyprian was no dogmatist and was not able to form a doctrine of the means of grace. He never got beyond his "propitiate God the judge by sacrifices after baptism" ("promereri deum judicem post baptismum sacrificiis"), and merely hinted, in an obscure way, that the absolution of him who has committed a deadly sin after baptism emanates from the same readiness of God to forgive as is expressed in that rite, and that membership in the Church is a condition of absolution. His whole theory as to the legal nature of man's (the Christian's) relationship to God, and the practice, inaugurated by Tertullian, of designating this connection by terms derived from Roman law continued to prevail in the West down to Augustine's time.[²⁷⁵] But, during this whole interval, no book was written by a Western Churchman which made the salvation of the sinful Christian dependent on ascetic offerings of atonement, with so little regard to Christ's grace and the divine factor in the case, as Cyprian's work de opere et eleemosynis.

No less significant is Cyprian's advance as regards the idea of the sacrifice in public worship, and that in three respects. To begin with, Cyprian was the first to associate the specific offering, i.e., the Lord's Supper[²⁷⁶] with the specific priesthood. Secondly, he was the first to designate the passio dominis, nay, the sanguis Christi and the dominica hostia as the object of the eucharistic offering.[²⁷⁷] Thirdly, he expressly represented the celebration of the Lord's Supper as an incorporation of the congregation and its individual members with Christ, and was the first to bear clear testimony as to the special importance attributed to commemoration of the celebrators ("vivi et defuncti"), though no other can be ascertained than a specially strong intercession.[²⁷⁸] But this is really the essential effect of the sacrifice of the supper as regards the celebrators; for however much the conceptions about this ceremony might be heightened, and whatever additions might be made to its ritual, forgiveness of sins in the strict sense could not be associated with it. Cyprian's statement that every celebration of the Lord's Supper is a repetition or imitation of Christ's sacrifice of himself, and that the ceremony has therefore an expiatory value remains a mere assertion, though the Romish Church still continues to repeat this doctrine to the present day. For the idea that partaking of the Lord's Supper cleansed from sin like the mysteries of the Great Mother (magna mater) and Mithras, though naturally suggested by the ceremonial practice, was counteracted by the Church principles of penance and by the doctrine of baptism. As a sacrificial rite the Supper never became a ceremony equivalent in effect to baptism. But no doubt, as far as the popular conception was concerned, the solemn ritual copied from the ancient mysteries could not but attain an indescribably important significance. It is not possible, within the framework of the history of dogma, to describe the development of religious ceremonial in the third century, and to show what a radical alteration took place in men's conceptions with regard to it (cf. for example, Justin with Cyprian). But, in dealing with the history of dogma within this period, we must clearly keep in view the development of the cultus, the new conceptions of the value of ritual, and the reference of ceremonial usages to apostolic tradition; for there was plainly a remodelling of the ritual in imitation of the ancient mysteries and of the heathen sacrificial system, and this fact is admitted by Protestant scholars of all parties. Ceremonial and doctrine may indeed be at variance, for the latter may lag behind the former and vice versa, but they are never subject to entirely different conditions.

III. MEANS OF GRACE, BAPTISM, and EUCHARIST. That which the Western Church of post-Augustinian times calls sacrament in the specific sense of the word (means of grace) was only possessed by the Church of the third century in the form of baptism.[²⁷⁹] In strict theory she still held that the grace once bestowed in this rite could be conferred by no holy ceremony of equal virtue, that is, by no fresh sacrament. The baptised Christian has no means of grace, conferred by Christ, at his disposal, but has his law to fulfil (see, e.g., Iren. IV. 27. 2). But, as soon as the Church began to absolve mortal sinners, she practically possessed in absolution a real means of grace that was equally effective with baptism from the moment that this remission became unlimited in its application.[²⁸⁰] The notions as to this means of grace, however, continued quite uncertain in so far as the thought of God's absolving the sinner through the priest was qualified by the other theory (see above) which asserted that forgiveness was obtained through the penitential acts of transgressors (especially baptism with blood, and next in importance lamentationes, ieiunia, eleemosynæ). In the third century there were manifold holy dispensations of grace by the hands of priests; but there was still no theory which traced the means of grace to the historical work of Christ in the same way that the grace bestowed in baptism was derived from it. From Cyprian's epistles and the anti-Novatian sections in the first six books of the Apostolic Constitutions we indeed see that appeal was not unfrequently made to the power of forgiving sins bestowed on the Apostles and to Christ's declaration that he received sinners; but, as the Church had not made up her mind to repeat baptism, so also she had yet no theory that expressly and clearly supplemented this rite by a sacramentum absolutionis. In this respect, as well as in regard to the sacramentum ordinis, first instituted by Augustine, theory remained far behind practice. This was by no means an advantage, for, as a matter of fact, the whole religious ceremonial was already regarded as a system of means of grace. The consciousness of a personal, living connection of the individual with God through Christ had already disappeared, and the hesitation in setting up new means of grace had only the doubtful result of increasing the significance of human acts, such as offerings and satisfactions, to a dangerous extent.

Since the middle of the second century the notions of baptism[²⁸¹] in the Church have not essentially altered (see Vol. I. p. 206 ff.). The result of baptism was universally considered to be forgiveness of sins, and this pardon was supposed to effect an actual sinlessness which now required to be maintained.[²⁸²] We frequently find "deliverance from death," "regeneration of man," "restoration to the image of God," and "obtaining of the Holy Spirit." ("Absolutio mortes," "regeneratio hominis," "restitutio ad similitudinem dei" and "consecutio spiritus sancti") named along with the "remission of sins" and "obtaining of eternal life" ("remissio delictorum" and "consecutio æternitatis"). Examples are to be found in Tertullian[²⁸³] adv. Marc. I. 28 and elsewhere; and Cyprian speaks of the "bath of regeneration and sanctification" ("lavacrum regenerationis et sanctificationis"). Moreover, we pretty frequently find rhetorical passages where, on the strength of New Testament texts, all possible blessings are associated with baptism.[²⁸⁴] The constant additions to the baptismal ritual, a process which had begun at a very early period, are partly due to the intention of symbolising these supposedly manifold virtues of baptism,[²⁸⁵] and partly owe their origin to the endeavour to provide the great mystery with fit accompaniments.[²⁸⁶] As yet the separate acts can hardly be proved to have an independent signification.[²⁸⁷] The water was regarded both as the symbol of the purification of the soul and as an efficacious, holy medium of the Spirit (in accordance with Gen. I. 2; water and Spirit are associated with each other, especially in Cyprian's epistles on baptism). He who asserted the latter did not thereby repudiate the former (see Orig. in Joann. Tom. VI. 17, Opp. IV. p. 133).[²⁸⁸] Complete obscurity prevails as to the Church's adoption of the practice of child baptism, which, though it owes its origin to the idea of this ceremony being indispensable to salvation, is nevertheless a proof that the superstitious view of baptism had increased.[²⁸⁹] In the time of Irenæus (II. 22. 4) and Tertullian (de bapt. 18) child baptism had already become very general and was founded on Matt. XIX. 14. We have no testimony regarding it from earlier times; Clement of Alexandria does not yet assume it. Tertullian argued against it not only because he regarded conscious faith as a needful preliminary condition, but also because he thought it advisable to delay baptism (cunctatio baptismi) on account of the responsibility involved in it (pondus baptismi). He says: "It is more advantageous to delay baptism, especially in the case of little children. For why is it necessary for the sponsors" (this is the first mention of "godparents") "also to be thrust into danger?... let the little ones therefore come when they are growing up; let them come when they are learning, when they are taught where they are coming to; let them become Christians when they are able to know Christ. Why does an age of innocence hasten to the remission of sins? People will act more cautiously in worldly affairs, so that one who is not trusted with earthly things is trusted with divine. Whoever understands the responsibility of baptism will fear its attainment more than its delay."[²⁹⁰] To all appearance the practice of immediately baptising the children of Christian families was universally adopted in the Church in the course of the third century. (Origen, Comment, in ep. ad Rom. V. 9, Opp. IV. p. 565, declared child baptism to be a custom handed down by the Apostles.) Grown up people, on the other hand, frequently postponed baptism, but this habit was disapproved.[²⁹¹]

The Lord's Supper was not only regarded as a sacrifice, but also as a divine gift.[²⁹²] The effects of this gift were not theoretically fixed, because these were excluded by the strict scheme[²⁹³] of baptismal grace and baptismal obligation. But in practice Christians more and more assumed a real bestowal of heavenly gifts in the holy food, and gave themselves over to superstitious theories. This bestowal was sometimes regarded as a spiritual and sometimes as a bodily self-communication of Christ, that is, as a miraculous implanting of divine life. Here ethical and physical, and again ethical and theoretical features were intermixed with each other. The utterances of the Fathers to which we have access do not allow us to classify these elements here; for to all appearance not a single one clearly distinguished between spiritual and bodily, or ethical and intellectual effects unless he was in principle a spiritualist. But even a writer of this kind had quite as superstitious an idea of the holy elements as the rest. Thus the holy meal was extolled as the communication of incorruption, as a pledge of resurrection, as a medium of the union of the flesh with the Holy Spirit; and again as food of the soul, as the bearer of the Spirit of Christ (the Logos), as the means of strengthening faith and knowledge, as a sanctifying of the whole personality. The thought of the forgiveness of sins fell quite into the background. This ever changing conception, as it seems to us, of the effects of partaking of the Lord's Supper had also a parallel in the notions as to the relation between the visible elements and the body of Christ. So far as we are able to judge no one felt that there was a problem here, no one enquired whether this relation was realistic or symbolical. The symbol is the mystery and the mystery was not conceivable without a symbol. What we now-a-days understand by "symbol" is a thing which is not that which it represents; at that time "symbol" denoted a thing which, in some kind of way, really is what it signifies; but, on the other hand, according to the ideas of that period, the really heavenly element lay either in or behind the visible form without being identical with it. Accordingly the distinction of a symbolic and realistic conception of the Supper is altogether to be rejected; we could more rightly distinguish between materialistic, dyophysite, and docetic conceptions which, however, are not to be regarded as severally exclusive in the strict sense. In the popular idea the consecrated elements were heavenly fragments of magical virtue (see Cypr., de laps. 25; Euseb., H. E. VI. 44). With these the rank and file of third-century Christians already connected many superstitious notions which the priests tolerated or shared.[²⁹⁴] The antignostic Fathers acknowledged that the consecrated food consisted of two things, an earthly (the elements) and a heavenly (the real body of Christ). They thus saw in the sacrament a guarantee of the union between spirit and flesh, which the Gnostics denied; and a pledge of the resurrection of the flesh nourished by the blood of the Lord (Justin; Iren. IV. 18. 4, 5; V. 2. 2, 3; likewise Tertullian who is erroneously credited with a "symbolical" doctrine[²⁹⁵]). Clement and Origen "spiritualise," because, like Ignatius, they assign a spiritual significance to the flesh and blood of Christ himself (summary of wisdom). To judge from the exceedingly confused passage in Pæd. II. 2, Clement distinguishes a spiritual and a material blood of Christ. Finally, however, he sees in the Eucharist the union of the divine Logos with the human spirit, recognises, like Cyprian at a later period, that the mixture of wine with water in the symbol represents the spiritual process, and lastly does not fail to attribute to the holy food a relationship to the body.[²⁹⁶] It is true that Origen, the great mysteriosophist and theologian of sacrifice, expressed himself in plainly "spiritualistic" fashion; but in his eyes religious mysteries and the whole person of Christ lay in the province of the spirit, and therefore his theory of the Supper is not "symbolical," but conformable to his doctrine of Christ. Besides, Origen was only able to recognise spiritual aids in the sphere of the intellect and the disposition, and in the assistance given to these by man's own free and spontaneous efforts. Eating and drinking and, in general, participation in a ceremonial are from Origen's standpoint completely indifferent matters. The intelligent Christian feeds at all times on the body of Christ, that is, on the Word of God, and thus celebrates a never ending Supper (c. Cels. VIII. 22). Origen, however, was not blind to the fact that his doctrine of the Lord's Supper was just as far removed from the faith of the simple Christian as his doctrinal system generally. Here also, therefore, he accommodated himself to that faith in points where it seemed necessary. This, however, he did not find difficult; for, though with him everything is at bottom "spiritual," he was unwilling to dispense with symbols and mysteries, because he knew that one must be initiated into the spiritual, since one cannot learn it as one learns the lower sciences.[²⁹⁷] But, whether we consider simple believers, the antignostic Fathers or Origen, and, moreover, whether we view the Supper as offering or sacrament, we everywhere observe that the holy ordinance had been entirely diverted from its original purpose and pressed into the service of the spirit of antiquity. In no other point perhaps is the hellenisation of the Gospel so evident as in this. To mention only one other example, this is also shown in the practice of child communion, which, though we first hear of it in Cyprian (Testim. III. 25; de laps. 25), can hardly be of later origin than child baptism. Partaking of the Supper seemed quite as indispensable as baptism, and the child had no less claim than the adult to a magical food from heaven.[²⁹⁸]

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In the course of the third century a crass superstition became developed in respect to the conceptions of the Church and the mysteries connected with her. According to this notion we must subject ourselves to the Church and must have ourselves filled with holy consecrations as we are filled with food. But the following chapters will show that this superstition and mystery magic were counterbalanced by a most lively conception of the freedom and responsibility of the individual. Fettered by the bonds of authority and superstition in the sphere of religion, free and self-dependent in the province of morality, this Christianity is characterised by passive submission in the first respect and by complete activity in the second. It may be that exegetical theology can never advance beyond an alternation between these two aspects of the case, and a recognition of their equal claim to consideration; for the religious phenomenon in which they are combined defies any explanation. But religion is in danger of being destroyed when the insufficiency of the understanding is elevated into a convenient principle of theory and life, and when the real mystery of the faith, viz., how one becomes a new man, must accordingly give place to the injunction that we must obediently accept the religious as a consecration, and add to this the zealous endeavour after ascetic virtue. Such, however, has been the character of Catholicism since the third century, and even after Augustine's time it has still remained the same in its practice.

EXCURSUS TO CHAPTERS II. AND III.

CATHOLIC AND ROMAN.[²⁹⁹]

In investigating the development of Christianity up till about the year 270 the following facts must be specially kept in mind: In the regions subject to Rome, apart from the Judæo-Christian districts and passing disturbances, Christianity had yet an undivided history in vital questions;[³⁰⁰] the independence of individual congregations and of the provincial groups of Churches was very great; and every advance in the development of the communities at the same time denoted a forward step in their adaptation to the existing conditions of the Empire. The first two facts we have mentioned have their limitations. The further apart the different Churches lay, the more various were the conditions under which they arose and flourished; the looser the relations between the towns in which they had their home the looser also was the connection between them. Still, it is evident that towards the end of the third century the development in the Church had well-nigh attained the same point everywhere—except in outlying communities. Catholicism, essentially as we conceive it now, was what most of the Churches had arrived at. Now it is an a priori probability that this transformation of Christianity, which was simply the adaptation of the Gospel to the then existing Empire, came about under the guidance of the metropolitan Church,[³⁰¹] the Church of Rome; and that "Roman" and "Catholic" had therefore a special relation from the beginning. It might a limine be objected to this proposition that there is no direct testimony in support of it, and that, apart from this consideration, it is also improbable, in so far as, in view of the then existing condition of society, Catholicism appears as the natural and only possible form in which Christianity could be adapted to the world. But this is not the case; for in the first place very strong proofs can be adduced, and besides, as is shown by the development in the second century, very different kinds of secularisation were possible. In fact, if all appearances are not deceptive, the Alexandrian Church, for example, was up to the time of Septimius Severus pursuing a path of development which, left to itself, would not have led to Catholicism, but, in the most favourable circumstances, to a parallel form.[³⁰²]

It can, however, be proved that it was in the Roman Church, which up to about the year 190 was closely connected with that of Asia Minor, that all the elements on which Catholicism is based first assumed a definite form.[³⁰³] (1) We know that the Roman Church possessed a precisely formulated baptismal confession, and that as early as the year 180 she declared this to be the apostolic rule by which everything is to be measured. It is only in her case that we are really certain of this, for we can merely guess at it as regards the Church of Smyrna, that is, of Asia Minor. It was accordingly admitted that the Roman Church was able to distinguish true from false with special exactness;[³⁰⁴] and Irenæus and Tertullian appealed to her to decide the practice in Gaul and Africa. This practice, in its precisely developed form, cannot be shown to have existed in Alexandria till a later period; but Origen, who testifies to it, also bears witness to the special reverence for and connection with the Roman Church. (2) The New Testament canon, with its claim to be accounted catholic and apostolic and to possess exclusive authority is first traceable in her; in the other communities it can only be proved to exist at a later period. In the great Antiochian diocese there was, for instance, a Church some of whose members wished the Gospel of Peter read; in the Pentapolis group of congregations the Gospel of the Egyptians was still used in the 3rd century; Syrian Churches of the same epoch used Tatian's Diatessaron; and the original of the first six books of the Apostolic Constitutions still makes no mention of a New Testament canon. Though Clement of Alexandria no doubt testifies that, in consequence of the common history of Christianity, the group of Scriptures read in the Roman congregations was also the same as that employed in public worship at Alexandria, he had as yet no New Testament canon before him in the sense of Irenæus and Tertullian. It was not till Origen's time that Alexandria reached the stage already attained in Rome about forty years earlier. It must, however, be pointed out that a series of New Testament books, in the form now found in the canon and universally recognised, show marks of revision that can be traced back to the Roman Church.[³⁰⁵] Finally, the later investigations, which show that after the third century the Western readings, that is, the Roman text, of the New Testament were adopted in the Oriental MSS. of the Bible,[³⁰⁶] are of the utmost value here; for the most natural explanation of these facts is that the Eastern Churches then received their New Testament from Rome and used it to correct their copies of books read in public worship.[³⁰⁷] (3) Rome is the first place which we can prove to have constructed a list of bishops reaching back to the Apostles (see Irenæus).[³⁰⁸] We know that in the time of Heliogabalus such lists also existed in other communities; but it cannot be proved that these had already been drawn up by the time of Marcus Aurelius or Commodus, as was certainly the case at Rome. (4) The notion of the apostolic succession of the episcopate[³⁰⁹] was first turned to account by the Roman bishops, and they were the first who definitely formulated the political idea of the Church in connection with this. The utterances and corresponding practical measures of Victor,[³¹⁰] Calixtus (Hippolytus), and Stephen are the earliest of their kind; whilst the precision and assurance with which they substituted the political and clerical for the ideal conception of the Church, or amalgamated the two notions, as well as the decided way in which they proclaimed the sovereignty of the bishops, were not surpassed in the third century by Cyprian himself. (5) Rome was the first place, and that at a very early period, to date occurrences according to her bishops; and, even outside that city, churches reckoned, not according to their own, but according to the Roman episcopate.[³¹¹] (6) The Oriental Churches say that two bishops of Rome compiled the chief apostolic regulations for the organisation of the Church; and this is only partially wrong.[³¹²] (7) The three great theologians of the age, Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Origen, opposed the pretensions of the Roman bishop Calixtus; and this very attitude of theirs testified that the advance in the political organisation of the Church, denoted by the measures of Calixtus, was still an unheard-of novelty, but immediately exercised a very important influence on the attitude of other Churches. We know that the other communities imitated this advance in the succeeding decades. (8) The institution of lower orders of clergy with the corresponding distinction of clerici maiores and minores first took place in Rome; but we know that this momentous arrangement gradually spread from that city to the rest of Christendom.[³¹³] (9) The different Churches communicated with one another through the medium of Rome.[³¹⁴]

From these considerations we can scarcely doubt that the fundamental apostolic institutions and laws of Catholicism were framed in the same city that in other respects imposed its authority on the whole earth; and that it was the centre from which they spread, because the world had become accustomed to receive law and justice from Rome.[³¹⁵] But it may be objected that the parallel development in other provinces and towns was spontaneous, though it everywhere came about at a somewhat later date. Nor do we intend to contest the assumption in this general sense; but, as I think, it can be proved that the Roman community had a direct and important share in the process and that, even in the second century, she was reckoned the first and most influential Church.[³¹⁶] We shall give a bird's-eye view of the most important facts bearing on the question, in order to prove this.

No other community made a more brilliant entrance into Church history than did that of Rome by the so called First Epistle of Clement—Paul having already testified (Rom. I. 8) that the faith of this Church was spoken of throughout the whole world. That letter to the Corinthians proves that, by the end of the first century, the Roman Church had already drawn up fixed rules for her own guidance, that she watched with motherly care over outlying communities, and that she then knew how to use language that was at once an expression of duty, love, and authority.[³¹⁷] As yet she pretends to no legal title of any kind, but she knows the "commandments and ordinances" (προσταγματα and δοκαιωματα) of God, whereas the conduct of the sister Church evinces her uncertainty on the matter; she is in an orderly condition, whereas the sister community is threatened with dissolution; she adheres to the κανων της παραδοσεως, whilst the other body stands in need of exhortation;[³¹⁸] and in these facts her claim to authority consists. The Shepherd of Hermas also proves that even in the circles of the laity the Roman Church is impressed with the consciousness that she must care for the whole of Christendom. The first testimony of an outsider as to this community is afforded us by Ignatius. Soften as we may all the extravagant expressions in his Epistle to the Romans, it is at least clear that Ignatius conceded to them a precedence in the circle of sister Churches; and that he was well acquainted with the energy and activity displayed by them in aiding and instructing other communities.[³¹⁹] Dionysius of Corinth, in his letter to bishop Soter, affords us a glimpse of the vast activity manifested by the Christian Church of the world's metropolis on behalf of all Christendom and of all brethren far and near; and reveals to us the feelings of filial affection and veneration with which she was regarded in all Greece as well as in Antioch. This author has specially emphasised the fact that the Roman Christians are Romans, that is, are conscious of the particular duties incumbent on them as members of the metropolitan Church.[³²⁰] After this evidence we cannot wonder that Irenæus expressly assigned to the Church of Rome the highest rank among those founded by the Apostles.[³²¹] His famous testimony has been quite as often under as over-estimated. Doubtless his reference to the Roman Church is introduced in such a way that she is merely mentioned by way of example, just as he also adds the allusion to Smyrna and Ephesus; but there is quite as little doubt that this example was no arbitrary selection. The truth rather is that the Roman community must have been named, because its decision was already the most authoritative and impressive in Christendom.[³²²] Whilst giving a formal scheme of proof that assigned the same theoretical value to each Church founded by the Apostles, Irenæus added a reference to particular circumstance, viz., that in his time many communities turned to Rome in order to testify their orthodoxy.[³²³] As soon as we cease to obscure our vision with theories and keep in view the actual circumstances, we have no cause for astonishment. Considering the active intercourse between the various Churches and the metropolis, it was of the utmost importance to all, especially so long as they required financial aid, to be in connection with that of Rome, to receive support from her, to know she would entertain travelling brethren, and to have the power of recommending prisoners and those pining in the mines to her influential intervention. The evidence of Ignatius and Dionysius as well as the Marcia-Victor episode place this beyond doubt (see above). The efforts of Marcion and Valentinus in Rome have also a bearing on this question, and the venerable bishop, Polycarp, did not shrink from the toil of a long journey to secure the valuable fellowship of the Roman Church;[³²⁴] it was not Anicetus who came to Polycarp, but Polycarp to Anicetus. At the time when the controversy with Gnosticism ensued, the Roman Church showed all the rest an example of resolution; it was naturally to be expected that, as a necessary condition of mutual fellowship, she should require other communities to recognise the law by which she had regulated her own circumstances. No community in the Empire could regard with indifference its relationship to the great Roman Church; almost everyone had connections with her; she contained believers from all the rest. As early as 180 this Church could point to a series of bishops reaching in uninterrupted succession from the glorious apostles Paul and Peter[³²⁵] down to the present time; and she alone maintained a brief but definitely formulated lex, which she entitled the summary of apostolic tradition, and by reference to which she decided all questions of faith with admirable certainty. Theories were incapable of overcoming the elementary differences that could not but appear as soon as Christianity became naturalised in the various provinces and towns of the Empire. Nor was it theories that created the empiric unity of the Churches, but the unity which the Empire possessed in Rome; the extent and composition of the Græco-Latin community there; the security—and this was not the least powerful element—that accompanied the development of this great society, well provided as it was with wealth and possessed of an influence in high quarters already dating from the first century;[³²⁶] as well as the care which it displayed on behalf of all Christendom. All these causes combined to convert the Christian communities into a real confederation under the primacy of the Roman Church (and subsequently under the leadership of her bishops). This primacy cannot of course be further defined, for it was merely a de facto one. But, from the nature of the case, it was immediately shaken, when it was claimed as a legal right associated with the person of the Roman bishop.

That this theory is more than a hypothesis is shown by several facts which prove the unique authority as well as the interference of the Roman Church (that is, of her bishop). First, in the Montanist controversy—and that too at the stage when it was still almost exclusively confined to Asia Minor—the already sobered adherents of the new prophecy petitioned Rome (bishop Eleutherus) to recognise their Church, and it was at Rome that the Gallic confessors cautiously interfered in their behalf; after which a native of Asia Minor induced the Roman bishop to withdraw the letters of toleration already issued.[³²⁷] In view of the facts that it was not Roman Montanists who were concerned, that Rome was the place where the Asiatic members of this sect sought for recognition, and that it was in Rome that the Gauls interfered in their behalf, the significance of this proceeding cannot be readily minimised. We cannot of course dogmatise on the matter; but the fact can be proved that the decision of the Roman Church must have settled the position of that sect of enthusiasts in Christendom. Secondly, what is reported to us of Victor, the successor of Eleutherus, is still plainer testimony. He ventured to issue an edict, which we may already style a peremptory one, proclaiming the Roman practice with regard to the regulation of ecclesiastical festivals to be the universal rule in the Church, and declaring that every congregation, that failed to adopt the Roman arrangement,[³²⁸] was excluded from the union of the one Church on the ground of heresy. How would Victor have ventured on such an edict—though indeed he had not the power of enforcing it in every case—unless the special prerogative of Rome to determine the conditions of the "common unity" (κοινη 'ενωσις) in the vital questions of the faith had been an acknowledged and well-established fact? How could Victor have addressed such a demand to the independent Churches, if he had not been recognised, in his capacity of bishop of Rome, as the special guardian of the κοινη 'ενωσισ?[³²⁹] Thirdly, it was Victor who formally excluded Theodotus from Church fellowship. This is the first really well-attested case of a Christian taking his stand on the rule of faith being excommunicated because a definite interpretation of it was already insisted on. In this instance the expression 'υιος μονογενης (only begotten Son) was required to be understood in the sense of Φυσει Θεος (God by nature). It was in Rome that this first took place. Fourthly, under Zephyrinus, Victor's successor, the Roman ecclesiastics interfered in the Carthaginian veil dispute, making common cause with the local clergy against Tertullian; and both appealed to the authority of predecessors, that is, above all, of the Roman bishops.[³³⁰] Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen, and Cyprian were obliged to resist the pretensions of these ecclesiastics to authority outside their own Church, the first having to contend with Calixtus, and the three others with Stephen.[³³¹]

It was the Roman Church that first displayed this activity and care; the Roman bishop sprang from the community in exactly the same way as the corresponding official did in other places.[³³²] In Irenæus' proof from prescription, however, it is already the Roman bishops that are specially mentioned.[³³³] Praxeas reminded the bishop of Rome of the authority of his predecessors ("auctoritates præcessorum eius") and it was in the character of bishop that Victor acted. The assumption that Paul and Peter laboured in Rome, that is, founded the Church of that city (Dionysius, Irenæus, Tertullian, Caius), must have conferred a high degree of prestige on her bishops, as soon as the latter officials were elevated to the position of more or less sovereign lords of the communities and were regarded as successors of the Apostles. The first who acted up to this idea was Calixtus. The sarcastic titles of "pontifex maximus," "episcopus episcoporum," "benedictus papa" and "apostolicus," applied to him by Tertullian in "de pudicitia" I. 13, are so many references to the fact that Calixtus already claimed for himself a position of primacy, in other words, that he associated with his own personal position as bishop the primacy possessed by the Roman Church, which pre-eminence, however, must have been gradually vanishing in proportion to the progress of the Catholic form of organisation among the other communities. Moreover, that is evident from the form of the edict he issued (Tert. I. c., I: "I hear that an edict has been issued and that a decisive one," "audio edictum esse præpositum et quidem peremptorium"), from the grounds it assigned and from the opposition to it on the part of Tertullian. From the form, in so far as Calixtus acted here quite independently and, without previous consultation, issued a peremptory edict, that is, one settling the matter and immediately taking effect; from the grounds it assigned, in so far as he appealed in justification of his action to Matt. XVI. 18 ff.[³³⁴]—the first instance of the kind recorded in history; from Tertullian's opposition to it, because the latter treats it not as local, Roman, but as pregnant in consequences for all Christendom. But, as soon as the question took the form of enquiring whether the Roman bishop was elevated above the rest, a totally new situation arose. Even in the third century, as already shown, the Roman community, led by its bishops, still showed the rest an example in the process of giving a political constitution to the Church. It can also be proved that even far distant congregations were still being bound to the Roman Church through financial support,[³³⁵] and that she was appealed to in questions of faith, just as the law of the city of Rome was invoked as the standard in civil questions.[³³⁶] It is further manifest from Cyprian's epistles that the Roman Church was regarded as the ecclesia principalis, as the guardian par excellence of the unity of the Church. We may explain from Cyprian's own particular situation all else that he said in praise of the Roman Church (see above p. 88, note 2) and specially of the cathedra Petri; but the general view that she is the "matrix et radix ecclesiæ catholicæ" is not peculiar to him, and the statement that the "unitas sacerdotalis" originated in Rome is merely the modified expression, necessitated by the altered circumstances of the Church, for the acknowledged fact that the Roman community was the most distinguished among the sister groups, and as such had had and still possessed the right and duty of watching over the unity of the whole. Cyprian himself no doubt took a further step at the time of his correspondence with Cornelius, and proclaimed the special reference of Matt. XVI. to the cathedra Petri; but he confined his theory to the abstractions "ecclesia," "cathedra." In him the importance of this cathedra oscillates between the significance of a once existent fact that continues to live on as a symbol, and that of a real and permanent court of appeal. Moreover, he did not go the length of declaring that any special authority within the collective Church attached to the temporary occupant of the cathedra Petri. If we remove from Cyprian's abstractions everything to which he himself thinks there is nothing concrete corresponding, then we must above all eliminate every prerogative of the Roman bishop for the time being. What remains behind is the special position of the Roman Church, which indeed is represented by her bishop. Cyprian can say quite frankly: "owing to her magnitude Rome ought to have precedence over Carthage" ("pro magnitudine sua debet Carthaginem Roma præcedere") and his theory: "the episcopate is one, and a part of it is held by each bishop for the whole" ("episcopatus unus est, cuius a singulis in solidum pars tenetur"), virtually excludes any special prerogative belonging to a particular bishop (see also "de unit." 4). Here we have reached the point that has already been briefly referred to above, viz., that the consolidation of the Churches in the Empire after the Roman pattern could not but endanger the prestige and peculiar position of Rome, and did in fact do so. If we consider that each bishop was the acknowledged sovereign of his own diocese—now Catholic, that all bishops, as such, were recognised to be successors of the Apostles, that, moreover, the attribute of priesthood occupied a prominent position in the conception of the episcopal office, and that, the metropolitan unions with their presidents and synods had become completely naturalised—in short, that the rigid episcopal and provincial constitution of the Church had become an accomplished fact, so that, ultimately, it was no longer communities, but merely bishops that had dealings with each other, then we shall see that a new situation was thereby created for Rome, that is, for her bishop. In the West it was perhaps chiefly through the coöperation of Cyprian that Rome found herself face to face with a completely organised Church system. His behaviour in the controversy about heretical baptism proves that in cases of dispute he was resolved to elevate his theory of the sovereign authority of each bishop above his theory of the necessary connection with the cathedra Petri. But, when that levelling of the episcopate came about, Rome had already acquired rights that could no longer be cancelled.[³³⁷] Besides, there was one thing that could not be taken from the Roman Church, nor therefore from her bishop, even if she were denied the special right to Matt. XVI., viz., the possession of Rome. The site of the world's metropolis might be shifted, but Rome could not be removed. In the long run, however, the shifting of the capital proved advantageous to ecclesiastical Rome. At the beginning of the great epoch when the alienation of East from West became pronounced and permanent, an emperor, from political grounds, decided in favour of that party in Antioch "with whom the bishops in Italy and the city of the Romans held intercourse" ('οις αν 'οι κατα την Ιταλιαν και την Ρωμαιων πολιν επισκοποι του δογματος επιστελλοιεν[³³⁸]). In this instance the interest of the Roman Church and the interest of the emperor coincided. But the Churches in the various provinces, being now completely organised and therefore seldom in need of any more help from outside, were henceforth in a position to pursue their own interest. So the bishop of Rome had step by step to fight for the new authority, which, being now based on a purely dogmatic theory and being forced to repudiate any empirical foundation, was inconsistent with the Church system that the Roman community more than any other had helped to build up. The proposition "the Roman Church always had the primacy" ("ecclesia Romana semper habuit primatum") and the statement that "Catholic" virtually means "Roman Catholic" are gross fictions, when devised in honour of the temporary occupant of the Roman see and detached from the significance of the Eternal City in profane history; but, applied to the Church of the imperial capital, they contain a truth the denial of which is equivalent to renouncing the attempt to explain the process by which the Church was unified and catholicised.[³³⁹]

Footnote 193:[ (return) ]

See Ritschl, l.c.; Schwegler. Der Montanismus, 1841; Gottwald, De Montanismo Tertulliani, 1862; Réville, Tertull. et le Montanisme, in the Revue des Deux Mondes of 1st Novr. 1864; Stroehlin, Essai sur le Montanisme, 1870; De Soyres, Montanism and the Primitive Church, 1878; Cunningham, The Churches of Asia, 1880; Renan, Les Crises du Catholicisme Naissant in the Revue des Deux Mondes of 15th Febr. 1881; Renan, Marc Aurèle, 1882, p. 208 ff.; Bonwetsch, Geschichte des Montanismus, 1881; Harnack, Das Monchthum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte, 3rd. ed., 1886; Belck, Geschichte des Montanismus, 1883; Voigt, Eine verschollene Urkunde des antimontanistischen Kampfes, 1891. Further the articles on Montanism by Moller (Herzog's Real-Encyklopädie), Salmon (Dictionary of Christian Biography), and Harnack (Encyclopedia Britannica). Weizsäcker in the Theologische Litteraturzeitung, 1882, no. 4; Bonwetsch, Die Prophetie im apostolischen und nachapostolischen Zeitalter in the Zeitschrift fur kirchliche Wissenschaft und kirchliches Leben, 1884, Parts 8, 9; M. von Engelhardt, Die ersten Versuche zur Aufrichtung des wahren Christenthums in einer Gemeinde von Heiligen, Riga, 1881.

Footnote 194:[ (return) ]

In certain vital points the conception of the original nature and history of Montanism, as sketched in the following account, does not correspond with that traditionally current. To establish it in detail would lead us too far. It may be noted that the mistakes in estimating the original character of this movement arise from a superficial examination of the oracles preserved to us and from the unjustifiable practice of interpreting them in accordance with their later application in the circles of Western Montanists. A completely new organisation of Christendom, beginning with the Church in Asia, to be brought about by its being detached from the bonds of the communities and collected into one region, was the main effort of Montanus. In this way he expected to restore to the Church a spiritual character and fulfil the promises contained in John. That is clear from Euseb., V. 16 ff. as well as from the later history of Montanism in its native land (see Jerome, ep. 41; Epiphan., H. 49. 2 etc.). In itself, however, apart from its particular explanation in the case of Montanus, the endeavour to detach Christians from the local Church unions has so little that is striking about it, that one rather wonders at being unable to point to any parallel in the earliest history of the Church. Wherever religious enthusiasm has been strong, it has at all times felt that nothing hinders its effect more than family ties and home connections. But it is just from the absence of similar undertakings in the earliest Christianity that we are justified in concluding that the strength of enthusiastic exaltation is no standard for the strength of Christian faith. (Since these words were written, we have read in Hippolytus' Commentary on Daniel [see Georgiades in the journal Εκκλ. αληθεια 1885, p. 52 sq.] very interesting accounts of such undertakings in the time of Septimius Severus. A Syrian bishop persuaded many brethren with wives and children to go to meet Christ in the wilderness; and another in Pontus induced his people to sell all their possessions, to cease tilling their lands, to conclude no more marriages etc., because the coming of the Lord was nigh at hand.)

Footnote 195:[ (return) ]

Oracle of Prisca in Epiph. H. 49. 1.

Footnote 196:[ (return) ]

Even in its original home Montanism must have accommodated itself to circumstances at a comparatively early date—which is not in the least extraordinary. No doubt the Montanist Churches in Asia and Phrygia, to which the bishop of Rome had already issued literæ pacis, were now very different from the original followers of the prophets (Tertull., adv. Prax. 1). When Tertullian further reports that Praxeas at the last moment prevented them from being recognised by the bishop of Rome, "falsa de ipsis prophetis et ecclesiis eorum adseverando," the "falsehood about the Churches" may simply have consisted in an account of the original tendencies of the Montanist sect. The whole unique history which, in spite of this, Montanism undoubtedly passed through in its original home is, however explained by the circumstance that there were districts there, where all Christians belonged to that sect (Epiph., H. 51. 33; cf. also the later history of Novatianism). In their peculiar Church organisation (patriarchs, stewards, bishops), these sects preserved a record of their origin.

Footnote 197:[ (return) ]

Special weight must be laid on this. The fact that whole communities became followers of the new prophets, who nevertheless adhered to no old regulation, must above all be taken into account.

Footnote 198:[ (return) ]

See Oracles 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 17, 18, 21 in Bonwetsch, l.c., p. 197 f. It can hardly have been customary for Christian prophets to speak like Montanus (Nos. 3-5): εγω κυριος 'ο θεος 'ο παντοκρατωρ καταγινομενος εν ανθροπω, or εγω κυριος 'ο θεος πατηρ ηλθον, or εγω ειμι 'ο πατηρ και 'ο υιος και 'ο παρακλητος, though Old Testament prophecy takes an analogous form. Maximilla says on one occasion (No. 11); απεστειλε με κυριος τουτου του πονου και της επαγγελιας αιρετιστην; and a second time (No. 12): διωκομαι 'ως λυκος εκ προβατων ουκ ειμι λυκος; 'ρημα ειμι και πνευμα και δυναμις. The two utterances do not exclude, but include, one another (cf. also No. 10: εμου μη ακουσητε αλλα Χριστου ακουσατε). From James IV. V. and Hermas, and from the Didache, on the other hand, we can see how the prophets of Christian communities may have usually spoken.

Footnote 199:[ (return) ]

L.c., no. 9: Χριστος 'εν ιδεα γυναικος εσχηματισμενος. How variable must the misbirths of the Christian imagination have been in this respect also! Unfortunately almost everything of that kind has been lost to us because it has been suppressed. The fragments of the once highly esteemed Apocalypse of Peter are instructive, for they still attest that the existing remains of early Christian literature are not able to give a correct picture of the strength of religious imagination in the first and second centuries. The passages where Christophanies are spoken of in the earliest literature would require to be collected. It would be shown what naive enthusiasm existed. Jesus appears to believers as a child, as a boy, as a youth, as Paul etc. Conversely, glorified men appear in visions with the features of Christ.

Footnote 200:[ (return) ]

See Euseb., H. E. V. 16. 9. In Oracle No. 2 an evangelical promise is repeated in a heightened form; but see Papias in Iren., V. 33. 3 f.

Footnote 201:[ (return) ]

We may unhesitatingly act on the principle that the Montanist elements, as they appear in Tertullian, are, in all cases, found not in a strengthened, but a weakened, form. So, when even Tertullian still asserts that the Paraclete in the new prophets could overturn or change, and actually did change, regulations of the Apostles, there is no doubt that the new prophets themselves did not adhere to apostolic dicta and had no hesitation in deviating from them. Cf., moreover, the direct declarations on this point in Hippolytus (Syntagma and Philos. VIII. 19) and in Didymus (de trin. III. 41. 2).

Footnote 202:[ (return) ]

The precepts for a Christian life, if we may so speak, given by the new prophets, cannot be determined from the compromises on which the discipline of the later Montanist societies of the Empire were based. Here they sought for a narrow line between the Marcionite and Encratite mode of life and the common church practice, and had no longer the courage and the candour to proclaim the "e sæculo excedere." Sexual purity and the renunciation of the enjoyments of life were the demands of the new prophets. But it is hardly likely that they prescribed precise "laws," for the primary matter was not asceticism, but the realising of a promise. In later days it was therefore possible to conceive the most extreme demands as regulations referring to none but the prophets themselves, and to tone down the oracles in their application to believers. It is said of Montanus himself (Euseb., H. E. V. 18. 2): 'ο διδαξας λυσεις γαμων, 'ο νηστειας νομοθετησας; Prisca was a παρθενος (l.c. § 3); Proculus, the chief of the Roman Montanists, "virginis senectæ" (Tert., adv. Val. 5). The oracle of Prisca (No. 8) declares that sexual purity is the preliminary condition for the oracles and visions of God; it is presupposed in the case of every "sanctus minister." Finally, Origen tells us (in Titum, Opp. IV. 696) that the (older) Cataphrygians said: "ne accedas ad me, quoniam mundus sum; non enim accepi uxorem, nec est sepulcrum patens guttur menin, sed sum Nazarenus dei non bibens vinum sicut illi." But an express legal direction to abolish marriage cannot have existed in the collection of oracles possessed by Tertullian. But who can guarantee that they were not already corrected? Such an assumption, however, is not necessary.

Footnote 203:[ (return) ]

Euseb., V. 16. 9: V. 18. 5.

Footnote 204:[ (return) ]

It will not do simply to place Montanus and his two female associates in the same category as the prophets of primitive Christian Churches. The claim that the Spirit had descended upon them in unique fashion must have been put forth by themselves with unmistakable clearness. If we apply the principle laid down on p. 98, note 3, we will find that—apart from the prophets' own utterances—this is still clearly manifest from the works of Tertullian. A consideration of the following facts will remove all doubt as to the claim of the new prophets to the possession of an unique mission, (1) From the beginning both opponents and followers constantly applied the title "New Prophecy" to the phenomenon in question (Euseb., V. 16. 4: V. 19. 2; Clem., Strom. IV. 13. 93; Tertull., monog. 14, ieiun. I, resurr. 63, Marc. III. 24.: IV. 22, Prax. 30; Firmil. ep. 75. 7; alii). (2) Similarly, the divine afflatus was, from the first, constantly designated as the "Paraclete" (Orac. no. 5; Tertull. passim; Hippol. passim; Didymus etc.). (3) Even in the third century the Montanist congregations of the Empire must still have doubted whether the Apostles had possessed this Paraclete or not, or at least whether this had been the case in the full sense. Tertullian identifies the Spirit and the Paraclete and declares that the Apostles possessed the latter in full measure—in fact as a Catholic he could not do otherwise. Nevertheless he calls Montanus etc. "prophetæ proprii" of the Spirit (pudic. 12; see Acta Perpet. 21). On the contrary we find in Philos. VIII. 19: 'υπερ δε αποστολους και παν χαρισμα ταυτα τα γυναια δοξαζουιν, 'ως τολμαν πλειον τι Χριστου εν τουτοις λεγειν τινας αυτων γεγονεαι. Pseudo-Tertullian says: "in apostolis quidem dicunt spiritum sanctum fuisse, paracletum non fuisse, et paracletum plura in Montano dixisse quam Christum in evangelio protulisse." In Didymus, l.c., we read: του αποστολου γραψαντος k.t.l., εκεινοι λεγουσιν τον Μοντανον εληλυθεναι και εσχηκεναι το τελειον το του παρακλητον, τουτ' εστιν το του αγιον πνευματος. (4) Lastly, the Montanists asserted that the prediction contained in John XIV. ff. had been fulfilled in the new prophecy, and that from the beginning, as is denoted by the very expression "Paraclete."

What sort of mission they ascribed to themselves is seen from the last quoted passage, for the promises contained in it must be regarded as the enthusiastic carrying out of Montanus' programme. If we read attentively John XIV. 16-21, 23, 26: XV. 20-26: XVI. 7-15, 25 as well as XVII. and X.; if we compare the oracles of the prophets still preserved to us; if we consider the attempt of Montanus to gather the scattered Christians and really form them into a flock, and also his claim to be the bearer of the greatest and last revelations that lead to all truth; and, finally, if we call to mind that in those Johannine discourses Christ designated the coming of the Paraclete as his own coming in the Paraclete and spoke of an immanence and unity of Father, Son, and Paraclete, which one finds re-echoed in Montanus' Oracle No. V., we cannot avoid concluding that the latter's undertaking is based on the impression made on excited and impatient prophets by the promises contained in the Gospel of John, understood in an apocalyptic and realistic sense, and also by Matt. XXIII. 34 (see Euseb., V. 16. 12 sq.). The correctness of this interpretation is proved by the fact that the first decided opponents of the Montanists in Asia—the so-called "Alogi" (Epiph., H. 51)—rejected both the Gospel and Revelation of John, that is, regarded them as written by some one else. Montanism therefore shows us the first and—up till about 180—really the only impression made by the Gospel of John on non-Gnostic Gentile Christians; and what a remarkable one it was! It has a parallel in Marcion's conception of Paulinism. Here we obtain glimpses of a state of matters which probably explains why these writings were made innocuous in the canon. To the view advanced here it cannot be objected that the later adherents of the new prophets founded their claims on the recognised gift of prophecy in the Church, or on a prophetic succession (Euseb, H. E. V. 17. 4; Proculus in the same author, II. 25. 7: III. 31. 4), nor that Tertullian, when it suits him, simply regards the new prophecy as a restitutio (e.g., in Monog. 4); for these assumptions merely represent the unsuccessful attempt to legitimise this phenomenon within the Catholic Church. In proof of the fact that Montanus appealed to the Gospel of John see Jerome, Ep. 41 (Migne I. p. 474), which begins with the words: "Testimonia de Johannis evangelio congregata, quæ tibi quidam Montani sectator ingessit, in quibus salvator noster se ad patrem iturum missurumque paracletum pollicetur etc." In opposition to this Jerome argues that the promises about the Paraclete are fulfilled in Acts II., as Peter said in his speech, and then continues as follows: "Quodsi voluerint respondere et Philippi deinceps quattuor filias prophetasse et prophetam Agabum reperiri et in divisionibus spiritus inter apostolos et doctores et prophetas quoque apostolo scribente formatos. etc."

Footnote 205:[ (return) ]

We are assured of this not only by Tertullian, but also by the Roman Montanist Proculus, who, like the former, argued against heretics, and by the testimony of the Church Fathers (see, e.g., Philos. VIII. 19). It was chiefly on the ground of their orthodoxy that Tertullian urged the claim of the new prophets to a hearing; and it was, above all, as a Montanist that he felt himself capable of combating the Gnostics, since the Paraclete not only confirmed the regula, but also by unequivocal utterances cleared up ambiguous and obscure passages in the Holy Scriptures, and (as was asserted) completely rejected doctrines like the Monarchian (see fuga 1, 14; corona 4; virg. vel. 1: Prax. 2, 13, 30; resurr. 63; pud. 1; monog. 2; ieiun. 10, II). Besides, we see from Tertullian's writings that the secession of the Montanist conventicles from the Church was forced upon them.

Footnote 206:[ (return) ]

The question as to whether the new prophecy had or had not to be recognised as such became the decisive one (fuga 1, 14; coron. 1; virg. vel. 1; Prax. 1: pudic. 11; monog. 1). This prophecy was recorded in writing (Euseb., V. 18. 1; Epiph., H. 48. 10; Euseb., VI. 20). The putting of this question, however, denoted a fundamental weakening of conviction, which was accompanied by a corresponding falling off in the application of the prophetic utterances.

Footnote 207:[ (return) ]

The situation that preceded the acceptance of the new prophecy in a portion of Christendom may be studied in Tertullian's writings "de idolol." and "de spectac." Christianity had already been conceived as a nova lex throughout the whole Church, and this lex had, moreover, been clearly defined in its bearing on the faith. But, as regards outward conduct, there was no definite lex, and arguments in favour both of strictness and of laxity were brought forward from the Holy Scriptures. No divine ordinances about morality could be adduced against the progressive secularising of Christianity; but there was need of statutory commandments by which all the limits were clearly defined. In this state of perplexity the oracles of the new prophets were gladly welcomed; they were utilised in order to justify and invest with divine authority a reaction of a moderate kind. More than that—as may be inferred from Tertullian's unwilling confession—could not be attained; but it is well known that even this result was not reached. Thus the Phrygian movement was employed in support of undertakings, that had no real connection with it. But this was the form in which Montanism first became a factor in the history of the Church. To what extent it had been so before, particularly as regards the creation of a New Testament canon (in Asia Minor and Rome), cannot be made out with certainty.

Footnote 208:[ (return) ]

See Bonwetsch, l.c., p. 82-108.

Footnote 209:[ (return) ]

This is the point about which Tertullian's difficulties are greatest. Tatian is expressly repudiated in de ieiun. 15.

Footnote 210:[ (return) ]

Tertullian (de monog.) is not deterred by such a limitation: "qui potest capere capiat, inquit, id est qui non potest discedat."

Footnote 211:[ (return) ]

It is very instructive, but at the same time very painful, to trace Tertullian's endeavours to reconcile the irreconcilable, in other words, to show that the prophecy is new and yet not so; that it does not impair the full authority of the New Testament and yet supersedes it. He is forced to maintain the theory that the Paraclete stands in the same relation to the Apostles as Christ does to Moses, and that he abrogates the concessions made by the Apostles and even by Christ himself; whilst he is at the same time obliged to reassert the sufficiency of both Testaments. In connection with this he hit upon the peculiar theory of stages in revelation—a theory which, were it not a mere expedient in his case, one might regard as the first faint trace of a historical view of the question. Still, this is another case of a dilemma, furnishing theology with a conception that she has cautiously employed in succeeding times, when brought face to face with certain difficulties; see virg. vel. I; exhort. 6; monog. 2, 3, 14; resurr. 63. For the rest, Tertullian is at bottom a Christian of the old stamp; the theory of any sort of finality in revelation is of no use to him except in its bearing on heresy; for the Spirit continually guides to all truth and works wherever he will. Similarly, his only reason for not being an Encratite is that this mode of life had already been adopted by heretics, and become associated with dualism. But the conviction that all religion must have the character of a fixed law and presupposes definite regulations—a belief not emanating from primitive Christianity, but from Rome—bound him to the Catholic Church. Besides, the contradictions with which he struggled were by no means peculiar to him; in so far as the Montanist societies accepted the Catholic regulations, they weighed on them all, and in all probability crushed them out of existence. In Asia Minor, where the breach took place earlier, the sect held its ground longer. In North Africa the residuum was a remarkable propensity to visions, holy dreams, and the like. The feature which forms the peculiar characteristic of the Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas is still found in a similar shape in Cyprian himself, who makes powerful use of visions and dreams; and in the genuine African Acts of the Martyrs, dating from Valerian's time, which are unfortunately little studied. See, above all, the Acta Jacobi, Mariani etc., and the Acta Montani, Lucii etc. (Ruinart, Acta Mart. edit Ratisb. 1859, p. 268 sq., p. 275 sq.)

Footnote 212:[ (return) ]

Nothing is known of attempts at a formal incorporation of the Oracles with the New Testament. Besides, the Montanists could dispense with this because they distinguished the commandments of the Paraclete as "novissima lex" from the "novum testamentum." The preface to the Montanist Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas (was Tertullian the author?) showed indeed the high value attached to the visions of martyrs. In so far as these were to be read in the Churches they were meant to be reckoned as an "instrumentum ecclesiæ" in the wider sense.

Footnote 213:[ (return) ]

Here the bishops themselves occupy the foreground (there are complaints about their cowardice and serving of two masters in the treatise de fugo). But it would be very unjust simply to find fault with them as Tertullian does. Two interests combined to influence their conduct; for if they drew the reins tight they gave over their flock to heresy or heathenism. This situation is already evident in Hermas and dominates the resolutions of the Church leaders in succeeding generations (see below).

Footnote 214:[ (return) ]

The distinction of "Spiritales" and "Psychici" on the part of the Montanists is not confined to the West (see Clem., Strom. IV. 13. 93); we find it very frequently in Tertullian. In itself it did not yet lead to the formal breach with the Catholic Church.

Footnote 215:[ (return) ]

A contrast to the bishops and the regular congregational offices existed in primitive Montanism. This was transmitted in a weakened form to the later adherents of the new prophecy (cf. the Gallic confessors' strange letter of recommendation on behalf of Irenæus in Euseb., H. E. V. 4), and finally broke forth with renewed vigour in opposition to the measures of the lax bishops (de pudic. 21; de exhort. 7; Hippolytus against Calixtus). The ecclesia, represented as numerus episcoporum, no longer preserved its prestige in the eyes of Tertullian.

Footnote 216:[ (return) ]

See here particularly, de pudicitia 1, where Tertullian sees the virginity of the Church not in pure doctrine, but in strict precepts for a holy life. As will have been seen in this account, the oft debated question as to whether Montanism was an innovation or merely a reaction does not admit of a simple answer. In its original shape it was undoubtedly an innovation; but it existed at the end of a period when one cannot very well speak of innovations, because no bounds had yet been set to subjective religiosity. Montanus decidedly went further than any Christian prophets known to us; Hermas, too, no doubt gave injunctions, as a prophet, which gave rise to innovations in Christendom; but these fell short of Montanus' proceedings. In its later shape, however, Montanism was to all intents and purposes a reaction, which aimed at maintaining or reviving an older state of things. So far, however, as this was to be done by legislation, by a novissima lex, we have an evident innovation analogous to the Catholic development. Whereas in former times exalted enthusiasm had of itself, as it were, given rise to strict principles of conduct among its other results, these principles, formulated with exactness and detail, were now meant to preserve or produce that original mode of life. Moreover, as soon as the New Testament was recognised, the conception of a subsequent revelation through the Paraclete was a highly questionable and strange innovation. But for those who acknowledged the new prophecy all this was ultimately nothing but a means. Its practical tendency, based as it was on the conviction that the Church abandons her character if she does not resist gross secularisation at least, was no innovation, but a defence of the most elementary requirements of primitive Christianity in opposition to a Church that was always more and more becoming a new thing.

Footnote 217:[ (return) ]

There were of course a great many intermediate stages between the extremes of laxity and rigour, and the new prophecy was by no means recognised by all those who had strict views as to the principles of Christian polity; see the letters of Dionysius of Corinth in Euseb., H. E. IV. 23. Melito, the prophet, eunuch, and bishop, must also be reckoned as one of the stricter party, but not as a Montanist. We must judge similarly of Irenæus.

Footnote 218:[ (return) ]

Euseb., H. E. V. 16. 17. The life of the prophets themselves was subsequently subjected to sharp criticism.

Footnote 219:[ (return) ]

This was first done by the so-called Alogi who, however, had to be repudiated.

Footnote 220:[ (return) ]

De ieiun. 12, 16.

Footnote 221:[ (return) ]

Tertullian protested against this in the most energetic manner.

Footnote 222:[ (return) ]

It is well known that in the 3rd century the Revelation of John itself was viewed with suspicion and removed from the canon in wide circles in the East.

Footnote 223:[ (return) ]

In the West the Chiliastic hopes were little or not at all affected by the Montanist struggle. Chiliasm prevailed there in unimpaired strength as late as the 4th century. In the East, on the contrary, the apocalyptic expectations were immediately weakened by the Montanist crisis. But it was philosophical theology that first proved their mortal enemy. In the rural Churches of Egypt Chiliasm was still widely prevalent after the middle of the 3rd century; see the instructive 24th chapter of Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History, Book VII. "Some of their teachers," says Dionysius, "look on the Law and the Prophets as nothing, neglect to obey the Gospel, esteem the Epistles of the Apostles as little worth, but, on the contrary, declare the doctrine contained in the Revelation of John to be a great and a hidden mystery." There were even temporary disruptions in the Egyptian Church on account of Chiliasm (see Chap. 24. 6).

Footnote 224:[ (return) ]

"Lex et prophetæ usque ad Johannem" now became the motto. Churchmen spoke of a "completus numerus prophetarum" (Muratorian Fragment), and formulated the proposition that the prophets corresponded to the pre-Christian stage of revelation, but the Apostles to the Christian; and that in addition to this the apostolic age was also particularly distinguished by gifts of the Spirit. "Prophets and Apostles" now replaced "Apostles, prophets, and teachers," as the court of appeal. Under such circumstances prophecy might still indeed exist; but it could no longer be of a kind capable of ranking, in the remotest degree, with the authority of the Apostles in point of importance. Hence it was driven into a corner, became extinct, or at most served only to support the measures of the bishops. In order to estimate the great revolution in the spirit of the times let us compare the utterances of Irenæus and Origen about gifts of the Spirit and prophecy. Irenæus still expressed himself exactly like Justin (Dial. 39, 81, 82, 88); he says (II. 32. 4: V. 6. 1): καθως και πολλων ακουομεν αδελφων 'εν τη εκκλησια προφητικα χαρισματα εχοντων κ.τ.λ. Origen on the contrary (see numerous passages, especially in the treatise c. Cels.), looks back to a period after which the Spirit's gifts in the Church ceased. It is also a very characteristic circumstance that along with the naturalisation of Christianity in the world, the disappearance of charisms, and the struggle against Gnosticism, a strictly ascetic mode of life came to be viewed with suspicion. Euseb., H. E. V. 3 is especially instructive on this point. Here it is revealed to the confessor Attalus that the confessor Alcibiades, who even in captivity continued his ascetic practice of living on nothing but bread and water, was wrong in refraining from that which God had created and thus become a "τυπος σκανδαλου" to others. Alcibiades changed his mode of life. In Africa, however, (see above, p. 103) dreams and visions still retained their authority in the Church as important means of solving perplexities.

Footnote 225:[ (return) ]

Tertullian, adv. Marc. IV. 9, enumerates "septem maculas capitalium delictorum," namely, "idololatria," "blasphemia," "homicidium," "adulterium," "stuprum," "falsum testimonium," "fraus." The stricter treatment probably applied to all these seven offences. So far as I know, the lapse into heresy was not placed in the same category in the first centuries; see Iren. III. 4. 2: Tertull., de præscr. 30 and, above all, de pudic. 19 init.; the anonymous writer in Euseb., H. E. V. 28. 12, from which passages it is evident that repentant heretics were readmitted.

Footnote 226:[ (return) ]

Hermas based the admissibility of a second atonement on a definite divine revelation to this effect, and did not expressly discuss the admission of gross sinners into the Church generally, but treated of their reception into that of the last days, which he believed had already arrived. See particulars on this point in my article "Lapsi," in Herzog's Real-Encyklopädie, 2 ed. Cf. Preuschen, Tertullian's Schriften de pænit. et de pudic. mit Rücksicht auf die Bussdisciplin, 1890; Rolffs, Indulgenz-Edict des Kallistus, 1893.

Footnote 227:[ (return) ]

In the work de pænit. (7 ff.) Tertullian treats this as a fixed Church regulation. K. Müller, Kirchengeschichte I. 1892, p. 114, rightly remarks: "He who desired this expiation continued in the wider circle of the Church, in her 'antechamber' indeed, but as her member in the wider sense. This, however, did not exclude the possibility of his being received again, even in this world, into the ranks of those possessing full Christian privileges,—after the performance of penance or exhomologesis. But there was no kind of certainty as to that taking place. Meanwhile this exhomologesis itself underwent a transformation which in Tertullian includes a whole series of basal religious ideas. It is no longer a mere expression of inward feeling, confession to God and the brethren, but is essentially performance. It is the actual attestation of heartfelt sorrow, the undertaking to satisfy God by works of self-humiliation and abnegation, which he can accept as a voluntarily endured punishment and therefore as a substitute for the penalty that naturally awaits the sinner. It is thus the means of pacifying God, appeasing his anger, and gaining his favour again—with the consequent possibility of readmission into the Church. I say the possibility, for readmission does not always follow. Participation in the future kingdom may be hoped for even by him who in this world is shut out from full citizenship and merely remains in the ranks of the penitent. In all probability then it still continued the rule for a person to remain till death in a state of penance or exhomologesis. For readmission continued to involve the assumption that the Church had in some way or other become certain that God had forgiven the sinner, or in other words that she had power to grant this forgiveness in virtue of the Spirit dwelling in her, and that this readmission therefore involved no violation of her holiness." In such instances it is first prophets and then martyrs that appear as organs of the Spirit, till at last it is no longer the inspired Christian, but the professional medium of the Spirit, viz., the priest, who decides everything.

Footnote 228:[ (return) ]

In the 2nd century even endeavours at a formal repetition of baptism were not wholly lacking. In Marcionite congregations repetition of baptism is said to have taken place (on the Elkesaites see Vol. I. p. 308). One can only wonder that there is not more frequent mention of such attempts. The assertion of Hippolytus (Philos. IX. 12 fin.) is enigmatical: Επι Καλλιστου προτω τετολμηται δευτερον αυτοις βαπτισμα.

Footnote 229:[ (return) ]

See Tertull., de pudic. 12: "hinc est quod neque idololatriæ neque sanguini pax ab ecclesiis redditur." Orig., de orat. 28 fin; c. Cels. III. 50.

Footnote 230:[ (return) ]

It is only of whoremongers and idolaters that Tertullian expressly speaks in de pudic. c. I. We must interpret in accordance with this the following statement by Hippolytus in Philos. IX. 12: Καλλιστος πρωτος τα προς τας 'ηδονας τοις ανθρωποις συνχωρειν επενοησε, λεγων πασιν 'υπ' αυτου αφιεσθαι 'αμαρτιας. The aim of this measure is still clear from the account of it given by Hippolytus, though this indeed is written in a hostile spirit. Roman Christians were then split into at least five different sects, and Calixtus left nothing undone to break up the unfriendly parties and enlarge his own. In all probability, too, the energetic bishop met with a certain measure of success. From Euseb., H. E. IV. 23. 6, one might be inclined to conclude that, even in Marcus Aurelius' time, Dionysius of Corinth had issued lax injunctions similar to those of Calixtus. But it must not be forgotten that we have nothing but Eusebius' report; and it is just in questions of this kind that his accounts are not reliable.

Footnote 231:[ (return) ]

No doubt persecutions were practically unknown in the period between 220 and 260.

Footnote 232:[ (return) ]

See Cypr., de lapsis.

Footnote 233:[ (return) ]

What scruples were caused by this innovation is shown by the first 40 letters in Cyprian's collection. He himself had to struggle with painful doubts.

Footnote 234:[ (return) ]

Apart from some epistles of Cyprian, Socrates, H. E. V. 22, is our chief source of information on this point. See also Conc. Illib. can. 1, 2, 6-8, 12, 17, 18-47, 70-73, 75.

Footnote 235:[ (return) ]

See my article "Novatian" in Herzog's Real-Encyklopädie, 2nd ed. One might be tempted to assume that the introduction of the practice of unlimited forgiveness of sins was an "evangelical reaction" against the merciless legalism which, in the case of the Gentile Church indeed, had established itself from the beginning. As a matter of fact the bishops and the laxer party appealed to the New Testament in justification of their practice. This had already been done by the followers of Calixtus and by himself. See Philos. IX. 12: φασκοντες Χριστον αφιεναι τοις ευδοκουσι; Rom. XIV. 4 and Matt. XIII. 29 were also quoted. Before this Tertullian's opponents who favoured laxity had appealed exactly in the same way to numerous Bible texts, e.g., Matt. X. 23: XI. 19 etc., see de monog, de pudic., de ieiun. Cyprian is also able to quote many passages from the Gospels. However, as the bishops and their party did not modify their conception of baptism, but rather maintained in principle, as before, that baptism imposes only obligations for the future, the "evangelical reaction" must not be estimated very highly; (see below, p. 117, and my essay in the Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche, Vol. I., "Die ehre von der Seligkeit allein durch den Glauben in der alten Kirche.")

Footnote 236:[ (return) ]

The distinction of sins committed against God himself, as we find it in Tertullian, Cyprian, and other Fathers, remains involved in an obscurity that I cannot clear up.

Footnote 237:[ (return) ]

Cyprian never expelled any one from the Church, unless he had attacked the authority of the bishops, and thus in the opinion of this Father placed himself outside her pale by his own act.

Footnote 238:[ (return) ]

Hippol., Philos. IX. 12: Και παραβολην των ζιζανιων προς τουτο εφη 'ο Καλλιστος λεγεσθαι. Αφετε τα ζιζανια συναυξειν τω σιτω, τουτεστιν εν τη εκκλησια τους 'αμαρτανοντας. Αλλα και την κιβωτον του Νωε εις 'ομοιωμα εκκλησιας εφη γεγονεναι, εν 'η και κυνες και λυκοι και κορακες και παντα τα καθαρα και ακαθαρτα; 'ουτω φασκων δειν ειναι εν εκκλησια 'ομοιως, και 'οσα προς τουτο δυνατος ην συναγειν 'ουτως 'ηρμηνευσεν. From Tertull., de idolol. 24, one cannot help assuming that even before the year 200 the laxer sort in Carthage had already appealed to the Ark. ("Viderimus si secundum arcæ typum et corvus et milvus et lupus et canis et serpens in ecclesia erit. Certe idololatres in arcæ typo non habetur. Quod in arca non fuit, in ecclesia non sit"). But we do not know what form this took and what inferences they drew. Moreover, we have here a very instructive example of the multitudinous difficulties in which the Fathers were involved by typology: the Ark is the Church, hence the dogs and snakes are men. To solve these problems it required an abnormal degree of acuteness and wit, especially as each solution always started fresh questions. Orig. (Hom. II. in Genes. III.) also viewed the Ark as the type of the Church (the working out of the image in Hom. I. in Ezech., Lomm. XIV. p. 24 sq., is instructive); but apparently in the wild animals he rather sees the simple Christians who are not yet sufficiently trained—at any rate he does not refer to the whoremongers and adulterers who must be tolerated in the Church. The Roman bishop Stephen again, positively insisted on Calixtus' conception of the Church, whereas Cornelius followed Cyprian (see Euseb., H. E. VI. 43. 10), who never declared sinners to be a necessary part of the Church in the same fashion as Calixtus did. (See the following note and Cyp., epp. 67. 6; 68. 5).

Footnote 239:[ (return) ]

Philos., l.c.: Καλλιστος εδογματισεν 'οπως ει επισκοπος 'αμαρτοι τι, ει και προς θανατον, μη δειν κατατιθεσθαι. That Hippolytus is not exaggerating here is evident from Cyp., epp. 67, 68; for these passages make it very probable that Stephen also assumed the irremovability of a bishop on account of gross sins or other failings.

Footnote 240:[ (return) ]

See Cypr., epp. 65, 66, 68; also 55. 11.

Footnote 241:[ (return) ]

This is asserted by Cyprian in epp. 65. 4 and 67. 3; but he even goes on to declare that everyone is polluted that has fellowship with an impure priest, and takes part in the offering celebrated by him.

Footnote 242:[ (return) ]

On this point the greatest uncertainty prevails in Cyprian. Sometimes he says that God himself installs the bishops, and it is therefore a deadly sin against God to criticise them (e.g., in ep. 66. 1); on other occasions he remembers that the bishops have been ordained by bishops; and again, as in ep. 67. 3, 4, he appears to acknowledge the community's right to choose and control them. Cf. the sections referring to Cyprian in Reuter's "Augustinische Studien" (Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, Vol. VII., p. 199 ff.).

Footnote 243:[ (return) ]

The Donatists were quite justified in appealing to Cyprian, that is, in one of his two aspects.

Footnote 244:[ (return) ]

Origen not only distinguishes between different groups within the Church as judged by their spiritual understanding and moral development (Comm. in Matt. Tom. XI. at Chap. XV. 29; Hom. II. in Genes. Chap. 3; Hom. in Cantic. Tom. I. at Chap. I. 4: "ecclesia una quidem est, cum perfecta est; multæ vero sunt adolescentulæ, cum adhuc instruuntur et proficiunt"; Hom. III. in Levit. Chap. iii.), but also between spiritual and carnal members (Hom. XXVI. in Num. Chap. vii.) i.e., between true Christians and those who only bear that name without heartfelt faith—who outwardly take part in everything, but bring forth fruits neither in belief nor conduct. Such Christians he as little views as belonging to the Church as does Clement of Alexandria (see Strom. VII. 14. 87, 88). To him they are like the Jebusites who were left in Jerusalem: they have no part in the promises of Christ, but are lost (Comm. in Matt. T. XII. c. xii.). It is the Church's task to remove such members, whence we see that Origen was far from sharing Calixtus' view of the Church as a corpus permixtum; but to carry out this process so perfectly that only the holy and the saved remain is a work beyond the powers of human sagacity. One must therefore content oneself with expelling notorious sinners; see Hom. XXI. in Jos., c. i.: "sunt qui ignobilem et degenerem vitam ducunt, qui et fide et actibus et omni conversatione sua perversi sunt. Neque enim possibile est, ad liquidum purgari ecclesiam, dum in terris est, ita ut neque impius in ea quisquam, neque peccator residere videatur, sed sint in ea omnes sancti et beati, et in quibus nulla prorsus peccati macula deprehendatur. Sed sicut dicitur de zizaniis: Ne forte eradicantes zizania simul eradicetis et triticum, ita etiam super iis dici potest, in quibus vel dubia vel occulta peccata sunt.... Eos saltem eiiciamus quos possumus, quorum peccata manifesta sunt. Ubi enim peccatum non est evidens, eiicere de ecclesia neminem possumus." In this way indeed very many wicked people remain in the Church (Comm. in Matt. T. X. at c. xiii. 47 f.: μη ξενιζομεθα, εαν 'ορωμεν 'ημων τα αθροισματα πεπληρωμενα και πονηρων); but in his work against Celsus Origen already propounded that empiric and relative theory of the Christian Churches which views them as simply "better" than the societies and civic communities existing alongside of them. The 29th and 30th chapters of the 3rd book against Celsus, in which he compares the Christians with the other population of Athens, Corinth, and Alexandria, and the heads of congregations with the councillors and mayors of these cities, are exceedingly instructive and attest the revolution of the times. In conclusion, however, we must point out that Origen expressly asserts that a person unjustly excommunicated remains a member of the Church in God's eyes; see Hom. XIV. in Levit. c. iii.: "ita fit, ut interdum ille qui foras mittitur intussit, et ille foris, qui intus videtur retineri." Döllinger (Hippolytus and Calixtus, page 254 ff.) has correctly concluded that Origen followed the disputes between Hippolytus and Calixtus in Rome, and took the side of the former. Origen's trenchant remarks about the pride and arrogance of the bishops of large towns (in Matth. XI. 9. 15; XII. 9-14; XVI. 8. 22 and elsewhere, e.g., de orat. 28, Hom. VI. in Isai c. i., in Joh. X. 16), and his denunciation of such of them as, in order to glorify God, assume a mere distinction of names between Father and Son, are also correctly regarded by Langen as specially referring to the Roman ecclesiastics (Geschichte der römischen Kirche I. p. 242). Thus Calixtus was opposed by the three greatest theologians of the age—Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Origen.

Footnote 245:[ (return) ]

If, in assuming the irremovability of a bishop even in case of mortal sin, the Roman bishops went beyond Cyprian, Cyprian drew from his conception of the Church a conclusion which the former rejected, viz., the invalidity of baptism administered by non-Catholics. Here, in all likelihood, the Roman bishops were only determined by their interest in smoothing the way to a return or admission to the Church in the case of non-Catholics. In this instance they were again induced to adhere to their old practice from a consideration of the catholicity of the Church. It redounds to Cyprian's credit that he drew and firmly maintained the undeniable inferences from his own theory in spite of tradition. The matter never led to a great dogmatic controversy.

Footnote 246:[ (return) ]

As to the events during the vacancy in the Roman see immediately before Novatian's schism, and the part then played by the latter, who was still a member of the Church, see my essay: "Die Briefe des römischen Klerus aus der Zeit. der Sedisvacanz im Jahre 250" (Abhandl. f. Weizsäcker, 1892).

Footnote 247:[ (return) ]

So far as we are able to judge, Novatian himself did not extend the severer treatment to all gross sinners (see ep. 55. 26, 27); but only decreed it in the case of the lapsed. It is, however, very probable that in the later Novatian Churches no mortal sinner was absolved (see, e.g., Socrates, H. E. I. 10). The statement of Ambrosius (de pænit. III. 3) that Novatian made no difference between gross and lesser sins and equally refused forgiveness to transgressors of every kind distorts the truth as much as did the old reproach laid to his charge, viz., that he as "a Stoic" made no distinction between sins. Moreover, in excluding gross sinners, Novatian's followers did not mean to abandon them, but to leave them under the discipline and intercession of the Church.

Footnote 248:[ (return) ]

The title of the evangelical life (evangelical perfection, imitation of Christ) in contrast to that of ordinary Catholic Christians, a designation which we first find among the Encratites (see Vol. I. p. 237, note 3) and Marcionites (see Tertull., adv. Marc. IV. 14: "Venio nunc ad ordinarias sententias Marcionis, per quas proprietatem doctrinæ suæ inducit ad edictum, ut ita dixerim, Christi, Beati mendici etc."), and then in Tertullian (in his pre-Montanist period, see ad mart., de patient., de pænit., de idolol.; in his later career, see de coron. 8, 9, 13, 14; de fuga 8, 13; de ieiun. 6, 8, 15; de monog. 3, 5, 11; see Aubé, Les Chrétiens dans l'empire Romain de la fin des Antonins, 1881, p. 237 ff.: "Chrétiens intransigeants et Chrétiens opportunistes") was expressly claimed by Novatian (Cypr., ep. 44. 3: "si Novatiani se adsertores evangelii et Christi esse confitentur"; 46. 2: "nec putetis, sic vos evangelium Christi adserere"). Cornelius in Eusebius, H. E. VI. 43. II calls Novatian: 'ο εκδικητης του ευαγγελιου. This is exceedingly instructive, and all the more so when we note that, even as far back as the end of the second century, it was not the "evangelical," but the lax, who declared the claims of the Gospel to be satisfied if they kept God in their hearts, but otherwise lived in entire conformity with the world. See Tertullian, de spec. 1; de pænit. 5: "Sed aiunt quidam, satis deum habere, si corde et animo suspiciatur, licet actu minus fiat; itaque se salvo metu et fide peccare, hoc est salva castitate matrimonia violare etc.": de ieiun. 2: "Et scimus, quales sint carnalium commodorum suasoriæ, quam facile dicatur: Opus est de totis præcordiis credam, diligam deum et proximum tanquam me. In his enim duobus præceptis tota lex pendet et prophetæ, non in pulmonum et intestinorum meorum inanitate." The Valentinian Heracleon was similarly understood, see above Vol. I. p. 262.

Footnote 249:[ (return) ]

Tertullian (de pud. 22) had already protested vigorously against such injustice.

Footnote 250:[ (return) ]

From Socrates' Ecclesiastical History we can form a good idea of the state of the Novatian communities in Constantinople and Asia Minor. On the later history of the Catharist Church see my article "Novatian," l.c., 667 ff. The most remarkable feature of this history is the amalgamation of Novatian's adherents in Asia Minor with the Montanists and the absence of distinction between their manner of life and that of the Catholics. In the 4th century of course the Novatians were nevertheless very bitterly attacked.

Footnote 251:[ (return) ]

This indeed was disputed by Hippolytus and Origen.

Footnote 252:[ (return) ]

This last conclusion was come to after painful scruples, particularly in the East—as we may learn from the 6th and 7th books of Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History. For a time the majority of the Oriental bishops adopted an attitude favourable to Novatian and unfavourable to Cornelius and Cyprian. Then they espoused the cause of the latter, though without adopting the milder discipline in all cases (see the canons of Ancyra and Neocæsarea IV. sæc. init.). Throughout the East the whole question became involved in confusion, and was not decided in accordance with clear principles. In giving up the last remnant of her exclusiveness (the canons of Elvira are still very strict while those of Arles are lax), the Church became "Catholic" in quite a special sense, in other words, she became a community where everyone could find his place, provided he submitted to certain regulations and rules. Then, and not till then, was the Church's pre-eminent importance for society and the state assured. It was no longer variance, and no longer the sword (Matt. X. 34, 35), but peace and safety that she brought; she was now capable of becoming an educative or, since there was little more to educate in the older society, a conservative power. At an earlier date the Apologists (Justin, Melito, Tertullian himself) had already extolled her as such, but it was not till now that she really possessed this capacity. Among Christians, first the Encratites and Marcionites, next the adherents of the new prophecy, and lastly the Novatians had by turns opposed the naturalisation of their religion in the world and the transformation of the Church into a political commonwealth. Their demands had progressively become less exacting, whence also their internal vigour had grown ever weaker. But, in view of the continuous secularising of Christendom, the Montanist demands at the beginning of the 3rd century already denoted no less than those of the Encratites about the middle of the second, and no more than those of the Novatians about the middle of the third. The Church resolutely declared war on all these attempts to elevate evangelical perfection to an inflexible law for all, and overthrew her opponents. She pressed on in her world-wide mission and appeased her conscience by allowing a twofold morality within her bounds. Thus she created the conditions which enabled the ideal of evangelical perfection to be realised in her own midst, in the form of monasticism, without threatening her existence. "What is monasticism but an ecclesiastical institution that makes it possible to separate oneself from the world and to remain in the Church, to separate oneself from the outward Church without renouncing her, to set oneself apart for purposes of sanctification and yet to claim the highest rank among her members, to form a brotherhood and yet to further the interests of the Church?" In succeeding times great Church movements, such as the Montanist and Novatian, only succeeded in attaining local or provincial importance. See the movement at Rome at the beginning of the 4th century, of which we unfortunately know so little (Lipsius, Chronologie der römischen Bischofe, pp. 250-255), the Donatist Revolution, and the Audiani in the East.

Footnote 253:[ (return) ]

It is a characteristic circumstance that Tertullian's de ieiun. does not assume that the great mass of Christians possess an actual knowledge of the Bible.

Footnote 254:[ (return) ]

The condition of the constitution of the Church about the middle of the 3rd century (in accordance with Cyprian's epistles) is described by Otto Ritschl, l.c., pp. 142-237. Parallels to the provincial and communal constitution of secular society are to be found throughout.

Footnote 255:[ (return) ]

To how great an extent the Church in Decius' time was already a state within the state is shown by a piece of information given in Cyprian's 55th epistle (c. 9.): "Cornelius sedit intrepidus Romæ in sacerdotali cathedra eo tempore: cum tyrannus infestus sacerdotibus dei fanda adque infanda comminaretur, cum multo patientius et tolerabilius audiret levari adversus se æmulum principem quam constitui Romæ dei sacerdotem." On the other hand the legislation with regard to Christian flamens adopted by the Council of Elvira, which, as Duchesne (Mélanges Renier: Le Concile d'Elvire et les flamines chrétiens, 1886) has demonstrated, most probably dates from before the Diocletian persecution of 300, shows how closely the discipline of the Church had already been adapted to the heathen regulations in the Empire. In addition to this there was no lack of syncretist systems within Christianity as early as the 3rd century (see the Κεστοι of Julius Africanus, and other examples). Much information on this point is to be derived from Origen's works and also, in many respects, from the attitude of this author himself. We may also refer to relic- and hero-worship, the foundation of which was already laid in the 3rd century, though the "religion of the second order" did not become a recognised power in the Church or force itself into the official religion till the 4th.

Footnote 256:[ (return) ]

See Tertullian's frightful accusations in de pudic. (10) and de ieiun. (fin) against the "Psychici", i.e., the Catholic Christians. He says that with them the saying had really come to signify "peccando promeremur," by which, however, he does not mean the Augustinian: "o felix culpa."

Footnote 257:[ (return) ]

The relation of this Church to theology, what theology she required and what she rejected, and, moreover, to what extent she rejected the kind that she accepted may be seen by reference to chap. 5 ff. We may here also direct attention to the peculiar position of Origen in the Church as well as to that of Lucian the Martyr, concerning whom Alexander of Alexandria (Theoderet, H. E. I. 3) remarks that he was a αποσυναγωγος in Antioch for a long time, namely, during the rule of three successive bishops.

Footnote 258:[ (return) ]

We have already referred to the passage above. On account of its importance we may quote it here:

"According to Celsus Apollo required the Metapontines to regard Aristeas as a god; but in their eyes the latter was but a man and perhaps not a virtuous one ... They would therefore not obey Apollo, and thus it happened that no one believed in the divinity of Aristeas. But with regard to Jesus we may say that it proved a blessing to the human race to acknowledge him as the Son of God, as God who appeared on earth united with body and soul." Origen then says that the demons counterworked this belief, and continues: "But God who had sent Jesus on earth brought to nought all the snares and plots of the demons and aided in the victory of the Gospel of Jesus throughout the whole earth in order to promote the conversion and amelioration of men; and everywhere brought about the establishment of Churches which are ruled by other laws than those that regulate the Churches of the superstitious, the dissolute and the unbelieving. For of such people the civil population (πολιτευομενα εν ταις εκκλησιαις των πολεων πληθη) of the towns almost everywhere consists." 'Αι δε του Θεου Χριστω μαθητευθεσαι εκκλησιαι, συνεζεταζομεναι ταις ων παροικουσι δημων εκκλησιαις, 'ως φωτηρες εισιν εν κοσμω. τις γαρ ουκ αν 'ομολογησαι, και τους χειρους των απο της εκκλησιας και συγκρισει βελτιονων ελαττους πολλω κρειττους τυγξ'ανειν των εν τοις δεμοις εκκλησιων; εκκλησια μεν γαρ του θεου, φερ' ειπειν, 'η Αθηναεσι πραεια τις και ευσταθης, 'ατε Θεω αρεσκειν τω επι πασι βουλομενη; 'η δ' Αθηναιων εκκλησια στασιωδης και ουδαμως παραβαλλομενη τη εκει εκκλησια του Θεου; το δ' αυτο ερεις, περι εκκλησιας του Θεου της εν Κορινθω και της εκκλησιας του δημον Κορινθιων; και, φερ' ειπειν, περι εκκλησιας του Θεου της εν Αλεξανδρεια, και εκκλησιας του Αλεξανδρεων δημου, και εαν ευγνωμων 'η 'ο τουτου ακουων και φιλαληθως εξεταζη τα πραγματα, θαυμασεται τον και βουλευσαμενον και ανουσαι δυνηθεντα πανταχου συστησασθαι εκκλησιας του Θεου, παροικουσας εκκλησιας των καθ' 'εκαστην πολιν δημων 'ουτω δε και βουλην εκκλησιας Θεου βουλη τη καθ' 'εκαστην πολιν συνεξεταζων 'ευροις αν 'οτι τινες μεν της εκκλησιας βουλευται εξιοι εισι—ει τις εστιν εν τω παντι πολις του Θεου—εν εκεινη πολιτευεσθαι 'οι δε πανταχου βουλευται ουδεν εξιον της εκ καταταξεως 'υπεροχης, 'ην 'υπερεχειν δοκουσι των πολιτων, φερουσιν εν τοις 'εαυτων ηθεσιν; 'ουτω δε και αρχοντα εκκλησιας 'εκαστης πολεως αρχοντι των εν τη πολει συγκροτεον; 'ινα κατανοησυς, 'οτι και επι των σφοδρα αποτυγχανομενοω βουλετων και αρχοντων εκκλησιας Θεου, και ρ'αθυμοτερον παρα τους ευτονωτερως βιουντας ουδεν ηττον εστιν 'ευρειν 'ως επιπαν 'υπεροχην την εν τη επι τας αρετας προκοπη παρα τα ηθη των εν ταις πολεσι βουλευτων και αρχοντων.

Footnote 259:[ (return) ]

Ritschl, Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche pp. 362, 368, 394, 461, 555, 560, 576. Otto Ritschl, l.c., pp. 208, 218, 231. Hatch "Organisation of the early Christian Church," Lectures 5 and 6; id., Art. "Ordination," "Priest," in the Dictionary of Christian Antiquities. Hauck, Art. "Priester" in Herzog's Real-Encyklopädie, 2nd ed. Voigt, l.c., p. 175 ff. Sohm, Kirchenrecht I. p. 205 ff. Louw, Het ontstaan van het Priesterschap in de christ. Kerk, Utrecht, 1892.

Footnote 260:[ (return) ]

Clement of Rome was the first to compare the conductors of public worship in Christian Churches with the priests and Levites, and the author of the Διδαχη was the first to liken the Christian prophets to the high priests. It cannot, however, be shown that there were any Christian circles where the leaders were directly styled "priests" before the last quarter of the 2nd century. We can by no means fall back on Ignatius, Philad. 9, nor on Iren., IV. 8. 3, which passage is rather to be compared with Διδ. 13. 3. It is again different in Gnostic circles, which in this case, too, anticipated the secularising process: read for example the description of Marcus in Iren., I. 13. Here, mutatis mutandis, we have the later Catholic bishop, who alone is able to perform a mysterious sacrifice to whose person powers of grace are attached—the formula of bestowal was: μεταδουναι σοι θελω της εμης χαριτος ... λαμβανε απ' εμου και δι' εμου χαριν, and through whose instrumentality union with God can alone be attained: the απολυτρωσις (I. 21.) is only conferred through the mystagogue. Much of a similar nature is to be found, and we can expressly say that the distinction between priestly mystagogues and laymen was of fundamental importance in many Gnostic societies (see also the writings of the Coptic Gnostics); it was different in the Marcionite Church. Tertullian (de bapt. 17) was the first to call the bishop "summus sacerdos," and the older opinion that he merely "played" with the idea is untenable, and refuted by Pseudo-Cyprian, de aleat. 2 ("sacerdotalis dignitas"). In his Antimontanist writings the former has repeatedly repudiated any distinction in principle of a particular priestly class among Christians, as well as the application of certain injunctions to this order (de exhort. 7: "nonne et laici sacerdotes sumus? ... adeo ubi ecclesiastici ordinis non est consessus, et offeis et tinguis et sacerdos es tibi solus, sed ubi tres, ecclesia est, licet laici."; de monog. 7). We may perhaps infer from his works that before about the year 200, the name "priest" was not yet universally applied to bishop and presbyters in Carthage (but see after this de præscr. 29, 41: sacerdotalia munera; de pud. 1, 21; de monog. 12: disciplina sacerd.; de exhort. 7: sacerdotalis ordo, ibid. 11 "et offeres pro duabus uxoribus, et commendabis illas duas per sacerdotem de monogamia ordinatum; de virg. vel. 9: sacerdotale officium;" Scorp. 7: sacerdos). The latest writings of Tertullian show us indeed that the name and the conception which it represents were already prevalent. Hippolytus (Philos. præf.: 'ων 'ημεις διαδοχοι τυγχανοντες της τε αυτης χαριτος μετεχοντες αρχιερατειας και διδασκαλιας, see also the Arabian canons) expressly claimed high priesthood for the bishops, and Origen thought he was justified in giving the name of "Priests and Levites" to those who conducted public worship among Christians. This he indeed did with reserve (see many passages, e.g., Hom. II. in Num., Vol. II. p. 278; Hom. VI. in Lev., Vol. II. p. 211; Comment, in Joh., Vol. I. 3), but yet to a far greater extent than Clement (see Bigg, l.c., p. 214 f.). In Cyprian and the literature of the Greek Church in the immediately following period we find the designation "priest" as the regular and most customary name for the bishop and presbyters. Novatian (Jerome, de vir. inl. 70) wrote a treatise de sacerdote and another de ordinatione. The notable and momentous change of conception expressed in the idea can be traced by us through its preparatory stages almost as little as the theory of the apostolic succession of the bishops. Irenæus (IV. 8. 3, 17. 5, 18. 1) and Tertullian, when compared with Cyprian, appear here as representatives of primitive Christianity. They firmly assert the priesthood of the whole congregation. That the laity had as great a share as the leaders of the Churches in the transformation of the latter into Priests is moreover shown by the bitter saying of Tertullian (de monog. 12): "Sed cum extollimur et inflamur adversus clerum, tunc unum omnes sumus, tunc omnes sacerdotes, quia 'sacerdotes nos deo et patri fecit'. Cum ad peræquationem disciplinæ sacerdotalis provocamur, deponimus infulas."

Footnote 261:[ (return) ]

See Sohm, I. p. 207.

Footnote 262:[ (return) ]

The "deservire altari et sacrificia divina celebrare" (Cypr. ep. 67. 1) is the distinctive function of the sacerdos dei. It may further be said, however, that all ceremonies of public worship properly belong to him, and Cyprian has moreover contrived to show that this function of the bishop as leader of the Church follows from his priestly attributes; for as priest the bishop is antistes Christi (dei); see epp. 59. 18: 61. 2: 63. 14: 66. 5, and this is the basis of his right and duty to preserve the lex evangelica and the traditio dominica in every respect. As antistes dei however, an attribute bestowed on the bishop by the apostolic succession and the laying on of hands, he has also received the power of the keys, which confers the right to judge in Christ's stead and to grant or refuse the divine grace. In Cyprian's conception of the episcopal office the successio apostolica and the position of vicegerent of Christ (of God) counterbalance each other; he also tried to amalgamate both elements (ep. 55. 8: "cathedra sacerdotalis"). It is evident that as far as the inner life of each church was concerned, the latter and newer necessarily proved the more important feature. In the East, where the thought of the apostolical succession of the bishops never received such pronounced expression as in Rome it was just this latter element that was almost exclusively emphasised from the end of the 3rd century. Ignatius led the way when he compared the bishop, in his position towards the individual community, with God and Christ. He, however, is dealing in images, but at a later period the question is about realities based on a mysterious transference.

Footnote 263:[ (return) ]

Soon after the creation of a professional priesthood, there also arose a class of inferior clergy. This was first the case in Rome. This development was not uninfluenced by the heathen priesthood, and the temple service (see my article in Texte und Untersuchungen II. 5). Yet Sohm, l.c., p. 128 ff., has disputed this, and proposed modifications, worth considering, in my view of the origin of the ordines minores.

Footnote 264:[ (return) ]

Along with the sacerdotal laws, strictly so called, which Cyprian already understood to apply in a frightful manner (see his appeal to Deut. XVII. 12; 1 Sam. VIII. 7; Luke X. 16; John XVIII. 22 f.; Acts XXIII. 4-5 in epp. 3. 43, 59. 66), other Old Testament commandments could not fail to be introduced. Thus the commandment of tithes, which Irenæus had still asserted to be abolished, was now for the first time established (see Origen; Constit. Apost. and my remarks on Διδ. c. 13); and hence Mosaic regulations as to ceremonial cleanness were adopted (see Hippol. Canones arab. 17; Dionys. Alex., ep. canon.). Constantine was the first to base the observance of Sunday on the commandment as to the Sabbath. Besides, the West was always more hesitating in this respect than the East. In Cyprian's time, however, the classification and dignity of the clergy were everywhere upheld by an appeal to Old Testament commandments, though reservations still continued to be made here and there.

Footnote 265:[ (return) ]

Tertullian (de pud. I) sneeringly named the bishop of Rome "pontifex maximus," thereby proving that he clearly recognised the heathen colouring given to the episcopal office. With the picture of the bishop drawn by the Apostolic constitutions may be compared the ill-natured descriptions of Paul of Samosata in Euseb., VII. 30.

Footnote 266:[ (return) ]

Yet this influence, in a direct form at least, can only be made out at a comparatively late period. But nevertheless, from the middle of the 3rd century the priests alone are possessed of knowledge. As μαθησις and μυσταγωγια are inseparably connected in the mysteries and Gnostic societies, and the mystagogue was at once knowing one and priest, so also in the Catholic Church the priest is accounted the knowing one. Doctrine itself became a mystery to an increasing extent.

Footnote 267:[ (return) ]

Examples are found in epp. 1, 3, 4, 33, 43, 54, 57, 59, 65, 66. But see Iren., IV. 26. 2, who is little behind Cyprian here, especially when he threatens offenders with the fate of Dathan and Abiram. One of the immediate results of the formation of a priestly and spiritual class was that the independent "teachers" now shared the fate of the old "prophets" and became extinct (see my edition of the Διδαχη, prolegg. pp. 131-137). It is an instructive fact that Theoktistus of Cæsarea and Alexander of Jerusalem in order to prove in opposition to Demetrius that independent teachers were still tolerated, i.e., allowed to speak in public meetings of the Church, could only appeal to the practice of Phrygia and Lycaonia, that is, to the habit of outlying provinces where, besides, Montanism had its original seat. Euelpis in Laranda, Paulinus in Iconium, and Theodorus in Synnada, who flourished about 216, are in addition to Origen the last independent teachers (i.e., outside the ranks of the clergy) known to us in Christendom (Euseb., H. E. VI. 19 fin.).

Footnote 268:[ (return) ]

See Döllinger, Die Lehre von der Eucharistie in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten, 1826. Höfling, Die Lehre der ältesten Kirche vom Opfer, p. 71 ff. Th. Harnack, Der christliche Gemeindegottesdienst im apostolischen und altkatholischen Zeitalter, p. 342 ff. Steitz, Art. "Messe" in Herzog's Real-Encyklopädie, 2nd ed. It is idle to enquire whether the conception of the "sacerdotium" or that of the "sacrificium" was first altered, because they are correlative ideas.

Footnote 269:[ (return) ]

See the proof passages in Höfling, l.c., who has also treated in detail Clement and Origen's idea of sacrifice, and cf. the beautiful saying of Irenæus IV. 18. 3: "Non sacrificia sanctificant hominem; non enim indiget sacrificio deus; sed conscientia eius qui offert sanctificat sacrificium, pura exsistens, et præstat acceptare deum quasi ab amico" (on the offering in the Lord's Supper see Iren. IV. 17. 5, 18. 1); Tertull., Apolog. 30; de orat. 28; adv. Marc. III. 22; IV. 1, 35: adv. Jud. 5; de virg. vel. 13.

Footnote 270:[ (return) ]

Cf. specially the Montanist writings; the treatise de ieiunio is the most important among them in this case; see cc. 7, 16; de resurr. 8. On the use of the word "satisfacere" and the new ideas on the point which arose in the West (cf. also the word "meritum") see below chap. 5. 2 and the 2nd chap. of the 5th Vol. Note that the 2nd Ep. of Clement already contains the sayings: καλον ελεημουνη 'ως μετανοια 'αμαρτιας κρεισσων νηστεια προσευχης, ελεημοσυνη δε αμφοτερων ... ελεημοσυνη γαρ κουφισμα 'αμαρτιας γινεται (16. 4; similar expressions occur in the "Shepherd"). But they only show how far back we find the origin of these injunctions borrowed from Jewish proverbial wisdom. One cannot say that they had no effect at all on Christian life in the 2nd century; but we do not yet find the idea that ascetic performances are a sacrifice offered to a wrathful God. Martyrdom seems to have been earliest viewed as a performance which expiated sins. In Tertullian's time the theory, that it was on a level with baptism (see Melito, 12. Fragment in Otto, Corp. Apol. IX. p. 418: δυο συνεστη τα αφεσιν αμαρτηματα παρεχομενα, παθος δια Χριστον και βαπτισμα), had long been universally diffused and was also exegetically grounded. In fact, men went a step further and asserted that the merits of martyrs could also benefit others. This view had likewise become established long before Tertullian's day, but was opposed by him (de pudic 22), when martyrs abused the powers universally conceded to them. Origen went furthest here; see exhort. ad mart. 50: 'ωσπερ τιμιω 'αιματι του Ιησου ηγορασθημεν ... 'ουτως τω τιμιω 'αιματι των μαρτυρων αγορασθησονται τινες; Hom. X. in Num. c. II.: "ne forte, ex quo martyres non fiunt et hostiæ sanctorum non offeruntur pro peccatis nostris, peccatorum nostrorum remissionem non mereamur." The origin of this thought is, on the one hand, to be sought for in the wide-spread notion that the sufferings of an innocent man benefit others, and, on the other, in the belief that Christ himself suffered in the martyrs (see, e.g., ep. Lugd. in Euseb., H. E. V. 1. 23, 41).

Footnote 271:[ (return) ]

In the East it was Origen who introduced into Christianity the rich treasure of ancient ideas that had become associated with sacrifices. See Bigg's beautiful account in "The Christian Platonists of Alexandria," Lect. IV.-VI.

Footnote 272:[ (return) ]

Moreover, Tertullian (Scorp. 6) had already said: "Quomodo multæ mansiones apud patrem, si non pro varietate meritorum."

Footnote 273:[ (return) ]

See c. 1: "Nam cum dominus adveniens sanasset illa, quæ Adam portaverit vulnera et venena serpentis antiqua curasset, legem dedit sano et præcepit, ne ultra iam peccaret, ne quid peccanti gravius eveniret: coartati eramus et in augustum innocentiæ præscriptione conclusi, nec haberet quid fragilitatis humanæ infirmitas adque imbecillitas faceret, nisi iterum pietas divina subveniens iustitiæ et misericordiæ operibus ostensis viam quandam tuendæ salutis aperiret, ut sordes postmodum quascumque contrahimus eleemosynis abluamus." c. 2: "sicut lavacro aquæ salutaris gehennæ ignis extinguitur, ita eleemosynis adque operationibus iustus delictorum flamma sopitur, et quia semel in baptismo remissa peccatorum datur, adsidua et iugis operatic baptismi instar imitata dei rursus indulgentiam largiatur." 5, 6, 9. In c. 18 Cyprian already established an arithmetical relation between the number of alms-offerings and the blotting out of sins, and in c. 21, in accordance with an ancient idea which Tertullian and Minucius Felix, however, only applied to martyrdom, he describes the giving of alms as a spectacle for God and Christ. In Cyprian's epistles "satisfacere deo" is exceedingly frequent. It is almost still more important to note the frequent use of the expression "promereri deum (iudicem)" in Cyprian. See de unitate 15: "iustitia opus est, ut promereri quis possit deum iudicem: præceptis eius et monitis obtemperandum est, ut accipiant merita nostra mercedem." 18; de lapsis 31; de orat. 8, 32, 36; de mortal. 10; de op. 11, 14, 15, 26; de bono pat. 18; ep. 62. 2: 73. 10. Here it is everywhere assumed that Christians acquire God's favour by their works.

Footnote 274:[ (return) ]

Baptism with blood is not referred to here.

Footnote 275:[ (return) ]

With modifications, this has still continued to be the case beyond Augustine's time down to the Catholicism of the present day. Cyprian is the father of the Romish doctrine of good works and sacrifice. Yet is it remarkable that he was not yet familiar with the theory according to which man must acquire merita. In his mind "merits" and "blessedness" are not yet rigidly correlated ideas; but the rudiments of this view are also found in him; cf. de unit. 15 (see p. 134, note 3).

Footnote 276:[ (return) ]

"Sacrificare," "sacrificium celebrare," in all passages where they are unaccompanied by any qualifying words, mean to celebrate the Lord's Supper. Cyprian has never called prayer a "sacrifice" without qualifying terms; on the contrary he collocates "preces" and "sacrificium," and sometimes also "oblatio" and "sacrificium." The former is then the offering of the laity and the latter of the priests.

Footnote 277:[ (return) ]

Cf. the whole 63rd epistle and above all c. 7: "Et quia passionis eius mentionem in sacrificiis omnibus facimus, passio est enim domini sacrificium quod offerrimus, nihil aliud quam quod ille fecit facere debemus;" c. 9.: "unde apparet sanguinem Christi non offerri, si desit vinum calici." 13; de unit. 17: "dominicæ hostiæ veritatem per falsa sacrificia profanare;" ep. 63. 4: "sacramentum sacrificii dominici." The transference of the sacrificial idea to the consecrated elements, which, in all probability, Cyprian already found in existence, is ultimately based on the effort to include the element of mystery and magic in the specifically sacerdotal ceremony of sacrifice, and to make the Christian offering assume, though not visibly, the form of a bloody sacrifice, such as secularised Christianity desired. This transference, however, was the result of two causes. The first has been already rightly stated by Ernesti (Antimur. p. 94) in the words: "quia eucharistia habet αναμνησιν Christi mortui et sacrificii eius in cruce peracti, propter ea paullatim cœpta est tota eucharistia sacrificium dici." In Cyprian's 63rd epistle it is still observable how the "calicem in commemorationem domini et passionis eius offerre" passes over into the "sanguinem Christi offerre," see also Euseb. demonstr. I. 13: μνημην της θυσιας Χριστου προσφερειν and την ενσαρκον του Χριστου παρουσιαν και το καταρτισθεν αυτου σωμα προσφερειν. The other cause has been specially pointed out by Theodore Harnack (l.c., p. 409 f.). In ep. 63. 2 and in many other passages Cyprian expresses the thought "that in the Lord's Supper nothing else is done by us but what the Lord has first done for us." But he says that at the institution of the Supper the Lord first offered himself as a sacrifice to God the Father. Consequently the priest officiating in Christ's stead only presents a true and perfect offering when he imitates what Christ has done (c. 14: "si Christus Jesus dominus et deus noster ipse est summus sacerdos dei patris et sacrificiam patri se ipsum obtulit et hoc fieri in sui commemorationem præcepit, utique ille sacerdos vice Christi vere fungitur, qui id quod Christus fecit imitatur et sacrificium verum et plenum tunc offert in ecclesia deo patri, si sic incipiat offerre secundum quod ipsum Christum videat obtulisse"). This brings us to the conception of the repetition of Christ's sacrifice by the priest. But in Cyprian's case it was still, so to speak, only a notion verging on that idea, that is, he only leads up to it, abstains from formulating it with precision, or drawing any further conclusions from it, and even threatens the idea itself inasmuch as he still appears to conceive the "calicem in commemorationem domini et passionis eius offerre" as identical with it. As far as the East is concerned we find in Origen no trace of the assumption of a repeated sacrifice of Christ. But in the original of the first 6 books of the Apostolic Constitutions this conception is also wanting, although the Supper ceremonial has assumed an exclusively sacerdotal character (see II. 25: 'αι τοτε (in the old covenant) θυσιαι, νυν ευχαι και δεησεις και ευχαριστιαι. II. 53). The passage VI. 23: αντι θυσιας της δι' 'αιματων την λογικην και αναιμακτον και την μυστικην, 'ητις εις τον θανατον του κυριου συμβολων χαριν επιτελειται του σωματος αυτου και του 'αιματος does not belong to the original document, but to the interpolator. With the exception therefore of one passage in the Apostolic Church order (printed in my edition of the Didache prolegg. p. 236) viz.: 'η προσφορα του σωματος και του 'αιματος, we possess no proofs that there was any mention in the East before Eusebius' time of a sacrifice of Christ's body in the Lord's Supper. From this, however, we must by no means conclude that the mystic feature in the celebration of the sacrifice had been less emphasised there.

Footnote 278:[ (return) ]

In ep. 63. 13 Cyprian has illustrated the incorporation of the community with Christ by the mixture of wine and water in the Supper, because the special aim of the epistle required this: "Videmus in aqua populum intellegi, in vino vero ostendi sanguinem Christi; quando autem in calice vino aqua miscetur, Christo populus adunatur et credentium plebs ei in quem credidit copulatur et iungitur etc." The special mention of the offerers (see already Tertullian's works: de corona 3, de exhort. cast. II, and de monog. 10) therefore means that the latter commend themselves to Christ as his own people, or are recommended to him as such. On the Praxis see Cyprian ep. I. 2 "... si quis hoc fecisset. non offerretur pro eo nee sacrificium pro dormitione eius celebraretur;" 62. 5: "ut fratres nostros in mente habeatis orationibus vestris et eis vicem boni operis in sacrificiis et precibus repræsentetis, subdidi nomina singulorum."

Footnote 279:[ (return) ]

Much as the use of the word "sacramentum" in the Western Church from Tertullian to Augustine (Hahn, Die Lehre von den Sacramenten, 1864, p. 5 ff.) differs from that in the classic Romish use it is of small interest in the history of dogma to trace its various details. In the old Latin Bible μυστηριον was translated "sacramentum" and thus the new signification "mysterious, holy ordinance or thing" was added to the meaning "oath," "sacred obligation." Accordingly Tertullian already used the word to denote sacred facts, mysterious and salutary signs and vehicles, and also holy acts. Everything in any way connected with the Deity and his revelation, and therefore, for example, the content of revelation as doctrine, is designated "sacrament;" and the word is also applied to the symbolical which is always something mysterious and holy. Alongside of this the old meaning "sacred obligation" still remains in force. If, because of this comprehensive use, further discussion of the word is unnecessary, the fact that revelation itself as well as everything connected with it was expressly designated as a "mystery" is nevertheless of importance in the history of dogma. This usage of the word is indeed not removed from the original one so long as it was merely meant to denote the supernatural origin and supernatural nature of the objects in question; but more than this was now intended; "sacramentum" (μυστηριον) was rather intended to represent the holy thing that was revealed as something relatively concealed. This conception, however, is opposed to the Judæo-Christian idea of revelation, and is thus to be regarded as an introduction of the Greek notion. Probst (Sacramente und Sacramentalia, 1872) thinks differently. That which is mysterious and dark appears to be such an essential attribute of the divine, that even the obscurities of the New Testament Scriptures were now justified because these writings were regarded as altogether "spiritual." See Iren. II. 28. 1-3. Tert. de bapt. 2: "deus in stultitia et impossibilitate materias operationis suæ instituit."

Footnote 280:[ (return) ]

We have explained above that the Church already possessed this means of grace, in so far as she had occasionally absolved mortal sinners, even at an earlier period; but this possession was quite uncertain and, strictly speaking, was not a possession at all, for in such cases the early Church merely followed extraordinary directions of the Spirit.

Footnote 281:[ (return) ]

Höfling, Das Sacrament der Taufe, 2 Vols., 1846. Steitz, Art. "Taufe" in Herzog's Real-Encyklopädie. Walch, Hist. pædobaptismi quattuor priorum sæculorum, 1739.

Footnote 282:[ (return) ]

In de bono pudic. 2: "renati ex aqua et pudicitia," Pseudo-Cyprian expresses an idea, which, though remarkable, is not confined to himself.

Footnote 283:[ (return) ]

But Tertullian says (de bapt. 6): "Non quod in aquis spiritum sanctum consequamur, sed in aqua emundati sub angelo spiritui sancto præparamur."

Footnote 284:[ (return) ]

The disquisitions of Clement of Alexandria in Pædag. I, 6 (baptism and sonship) are very important, but he did not follow them up. It is deserving of note that the positive effects of baptism were more strongly emphasised in the East than in the West. But, on the other hand, the conception is more uncertain in the former region.

Footnote 285:[ (return) ]

See Tertullian, de bapt. 7 ff.; Cypr., ep. 70. 2 ("ungi quoque necesse est eum qui baptizatus est, ut accepto chrismate, i.e., unctione esse unctus dei et habere in se gratiam Christi possit"), 74. 5 etc. "Chrism" is already found in Tertullian as well as the laying on of hands. The Roman Catholic bishop Cornelius in the notorious epistle to Fabius (Euseb., H. E. VI. 43. 15), already traces the rites which accompany baptism to an ecclesiastical canon (perhaps one from Hippolytus' collection: see can. arab. 19). After relating that Novatian in his illness had only received clinical baptism he writes: ου μην ουδε των λοιπων ετυχε, διαφυγων την νοσον, 'ων χρη μεταλαμβανειν κατα τον της εκκλησιας κανονα, του τε σφραγισθηναι 'υπο του επισκοπου. It is also remarkable that one of the bishops who voted about heretic baptism (Sentent. episcop., Cypr., opp. ed. Hartel I. p. 439) calls the laying on of hands a sacrament like baptism: "neque enim spiritus sine aqua separatim operari potest nec aqua sine spiritu male ergo sibi quidem interpretantur ut dicant, quod per manus impositionem spiritum sanctum accipiant et sic recipiantur, cum manifestum sit utroque sacramento debere eos renasci in ecclesia catholica." Among other particulars found in Tertullian's work on baptism (cc. I. 12 seq.) it may moreover be seen that there were Christians about the year 200, who questioned the indispensability of baptism to salvation (baptismus non est necessarius, quibus fides satis est). The assumption that martyrdom replaces baptism (Tertull., de bapt. 16; Origen), is in itself a sufficient proof that the ideas of the "sacrament" were still uncertain. As to the objection that Jesus himself had not baptised and that the Apostles had not received Christian baptism see Tert., de bapt. 11, 12.

Footnote 286:[ (return) ]

In itself the performance of this rite seemed too simple to those who sought eagerly for mysteries. See Tertull., de bapt. 2: "Nihil adeo est quod obduret mentes hominum quam simplicitas divinorum operum, quæ in actu videtur, et magnificentia, quæ in effecta repromittitur, ut hinc quoque, quoniam tanta simplicitate, sine pompa, sine apparatu novo aliquo, denique sine sumptu homo in aqua demissus et inter pauca verba tinctus non multo vel nihilo mundior resurgit, eo incredibilis existimetur consecutio æternitatis. Mentior, si non e contrario idolorum solemnia vel arcana de suggestu et apparatu deque sumptu fidem at auctoritatem sibi exstruunt."

Footnote 287:[ (return) ]

But see Euseb., H. E. VI. 43. 15, who says that only the laying on of hands on the part of the bishop communicates the Holy Spirit, and this ceremony must therefore follow baptism. It is probable that confirmation as a specific act did not become detached from baptism in the West till shortly before the middle of the third century. Perhaps we may assume that the Mithras cult had an influence here.

Footnote 288:[ (return) ]

See Tertullian's superstitious remarks in de bap. 3-9 to the effect that water is the element of the Holy Spirit and of unclean Spirits etc. Melito also makes a similar statement in the fragment of his treatise on baptism in Pitra, Anal, Sacra II., p. 3 sq. Cyprian, ep. 70. I, uses the remarkable words: "oportet veio mundari et sanctificari aquam prius a sacer dote (Tertull. still knows nothing of this: c. 17: etiam laicis ius est), ut possit baptismo suo peccata hominis qui baptizatur abluere." Ep. 74. 5: "peccata purgare et hominem sanctificare aqua sola non potest, nisi habeat et spiritum sanctum." Clem. Alex. Protrept. 10.99: λαβετε 'υδωρ λογικος.

Footnote 289:[ (return) ]

It was easy for Origen to justify child baptism, as he recognised something sinful in corporeal birth itself, and believed in sin which had been committed in a former life. The earliest justification of child baptism may therefore be traced back to a philosophical doctrine.

Footnote 290:[ (return) ]

Translator's note. The following is the original Latin, as quoted by Prof. Harnack: "Cunctatio baptismi utilior est, præcipue circa parvulos. Quid enim necesse, sponsores etiam periculo ingeri ... veniant ergo parvuli, dum adolescunt; veniant dum discunt, dum quo veniant docentur; fiant Christiani, cum Christum nosse potuerint. Quid festinat innocens ætas ad remissionem peccatorum? Cautius agetur in sæcularibus, ut cui substantia terrena non creditur, divina credatur ... Si qui pondus intelligant baptismi, magis timebunt consecutionem quam dilationem."

Footnote 291:[ (return) ]

Under such circumstances the recollection of the significance of baptism in the establishment of the Church fell more and more into the background (see Hermas: "the Church rests like the world upon water;" Irenæus III. 17. 2: "Sicut de arido tritico massa una non fieri potest sine humore neque unus panis, ita nec nos multi unum fieri in Christo Iesu poteramus sine aqua quæ de cœlo est. Et sicut aricla terra, si non percipiat humorem, non fructificat: sic et nos lignum aridum exsistentes primum, nunquam fructificaremus vitam sine superna voluntaria pluvia. Corpora unim nostra per lavacrum illam quæ est ad incorruptionem unitatem acceperunt, animæ autem per spiritum"). The unbaptised (catechumens) also belong to the Church, when they commit themselves to her guidance and prayers. Accordingly baptism ceased more and more to be regarded as an act of initiation, and only recovered this character in the course of the succeeding centuries. In this connection the 7th (spurious) canon of Constantinople (381) is instructive: και την πρωτην 'ημεραν ποιουμεν αυτους Χριστιανους, την δε δευτεραν κατηχουμενους, ειτα την τριτην εξορκιζομεν αυτους κ.τ.λ.

Footnote 292:[ (return) ]

Döllinger, Die Lehre von der Eucharistie in dem ersten 3 Jahrhunderten, 1826. Engelhardt in the Zeitschrift fur die hist. Theologie, 1842, I. Kahnis, Lehre vom Abendmahl, 1851. Ruckert, Das Abendmahl, sein Wesen und seine Geschichte, 1856. Leimbach, Beitrage zur Abendmahlslehre Tertullian's, 1874. Steitz, Die Abendmahlslehre der griechischen Kirche, in the Jahrbucher fur deutsche Theologie, 1864-1868; cf. also the works of Probst. Whilst Eucharist and love feast had already been separated from the middle of the 2nd century in the West, they were still united in Alexandria in Clement's time; see Bigg, l.c., p. 103.

Footnote 293:[ (return) ]

The collocation of baptism and the Lord's Supper, which, as the early Christian monuments prove, was a very familiar practice (Tert. adv. Marc. IV. 34: "sacramentum baptismi et eucharistiæ;" Hippol., can. arab. 38: "baptizatus et corpore Christi pastus"), was, so far as I know, justified by no Church Father on internal grounds. Considering their conception of the holy ordinances this is not surprising. They were classed together because they were instituted by the Lord, and because the elements (water, wine, bread) afforded much common ground for allegorical interpretation.

Footnote 294:[ (return) ]

The story related by Dionysius (in Euseb., l.c.) is especially characteristic, as the narrator was an extreme spiritualist. How did it stand therefore with the dry tree? Besides, Tertull. (de corona 3) says: "Calicis aut panis nostri aliquid decuti in terram anxie patimur". Superstitious reverence for the sacrament ante et extra usum is a very old habit of mind in the Gentile Church.

Footnote 295:[ (return) ]

Leimbach's investigations of Tertullian's use of words have placed this beyond doubt; see de orat. 6; adv. Marc. I. 14: IV. 40: III. 19; de resuri. 8.

Footnote 296:[ (return) ]

The chief passages referring to the Supper in Clement are Protrept. 12. 120; Pæd. I. 6. 43: II. 2. 19 sq.: I. 5. 15: I. 6. 38, 40; Quis div. 23; Strom. V. 10. 66: I. 10. 46: I. 19. 96: VI. 14. 113: V. II. 70. Clement thinks as little of forgiveness of sins in connection with the Supper as does the author of the Didache or the other Fathers; this feast is rather meant to bestow an initiation into knowledge and immortality. Ignatius had already said, "the body is faith, the blood is hope." This is also Clement's opinion; he also knows of a transubstantiation, not, however, into the real body of Christ, but into heavenly powers. His teaching was therefore that of Valentinus (see the Exc. ex. Theod. § 82, already given on Vol. i. p. 263) Strom. V. 11. 70: λογικον 'ημιν βρωμα 'η γνωσις; I. 20. 46: 'ινα δη φαγωμεν λογικως; V. 10. 66: βρωσις γαρ και ποσις του θειου λογου 'η γνωσις εστι της θειας ουσιας. Adumbrat. in epp. Joh.: "sanguis quod est cognitio"; see Bigg, l.c., p. 106 ff.

Footnote 297:[ (return) ]

Orig. in Matth. Comment. ser. 85: "Panis iste, quem deus verbum corpus suum esse fatetur, verbum est nutritorium animarum, verbum de deo verbo procedens et panis de pane cœ'esti... Non enim panem illum visibilem, quem tenebat in manibus, corpus suum dicebat deus verbum, sed verbum, in cuius mysterio fuerat panis ille frangendus; nec potum illum visibilem sanguinem suum dicebat, sed verbum in cuius mysterio potus ille fuerat effundendus;" see in Matt. XI. 14; c. Cels. VIII. 33. Hom. XVI. 9 in Num. On Origen's doctrine of the Lord's Supper see Bigg, p. 219 ff.

Footnote 298:[ (return) ]

The conception of the Supper as viaticum mortis (fixed by the 13th canon of Nicæa: περι δε των εξοδευοντων 'ο παλαιος και κανονικος νομος φυλαχθησεται και νυν, 'ωστε ειτις εξοδευοι, του τελευταιου και αναγκαιοτατου εφοδιου μη αποστερεισθαι), a conception which is genuinely Hellenic and which was strengthened by the idea that the Supper was φαρμακον αθανασιας, the practice of benediction, and much else in theory and practice connected with the Eucharist reveal the influence of antiquity. See the relative articles in Smith and Cheetham's Dictionary of Christian Antiquities.

Footnote 299:[ (return) ]

The fullest account of the "history of the Romish Church down to the pontificate of Leo I." has been given by Langen, 1881; but I can in no respect agree (see Theol. Lit. Ztg. 1891, No. 6) with the hypotheses about the primacy as propounded by him in his treatise on the Clementine romances (1890, see especially p. 163 ff). The collection of passages given by Caspari, "Quellen zur Geschichte des Taufsymbols," Vol. III., deserves special recognition. See also the sections bearing on this subject in Renan's "Origines du Christianisme," Vols. V.-VII. especially VII., chaps. 5, 12, 23. Sohm in his "Kirchenrecht" I. (see especially pp. 164 ff., 350 ff., 377 ff.) has adopted my conception of "Catholic" and "Roman," and made it the basis of further investigations. He estimates the importance of the Roman Church still more highly, in so far as, according to him, she was the exclusive originator of Church law as well as of the Catholic form of Church constitution; and on page 381 he flatly says: "The whole Church constitution with its claim to be founded on divine arrangement was first developed in Rome and then transferred from her to the other communities." I think this is an exaggeration. Tschirn (Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, XII. p. 215 ff.) has discussed the origin of the Roman Church in the 2nd century. Much that was the common property of Christendom, or is found in every religion as it becomes older, is regarded by this author as specifically Roman.

Footnote 300:[ (return) ]

No doubt we must distinguish two halves in Christendom. The first, the ecclesiastical West, includes the west coast of Asia Minor, Greece, and Rome together with their daughter Churches, that is, above all, Gaul and North Africa. The second or eastern portion embraces Palestine, Egypt, Syria, and the east part of Asia Minor. A displacement gradually arose in the course of the 3rd century. In the West the most important centres are Ephesus, Smyrna, Corinth, and Rome, cities with a Greek and Oriental population. Even in Carthage the original speech of the Christian community was probably Greek.

Footnote 301:[ (return) ]

Rome was the first city in the Empire, Alexandria the second. They were the metropolitan cities of the world (see the inscription in Kaibel, No. 1561, p. 407: θρεψε μ' Αλεξανδρεια, μετοικον εθαψε δε 'Ρομη, 'αι κοσμου και γης, ω ξενε, μητροπολεις). This is reflected in the history of the Church; first Rome appears, then Alexandria. The significance of the great towns for the history of dogma and of the Church will be treated of in a future volume. Abercius of Hieropolis, according to the common interpretation (inscription V. 7 f.) designates Rome as "queen." This was a customary appellation; see Eunap., vita Prohaer. p. 90: 'η βασιλευουσα 'Ρωμη.

Footnote 302:[ (return) ]

In this connection we need only keep in mind the following summary of facts. Up to the end of the second century the Alexandrian Church had none of the Catholic and apostolic standards, and none of the corresponding institutions as found in the Roman Church; but her writer, Clement, was also "as little acquainted with the West as Homer." In the course of the first half of the 3rd century she received those standards and institutions; but her writer, Origen, also travelled to Rome himself in order to see "the very old" church and formed a connection with Hippolytus; and her bishop Dionysius carried on a correspondence with his Roman colleague, who also made common cause with him. Similar particulars may also be ascertained with regard to the Syrian Church.

Footnote 303:[ (return) ]

See the proofs in the two preceding chapters. Note also that these elements have an inward connection. So long as one was lacking, all were, and whenever one was present, all the others immediately made their appearance.

Footnote 304:[ (return) ]

Ignatius already says that the Roman Christians are αποδιυλισμενοι απο παντος αλλοτριον χρωματος (Rom. inscr.); he uses this expression of no others. Similar remarks are not quite rare at a later period; see, for instance, the oft-repeated eulogy that no heresy ever arose in Rome. At a time when this city had long employed the standard of the apostolic rule of faith with complete confidence, namely, at the beginning of the 3rd century, we hear that a lady of rank in Alexandria, who was at any rate a Christian, lodged and entertained in her house Origen, then a young man, and a famous heretic. (See Euseb., H. E. VI. 2. 13, 14). The lectures on doctrine delivered by this heretic and the conventicles over which he presided were attended by a μυριον πληθος ου μονον 'αιρετικων, αλλα και 'ημετεφων. That is a very valuable piece of information which shows us a state of things in Alexandria that would have been impossible in Rome at the same period. See, besides, Dionys. Alex, in Euseb., H. E. VII. 7.

Footnote 305:[ (return) ]

I must here refrain from proving the last assertion. The possibility of Asia Minor having had a considerable share, or having led the way, in the formation of the canon must be left an open question (cf. what Melito says, and the use made of New Testament writings in the Epistle of Polycarp). We will, however, be constrained to lay the chief emphasis on Rome, for it must not be forgotten that Irenæus had the closest connection with the Church of that city, as is proved by his great work, and that he lived there before he came to Gaul. Moreover, it is a fact deserving of the greatest attention that the Montanists and their decided opponents in Asia, the so-called Alogi, had no ecclesiastical canon before them, though they may all have possessed the universally acknowledged books of the Romish canon, and none other, in the shape of books read in the churches.

Footnote 306:[ (return) ]

See the Prolegg. of Westcott and Hort (these indeed give an opposite judgment), and cf. Harris, Codex Bezae. A study of the so-called Western text of the New Testament 1891. An exhaustive study of the oldest martyrologies has already led to important cases of agreement between Rome and the East, and promises still further revelations. See Duchesne, "Les Sources du Martyrologe Hieron." 1885. Egli, "Altchristliche Studien, Martyrien und Martyrologieen ältester Zeit." 1887; the same writer in the "Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie", 1891, p. 273 ff.

Footnote 307:[ (return) ]

On the relations between Edessa and Rome see the end of the Excursus.

Footnote 308:[ (return) ]

See my treatise "Die ältesten christlichen Datirungen und die Anfánge einer bischòflichen Chronographie in Rom." in the report of the proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science, 1892, pp. 617-658. I think I have there proved that, in the time of Soter, Rome already possessed a figured list of bishops, in which important events were also entered.

Footnote 309:[ (return) ]

That the idea of the apostolic succession of the bishops was first turned to account or appeared in Rome is all the more remarkable, because it was not in that city, but rather in the East, that the monarchical episcopate was first consolidated. (Cf. the Shepherd of Hermas and Ignatius' Epistles to the Romans with his other Epistles). There must therefore have been a very rapid development of the constitution in the time between Hyginus and Victor. Sohm, l.c., tries to show that the monarchical episcopate arose in Rome immediately after the composition of the First Epistle of Clement, and as a result of it; and that this city was the centre from which it spread throughout Christendom.

Footnote 310:[ (return) ]

See Pseudo-Cyprian's work "de aleat" which, in spite of remarks to the contrary, I am inclined to regard as written by Victor; cf. "Texte und Untersuchungen" V. I; see c. I of this writing: "et quoniam in nobis divina et paterna pietas apostolatus ducatum contulit et vicariam domini sedem cælesti dignatione ordinavit et originem authentici apostolatus, super quem Christus fundavit ecclesiam, in superiore nostro portamus."

Footnote 311:[ (return) ]

See report of the proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science, 1892, p. 622 ff. To the material found there must be added a remarkable passage given by Nestle (Zeitschrift fur wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1893, p. 437), where the dates are reckoned after Sixtus I.

Footnote 312:[ (return) ]

Cf. the 8th book of the Apostolic Constitutions with the articles referring to the regulation of the Church, which in Greek MSS. bear the name of Hippolytus. Compare also the Arabian Canones Hippolyti, edited by Haneberg (1870) and commented on by Achelis (Texte und Untersuchungen VI. 4). Apart from the additions and alterations, which are no doubt very extensive, it is hardly likely that the name of the Roman bishop is wrongly assigned to them. We must further remember the importance assigned by the tradition of the Eastern and Western Churches to one of the earliest Roman "bishops," Clement, as the confidant and secretary of the Apostles and as the composer and arranger of their laws.

Footnote 313:[ (return) ]

See my proofs in "Texte und Untersuchungen," Vol. II., Part 5. The canons of the Council of Nicæa presuppose the distinction of higher and lower clergy for the whole Church.

Footnote 314:[ (return) ]

We see this from the Easter controversy, but there are proofs of it elsewhere, e.g., in the collection of Cyprian's epistles. The Roman bishop Cornelius informs Fabius, bishop of Antioch, of the resolutions of the Italian, African, and other Churches (Euseb., H. E. VI. 43. 3: ηλθον εις 'ημας επιστολαι Κορνηλιου 'Ρωμαιων επισκοπου προς ... φαβιον, δηλουσαι τα περι της 'Ρωμαιων συνοδου, και τα δοξαντα πασι τοις κατα την Ιταλιαν και Αφρικην και τας αυτοφι χωρας). We must not forget, however, that there were also bishops elsewhere who conducted a so-called œcumenical correspondence and enjoyed great influence, as, e.g., Dionysius of Corinth and Dionysius of Alexandria. In matters relating to penance the latter wrote to a great many Churches, even as far as Armenia, and sent many letters to Rome (Euseb., H. E. VI. 46). The Catholic theologian, Dittrich—before the Vatican Decree, no doubt—has spoken of him in the following terms (Dionysius von Alexandrien, 1867, p. 26): "As Dionysius participated in the power, so also he shared in the task of the primateship." "Along with the Roman bishop he was, above all, called upon to guard the interests of the whole Church."

Footnote 315:[ (return) ]

This conception, as well as the ideas contained in this Excursus generally, is now entirely shared by Weingarten (Zeittafeln, 3rd. ed., 1888, pp. 12, 21): "The Catholic Church is essentially the work of those of Rome and Asia Minor. The Alexandrian Church and theology do not completely adapt themselves to it till the 3rd century. The metropolitan community becomes the ideal centre of the Great Church" ... "The primacy of the Roman Church is essentially the transference to her of Rome's central position in the religion of the heathen world during the Empire: urbs æterna urbs sacra."

Footnote 316:[ (return) ]

This is also admitted by Langen (l.c., 184 f.), who even declares that this precedence existed from the beginning.

Footnote 317:[ (return) ]

Cf. chaps. 59 and 62, but more especially 63.

Footnote 318:[ (return) ]

At that time the Roman Church did not confine herself to a letter; she sent ambassadors to Corinth, 'οιτινες μαρτυρες εσονται μεταξυ 'υμων και 'ημων. Note carefully also the position of the Corinthian community with which the Roman one interfered (see on this point Wrede, Untersuchungen zum I Clemensbrief, 1891.)

Footnote 319:[ (return) ]

In Ignatius, Rom. inscr., the verb προκαθημαι is twice used about the Roman Church (προκαθηται εν [to be understood in a local sense] τοπωι κ'ωριον 'Ρωμαιων—προκαθημενη της αγαπης = presiding in, or having the guardianship of, love). Ignatius (Magn. 6), uses the same verb to denote the dignity of the bishop or presbyters in relation to the community. See, besides, the important testimony in Rom. II.: αλλους εδιδαξατε. Finally, it must be also noted that Ignatius presupposes an extensive influence on the part of individual members of the Church in the higher spheres of government. Fifty years later we have a memorable proof of this in the Marcia-Victor episode. Lastly, Ignatius is convinced that the Church will interfeie quite as energetically on behalf of a foreign brother as on behalf of one of her own number. In the Epistle of Clement to James, c. 2, the Roman bishop is called 'ο αληθειας προκαθεζομενος.

Footnote 320:[ (return) ]

Euseb., H. E. IV. 23. 9-12; cf., above all, the words: Εξ αρχης 'υμιν εθος εστι τουτο, παντας μεν αδελφους ποικιως ευεργετειν, εκκλησιαις τε πολλαις ταις κατα πασαν πολιν εφοδια πεμπειν ... πατροπαραδοτον εθος 'Ρωμαιων 'Ρωμαιοι διαφυλαττοντες. Note here the emphasis laid on Ρωμαιοι.

Footnote 321:[ (return) ]

According to Irenæus a peculiar significance belongs to the old Jerusalem Church, in so far as all the Christian congregations sprang from her (III. 12. 5: αυται φωναι της εκκλησιας, εξ 'ης πασα εσχηκεν εκκλησια της αρχην αυται φωναι της μητροπολεως των της καινης διαθηκης πολιτων). For obvious reasons Irenæus did not speak of the Jerusalem Church of his own time. Hence that passage cannot be utilised.

Footnote 322:[ (return) ]

Iren. III. 3. i: "Sed quomiam valde longum est, in hoc tali volumine omnium ecclesiarum enumerare successiones, maximæ et antiquissimæ et omnibus cognitæ, a gloriosissimis duobus apostolis Paulo et Petro Romæ fundatæ et constitutæ ecclesiæ, eam quam habet ab apostolis traditionem et annuutiatam hominibus fidem, per successiones episcoporum pervenientem usque ad nos indicantes confundimus omnes eos, qui quoquo modo vel per sibiplacentiam malam vel vanam gloriam vel per cæcitatem et malam sententiam, præterquam oportet, colligunt. Ad hanc enim ecclesiam propter potentiorem principalitatem necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam, hoc est, eos qui sunt undique fideles, in qua semper ab his, qui sunt undique, conservata est ea quæ est ab apostolis traditio." On this we may remark as follows: (1) The special importance which Irenæus claims for the Roman Church—for he is only referring to her—is not merely based by him on her assumed foundation by Peter and Paul, but on a combination of the four attributes "maxima," "antiquissima" etc. Dionysius of Corinth also made this assumption (Euseb., II. 25. 8), but applied it quite as much to the Corinthian Church. As regards capability of proving the truth of the Church's faith, all the communities founded by the Apostles possess principalitas in relation to the others; but the Roman Church has the potentior principalitas, in so far as she excels all the rest in her qualities of ecclesia maxima et omnibus cognita etc. Principalitas = "sovereign authority," αυθεντια, for this was probably the word in the original text (see proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science, 9th Nov., 1893). In common with most scholars I used to think that the "in qua" refers to "Roman Church;" but I have now convinced myself (see the treatise just cited) that it relates to "omnem ecclesiam," and that the clause introduced by "in qua" merely asserts that every church, in so far as she is faithful to tradition, i.e., orthodox, must as a matter of course agree with that of Rome. (2) Irenæus asserts that every Church, i.e., believers in all parts of the world, must agree with this Church ("convenire" is to be understood in a figurative sense; the literal acceptation "every Church must come to that of Rome" is not admissible). However, this "must" is not meant as an imperative, but == αναγκη == "it cannot be otherwise." In reference to principalitas == αυθεντια (see I. 31. 1: I. 26. 1) it must be remembered that Victor of Rome (l.c.) speaks of the "origo authentici apostolatus," and Tertullian remarks of Valentinus when he apostatised at Rome, "ab ecclesia authenticæ regulæ abrupit" (adv. Valent. 4).

Footnote 323:[ (return) ]

Beyond doubt his "convenire necesse est" is founded on actual circumstances.

Footnote 324:[ (return) ]

On other important journeys of Christian men and bishops to Rome in the 2nd and 3rd centuries see Caspari, l.c. Above all we may call attention to the journey of Abercius of Hierapolis (not Hierapolis on the Meander) about 200 or even earlier. Its historical reality is not to be questioned. See his words in the epitaph composed by himself (V. 7 f.): εις 'Ρωμην 'ος επεμψεν εμεν βασιληαν αθρησαι και βασιλισσαν ιδειν χρυσοστολον χρυσοπεδιλον. However, Ficker raises very serious objections to the Christian origin of the inscription.

Footnote 325:[ (return) ]

We cannot here discuss how this tradition arose; in all likelihood it already expresses the position which the Roman Church very speedily attained in Christendom. See Renan, Orig., Vol. VII., p. 70: "Pierre el Paul (léconciliés), voilà le chef-d'oeuvre qui fondait la suprématie ecclésiastique de Rome dans làvenir. Une nouvelle qualité mythique lemplagait celle de Romulus et Remus." But it is highly probable that Peter was really in Rome like Paul (see 1 Clem. V., Ignatius ad Rom. IV.); both really performed important services to the Church there, and died as martyrs in that city.

Footnote 326:[ (return) ]

The wealth of the Roman Church is also illustrated by the present of 200,000 sesterces brought her by Marcion (Tertull., de præse. 30). The "Shepherd" also contains instructive particulars with regard to this. As far as her influence is concerned, we possess various testimonies from Philipp. IV. 22 down to the famous account by Hippolytus of the relations of Victor to Marcia. We may call special attention to Ignatius' Epistle to the Romans.

Footnote 327:[ (return) ]

See Tertullian, adv. Prax. I; Euseb., H. E. V. 3, 4. Dictionary of Christian Biography III., p. 937.

Footnote 328:[ (return) ]

Euseb, H.E. V. 24. 9: επι τουτοις 'ο μεν της 'Ρωμαιων προεστως Βικτωρ αθροως της Ασιας πασης 'αμα ταις 'ομοροις εκκλησιαις τας παροικιας αποτεμνειν 'ωσαν 'ετεροδοξουσας, της κοινης 'ενωσεως πειραται, και στηλιτευει γε δια γραμματων, ακοινωνητους παντας αρδην τους εκεισε ανακηρυττων αδελφους. Stress should be laid on two points here: (1) Victor proclaimed that the people of Asia Minor were to be excluded from the κοινη 'ενωσις, and not merely from the fellowship of the Roman Church; (2) he based the excommunication on the alleged heterodoxy of those Churches. See Heinichen, Melet. VIII, on Euseb., l.c. Victor's action is parallelled by that of Stephen. Firmilian says to the latter: "Dum enim putas, omnes abs te abstineri posse, solum te ab omnibus abstinuisti." It is a very instructive fact that in the 4th century Rome also made the attempt to have Sabbath fasting established as an apostolic custom. See the interesting work confuted by Augustine (ep. 36), a writing which emanates from a Roman author who is unfortunately unknown to us. Cf. also Augustine's 54th and 55th epistles.

Footnote 329:[ (return) ]

Irenæus also (l.c. § 11) does not appear to have questioned Victor's proceeding as such, but as applied to this particular case.

Footnote 330:[ (return) ]

See Tertull., de orat. 22: "Sed non putet institutionem unusquisque antecessoris commovendam." De virg. vel. I: "Paracletus solus antecessor, quia solus post Christum;" 2: "Eas ego ecclesias proposui, quas et ipsi apostolici viri condiderunt, et puto ante quosdam;" 3: "Sed nec inter consuetudines dispicere voluerunt illi sanctissimi antecessores." This is also the question referred to in the important remark in Jerome, de vir. inl. 53: "Tertullianus ad mediam ætatem presbyter fuit ecclesiæ Africanæ, invidia postea et contumeliis clericorum Romanæ ecclesiæ ad Montani dogma delapsus."

Footnote 331:[ (return) ]

Stephen acted like Victor and excluded almost all the East from the fellowship of the Church; see in addition to Cyprian's epistles that of Dionysius of Alexandria in Euseb., H. E. VII. 5. In reference to Hippolytus, see Philosoph. l. IX. In regard to Origen, see the allusions in de orat. 28 fin.; in Matth. XI. 9, 15: XII. 9-14: XVI. 8, 22: XVII. 14; in Joh. X. 16; Rom. VI in Isai. c. 1. With regard to Philosoph. IX. 12, Sohm rightly remarks (p. 389): "It is clear that the responsibility was laid on the Roman bishop not merely in several cases where married men were made presbyters and deacons, but also when they were appointed bishops; and it is also evident that he appears just as responsible when bishops are not deposed in consequence of their marrying." One cannot help concluding that the Roman bishop has the power of appointing and deposing not merely presbyters and deacons, but also bishops. Moreover, the impression is conveyed that this appointment and deposition of bishops takes place in Rome, for the passage contains a description of existent conditions in the Roman Church. Other communities may be deprived of their bishops by an order from Rome, and a bishop (chosen in Rome) may be sent them. The words of the passage are: επι καλλιστου ηρξαντο επισκοποι και πρεσβυτεροι και διακονοι διγαμοι και τριγαμοι καθιστασθαι εις κληρους ει δε και τις εν κληρω ων γαμοιη, μενειν τον τοιουτον εν τω κληρω 'ως μη 'ημαρτηκοτα.

Footnote 332:[ (return) ]

In the treatise "Die Briefe des romischen Klerus aus der Zeit der Sedisvacanz im Jahre 250" (Abhandlungen fur Weizsäcker, 1892), I have shown how the Roman clergy kept the revenue of the Church and of the Churches in their hands, though they had no bishop. What language the Romans used in epistles 8, 30, 36 of the Cyprian collection, and how they interfered in the affairs of the Carthaginian Church! Beyond doubt the Roman Church possessed an acknowledged primacy in the year 250; it was the primacy of active participation and fulfilled duty. As yet there was no recognised dogmatic or historic foundation assigned for it; in fact it is highly probable that this theory was still shaky and uncertain in Rome herself. The college of presbyters and deacons feels and speaks as if it were the bishop. For it was not on the bishop that the incomparable prestige of Rome was based—at least this claim was not yet made with any confidence,—but on the city itself, on the origin and history, the faith and love, the earnestness and zeal of the whole Roman Church and her clergy.

Footnote 333:[ (return) ]

In Tertullian, de præsc. 36, the bishops are not mentioned. He also, like Irenæus, cites the Roman Church as one amongst others. We have already remarked that in the scheme of proof from prescription no higher rank could be assigned to the Roman Church than to any other of the group founded by the Apostles. Tertullian continues to maintain this position, but expressly remarks that the Roman Church has special authority for the Carthaginian, because Carthage had received its Christianity from Rome. He expresses the special relationship between Rome and Carthage in the following terms: "Si autem Italiæ adiaces habes Romam, unde nobis quoque auctoritas præsto est." With Tertullian, then, the de facto position of the Roman Church in Christendom did not lead to the same conclusion in the scheme of proof from prescription as we found in Irenæus. But in his case also that position is indicated by the rhetorical ardour with which he speaks of the Roman Church, whereas he does nothing more than mention Corinth, Philippi, Thessalonica, and Ephesus. Even at that time, moreover, he had ground enough for a more reserved attitude towards Rome, though in the antignostic struggle he could not dispense with the tradition of the Roman community. In the veil dispute (de virg. vel. 2) he opposed the authority of the Greek apostolic Churches to that of Rome. Polycarp had done the same against Anicetus, Polycrates against Victor, Proculus against his Roman opponents. Conversely, Praxeas in his appeal to Eleutherus (c. 1.: "præcessorum auctoritates"), Caius when contending with Proculus, the Carthaginian clergy when opposing Tertullian (in the veil dispute), and Victor when contending with Polycrates set the authority of Rome against that of the Greek apostolic Churches. These struggles at the transition from the and to the 3rd century are of the utmost importance. Rome was here seeking to overthrow the authority of the only group of Churches able to enter into rivalry with her those of Asia Minor, and succeeded in the attempt.

Footnote 334:[ (return) ]

De pudic. 21: "De tua nunc sententia quæro, unde hoc ius ecclesiæ usurpes. Si quia dixerit Petro dominus: Super hanc petram ædificabo ecclesiam meam, tibi dedi claves regni cælestis, vel, Quæcumque alligaveris vel solveris in terra, erunt alligata vel soluta in cœlis, id circo præsumis et ad te derivasse solvendi et alligandi potestatem?" Stephen did the same; see Firmilian in Cyprian ep. 75. With this should be compared the description Clement of Rome gives in his epistles to James of his own installation by Peter (c. 2). The following words are put in Peter's mouth: κλημεντα τουτον επισκοπον 'υμιν χειροντονω, 'ω την εμην των λογων πιστευω καθεδραν ... δια αυτω μεταδιδωμι την εξουσιαν του δεσμευειν και λυειν, 'ινα περι παντος ου αν χειροτονηση επι γης εσται δεδογματισμενον εν ουρανοις. δησει γαρ 'ο δει δεθηναι και λυσει 'ο δει λυθηναι, 'ως τον της εκκλησιας ειδως κανονα.

Footnote 335:[ (return) ]

See Dionysius of Alexandria's letter to the Roman bishop Stephen (Euseb., H. E. VII. 5. 2): 'Αι μεντοι Συριαι 'ολαι και 'η Αραβια, οις επαρκειτε 'εκαστοτε και οις νυν επεστειλατε.

Footnote 336:[ (return) ]

In the case of Origen's condemnation the decision of Rome seems to have been of special importance. Origen sought to defend his orthodoxy in a letter written by his own hand to the Roman bishop Fabian (see Euseb., H. E. VI. 36; Jerome, ep. 84. 10). The Roman bishop Pontian had previously condemned him after summoning a "senate;" see Jerome, ep. 33 (Döllinger, Hippolytus and Calixtus, p. 259 f.). Further, it is an important fact that a deputation of Alexandrian Christians, who did not agree with the Christology of their bishop Dionysius, repaired to Rome to the Roman bishop Dionysius and formally accused the first named prelate. It is also significant that Dionysius received this complaint and brought the matter up at a Roman synod. No objection was taken to this proceeding (Athanas., de synod.). This information is very instructive, for it proves that the Roman Church was ever regarded as specially charged with watching over the observance of the conditions of the general ecclesiastical federation, the κοινη 'ενωσις. As to the fact that in circular letters, not excepting Eastern ones, the Roman Church was put at the head of the address, see Euseb., H. E. VII. 30. How frequently foreign bishops came to Rome is shown by the 19th canon of Arles (A.D. 314): "De episcopis peregrinis, qui in urbem solent venire, placuit iis locum dari ut offerant." The first canon is also important in deciding the special position of Rome.

Footnote 337:[ (return) ]

Peculiar circumstances, which unfortunately we cannot quite explain, are connected with the cases discussed by Cyprian in epp. 67 and 68. The Roman bishop must have had the acknowledged power of dealing with the bishop of Arles, whereas the Gallic prelates had not this right. Sohm, p. 391 ff., assumes that the Roman bishop alone—not Cyprian or the bishops of Gaul—had authority to exclude the bishop of Arles from the general fellowship of the Church, but that, as far as the Gallic Churches were concerned, such an excommunication possessed no legal effect, but only a moral one, because in their case the bishop of Rome had only a spiritual authority and no legal power. Further, two Spanish bishops publicly appealed to the Roman see against their deposition, and Cyprian regarded this appeal as in itself correct. Finally, Cornelius says of himself in a letter (in Euseb., H. E. VI. 43. 10): των λοιπων επισκοπων διαδοχους εις τους τοπους, εν 'οις ησαν, χειροτονησαντες απεσταλκαμεν. This quotation refers to Italy, and the passage, which must be read connectedly, makes it plain (see, besides, the quotation in reference to Calixtus given above on p. 162), that, before the middle of the 3rd century, the Roman Church already possessed a legal right of excommunication and the recognised power of making ecclesiastical appointments as far as the communities and bishops in Italy were concerned (see Sohm, p. 389 ff.).

Footnote 338:[ (return) ]

Euseb., H. E. VII. 30. 19. The Church of Antioch sought to enter upon an independent line of development under Paul of Samosata. Paul's fall was the victory of Rome. We may suppose it to be highly probable, though to the best of my belief there is for the present no sure proof, that it was not till then that the Roman standards and sacraments, catholic and apostolic collection of Scriptures (see, on the contrary, the use of Scripture in the Didaskalia), apostolic rule of faith, and apostolic episcopacy attained supremacy in Antioch; but that they began to be introduced into that city about the time of Serapion's bishopric (that is, during the Easter controversy). The old records of the Church of Edessa have an important bearing on this point; and from these it is evident that her constitution did not begin to assume a Catholic form till the beginning of the 3rd century, and that as the result of connection with Rome. See the Doctrine of Addai by Phillips, p. 50: "Palut himself went to Antioch and received the hand of the priesthood from Serapion, bishop of Antioch. Serapion, bishop of Antioch, himself also received the hand from Zephyrinus, bishop of the city of Rome, from the succession of the hand of the priesthood of Simon Cephas, which he received from our Lord, who was there bishop of Rome 25 years, (sic) in the days of the Cæsar, who reigned there 13 years." (See also Tixeront, Edesse, pp. 149, 152.) Cf. with this the prominence given in the Acts of Scharbil and Barsamya to the fact that they were contemporaries of Fabian, bishop of Rome. We read there (see Rubens Duval, Les Actes de Scharbil et les Actes de Barsamya, Paris, 1889, and Histoire d'Eclesse, p. 130): "Barsamya (he was bishop of Edessa at the time of Decius) lived at the time of Fabian, bishop of Rome. He had received the laying on of hands from Abschelama, who had received it from Palut. Palut had been consecrated by Serapion, bishop of Antioch, and the latter had been consecrated by Zephyrinus, bishop of Rome." As regards the relation of the State of Rome to the Roman Church, that is, to the Roman bishop, who by the year 250 had already become a sort of præfectus urbis, with his district superintendents, the deacons, and in fact a sort of princeps æmulus, cf. (1) the recorded comments of Alexander Severus on the Christians, and especially those on their organisation; (2) the edict of Maximinus Thrax and the banishment of the bishops Pontian and Hippolytus; (3) the attitude of Philip the Arabian; (4) the remarks of Decius in Cyp. ep. 55 (see above p. 124) and his proceedings against the Roman bishops, and (5) the attitude of Aurelian in Antioch. On the extent and organisation of the Roman Church about 250 see Euseb., H. E. VI. 43.

Footnote 339:[ (return) ]

The memorable words in the lately discovered appeal by Eusebius of Dorylæum to Leo I. (Neues Archiv., Vol. XI., part 2, p. 364 f.) are no mere flattery, and the fifth century is not the first to which they are applicable: "Curavit desuper et ab exordio consuevit thronus apostolicus iniqua perferentes defensare et eos qui in evitabiles factiones inciderunt, adiuvare et humi iacentes erigere, secundum possibilitatem, quam habetis; causa autem rei, quod sensum rectum tenetis et inconcussam servatis erga dominum nostrum Iesum Christum fidem, nec non etiam indissimulatam universis fratribus et omnibus in nomine Christi vocatis tribuitis caritatem, etc." See also Theodoret's letters addressed to Rome.

II. FIXING AND GRADUAL HELLENISING OF CHRISTIANITY AS A SYSTEM OF DOCTRINE

CHAPTER IV.

ECCLESIASTICAL CHRISTIANITY AND PHILOSOPHY. THE APOLOGISTS.

1. Introduction.[³⁴⁰]

The object of the Christian Apologists, some of whom filled ecclesiastical offices and in various ways promoted spiritual progress,[³⁴¹] was, as they themselves explained, to uphold the Christianity professed by the Christian Churches and publicly preached. They were convinced that the Christian faith was founded on revelation and that only a mind enlightened by God could grasp and maintain the faith. They acknowledged the Old Testament to be the authoritative source of God's revelation, maintained that the whole human race was meant to be reached by Christianity, and adhered to the early Christian eschatology. These views as well as the strong emphasis they laid upon human freedom and responsibility, enabled them to attain a firm standpoint in opposition to "Gnosticism," and to preserve their position within the Christian communities, whose moral purity and strength they regarded as a strong proof of the truth of this faith. In the endeavours of the Apologists to explain Christianity to the cultured world, we have before us the attempts of Greek churchmen to represent the Christian religion as a philosophy, and to convince outsiders that it was the highest wisdom and the absolute truth. These efforts were not rejected by the Churches like those of the so-called Gnostics, but rather became in subsequent times the foundation of the ecclesiastical dogmatic. The Gnostic speculations were repudiated, whereas those of the Apologists were accepted. The manner in which the latter set forth Christianity as a philosophy met with approval. What were the conditions under which ecclesiastical Christianity and Greek philosophy concluded the alliance which has found a place in the history of the world? How did this union attain acceptance and permanence, whilst "Gnosticism" was at first rejected? These are the two great questions the correct answers to which are of fundamental importance for the understanding of the history of Christian dogma.

The answers to these questions appear paradoxical. The theses of the Apologists finally overcame all scruples in ecclesiastical circles and were accepted by the Græco-Roman world, because they made Christianity rational without taking from, or adding to, its traditional historic material. The secret of the epoch-making success of the apologetic theology is thus explained: These Christian philosophers formulated the content of the Gospel in a manner which appealed to the common sense of all the serious thinkers and intelligent men of the age. Moreover, they contrived to use the positive material of tradition, including the life and worship of Christ, in such a way as to furnish this reasonable religion with a confirmation and proof that had hitherto been eagerly sought, but sought in vain. In the theology of the Apologists, Christianity, as the religious enlightenment directly emanating from God himself, is most sharply contrasted with all polytheism, natural religion, and ceremonial. They proclaimed it in the most emphatic manner as the religion of the spirit, of freedom, and of absolute morality. Almost the whole positive material of Christianity is embodied in the story which relates its entrance into the world, its spread, and the proof of its truth. The religion itself, on the other hand, appears as the truth that is surely attested and accords with reason—a truth the content of which is not primarily dependent on historical facts and finally overthrows all polytheism.

Now this was the very thing required. In the second century of our era a great many needs and aspirations were undoubtedly making themselves felt in the sphere of religion and morals. "Gnosticism" and Marcionite Christianity prove the variety and depth of the needs then asserting themselves within the space that the ecclesiastical historian is able to survey. Mightier than all others, however, was the longing men felt to free themselves from the burden of the past, to cast away the rubbish of cults and of unmeaning religious ceremonies, and to be assured that the results of religious philosophy, those great and simple doctrines of virtue and immortality and of the God who is a Spirit, were certain truths. He who brought the message that these ideas were realities, and who, on the strength of these realities, declared polytheism and the worship of idols to be obsolete, had the mightiest forces on his side; for the times were now ripe for this preaching. What formed the strength of the apologetic philosophy was the proclamation that Christianity both contained the highest truth, as men already supposed it to be and as they had discovered it in their own minds, and the absolutely reliable guarantee that was desired for this truth. To the quality which makes it appear meagre to us it owed its impressiveness. The fact of its falling in with the general spiritual current of the time and making no attempt to satisfy special and deeper needs enabled it to plead the cause of spiritual monotheism and to oppose the worship of idols in the manner most easily understood. As it did not require historic and positive material to describe the nature of religion and morality, this philosophy enabled the Apologists to demonstrate the worthlessness of the traditional religion and worship of the different nations.[³⁴²] The same cause, however, made them take up the conservative position with regard to the historical traditions of Christianity. These were not ultimately tested as to their content, for this was taken for granted, no matter how they might be worded; but they were used to give an assurance of the truth, and to prove that the religion of the spirit was not founded on human opinion, but on divine revelation. The only really important consideration in Christianity is that it is revelation, real revelation. The Apologists had no doubt as to what it reveals, and therefore any investigation was unnecessary. The result of Greek philosophy, the philosophy of Plato and Zeno, as it had further developed in the empires of Alexander the Great and the Romans, was to attain victory and permanence by the aid of Christianity. Thus we view the progress of this development to-day,[³⁴³] and Christianity really proved to be the force from which that religious philosophy, viewed as a theory of the world and system of morality, first received the courage to free itself from the polytheistic past and descend from the circles of the learned to the common people.

This constitutes the deepest distinction between Christian philosophers like Justin and those of the type of Valentinus. The latter sought for a religion; the former, though indeed they were not very clear about their own purpose, sought assurance as to a theistic and moral conception of the world which they already possessed. At first the complexus of Christian tradition, which must have possessed many features of attraction for them, was something foreign to both. The latter, however, sought to make this tradition intelligible. For the former it was enough that they had here a revelation before them; that this revelation also bore unmistakable testimony to the one God, who was a Spirit, to virtue, and to immortality; and that it was capable of convincing men and of leading them to a virtuous life. Viewed superficially, the Apologists were no doubt the conservatives; but they were so, because they scarcely in any respect meddled with the contents of tradition. The "Gnostics," on the contrary, sought to understand what they read and to investigate the truth of the message of which they heard. The most characteristic feature is the attitude of each to the Old Testament. The Apologists were content to have found in it an ancient source of revelation, and viewed the book as a testimony to the truth, i.e., to philosophy and virtue; the Gnostics investigated this document and examined to what extent it agreed with the new impressions they had received from the Gospel. We may sum up as follows: The Gnostics sought to determine what Christianity is as a religion, and, as they were convinced of the absoluteness of Christianity, this process led them to incorporate with it all that they looked on as sublime and holy and to remove everything they recognised to be inferior. The Apologists, again, strove to discover an authority for religious enlightenment and morality and to find the confirmation of a theory of the universe, which, if true, contained for them the certainty of eternal life; and this they found in the Christian tradition.

At bottom this contrast is a picture of the great discord existing in the religious philosophy of the age itself (see p. 129, vol. I.). No one denied the fact that all truth was divine, that is, was founded on revelation. The great question, however, was whether every man possessed this truth as a slumbering capacity that only required to be awakened; whether it was rational, i.e., merely moral truth, or must be above that which is moral, that is, of a religious nature; whether it must carry man beyond himself; and whether a real redemption was necessary. It is ultimately the dispute between morality and religion, which appears as an unsettled problem in the theses of the idealistic philosophers and in the whole spiritual conceptions then current among the educated, and which recurs in the contrast between the Apologetic and the Gnostic theology. And, as in the former case we meet with the most varied shades and transitions, for no one writer has developed a consistent theory, so also we find a similar state of things in the latter;[³⁴⁴] for no Apologist quite left out of sight the idea of redemption (deliverance from the dominion of demons can only be effected by the Logos, i.e., God). Wherever the idea of freedom is strongly emphasised, the religious element, in the strict sense of the word, appears in jeopardy. This is the case with the Apologists throughout. Conversely, wherever redemption forms the central thought, need is felt of a suprarational truth, which no longer views morality as the only aim, and which, again, requires particular media, a sacred history and sacred symbols. Stoic rationalism, in its logical development, is menaced wherever we meet the perception that the course of the world must in some way be helped, and wherever the contrast between reason and sensuousness, that the old Stoa had confused, is clearly felt to be an unendurable state of antagonism that man cannot remove by his own unaided efforts. The need of a revelation had its starting-point in philosophy here. The judgment of oneself and of the world to which Platonism led, the self-consciousness which it awakened by the detachment of man from nature, and the contrasts which it revealed led of necessity to that frame of mind which manifested itself in the craving for a revelation. The Apologists felt this. But their rationalism gave a strange turn to the satisfaction of that need. It was not their Christian ideas which first involved them in contradictions. At the time when Christianity appeared on the scene, the Platonic and Stoic systems themselves were already so complicated that philosophers did not find their difficulties seriously increased by a consideration of the Christian doctrines. As Apologists, however, they decidedly took the part of Christianity because, according to them, it was the doctrine of reason and freedom.

The Gospel was hellenised in the second century in so far as the Gnostics in various ways transformed it into a Hellenic religion for the educated. The Apologists used it—we may almost say inadvertently—to overthrow polytheism by maintaining that Christianity was the realisation of an absolutely moral theism. The Christian religion was not the first to experience this twofold destiny on Græco-Roman soil. A glance at the history of the Jewish religion shows us a parallel development; in fact, both the speculations of the Gnostics and the theories of the Apologists were foreshadowed in the theology of the Jewish Alexandrians, and particularly in that of Philo. Here also the Gospel merely entered upon the heritage of Judaism.[³⁴⁵] Three centuries before the appearance of Christian Apologists, Jews, who had received a Hellenic training, had already set forth the religion of Jehovah to the Greeks in that remarkably summary and spiritualised form which represents it as the absolute and highest philosophy, i.e., the knowledge of God, of virtue, and of recompense in the next world. Here these Jewish philosophers had already transformed all the positive and historic elements of the national religion into parts of a huge system for proving the truth of that theism. The Christian Apologists adopted this method, for they can hardly be said to have invented it anew.[³⁴⁶] We see from the Jewish Sibylline oracles how wide-spread it was. Philo, however, was not only a Stoic rationalist, but a hyper-Platonic religious philosopher. In like manner, the Christian Apologists did not altogether lack this element, though in some isolated cases among them there are hardly any traces of it. This feature is most fully represented among the Gnostics.

This transformation of religion into a philosophic system would not have been possible had not Greek philosophy itself happened to be in process of development into a religion. Such a transformation was certainly very foreign to the really classical time of Greece and Rome. The pious belief in the efficacy and power of the gods and in their appearances and manifestations, as well as the traditional worship, could have no bond of union with speculations concerning the essence and ultimate cause of things. The idea of a religious dogma which was at once to furnish a correct theory of the world and a principle of conduct was from this standpoint completely unintelligible. But philosophy, particularly in the Stoa, set out in search of this idea, and, after further developments, sought for one special religion with which it could agree or through which it could at least attain certainty. The meagre cults of the Greeks and Romans were unsuited for this. So men turned their eyes towards the barbarians. Nothing more clearly characterises the position of things in the second century than the agreement between two men so radically different as Tatian and Celsus. Tatian emphatically declares that salvation comes from the barbarians, and to Celsus it is also a "truism" that the barbarians have more capacity than the Greeks for discovering valuable doctrines.[³⁴⁷] Everything was in fact prepared, and nothing was wanting.

About the middle of the second century, however, the moral and rationalistic element in the philosophy and spiritual culture of the time was still more powerful than the religious and mystic; for Neoplatonism, which under its outward coverings concealed the aspiration after religion and the living God, was only in its first beginnings. It was not otherwise in Christian circles. The "Gnostics" were in the minority. What the great majority of the Church felt to be intelligible and edifying above everything else was an earnest moralism.[³⁴⁸] New and strange as the undertaking to represent Christianity as a philosophy might seem at first, the Apologists, so far as they were understood, appeared to advance nothing inconsistent with Christian common sense. Besides, they did not question authorities, but rather supported them, and introduced no foreign positive materials. For all these reasons, and also because their writings were not at first addressed to the communities, but only to outsiders, the marvellous attempt to present Christianity to the world as the religion which is the true philosophy, and as the philosophy which is the true religion, remained unopposed in the Church. But in what sense was the Christian religion set forth as a philosophy? An exact answer to this question is of the highest interest as regards the history of Christian dogma.

2. Christianity as Philosophy and as Revelation.

It was a new undertaking and one of permanent importance to a tradition hitherto so little concerned for its own vindication, when Quadratus and the Athenian philosopher, Aristides, presented treatises in defence of Christianity to the emperor.[³⁴⁹] About a century had elapsed since the Gospel of Christ had begun to be preached. It may be said that the Apology of Aristides was a most significant opening to the second century, whilst we find Origen at its close. Marcianus Aristides expressly designates himself in his pamphlet as a philosopher of the Athenians. Since the days when the words were written: "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit" (Col. II. 8), it had constantly been repeated (see, as evidence, Celsus, passim) that Christian preaching and philosophy were things entirely different, that God had chosen the fools, and that man's duty was not to investigate and seek, but to believe and hope. Now a philosopher, as such, pleaded the cause of Christianity. In the summary he gave of the content of Christianity at the beginning of his address, he really spoke as a philosopher and represented this faith as a philosophy. By expounding pure monotheism and giving it the main place in his argument, Aristides gave supreme prominence to the very doctrine which simple Christians also prized as the most important.[³⁵⁰] Moreover, in emphasing not only the supernatural character of the Christian doctrine revealed by the Son of the Most High God, but also the continuous inspiration of believers—the new race (not a new school)—he confessed in the most express way the peculiar nature of this philosophy as a divine truth. According to him Christianity is philosophy because its content is in accordance with reason, and because it gives a satisfactory and universally intelligible answer to the questions with which all real philosophers have concerned themselves. But it is no philosophy, in fact it is really the complete opposite of this, in so far as it proceeds from revelation and is propagated by the agency of God, i.e., has a supernatural and divine origin, on which alone the truth and certainty of its doctrines finally depend. This contrast to philosophy is chiefly shown in the unphilosophical form in which Christianity was first preached to the world. That is the thesis maintained by all the Apologists from Justin to Tertullian,[³⁵¹] and which Jewish philosophers before them propounded and defended. This proposition may certainly be expressed in a great variety of ways. In the first place, it is important whether the first or second half is emphasised, and secondly, whether that which is "universally intelligible" is to be reckoned as philosophy at all, or is to be separated from it as that which comes by "nature." Finally, the attitude to be taken up towards the Greek philosophers is left an open question, so that the thesis, taking up this attitude as a starting-point, may again assume various forms. But was the contradiction which it contains not felt? The content of revelation is to be rational; but does that which is rational require a revelation? How the proposition was understood by the different Apologists requires examination.

Aristides. He first gives an exposition of monotheism and the monotheistic cosmology (God as creator and mover of the universe, as the spiritual, perfect, almighty Being, whom all things need, and who requires nothing). In the second chapter he distinguishes, according to the Greek text, three, and, according to the Syriac, four classes of men (in the Greek text polytheists, Jews, Christians, the polytheists being divided into Chaldeans, Greeks, and Egyptians; in the Syriac barbarians, Greeks, Jews, Christians), and gives their origin. He derives the Christians from Jesus Christ and reproduces the Christian kerygma (Son of the Most High God, birth from the Virgin, 12 disciples, death on the cross, burial, resurrection, ascension, missionary labours of the 12 disciples). After this, beginning with the third chapter, follows a criticism of polytheism, that is, the false theology of the barbarians, Greeks, and Egyptians (down to chapter 12). In the 13th chapter the Greek authors and philosophers are criticised, and the Greek myths, as such, are shown to be false. In the 14th chapter the Jews are introduced (they are monotheists and their ethical system is praised; but they are then reproached with worshipping of angels and a false ceremonial). In the 15th chapter follows a description of the Christians, i.e., above all, of their pure, holy life. It is they who have found the truth, because they know the creator of heaven and earth. This description is continued in chapters 16 and 17: "This people is new and there is a divine admixture in it." The Christian writings are recommended to the emperor.

Justin.[³⁵²] In his treatise addressed to the emperor Justin did not call himself a philosopher as Aristides had done. In espousing the cause of the hated and despised Christians he represented himself as a simple member of that sect. But in the very first sentence of his Apology he takes up the ground of piety and philosophy, the very ground taken up by the pious and philosophical emperors themselves, according to the judgment of the time and their own intention. In addressing them he appeals to the λογος σωφρων in a purely Stoic fashion. He opposes the truth—also in the Stoic manner—to the δοξαις παλαιων.[³⁵³] It was not to be a mere captatio benevolentiæ. In that case Justin would not have added: "That ye are pious and wise and guardians of righteousness and friends of culture, ye hear everywhere. Whether ye are so, however, will be shown."[³⁵⁴] His whole exordium is calculated to prove to the emperors that they are in danger of repeating a hundredfold the crime which the judges of Socrates had committed.[³⁵⁵] Like a second Socrates Justin speaks to the emperors in the name of all Christians. They are to hear the convictions of the wisest of the Greeks from the mouth of the Christians. Justin wishes to enlighten the emperor with regard to the life and doctrines (βιος και μαθηματα) of the latter. Nothing is to be concealed, for there is nothing to conceal.

Justin kept this promise better than any of his successors. For that very reason also he did not depict the Christian Churches as schools of philosophers (cc. 61-67). Moreover, in the first passage where he speaks of Greek philosophers,[³⁵⁶] he is merely drawing a parallel. According to him there are bad Christians and seeming Christians, just as there are philosophers who are only so in name and outward show. Such men, too, were in early times called "philosophers" even when they preached atheism. To all appearance, therefore, Justin does not desire Christians to be reckoned as philosophers. But it is nevertheless significant that, in the case of the Christians, a phenomenon is being repeated which otherwise is only observed in the case of philosophers; and how were those whom he was addressing to understand him? In the same passage he speaks for the first time of Christ. He introduces him with the plain and intelligible formula: 'ο διδασκαλος Χριστος ("the teacher Christ").[³⁵⁷] Immediately thereafter he praises Socrates because he had exposed the worthlessness and deceit of the evil demons, and traces his death to the same causes which are now he says bringing about the condemnation of the Christians. Now he can make his final assertion. In virtue of "reason" Socrates exposed superstition; in virtue of the same reason, this was done by the teacher whom the Christians follow. But this teacher was reason itself; it was visible in him, and indeed it appeared bodily in him.[³⁵⁸]

Is this philosophy or is it myth? The greatest paradox the Apologist has to assert is connected by him with the most impressive remembrance possessed by his readers as philosophers. In the same sentence where he represents Christ as the Socrates of the barbarians,[³⁵⁹] and consequently makes Christianity out to be a Socratic doctrine, he propounds the unheard of theory that the teacher Christ is the incarnate reason of God.

Justin nowhere tried to soften the effect of this conviction or explain it in a way adapted to his readers. Nor did he conceal from them that his assertion admits of no speculative demonstration. That philosophy can only deal with things which ever are, because they ever were, since this world began, is a fact about which he himself is perfectly clear. No Stoic could have felt more strongly than Justin how paradoxical is the assertion that a thing is of value which has happened only once. Certain as he is that the "reasonable" emperors will regard it as a rational assumption that "Reason" is the Son of God,[³⁶⁰] he knows equally well that no philosophy will bear him out in that other assertion, and that such a statement is seemingly akin to the contemptible myths of the evil demons.

But there is certainly a proof which, if not speculative, is nevertheless sure. The same ancient documents, which contain the Socratic and super-Socratic wisdom of the Christians, bear witness through prophecies, which, just because they are predictions, admit of no doubt, that the teacher Christ is the incarnate reason; for history confirms the word of prophecy even in the minutest details. Moreover, in so far as these writings are in the lawful possession of the Christians, and announced at the very beginning of things that this community would appear on the earth, they testify that the Christians may in a certain fashion date themselves back to the beginning of the world, because their doctrine is as old as the earth itself (this thought is still wanting in Aristides).

The new Socrates who appeared among the barbarians is therefore quite different from the Socrates of the Greeks, and for that reason also his followers are not to be compared with the disciples of the philosophers.[³⁶¹] From the very beginning of things a world-historical dispensation of God announced this reasonable doctrine through prophets, and prepared the visible appearance of reason itself. The same reason which created and arranged the world took human form in order to draw the whole of humanity to itself. Every precaution has been taken to make it easy for any one, be he Greek or barbarian, educated or uneducated, to grasp all the doctrines of this reason, to verify their truth, and test their power in life. What further importance can philosophy have side by side with this, how can one think of calling this a philosophy?

And yet the doctrine of the Christians can only be compared with philosophy. For, so far as the latter is genuine, it is also guided by the Logos; and, conversely, what the Christians teach concerning the Father of the world, the destiny of man, the nobility of his nature, freedom and virtue, justice and recompense, has also been attested by the wisest of the Greeks. They indeed only stammered, whereas the Christians speak. These, however, use no unintelligible and unheard-of language, but speak with the words and through the power of reason. The wonderful arrangement, carried out by the Logos himself, through which he ennobled the human race by restoring its consciousness of its own nobility, compels no one henceforth to regard the reasonable as the unreasonable or wisdom as folly. But is the Christian wisdom not of divine origin? How can it in that case be natural, and what connection can exist between it and the wisdom of the Greeks? Justin bestowed the closest attention on this question, but he never for a moment doubted what the answer must be. Wherever the reasonable has revealed itself, it has always been through the operation of the divine reason. For man's lofty endowment consists in his having had a portion of the divine reason implanted within him, and in his consequent capacity of attaining a knowledge of divine things, though not a perfect and clear one, by dint of persistent efforts after truth and virtue. When man remembers his real nature and destination, that is, when he comes to himself, the divine reason is already revealing itself in him and through him. As man's possession conferred on him at the creation, it is at once his most peculiar property, and the power which dominates and determines his nature.[³⁶²] All that is reasonable is based on revelation. In order to accomplish his true destiny man requires from the beginning the inward working of that divine reason which has created the world for the sake of man, and therefore wishes to raise man beyond the world to God.[³⁶³]

Apparently no one could speak in a more stoical fashion. But this train of thought is supplemented by something which limits it. Revelation does retain its peculiar and unique significance. For no one who merely possessed the "seed of the Logos" (σπερμα του λογου), though it may have been his exclusive guide to knowledge and conduct, was ever able to grasp the whole truth and impart it in a convincing manner. Though Socrates and Heraclitus may in a way be called Christians, they cannot be so designated in any real sense. Reason is clogged with unreasonableness, and the certainty of truth is doubtful wherever the whole Logos has not been acting; for man's natural endowment with reason is too weak to oppose the powers of evil and of sense that work in the world, namely, the demons. We must therefore believe in the prophets in whom the whole Logos spoke. He who does that must also of necessity believe in Christ; for the prophets clearly pointed to him as the perfect embodiment of the Logos. Measured by the fulness, clearness, and certainty of the knowledge imparted by the Logos Christ, all knowledge independent of him appears as merely human wisdom, even when it emanates from the seed of the Logos. The Stoic argument is consequently untenable. Men blind and kept in bondage by the demons require to be aided by a special revelation. It is true that this revelation is nothing new, and in so far as it has always existed, and never varied in character, from the beginning of the world, it is in this sense nothing extraordinary. It is the divine help granted to man, who has fallen under the power of the demons, and enabling him to follow his reason and freedom to do what is good. By the appearance of Christ this help became accessible to all men. The dominion of demons and revelation are the two correlated ideas. If the former did not exist, the latter would not be necessary. According as we form a lower or higher estimate of the pernicious results of that sovereignty, the value of revelation rises or sinks. This revelation cannot do less than give the necessary assurance of the truth, and it cannot do more than impart the power that develops and matures the inalienable natural endowment of man and frees him from the dominion of the demons.

Accordingly the teaching of the prophets and Christ is related even to the very highest human philosophy as the whole is to the part,[³⁶⁴] or as the certain is to the uncertain; and hence also as the permanent is to the transient. For the final stage has now arrived and Christianity is destined to put an end to natural human philosophy. When the perfect work is there, the fragmentary must cease. Justin gave the clearest expression to this conviction. Christianity, i.e., the prophetic teaching attested by Christ and accessible to all, puts an end to the human systems of philosophy that from their close affinity to it may be called Christian, inasmuch as it effects all and more than all that these systems have done, and inasmuch as the speculations of the philosophers, which are uncertain and mingled with error, are transformed by it into dogmas of indubitable certainty.[³⁶⁵] The practical conclusion drawn in Justin's treatise from this exposition is that the Christians are at least entitled to ask the authorities to treat them as philosophers (Apol. I. 7, 20: II. 15). This demand, he says, is the more justifiable because the freedom of philosophers is enjoyed even by such people as merely bear the name, whereas in reality they set forth immoral and pernicious doctrines.[³⁶⁶]

In the dialogue with the Jew Trypho, which is likewise meant for heathen readers, Justin ceased to employ the idea of the existence of a "seed of the Logos implanted by nature" (σπερμα λογου εμφυτον) in every man. From this fact we recognise that he did not consider the notion of fundamental importance. He indeed calls the Christian religion a philosophy;[³⁶⁷] but, in so far as this is the case, it is "the only sure and saving philosophy." No doubt the so-called philosophies put the right questions, but they are incapable of giving correct answers. For the Deity, who embraces all true being, and a knowledge of whom alone makes salvation possible, is only known in proportion as he reveals himself. True wisdom is therefore exclusively based on revelation. Hence it is opposed to every human philosophy, because revelation was only given in the prophets and in Christ.[³⁶⁸] The Christian is the philosopher,[³⁶⁹] because the followers of Plato and the Stoics are virtually no philosophers. In applying the title "philosophy" to Christianity he therefore does not mean to bring Christians and philosophers more closely together. No doubt, however, he asserts that the Christian doctrine, which is founded on the knowledge of Christ and leads to blessedness,[³⁷⁰] is in accordance with reason.

Athenagoras. The petition on behalf of Christians, which Athenagoras, "the Christian philosopher of Athens," presented, to the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, nowhere expressly designates Christianity as a philosophy, and still less does it style the Christians philosophers.[³⁷¹] But, at the very beginning of his writing Athenagoras also claims for the Christian doctrines the toleration granted by the state to all philosophic tenets.[³⁷²] In support of his claim he argues that the state punishes nothing but practical atheism,[³⁷³] and that the "atheism" of the Christians is a doctrine about God such as had been propounded by the most distinguished philosophers—Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics—who, moreover, were permitted to write whatsoever they pleased on the subject of the "Deity."[³⁷⁴] The Apologist concedes even more: "If philosophers did not also acknowledge the existence of one God, if they did not also conceive the gods in question to be partly demons, partly matter, partly of human birth, then certainly we would be justly expelled as aliens."[³⁷⁵] He therefore takes up the standpoint that the state is justified in refusing to tolerate people with completely new doctrines. When we add that he everywhere assumes that the wisdom and piety of the emperors are sufficient to test and approve[³⁷⁶] the truth of the Christian teaching, that he merely represents this faith itself as the reasonable doctrine,[³⁷⁷] and that, with the exception of the resurrection of the body, he leaves all the positive and objectionable tenets of Christianity out of account,[³⁷⁸] there is ground for thinking that this Apologist differs essentially from Justin in his conception of the relation of Christianity to secular philosophy.

Moreover, it is not to be denied that Athenagoras views the revelation in the prophets and in Christ as completely identical. But in one very essential point he agrees with Justin; and he has even expressed himself still more plainly than the latter, inasmuch as he does not introduce the assumption of a "seed of the Logos implanted by nature" σπερμα λογου εμφυτον. The philosophers, he says, were incapable of knowing the full truth, since it was not from God, but rather from themselves, that they wished to learn about God. True wisdom, however, can only be learned from God, that is, from his prophets; it depends solely on revelation.[³⁷⁹] Here also then we have a repetition of the thought that the truly reasonable is of supernatural origin. Such is the importance attached by Athenagoras to this proposition, that he declares any demonstration of the "reasonable" to be insufficient, no matter how luminous it may appear. Even that which is most evidently true—e.g., monotheism—is not raised from the domain of mere human opinion into the sphere of undoubted certainty till it can be confirmed by revelation.[³⁸⁰] This can be done by Christians alone. Hence they are very different from the philosophers, just as they are also distinguished from these by their manner of life.[³⁸¹] All the praises which Athenagoras from time to time bestows on philosophers, particularly Plato,[³⁸²] are consequently to be understood in a merely relative sense. Their ultimate object is only to establish the claim made by the Apologist with regard to the treatment of Christians by the state; but they are not really meant to bring the former into closer relationship to philosophers. Athenagoras also holds the theory that Christians are philosophers, in so far as the "philosophers" are not such in any true sense. It is only the problems they set that connect the two. He exhibits less clearness than Justin in tracing the necessity of revelation to the fact that the demon sovereignty, which, above all, reveals itself in polytheism,[³⁸³] can only be overthrown by revelation; he rather emphasises the other thought (cc. 7, 9) that the necessary attestation of the truth can only be given in this way.[³⁸⁴]

Tatian's[³⁸⁵] chief aim was not to bring about a juster treatment of the Christians.[³⁸⁶] He wished to represent their cause as the good contrasted with the bad, wisdom as opposed to error, truth in contradistinction to outward seeming, hypocrisy, and pretentious emptiness. His "Address to the Greeks" begins with a violent polemic against all Greek philosophers. Tatian merely acted up to a judgment of philosophers and philosophy which in Justin's case is still concealed.[³⁸⁷] Hence it was not possible for him to think of demonstrating analogies between Christians and philosophers. He also no doubt views Christianity as "reasonable;" he who lives virtuously and follows wisdom receives it;[³⁸⁸] but yet it is too sublime to be grasped by earthly perception.[³⁸⁹] It is a heavenly thing which depends on the communication of the "Spirit," and hence can only be known by revelation.[³⁹⁰] But yet it is a "philosophy" with definite doctrines (δογματα);[³⁹¹] it brings nothing new, but only such blessings as we have already received, but could not retain[³⁹²] owing to the power of error, i.e., the dominion of the demons.[³⁹³] Christianity is therefore the philosophy in which, by virtue of the Logos revelation through the prophets,[³⁹⁴] the rational knowledge that leads to life[³⁹⁵] is restored. This knowledge was no less obscured among the Greek philosophers than among the Greeks generally. In so far as revelation took place among the barbarians from the remotest antiquity, Christianity may also be called the barbarian philosophy.[³⁹⁶] Its truth is proved by its ancient date[³⁹⁷] as well as by its intelligible form, which enables even the most uneducated person that is initiated in it[³⁹⁸] to understand it perfectly.[³⁹⁹] Finally, Tatian also states (c. 40) that the Greek sophists have read the writings of Moses and the prophets, and reproduced them in a distorted form. He therefore maintains the very opposite of what Celsus took upon him to demonstrate when venturing to derive certain sayings and doctrines of Christ and the Christians from the philosophers. Both credit the plagiarists with intentional misrepresentation or gross misunderstanding. Justin judged more charitably. To Tatian, on the contrary, the mythology of the Greeks did not appear worse than their philosophy; in both cases he saw imitations and intentional corruption of the truth.[⁴⁰⁰]

Theophilus agrees with Tatian, in so far as he everywhere appears to contrast Christianity with philosophy. The religious and moral culture of the Greeks is derived from their poets (historians) and philosophers (ad Autol. II. 3 fin. and elsewhere). However, not only do poets and philosophers contradict each other (II. 5); but the latter also do not agree (II. 4. 8: III. 7), nay, many contradict themselves (III. 3). Not a single one of the so-called philosophers, however, is to be taken seriously;[⁴⁰¹] they have devised myths and follies (II. 8); everything they have set forth is useless and godless (III. 2); vain and worthless fame was their aim (III. 3). But God knew beforehand the "drivellings of these hollow philosophers" and made his preparations (II. 15). He of old proclaimed the truth by the mouth of prophets, and these deposited it in holy writings. This truth refers to the knowledge of God, the origin and history of the world, as well as to a virtuous life. The prophetic testimony in regard to it was continued in the Gospel.[⁴⁰²] Revelation, however, is necessary because this wisdom of the philosophers and poets is really demon wisdom, for they were inspired by devils.[⁴⁰³] Thus the most extreme contrasts appear to exist here. Still, Theophilus is constrained to confess that truth was not only announced by the Sibyl, to whom his remarks do not apply, for she is (II. 36): εν Ελλησιν και εν τοις λοιποις εθνετιν γενομενη προφητις, but that poets and philosophers, "though against their will," also gave clear utterances regarding the justice, the judgment, and the punishments of God, as well as regarding his providence in respect to the living and the dead, or, in other words, about the most important points (II. 37, 38, 8 fin.). Theophilus gives a double explanation of this fact. On the one hand he ascribes it to the imitation of holy writings (II. 12, 37: I. 14), and on the other he admits that those writers, when the demons abandoned them (τη ψυχη εκνηψαντες εξ αυτων), of themselves displayed a knowledge of the divine sovereignty, the judgment etc., which agrees with the teachings of the prophets (II. 8). This admission need not cause astonishment; for the freedom and control of his own destiny with which man is endowed (II. 27) must infallibly lead him to correct knowledge and obedience to God, as soon as he is no longer under the sway of the demons. Theophilus did not apply the title of philosophy to Christian truth, this title being in his view discredited; but Christianity is to him the "wisdom of God," which by luminous proofs convinces the men who reflect on their own nature.[⁴⁰⁴]

Tertullian and Minucius Felix.[⁴⁰⁵] Whilst, in the case of the Greek Apologists, the acknowledgment of revelation appears conditioned by philosophical scepticism on the one hand, and by the strong impression of the dominion of the demons on the other, the sceptical element is not only wanting in the Latin Apologists, but the Christian truth is even placed in direct opposition to the sceptical philosophy and on the side of philosophical dogmatism, i.e., Stoicism.[⁴⁰⁶] Nevertheless the observations of Tertullian and Minucius Felix with regard to the essence of Christianity, viewed as philosophy and as revelation, are at bottom completely identical with the conception of the Greek Apologists, although it is undeniable that in the former case the revealed character of Christianity is placed in the background.[⁴⁰⁷] The recognition of this fact is exceedingly instructive, for it proves that the conception of Christianity set forth by the Apologists was not an individual one, but the necessary expression of the conviction that Christian truth contains the completion and guarantee of philosophical knowledge. To Minucius Felix (and Tertullian) Christian truth chiefly presents itself as the wisdom implanted by nature in every man (Oct. 16. 5). In so far as man possesses reason and speech and accomplishes the task of the "examination of the universe" ("inquisitio universitatis"), conditioned by this gift, he has the Christian truth, that is, he finds Christianity in his own constitution, and in the rational order of the world. Accordingly, Minucius is also able to demonstrate the Christian doctrines by means of the Stoic principle of knowledge, and arrives at the conclusion that Christianity is a philosophy, i.e., the true philosophy, and that philosophers are to be considered Christians in proportion as they have discovered the truth.[⁴⁰⁸] Moreover, as he represented Christian ethics to be the expression of the Stoic, and depicted the Christian bond of brotherhood as a cosmopolitan union of philosophers, who have become conscious of their natural similarity,[⁴⁰⁹] the revealed character of Christianity appears to be entirely given up. This religion is natural enlightenment, the revelation of a truth contained in the world and in man, the discovery of the one God from the open book of creation. The difference between him and an Apologist like Tatian seems here to be a radical one. But, if we look more closely, we find that Minucius—and not less Tertullian—has abandoned Stoic rationalism in vital points. We may regard his apologetic aim as his excuse for clearly drawing the logical conclusions from these inconsistencies himself. However, these deviations of his from the doctrines of the Stoa are not merely prompted by Christianity, but rather have already become an essential component of his philosophical theory of the world. In the first place, Minucius developed a detailed theory of the pernicious activity of the demons (cc. 26, 27). This was a confession that human nature was not what it ought to be, because an evil element had penetrated it from without. Secondly, he no doubt acknowledged (I. 4: 16. 5) the natural light of wisdom in humanity, but nevertheless remarked (32. 9) that our thoughts are darkness when measured by the clearness of God. Finally, and this is the most essential point, after appealing to various philosophers when expounding his doctrine of the final conflagration of the world, he suddenly repudiated this tribunal, declaring that the Christians follow the prophets, and that philosophers "have formed this shadowy picture of distorted truth in imitation of the divine predictions of the prophets." (34) Here we have now a union of all the elements already found in the Greek Apologists; only they are, as it were, hid in the case of Minucius. But the final proof that he agreed with them in the main is found in the exceedingly contemptuous judgment which he in conclusion passed on all philosophers and indeed on philosophy generally.[⁴¹⁰] (34. 5: 38. 5) This judgment is not to be explained, as in Tertullian's case, by the fact that his Stoic opinions led him to oppose natural perception to all philosophical theory—for this, at most, cannot have been more than a secondary contributing cause,[⁴¹¹] but by the fact that he is conscious of following revealed wisdom.[⁴¹²] Revelation is necessary because mankind must be aided from without, i.e., by God. In this idea man's need of redemption is acknowledged, though not to the same extent as by Seneca and Epictetus. But no sooner does Minucius perceive the teachings of the prophets to be divine truth than man's natural endowment and the speculation of philosophers sink for him into darkness. Christianity is the wisdom which philosophers sought, but were not able to find.[⁴¹³]

We may sum up the doctrines of the Apologists as follows: (1) Christianity is revelation, i.e., it is the divine wisdom, proclaimed of old by the prophets and, by reason of its origin, possessing an absolute certainty which can also be recognised in the fulfilment of their predictions. As divine wisdom Christianity is contrasted with, and puts an end to, all natural and philosophical knowledge. (2) Christianity is the enlightenment corresponding to the natural but impaired knowledge of man.[⁴¹⁴] It embraces all the elements of truth in philosophy, whence it is the philosophy; and helps man to realise the knowledge with which he is naturally endowed. (3) Revelation of the rational was and is necessary, because man has fallen under the sway of the demons. (4) The efforts of philosophers to ascertain the right knowledge were in vain; and this is, above all, shown by the fact that they neither overthrew polytheism nor brought about a really moral life. Moreover, so far as they discovered the truth, they owed it to the prophets from whom they borrowed it; at least it is uncertain whether they even attained a knowledge of fragments of the truth by their own independent efforts.[⁴¹⁵] But it is certain that many seeming truths in the writings of the philosophers were imitations of the truth by evil demons. This is the origin of all polytheism, which is, moreover, to some extent an imitation of Christian institutions. (5) The confession of Christ is simply included in the acknowledgment of the wisdom of the prophets; the doctrine of the truth did not receive a new content through Christ; he only made it accessible to the world and strengthened it (victory over the demons; special features acknowledged by Justin and Tertullian). (6) The practical test of Christianity is first contained in the fact that all persons are able to grasp it, for women and uneducated men here become veritable sages; secondly in the fact that it has the power of producing a holy life, and of overthrowing the tyranny of the demons. In the Apologists, therefore, Christianity served itself heir to antiquity, i.e., to the result of the monotheistic knowledge and ethics of the Greeks: "Οσα ουν παρα πασικαλως ειρηται, 'ημων των Χριστιανων εστι" (Justin, Apol. II. 13). It traced its origin back to the beginning of the world. Everything true and good which elevates mankind springs from divine revelation, and is at the same time genuinely human, because it is a clear expression of what man finds within him and of his destination (Justin, Apol. I. 46: 'οι μετα λογου βιωσαντες Χριστιανοι εισι, καν αθεοι ενομισθησαν, οιον εν 'Ελλησι μεν Σωκρατης και Ηρακλειτος και οι ομοιοι αυτοις, εν βαρβαροις δε Αβρααμ κ.τ.λ., "those that have lived with reason are Christians, even though they were accounted atheists, such as Socrates and Heraclitus and those similar to them among the Greeks, and Abraham etc. among the barbarians"). But everything true and good is Christian, for Christianity is nothing else than the teaching of revelation. No second formula can be imagined in which the claim of Christianity to be the religion of the world is so powerfully expressed (hence also the endeavour of the Apologists to reconcile Christianity and the Empire), nor, on the other hand, can we conceive of one where the specific content of traditional Christianity is so thoroughly neutralised as it is here. But the really epoch-making feature is the fact that the intellectual culture of mankind now appears reconciled and united with religion. The "dogmas" are the expression of this. Finally, these fundamental presuppositions also result in a quite definite idea of the essence of revelation and of the content of reason. The essence of revelation consists in its form: it is divine communication through a miraculous inward working. All the media of revelation are passive organs of the Holy Spirit (Athenag. Supplic. 7; Pseudo-Justin, Cohort. 8; Justin, Dialogue 115. 7; Apol. I. 31, 33, 36; etc.; see also Hippolytus, de Christo et Antichr. 2). These were not necessarily at all times in a state of ecstasy, when they received the revelations; but they were no doubt in a condition of absolute receptivity. The Apologists had no other idea of revelation. What they therefore viewed as the really decisive proof of the reality of revelation is the prediction of the future, for the human mind does not possess this power. It was only in connection with this proof that the Apologists considered it important to show what Moses, David, Isaiah, etc., had proclaimed in the Old Testament, that is, these names have only a chronological significance. This also explains their interest in a history of the world, in so far as this interest originated in the effort to trace the chain of prophets up to the beginning of history, and to prove the higher antiquity of revealed truth as compared with all human knowledge and errors, particularly as found among the Greeks (clear traces in Justin,[⁴¹⁶] first detailed argument in Tatian).[⁴¹⁷] If, however, strictly speaking, it is only the form and not the content of revelation that is supernatural in so far as this content coincides with that of reason, it is evident that the Apologists simply took the content of the latter for granted and stated it dogmatically. So, whether they expressed themselves in strictly Stoic fashion or not, they all essentially agree in the assumption that true religion and morality are the natural content of reason. Even Tatian forms no exception, though he himself protests against the idea.

3. The doctrines of Christianity as the revealed and rational religion.

The Apologists frequently spoke of the doctrines or "dogmas" of Christianity; and the whole content of this religion as philosophy is included in these dogmas.[⁴¹⁸] According to what we have already set forth there can be no doubt about the character of Christian dogmas. They are the rational truths, revealed by the prophets in the Holy Scriptures, and summarised in Christ (χριστος λογος και νομος), which in their unity represent the divine wisdom, and the recognition of which leads to virtue and eternal life. The Apologists considered it their chief task to set forth these doctrines, and hence they can be reproduced with all desirable clearness. The dogmatic scheme of the Apologists may therefore be divided into three component parts. These are: (A) Christianity viewed as monotheistic cosmology (God as the Father of the world); (B) Christianity as the highest morality and righteousness (God as the judge who rewards goodness and punishes wickedness); (C) Christianity regarded as redemption (God as the Good One who assists man and rescues him from the power of the demons).[⁴¹⁹] Whilst the first two ideas are expressed in a clear and precise manner, it is equally true that the third is not worked out in a lucid fashion. This, as will afterwards be seen, is, on the one hand, the result of the Apologists' doctrine of freedom, and, on the other, of their inability to discover a specific significance for the person of Christ within the sphere of revelation. Both facts again are ultimately to be explained from their moralism.

The essential content of revealed philosophy is viewed by the Apologists (see A, B) as comprised in three doctrines.[⁴²⁰] First, there is one spiritual and inexpressibly exalted God, who is Lord and Father of the world. Secondly, he requires a holy life. Thirdly, he will at last sit in judgment, and will reward the good with immortality and punish the wicked with death. The teaching concerning God, virtue, and eternal reward is traced to the prophets and Christ; but the bringing about of a virtuous life (of righteousness) has been necessarily left by God to men themselves; for God has created man free, and virtue can only be acquired by man's own efforts. The prophets and Christ are therefore a source of righteousness in so far as they are teachers. But as God, that is, the divine Word (which we need not here discuss) has spoken in them, Christianity is to be defined as the Knowledge of God, mediated by the Deity himself, and as a virtuous walk in the longing after eternal and perfect life with God, as well as in the sure hope of this imperishable reward. By knowing what is true and doing what is good man becomes righteous and a partaker of the highest bliss. This knowledge, which has the character of divine instruction,[⁴²¹] rests on faith in the divine revelation. This revelation has the nature and power of redemption in so far as the fact is undoubted that without it men cannot free themselves from the tyranny of the demons, whilst believers in revelation are enabled by the Spirit of God to put them to flight. Accordingly, the dogmas of Christian philosophy theoretically contain the monotheistic cosmology, and practically the rules for a holy life, which appears as a renunciation of the world and as a new order of society.[⁴²²] The goal is immortal life, which consists in the full knowledge and contemplation of God. The dogmas of revelation lie between the cosmology and ethics; they are indefinitely expressed so far as they contain the idea of salvation; but they are very precisely worded in so far as they guarantee the truth of the cosmology and ethics.

1. The dogmas which express the knowledge of God and the world are dominated by the fundamental idea that the world as the created, conditioned, and transient is contrasted with something self-existing, unchangeable and eternal, which is the first cause of the world. This self-existing Being has none of the attributes which belong to the world; hence he is exalted above every name and has in himself no distinctions. This implies, first, the unity and uniqueness of this eternal Being; secondly, his spiritual nature, for everything bodily is subject to change; and, finally, his perfection, for the self-existent and eternal requires nothing. Since, however, he is the cause of all being, himself being unconditioned, he is the fulness of all being or true being itself (Tatian 5: καθο πασα δυναμις ορατων τε και αορατων αυτος 'υποστασις ην, συν αυτω τα παντα). As the living and spiritual Being he reveals himself in free creations, which make known his omnipotence and wisdom, i.e., his operative reason. These creations are, moreover, a proof of the goodness of the Deity, for they can be no result of necessities, in so far as God is in himself perfect. Just because he is perfect, the Eternal Essence is also the Father of all virtues, in so far as he contains no admixture of what is defective. These virtues include both the goodness which manifests itself in his creations, and the righteousness which gives to the creature what belongs to him, in accordance with the position he has received. On the basis of this train of thought the Apologists lay down the dogmas of the monarchy of God (των 'ολων το μοναρχικον), his supramundaneness (το αρρητον, το ανεκφραστον, το αχωρητον, το ακαταληπτον, το απερινοητον, το ασυγκριτον, το ασυμβιβαστον, το ανεκδιηγητον; see Justin, Apol. II. 6; Theoph. I. 3); his unity (εις Θεος); his having no beginning (αναρχος, 'οτι αγενητος); his eternity and unchangeableness (αναλλοιωτος καθοτι αθανατος); his perfection (τελειος); his need of nothing (απροσδεης); his spiritual nature (πνευμα 'ο Θεος); his absolute causality (αυτος 'υπαρχων του παντος 'η 'υποστασις, the motionless mover, see Aristides c. 1); his creative activity (κτιστης των παντων); his sovereignty (δεσποτης των 'ολων); his fatherhood (πατηρ δια το ειναι αυτον προ των 'ολων) his reason-power (God as λογος, νους, πνευμα, σοφια); his omnipotence (παντοκρατωρ 'οτι αυτος τα παντα κρατει και εμπεριεχει); his righteousness and goodness (πατηρ της δικαιοσυνης και πασων των αρετων χρηστοτης). These dogmas are set forth by one Apologist in a more detailed, and by another in a more concise form, but three points are emphasised by all. First, God is primarily to be conceived as the First Cause. Secondly, the principle of moral good is also the principle of the world. Thirdly, the principle of the world, that is, the Deity, as being the immortal and eternal, forms the contrast to the world which is the transient. In the cosmology of the Apologists the two fundamental ideas are that God is the Father and Creator of the world, but that, as uncreated and eternal, he is also the complete contrast to it.[⁴²³]

These dogmas about God were not determined by the Apologists from the standpoint of the Christian Church which is awaiting an introduction into the Kingdom of God; but were deduced from a contemplation of the world on the one hand (see particularly Tatian, 4; Theophilus, I. 5, 6), and of the moral nature of man on the other. But, in so far as the latter itself belongs to the sphere of created things, the cosmos is the starting-point of their speculations. This is everywhere dominated by reason and order;[⁴²⁴] it bears the impress of the divine Logos, and that in a double sense. On the one hand it appears as the copy of a higher, eternal world, for if we imagine transient and changeable matter removed, it is a wonderful complex of spiritual forces; on the other it presents itself as the finite product of a rational will. Moreover, the matter which lies at its basis is nothing bad, but an indifferent substance created by God,[⁴²⁵] though indeed perishable. In its constitution the world is in every respect a structure worthy of God.[⁴²⁶] Nevertheless, according to the Apologists, the direct author of the world was not God, but the personified power of reason which they perceived in the cosmos and represented as the immediate source of the universe. The motive for this dogma and the interest in it would be wrongly determined by alleging that the Apologists purposely introduced the Logos in order to separate God from matter, because they regarded this as something bad. This idea of Philo's cannot at least have been adopted by them as the result of conscious reflection, for it does not agree with their conception of matter; nor is it compatible with their idea of God and their belief in Providence, which is everywhere firmly maintained. Still less indeed can it be shown that they were all impelled to this dogma from their view of Jesus Christ, since in this connection, with the exception of Justin and Tertullian, they manifested no specific interest in the incarnation of the Logos in Jesus. The adoption of the dogma of the Logos is rather to be explained thus: (1) The idea of God, derived by abstraction from the cosmos, did indeed, like that of the idealistic philosophy, involve the element of unity and spirituality, which implied a sort of personality; but the fulness of all spiritual forces, the essence of everything imperishable were quite as essential features of the conception; for in spite of the transcendence inseparable from the notion of God, this idea was nevertheless meant to explain the world.[⁴²⁷] Accordingly, they required a formula capable of expressing the transcendent and unchangeable nature of God on the one hand, and his fulness of creative and spiritual powers on the other. But the latter attributes themselves had again to be comprehended in a unity, because the law of the cosmos bore the appearance of a harmonious one. From this arose the idea of the Logos, and indeed the latter was necessarily distinguished from God as a separate existence, as soon as the realisation of the powers residing in God was represented as beginning. The Logos is the hypostasis of the operative power of reason, which at once preserves the unity and unchangeableness of God in spite of the exercise of the powers residing in him, and renders this very exercise possible. (2) Though the Apologists believed in the divine origin of the revelation given to the prophets, on which all knowledge of truth is based, they could nevertheless not be induced by this idea to represent God himself as a direct actor. For that revelation presupposes a speaker and a spoken word; but it would be an impossible thought to make the fulness of all essence and the first cause of all things speak. The Deity cannot be a speaking and still less a visible person, yet according to the testimony of the prophets, a Divine Person was seen by them. The Divine Being who makes himself known on earth in audible and visible fashion can only be the Divine Word. As, however, according to the fundamental view of the Apologists the principle of religion, i.e., of the knowledge of the truth, is also the principle of the world, so that Divine Word, which imparts the right knowledge of the world, must be identical with the Divine Reason which produced the world itself. In other words, the Logos is not only the creative Reason of God, but also his revealing Word. This explains the motive and aim of the dogma of the Logos. We need not specially point out that nothing more than the precision and certainty of the Apologists' manner of statement is peculiar here; the train of thought itself belongs to Greek philosophy. But that very confidence is the most essential feature of the case; for in fact the firm belief that the principle of the world is also that of revelation represents an important early-Christian idea, though indeed in the form of philosophical reflection. To the majority of the Apologists the theoretical content of the Christian faith is completely exhausted in this proposition. They required no particular Christology, for in every revelation of God by his Word they already recognised a proof of his existence not to be surpassed, and consequently regarded it as Christianity in nuce.[⁴²⁸] But the fact that the Apologists made a distinction in thesi between the prophetic Spirit of God and the Logos, without being able to make any use of this distinction, is a very clear instance of their dependence on the formulæ of the Church's faith. Indeed their conception of the Logos continually compelled them to identify the Logos and the Spirit, just as they not unfrequently define Christianity as the belief in the true God and in his Son, without mentioning the Spirit.[⁴²⁹] Further their dependence on the Christian tradition is shown in the fact that the most of them expressly designated the Logos as the Son of God.[⁴³⁰]

The Logos doctrine of the Apologists is an essentially unanimous one. Since God cannot be conceived as without reason, αλογος, but as the fulness of all reason,[⁴³¹] he has always Logos in himself. This Logos is on the one hand the divine consciousness itself, and on the other the power (idea and energy) to which the world is due; he is not separate from God, but is contained in his essence.[⁴³²] For the sake of the creation God produced (sent forth, projected) the Logos from himself, that is, he engendered[⁴³³] him from his essence by a free and simple act of will (Θεος εκ Θεου πεφυκως εξ 'εαυτου. Dial. 61). Then for the first time the Logos became a hypostasis separate from God, or, in other words, he first came into existence; and, in virtue of his origin, he possesses the following distinctive features:[⁴³⁴] (1) The inner essence of the Logos is identical with the essence of God himself; for it is the product of self-separation in God, willed and brought about by himself. Further, the Logos is not cut off and separated from God, nor is he a mere modality in him. He is rather the independent product of the self-unfolding of God (οικονομια), which product, though it is the epitome of divine reason, has nevertheless not stripped the Father of this attribute. The Logos is the revelation of God, and the visible God. Consequently the Logos is really God and Lord, i.e., he possesses the divine nature in virtue of his essence. The Apologists, however, only know of one kind of divine nature and this is that which belongs to the Logos. (2) From the moment when he was begotten the Logos is a being distinct from the Father; he is αριθμω ετερον τι, Θεος 'ετερος, Θεος δευτερος ("something different in number, another God, a second God.") But his personality only dates from that moment. "Fuit tempus, cum patri filius non fuit," ("there was a time when the Father had no Son," so Tertullian, adv. Hermog. 3). The λογος προφορικος is for the first time a hypostasis distinct from the Father, the λογος ενδιαθετος is not.[⁴³⁵] (3) The Logos has an origin, the Father has not; hence it follows that in relation to God the Logos is a creature; he is the begotten, that is, the created God, the God who has a beginning. Wherefore in rank he is below God (εν δευτερα χωρα—δευτερος Θεος, "in the second place, and a second God"), the messenger and servant of God. The subordination of the Logos is not founded on the content of his essence, but on his origin. In relation to the creatures, however, the Logos is the αρχη, i.e., not only the beginning but the principle of the vitality and form of everything that is to receive being. As an emanation (the begotten) he is distinguished from all creatures, for he alone is the Son;[⁴³⁶] but, as having a beginning, he again stands on a level with them. Hence the paradoxical expression, εργον πρωτοτοκον του πατρος ("first begotten work of the Father"), is here the most appropriate designation. (4) In virtue of his finite origin, it is possible and proper for the Logos to enter into the finite, to act, to speak, and to appear. As he arose for the sake of the creation of the world, he has the capacity of personal and direct revelation which does not belong to the infinite God; nay, his whole essence consists in the very fact that he is thought, word, and deed. Behind this active substitute and vicegerent, the Father stands in the darkness of the incomprehensible, and in the incomprehensible light of perfection as the hidden, unchangeable God.[⁴³⁷]

With the issuing forth of the Logos from God began the realisation of the idea of the world. The world as κοσμος νοητος is contained in the Logos. But the world is material and manifold, the Logos is spiritual and one. Therefore the Logos is not himself the world, but he is its creator and in a certain fashion its archetype. Justin and Tatian used the expression "beget" γενναν for the creation of the world, but in connections which do not admit of any importance being attached to this use. The world was created out of nothing after a host of spirits, as is assumed by most Apologists, had been created along with heaven, which is a higher, glorious world. The purpose of the creation of the world was and is the production of men, i.e., beings possessed of soul and body, endowed with reason and freedom, and therefore made in the image of God; beings who are to partake of the blessedness and perfection of God. Everything is created for man's sake, and his own creation is a proof of the goodness of God. As beings possessed of soul and body, men are neither mortal nor immortal, but capable either of death or immortality.[⁴³⁸] The condition on which men can attain the latter introduces us to ethics. The doctrines, that God is also the absolute Lord of matter; that evil cannot be a quality of matter, but rather arose in time and from the free decision of the spirits or angels; and finally that the world will have an end, but God can call the destroyed material into existence, just as he once created it out of nothing, appear in principle to reconcile the dualism in the cosmology. We have the less occasion to give the details here, because they are known from the philosophical systems of the period, especially Philo's, and vary in manifold ways. All the Apologists, however, are imbued with the idea that this knowledge of God and the world, the genesis of the Logos and cosmos, are the most essential part of Christianity itself.[⁴³⁹] This conception is really not peculiar to the Apologists: in the second century the great majority of Christians, in so far as they reflected at all, regarded the monotheistic explanation of the world as a main part of the Christian religion. The theoretical view of the world as a harmonious whole, of its order, regularity and beauty; the certainty that all this had been called into existence by an Almighty Spirit; the sure hope that heaven and earth will pass away, but will give place to a still more glorious structure, were always present, and put an end to the bright and gorgeously coloured, but phantastic and vague, cosmogonies and theogonies of antiquity.

2. Their clear system of morality is in keeping with their relatively simple cosmology. In giving man reason and freedom as an inalienable possession God destined him for incorruptibility (αθανασια, αφθαρσια), by the attainment of which he was to become a being similar to God.[⁴⁴⁰] To the gift of imperishability God, however, attached the condition of man's preserving τα της αθανασιας ("the things of immortality"), i.e., preserving the knowledge of God and maintaining a holy walk in imitation of the divine perfection. This demand is as natural as it is just; moreover, nobody can fulfil it in man's stead, for an essential feature of virtue is its being free, independent action. Man must therefore determine himself to virtue by the knowledge that he is only in this way obedient to the Father of the world and able to reckon on the gift of immortality. The conception of the content of virtue, however, contains an element which cannot be clearly apprehended from the cosmology; moral goodness consists in letting oneself be influenced in no way by the sensuous, but in living solely, after the Spirit, and imitating the perfection and purity of God. Moral badness is giving way to any affection resulting from the natural basis of man. The Apologists undoubtedly believe that virtue consists negatively in man's renunciation of what his natural constitution of soul and body demands or impels him to. Some express this thought in a more pregnant and unvarnished fashion, others in a milder way. Tatian, for instance, says that we must divest ourselves of the human nature within us; but in truth the idea is the same in all. The moral law of nature of which the Apologists speak, and which they find reproduced in the clearest and most beautiful way in the sayings of Jesus,[⁴⁴¹] calls upon man to raise himself above his nature and to enter into a corresponding union with his fellow-man which is something higher than natural connections. It is not so much the law of love that is to rule everything, for love itself is only a phase of a higher law; it is the law governing the perfect and sublime Spirit, who, as being the most exalted existence on this earth, is too noble for the world. Raised already in this knowledge beyond time and space, beyond the partial and the finite, the man of God, even while upon the earth, is to hasten to the Father of Light. By equanimity, absence of desires, purity, and goodness, which are the necessary results of clear knowledge, he is to show that he has already risen above the transient through gazing on the imperishable and through the enjoyment of knowledge, imperfect though the latter still be. If thus, a suffering hero, he has stood the test on earth, if he has become dead to the world,[⁴⁴²] he may be sure that in the life to come God will bestow on him the gift of immortality, which includes the direct contemplation of God together with the perfect knowledge that flows from it.[⁴⁴³] Conversely, the vicious man is given over to eternal death, and in this punishment the righteousness of God is quite as plainly manifested, as in the reward of everlasting life.

3. While it is certain that virtue is a matter of freedom, it is just as sure that no soul is virtuous unless it follows the will of God, i.e., knows and judges of God and all things as they must be known and judged of; and fulfils the commandments of God. This presupposes a revelation of God through the Logos. A revelation of God, complete in itself and mediated by the Logos, is found in the cosmos and in the constitution of man, he being created in his Maker's image.[⁴⁴⁴] But experience has shown that this revelation is insufficient to enable men to retain clear knowledge. They yielded to the seduction of evil demons, who, by God's sufferance, took possession of the world, and availed themselves of man's sensuous side to draw him away from the contemplation of the divine and lead him to the earthly.[⁴⁴⁵] The results of this temptation appeared in the facts that humanity as a whole fell a prey to error, was subjected to the bonds of the sensuous and of the demons, and therefore became doomed to death, which is at once a punishment and the natural consequence of want of knowledge of God.[⁴⁴⁶] Hence it required fresh efforts of the Logos to free men from a state which is indeed in no instance an unavoidable necessity, though a sad fact in the case of almost all. For very few are now able to recognise the one true God from the order of the universe and from the moral law implanted in themselves; nor can they withstand the power of the demons ruling in the world and use their freedom to imitate the virtues of God. Therefore the Almighty in his goodness employed new means through the Logos to call men back from the error of their ways, to overthrow the sovereignty of the demons upon earth, and to correct the disturbed course of the world before the end has yet come. From the earliest times the Logos (the Spirit) has descended on such men as preserved their souls pure, and bestowed on them, through inspiration, knowledge of the truth (with reference to God, freedom, virtue, the demons, the origin of polytheism, the judgment) to be imparted by them to others. These are his "prophets." Such men are rare among the Greeks (and according to some not found at all), but numerous among the barbarians, i.e., among the Jewish people. Taught by God, they announced the truth about him, and under the promptings of the Logos they also committed the revelations to writings, which therefore, as being inspired, are an authentic record of the whole truth.[⁴⁴⁷] To some of the most virtuous among them he himself even appeared in human form and gave directions. He then is a Christian, who receives and follows these prophetic teachings, that have ever been proclaimed afresh from the beginning of the world down to the present time, and are summed up in the Old Testament. Such a one is enabled even now to rescue his soul from the rule of the demons, and may confidently expect the gift of immortality.

With the majority of the Apologists "Christianity" seems to be exhausted in these doctrines; in fact, they do not even consider it necessary to mention ex professo the appearance of the Logos in Christ (see above, p. 189 ff.). But, while it is certain that they all recognised that the teachings of the prophets contained the full revelation of the truth, we would be quite wrong in assuming that they view the appearance and history of Christ as of no significance. In their presentations some of them no doubt contented themselves with setting forth the most rational and simple elements, and therefore took almost no notice of the historical; but even in their case certain indications show that they regarded the manifestation of the Logos in Christ as of special moment.[⁴⁴⁸] For the prophetic utterances, as found from the beginning, require an attestation, the prophetic teaching requires a guarantee, so that misguided humanity may accept them and no longer take error for truth and truth for error. The strongest guarantee imaginable is found in the fulfilment of prophecy. Since no man is able to foretell what is to come, the prediction of the future accompanying a doctrine proves its divine origin. God, in his extraordinary goodness, not only inspired the prophets, through the Logos, with the doctrines of truth, but has from the beginning put numerous predictions in their mouth. These predictions were detailed and manifold; the great majority of them referred to a more prolonged appearance of the Logos in human form at the end of history, and to a future judgment. Now, so long as the predictions had not yet come to pass, the teachings of the prophets were not sufficiently impressive, for the only sure witness of the truth is its outward attestation. In the history of Christ, however, the majority of these prophecies were fulfilled in the most striking fashion, and this not only guarantees the fulfilment of the relatively small remainder not yet come to pass (judgment, resurrection), but also settles beyond all doubt the truth of the prophetic teachings about God, freedom, virtue, immortality, etc. In the scheme of fulfilment and prophecy even the irrational becomes rational; for the fulfilment of a prediction is not a proof of its divine origin unless it refers to something extraordinary. Any one can predict regular occurrences which always take place. Accordingly, a part of what was predicted had to be irrational. Every particular in the history of Christ has therefore a significance, not as regards the future, but as regards the past. Here everything happened "that the word of the prophet might be fulfilled." Because the prophet had said so, it had to happen. Christ's destiny attests the ancient teachings of the prophets. Everything, however, depends on this attestation, for it was no longer the full truth that was wanting, but a convincing proof that the truth was a reality and not a fancy.[⁴⁴⁹] But prophecy testifies that Christ is the ambassador of God, the Logos that has appeared in human form, and the Son of God. If the future destiny of Jesus is recorded in the Old Testament down to the smallest particular, and the book at the same time declares that this predicted One is the Son of God and will be crucified, then the paying of divine honours to this crucified man, to whom all the features of prophecy apply, is completely justified. The stage marked by Christ in the history of God's revelation, the content of which is always the same, is therefore the highest and last, because in it the "truth along with the proof" has appeared. This circumstance explains why the truth is so much more impressive and convinces more men than formerly, especially since Christ has also made special provision for the spread of the truth and is himself an unequalled exemplification of a virtuous life, the principles of which have now become known in the whole world through the spread of his precepts.

These statements exhaust the arguments in most of the Apologies; and they accordingly seem neither to have contemplated a redemption by Christ in the stricter sense of the word, nor to have assumed the unique nature of the appearance of the Logos in Jesus. Christ accomplished salvation as a divine teacher, that is to say, his teaching brings about the αλλαγη and επανγωγη of the human race, its restoration to its original destination. This also seems to suffice as regards demon rule. Logically considered, the individual portions of the history of Jesus (of the baptismal confession) have no direct significance in respect to salvation. Hence the teachings of the Christians seem to fall into two groups having no inward connection, i.e., the propositions treating of the rational knowledge of God, and the predicted and fulfilled historical facts which prove those doctrines and the believing hopes they include.

But Justin at least gave token of a manifest effort to combine the historical statements regarding Christ with the philosophical and moral doctrines of salvation and to conceive Jesus as the Redeemer.[⁴⁵⁰] Accordingly, if the Christian dogmatic of succeeding times is found in the connection of philosophical theology with the baptismal confession, that is, in the "scientific theology of facts," Justin is, in a certain fashion, the first framer of Church dogma, though no doubt in a very tentative way. (1) He tried to distinguish between the appearance of the Logos in pre-Christian times and in Christ; he emphasised the fact that the whole Logos appeared only in Christ, and that the manner of this appearance has no counterpart in the past. (2) Justin showed in the Dialogue that, independently of the theologoumenon of the Logos, he was firmly convinced of the divinity of Christ on the ground of predictions and of the impression made by his personality.[⁴⁵¹] (3) In addition to the story of the exaltation of Christ, Justin also emphasised other portions of his history, especially the death on the cross (together with baptism and the Lord's Supper) and tried to give them a positive significance.[⁴⁵²] He adopted the common Christian saying that the blood of Christ cleanses believers and men are healed through his wounds; and he tried to give a mystic significance to the cross. (4) He accordingly spoke of the forgiveness of sins through Christ and confessed that men are changed, through the new birth in baptism, from children of necessity and ignorance into children of purpose and understanding and forgiveness of sins.[⁴⁵³] Von Engelhardt has, however, quite rightly noticed that these are mere words which have nothing at all corresponding to them in the general system of thought, because Justin remains convinced that the knowledge of the true God, of his will, and of his promises, or the certainty that God will always grant forgiveness to the repentant and eternal life to the righteous, is sufficient to convert the man who is master of himself. Owing to the fundamental conviction which is expressed in the formulæ, "perfect philosophy," "divine teacher," "new law," "freedom," "repentance," "sinless life," "sure hope," "reward," "immortality," the ideas, "forgiveness of sins," "redemption," "reconciliation," "new birth," "faith" (in the Pauline sense) must remain words,[⁴⁵⁴] or be relegated to the sphere of magic and mystery.[⁴⁵⁵] Nevertheless we must not on that account overlook the intention. Justin tried to see the divine revelation not only in the sayings of the prophets, but in unique fashion in the person of Christ, and to conceive Christ not only as the divine teacher, but also as the "Lord and Redeemer." In two points he actually succeeded in this. By the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus Justin proved that Christ, the divine teacher, is also the future judge and bestower of reward. Christ himself is able to give what he has promised—a life after death free from sufferings and sins, that is the first point. The other thing, however, which Justin very strongly emphasised is that Jesus is even now reigning in heaven, and shows his future visible sovereignty of the world by giving his own people the power to cast out and vanquish the demons in and by his name. Even at the present time the latter are put to flight by believers in Christ.[⁴⁵⁶] So the redemption is no mere future one; it is even now taking place, and the revelation of the Logos in Jesus Christ is not merely intended to prove the doctrines of the rational religion, but denotes a real redemption, that is, a new beginning, in so far as the power of the demons on earth is overthrown through Christ and in his strength. Jesus Christ, the teacher of the whole truth and of a new law, which is the rational, the oldest, and the divine, the only being who has understood how to call men from all the different nations and in all stages of culture into a union of holy life, the inspiring One, for whom his disciples go to death, the mighty One, through whose name the demons are cast out, the risen One, who will one day reward and punish as judge, must be identical with the Son of God, who is the divine reason and the divine power. In this belief which accompanies the confession of the one God, creator of heaven and earth, Justin finds the special content of Christianity, which the later Apologists, with the probable exception of Melito, reproduced in a much more imperfect and meagre form. One thing, however, Justin in all probability did not formulate with precision, viz., the proposition that the special result of salvation, i.e., immortality, was involved in the incarnation of the Logos, in so far as that act brought about a real secret transformation of the whole mortal nature of man. With Justin, indeed, as with the other Apologists, the "salvation" (σωτηρια) consists essentially in the apportioning of eternal life to the world, which has been created mortal and in consequence of sin has fallen a prey to the natural destiny of "death;" and Christ is regarded as the bestower of incorruptibility who thus brings the creation to its goal; but as a rule Justin does not go beyond this thought. Yet we certainly find hints pointing to the notion of a physical and magical redemption accomplished at the moment of the incarnation. See particularly the fragment in Irenæus (already quoted on page 220), which may be thus interpreted, and Apol. I. 66. This conception, in its most complete shape, would have to be attributed to Justin if the fragment V. (Otto, Corp. Apol. III. p. 256) were genuine.[⁴⁵⁷] But the precise form of the presentation makes this very improbable. The question as to how, i.e., in what conceivable way, immortality can be imparted to the mortal nature as yet received little attention from Justin and the Apologists: it is the necessary result of knowledge and virtue. Their great object was to assure the belief in immortality. "Religion and morality depend on the belief in immortality or the resurrection from the dead. The fact that the Christian religion, as faith in the incarnate Son of God the creator, leads to the assurance that the maker of all things will reward piety and righteousness with the bestowal of eternal and immortal life, is the essential advantage possessed by the Christian religion over all others. The righteousness of the heathen was imperfect in spite of all their knowledge of good and evil, because they lacked the certain knowledge that the creator makes the just immortal and will consign the unjust to eternal torment." The philosophical doctrines of God, virtue, and immortality became through the Apologists the certain content of a world-wide religion, which is Christian because Christ guarantees its certainty. They made Christianity a deistical religion for the whole world without abandoning in word at least the old "teachings and knowledge" (διδαγματα και μαθηματα) of the Christians. They thus marked out the task of "dogmatic" and, so to speak, wrote the prolegomena for every future theological system in the Church (see Von Engelhardt's concluding observations in his "Christenthum Justin's" pp. 447-490, also Overbeck in the Historische Zeitschrift, 1880, pp. 499-505.) At the same time, however, they adhered to the early-Christian eschatology (see Justin, Melito, and, with reference to the resurrection of the flesh, the Apologists generally), and thus did not belie their connection with early Christianity.[⁴⁵⁸]

Interpretation and Criticism, especially of Justin's Doctrines.

1. The fundamental assumption of all the Apologists is that there can only be one and the same relation on earth between God and free man, and that it has been conditioned by the creation. This thought, which presupposes the idea of God's unchangeableness, at bottom neutralises every quasi-historical and mythological consideration. According to it grace can be nothing else than the stimulation of the powers of reason existent in man; revelation is supernatural only in respect of its form, and the redemption merely enables us to redeem ourselves, just as this possibility was given at the creation. Sin, which arose through temptation, appears on the one hand as error which must almost of necessity have arisen so long as man only possessed the "germs of the Logos" (σπερματα του λογου) and on the other as the dominion of sensuousness, which was nearly unavoidable since earthly material clothes the soul and mighty demons have possession of the world. The mythological idea of the invading sway of the demons is really the only interruption of the rationalistic scheme. So far as Christianity is something different from morality, it is the antithesis of the service and sovereignty of the demons. Hence the idea that the course of the world and mankind require in some measure to be helped is the narrow foundation of the thought of revelation or redemption. The necessity of revelation and redemption was expressed in a much stronger and more decisive way by many heathen philosophers of the same period. Accordingly, not only did these long for a revelation which would give a fresh attestation to old truth, but they yearned for a force, a real redemption, a præsens numen, and some new thing. Still more powerful was this longing in the case of the Gnostics and Marcion; compare the latter's idea of revelation with that of the Apologists. It is probable indeed that the thought of redemption would have found stronger expression among them also, had not the task of proof, which could be best discharged by the aid of the Stoic philosophy, demanded religious rationalism. But, admitting this, the determination of the highest good itself involved rationalism and moralism. For immortality is the highest good, in so far as it is perfect knowledge—which is, moreover, conceived as being of a rational kind,—that necessarily leads to immortality. We can only find traces of the converse idea, according to which the change into the immortal condition is the prius and the knowledge the posterius. But, where this conception is the prevailing one, moralistic intellectualism is broken through, and we can now point to a specific, supernatural blessing of salvation, produced by revelation and redemption. Corresponding to the general development of religious philosophy from moralism into mysticism (transition from the second to the third century), a displacement in this direction can also be noticed in the history of Greek apologetics (in the West it was different); but this displacement was never considerable and therefore cannot be clearly traced. Even later on under altered circumstances, apologetic science adhered in every respect to its old method, as being the most suitable (monotheism, morality, proof from prophecy), a circumstance which is evident, for example, from the almost complete disregard of the New Testament canon of Scripture and from other considerations besides.

2. In so far as the possibility of virtue and righteousness has been implanted by God in men, and in so far as—apart from trifling exceptions—they can actually succeed in doing what is good only through prophetic, i.e., divine, revelations and exhortations, some Apologists, following the early Christian tradition, here and there designate the transformation of the sinner into a righteous man as a work of God, and speak of renewal and regeneration. The latter, however, as a real fact, is identical with the repentance which, as a turning from sin and turning to God, is a matter of free will. As in Justin, so also in Tatian, the idea of regeneration is exhausted in the divine call to repentance. The conception of the forgiveness of sins is also determined in accordance with this. Only those sins can be forgiven, i.e., overlooked, which are really none, i.e., which were committed in a state of error and bondage to the demons, and were well-nigh unavoidable. The blotting out of these sins is effected in baptism, "which is the bath of regeneration in so far as it is the voluntary consecration of one's own person. The cleansing which takes place is God's work in so far as baptism was instituted by him, but it is effected by the man who in his change of mind lays aside his sins. The name of God is pronounced above him who repents of his transgressions, that he may receive freedom, knowledge, and forgiveness of his previous sins, but this effects a change only denoting the new knowledge to which the baptised person has attained." If, as all this seems to show, the thought of a specific grace of God in Christ appears virtually neutralised, the adherence to the language of the cultus (Justin and Tatian) and Justin's conception of the Lord's Supper show that the Apologists strove to get beyond moralism, that is, they tried to supplement it through the mysteries. Augustine's assertion (de predest. sanct. 27) that the faith of the old Church in the efficacy of divine grace was not so much expressed in the opuscula as in the prayers, shows correct insight.

3. All the demands, the fulfilment of which constitutes the virtue and righteousness of men, are summed up under the title of the new law. In virtue of its eternally valid content this new law is in reality the oldest; but it is new because Christ and the prophets were preceded by Moses, who inculcated on the Jews in a transient form that which was eternally valid. It is also new because, being proclaimed by the Logos that appeared in Christ, it announced its presence with the utmost impressiveness and undoubted authority, and contains the promise of reward in terms guaranteed by the strongest proof—the proof from prophecy. The old law is consequently a new one because it appears now for the first time as purely spiritual, perfect, and final. The commandment of love to one's neighbour also belongs to the law; but it does not form its essence (still less love to God, the place of which is taken by faith, obedience, and imitation). The content of all moral demands is comprehended in the commandment of perfect, active holiness, which is fulfilled by the complete renunciation of all earthly blessings, even of life itself. Tatian preached this renunciation in a specially powerful manner. There is no need to prove that no remains of Judæo-Christianity are to be recognised in these ideas about the new law. It is not Judæo-Christianity that lies behind the Christianity and doctrines of the Apologists, but Greek philosophy (Platonic metaphysics, Logos doctrine of the Stoics, Platonic and Stoic ethics), the Alexandrine-Jewish apologetics, the maxims of Jesus, and the religious speech of the Christian Churches. Justin is distinguished from Philo by the sure conviction of the living power of God, the Creator and Lord of the world, and the steadfast confidence in the reality of all the ideals which is derived from the person of Christ. We ought not, however, to blame the Apologists because to them nearly everything historical was at bottom only a guarantee of thoughts and hopes. As a matter of fact, the assurance is not less important than the content. By dint of thinking one can conceive the highest truth, but one cannot in this way make out the certainty of its reality. No positive religion can do more for its followers than faith in the revelation through Christ and the prophets did for the Apologists. Although it chiefly proved to them the truth of that which we call natural theology and which was the idealistic philosophy of the age, so that the Church appears as the great insurance society for the ideas of Plato and Zeno, we ought not at the same time to forget that their idea of a divine spirit working upon earth was a far more lively and worthy one than in the case of the Greek philosophers.

4. By their intellectualism and exclusive theories the Apologists founded philosophic and dogmatic Christianity (Loofs: "they laid the foundation for the conversion of Christianity into a revealed doctrine."[⁴⁵⁹]) If about the middle of the second century the short confession of the Lord Jesus Christ was regarded as a watchword, passport, and tessera hospitalitas (signum et vinculum), and if even in lay and uneducated circles it was conceived as "doctrine" in contradistinction to heresy, this transformation must have been accelerated through men, who essentially conceived Christianity as the "divine doctrine," and by whom all its distinctive features were subordinated to this conception or neutralised. As the philosophic schools are held together by their "laws" (νομοι) as the "dogmas" form the real bond between the "friends," and as, in addition to this, they are united by veneration for the founder, so also the Christian Church appeared to the Apologists as a universal league established by a divine founder and resting on the dogmas of the perfectly known truth, a league the members of which possess definite laws, viz., the eternal laws of nature for everything moral, and unite in common veneration for the Divine Master. In the "dogmas" of the Apologists, however, we find nothing more than traces of the fusion of the philosophical and historical elements; in the main both exist separately side by side. It was not till long after this that intellectualism gained the victory in a Christianity represented by the clergy. What we here chiefly understand by "intellectualism" is the placing of the scientific conception of the world behind the commandments of Christian morality and behind the hopes and faith of the Christian religion, and the connecting of the two things in such a way that this conception appeared as the foundation of these commandments and hopes. Thus was created the future dogmatic in the form which still prevails in the Churches and which presupposes the Platonic and Stoic conception of the world long ago overthrown by science. The attempt made at the beginning of the Reformation to free the Christian faith from this amalgamation remained at first without success.

Footnote 340:[ (return) ]

Edition by Otto, 9 Vols., 1876 f. New edition of the Apologists (unfinished; only Tatian and Athenagoras by Schwarz have yet appeared) in the Texte und Untersuchungen zur altchristlichen Litteratur-Geschichte, Vol. IV. Tzschirner, Geschichte der Apologetik, 1st part, 1805; id., Der Fall des Heidenthums, 1829. Ehlers, Vis atque potestas, quam philosophia antiqua, imprimis Platonica et Stoica in doctrina apologetarum habuerit, 1859.

Footnote 341:[ (return) ]

It is intrinsically probable that their works directly addressed to the Christian Church gave a more full exposition of their Christianity than we find in the Apologies. This can moreover be proved with certainty from the fragments of Justin's, Tatian's and Melito's esoteric writings. But, whilst recognising this fact, we must not make the erroneous assumption that the fundamental conceptions and interests of Justin and the rest were in reality other than may be inferred from their Apologies.

Footnote 342:[ (return) ]

That is, so far as these were clearly connected with polytheism. Where this was not the case or seemed not to be so, national traditions, both the true and the spurious, were readily and joyfully admitted into the catalogus testimoniorum of revealed truth.

Footnote 343:[ (return) ]

Though these words were already found in the first edition, Clemen (Justin 1890, p. 56) has misunderstood me so far as to think that I spoke here of conscious intention on the part of the Apologists. Such nonsense of course never occurred to me.

Footnote 344:[ (return) ]

Note here particularly the attitude of Tatian, who has already introduced a certain amount of the "Gnostic" element into his "Oratio ad Græcos," although, he adheres in the main to the ordinary apologetic doctrines.

Footnote 345:[ (return) ]

Since the time of Josephus Greek philosophers had ever more and more acknowledged the "philosophical" character of Judaism; see Porphyr., de abstin. anim. II. 26, 'ατε φιλοσοφοι το γενος οντες.

Footnote 346:[ (return) ]

On the relation of Christian literature to the writings of Philo, of Siegfried, Philo von Alexandrien, p. 303 f.

Footnote 347:[ (return) ]

It is very instructive to find Celsus (Origen, c. Cels. I. 2) proceeding to say that the Greeks understood better how to judge, to investigate, and to perfect the doctrines devised by the barbarians, and to apply them to the practice of virtue. This is quite in accordance with the idea of Origen, who makes the following remarks on this point: "When a man trained in the schools and sciences of the Greeks becomes acquainted with our faith, he will not only recognise and declare it to be true, but also by means of his scientific training and skill reduce it to a system and supplement what seems to him defective in it, when tested by the Greek method of exposition and proof, thus at the same time demonstrating the truth of Christianity."

Footnote 348:[ (return) ]

See the section "Justin und die apostolischen Váter" in Engelhardt's "Christenthum Justin's des Martyrers," p. 375 ff., and my article on the so-called 2nd Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians (Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte I. p. 329 ff.). Engelhardt, who on the whole emphasises the correspondences, has rather under- than over-estimated them. If the reader compares the exposition given in Book I., chap. 3, with the theology of the Apologists (see sub. 3), he will find proof of the intimate relationship that may be traced here.

Footnote 349:[ (return) ]

See Euseb., H. E. IV. 3. Only one sentence of Quadratus' Apology is preserved; we have now that of Aristides in the Syriac language; moreover, it is proved to have existed in the original language in the Historia Barlaam et Joasaph; finally, a considerable fragment of it is found in Armenian. See an English edition by Harris and Robinson in the Texts and Studies I. 1891. German translation and commentary by Raabe in the Texte und Untersuchungen IX. 1892. Eusebius says that the Apology was handed in to the emperor Hadrian; but the superscription in Syriac is addressed to the emperor Titus Hadrianus Antoninus.

Footnote 350:[ (return) ]

See Hermas, Mand I.

Footnote 351:[ (return) ]

With reservations this also holds good of the Alexandrians. See particularly Orig., c. Cels. I. 62.

Footnote 352:[ (return) ]

Semisch, Justin der Martyrer, 2 Vols, 1840 f. Aubé, S Justin, philosophe et martyre, 2nd reprint, 1875. Weizsäcker, Die Theologie des Martyrers Justin's in the Jahrbuch fur deutsche Theologie, 1867, p. 60 ff. Von Engelhardt, Christenthum Justin's, 1878; id, "Justin," in Herzog's Real-Encyklopädie. Stählin, Justin der Martyrer, 1880 Clemen, Die religionsphilosophische Bedeutung des stoisch-christlichen Eudamonismus in Justin's Apologie, 1890. Flemming, zur Beurtheilung des Christenthums Justin's des Martyrers, 1893. Duncker, Logoslehre Justin's, 1848. Bosse, Der prae istente Christus des Justinus, 1891.

Footnote 353:[ (return) ]

Apol. I. 2, p. 6, ed. Otto.

Footnote 354:[ (return) ]

Apol. I. 2, p. 6, sq.

Footnote 355:[ (return) ]

See the numerous philosophical quotations and allusions in Justin's Apology pointed out by Otto. Above all, he made an extensive use of Plato's Apology of Socrates.

Footnote 356:[ (return) ]

Apol. I. 4. p. 16, also I. 7, p. 24 sq: I. 26.

Footnote 357:[ (return) ]

Apol. I. 4, p. 14.

Footnote 358:[ (return) ]

Apol. I. 5, p. 18 sq., see also I. 14 fin.: ου σοφιστης 'υπηρχεν αλλα δυναμις Θεου 'ο λογος αυτου ην.

Footnote 359:[ (return) ]

L.c.: ου γαρ μονον εν 'Ελλησι δια Σωκρατους 'υπο λογου ηλεγχθηταυτα, αλλα και εν βαρβαροις 'υπ' αυτου του λογου μορφωθεντος και ανθρωπου και Ιησου Χριστου κληθενος.

Footnote 360:[ (return) ]

Celsus also admits this, or rather makes his Jew acknowledge it (Orig., c. Cels. II. 31). In Book VI. 47 he adopts the proposition of the "ancients" that the world is the Son of God.

Footnote 361:[ (return) ]

See Apol. II. 10 fin.: Σωκρατει ουδεις επεισθη 'υπερ τουτου του δογματος αποθνησκιν Χριστω δε τω και 'υπο Σωκρατους απο μερους γνωσθεντι ... ου φιλοσοφοι ουδε φιλολογοι μονον επεισθησαν.

Footnote 362:[ (return) ]

The utterances of Justin do not clearly indicate whether the non-Christian portion of mankind has only a σπερμα του λογον as a natural possession, or whether this σπερμα has in some cases been enhanced by the inward workings of the whole Logos (inspiration). This ambiguity, however, arises from the fact that he did not further discuss the relation between 'ο λογος and το σπερμα του λογου and we need not therefore attempt to remove it. On the one hand, the excellent discoveries of poets and philosophers are simply traced to το εμφυτον παντι γενει ανθρωπων σπερμα του λογου (Apol. II. 8), the μερος σπερματικου λογου (ibid) which was implanted at the creation, and on which the human 'ευρεσις και θεωρια depend (II. 10). In this sense it may be said of them all that they "in human fashion attempted to understand and prove things by means of reason;" and Socrates is merely viewed as the παντων ευτονωτερος (ibid.), his philosophy also, like all pre-Christian systems, being a φιλοσοφια ανθρωπειος (II. 15). But on the other hand Christ was known by Socrates though only απο μερους; for "Christ was and is the Logos who dwells in every man." Further, according to the Apologist, the μερος του σπερματικου θειου λογου bestows the power of recognising whatever is related to the Logos (το συγγενες II. 13). Consequently it may not only be said: 'οσα παρα πασι καλως ειρηται 'ημων, των Χριστιανων εστι (ibid.), but, on the strength of the "participation" in reason conferred on all, it may be asserted that all who have lived with the Logos (μετα λογου)—an expression which must have been ambiguous—were Christians. Among the Greeks this specially applies to Socrates and Heraclitus (I. 46). Moreover, the Logos implanted in man does not belong to his nature in such a sense as to prevent us saying υπο λογου δια Σωκρατους ηλεγχθη κ.τ.λ. (I. 5). Nevertheless αυτος 'ο λογος did not act in Socrates, for this only appeared in Christ (ibid). Hence the prevailing aspect of the case in Justin was that to which he gave expression at the close of the 2nd Apology (II. 15: alongside of Christianity there is only human philosophy), and which, not without regard for the opposite view, he thus formulated in II. 13 fin.: All non-Christian authors were able to attain a knowledge of true being, though only darkly, by means of the seed of the Logos naturally implanted within them. For the σπορα and μιμημα of a thing, which are bestowed in proportion to one's receptivity, are quite different from the thing itself, which divine grace bestows on us for our possession and imitation.

Footnote 363:[ (return) ]

"For the sake of man" (Stoic) Apol. I. 10: II. 4, 5; Dial. 41, p. 260, Apol I. 8: "Longing for the eternal and pure life, we strive to abide in the fellowship of God, the Father and Creator of all things, and we hasten to make confession, because we are convinced and firmly believe that that happiness is really attainable." It is frequently asserted that it is the Logos which produces such conviction and awakens courage and strength.

Footnote 364:[ (return) ]

Justin has destroyed the force of this argument in two passages (I. 44, 59) by tracing (like the Alexandrian Jews) all true knowledge of the poets and philosophers to borrowing from the books of the Old Testament (Moses). Of what further use then is the σπερμα λογος εμφυτον? Did Justin not really take it seriously? Did he merely wish to suit himself to those whom he was addressing? We are not justified in asserting this. Probably, however, the adoption of that Jewish view of the history of the world is a proof that the results of the demon sovereignty were in Justin's estimation so serious that he no longer expected anything from the σπερμα λογος εμφυτον when left to its own resources; and therefore regarded truth and prophetic revelation as inseparable. But this view is not the essential one in the Apology. That assumption of Justin's is evidently dependent on a tradition, whilst his real opinion was more "liberal."

Footnote 365:[ (return) ]

Compare with this the following passages: In Apol. I. 20 are enumerated a series of the most important doctrines common to philosophers and Christians. Then follow the words: "If we then in particular respects even teach something similar to the doctrines of the philosophers honoured among you, though in many cases in a divine and more sublime way; and we indeed alone do so in such a way that the matter is proved etc." In Apol. I. 44: II. 10. 13 uncertainty, error, and contradictions are shown to exist in the case of the greatest philosophers. The Christian doctrines are more sublime than all human philosophy (II. 15). "Our doctrines are evidently more sublime than any human teaching, because the Christ who appeared for our sakes was the whole fulness of reason" (το λογικον το 'ολον, II. 10). "The principles of Plato are not foreign (αλλοτρια) to the teaching of Christ, but they do not agree in every respect. The same holds good of the Stoics" (II. 13). "We must go forth from the school of Plato" (II. 12). "Socrates convinced no one in such a way that he would have been willing to die for the doctrine proclaimed by him; whereas not only philosophers and philologers, but also artisans and quite common uneducated people have believed in Christ" (II. 10). These are the very people—and that is perhaps the strongest contrast found between Logos and Logos in Justin—among whom it is universally said of Christianity: δυναμις εστι του αρρητου πατρος και ουχι ανθρωπειου λογου κατασκευη (see also I. 14 and elsewhere.)

Footnote 366:[ (return) ]

In Justin's estimate of the Greek philosophers two other points deserve notice. In the first place, he draws a very sharp distinction between real and nominal philosophers. By the latter he specially means the Epicureans. They are no doubt referred to in I. 4, 7, 26 (I. 14: Atheists). Epicurus and Sardanapalus are classed together in II. 7; Epicurus and the immoral poets in II. 12; and in the conclusion of II, 15 the same philosopher is ranked with the worst society. But according to II. 3 fin. (αδυνατον Κυνικω, αδιαφορον το τελος προθεμενω, το αγαθον ειδεναι πλην αδικφοριας) the Cynics also seem to be outside the circle of real philosophers. This is composed principally of Socrates, Plato, the Platonists and Stoics, together with Heraclitus and others. Some of these understood one set of doctrines more correctly, others another series. The Stoics excelled in ethics (II. 7); Plato described the Deity and the world more correctly. It is, however, worthy of note—and this is the second point—that Justin in principle conceived the Greek philosophers as a unity, and that he therefore saw in their very deviations from one another a proof of the imperfection of their teaching. In so far as they are all included under the collective idea "human philosophy," philosophy is characterised by the conflicting opinions found within it. This view was suggested to Justin by the fact that the highest truth, which is at once allied and opposed to human philosophy, was found by him among an exclusive circle of fellow-believers. Justin showed great skill in selecting from the Gospels the passages (I. 15-17), that prove the "philosophical" life of the Christians as described by him in c. 14. Here he cannot be acquitted of colouring the facts (cf. Aristides) nor of exaggeration (see, for instance, the unqualified statement: 'α εχομεν εις κοινον φεροντες και παντι δεομενω κοινωνουντες). The philosophical emperors were meant here to think of the "φιλοις παντα κοινα." Yet in I. 67 Justin corrected exaggerations in his description. Justin's reference to the invaluable benefits which Christianity confers on the state deserves notice (see particularly I. 12, 17.) The later Apologists make a similar remark.

Footnote 367:[ (return) ]

Dialogue 8. The dialogue takes up a more positive attitude than the Apology, both as a whole and in detail. If we consider that both works are also meant for Christians, and that, on the other hand, the Dialogue as well as the Apology appeals to the cultured heathen public, we may perhaps assume that the two writings were meant to present a graduated system of Christian instruction. (In one passage the Dialogue expressly refers to the Apology.) From Justin's time onward the apologetic polemic of the early Church appears to have adhered throughout to the same method. This consisted in giving the polemical writings directed against the Greeks the form of an introduction to Christian knowledge, and in continuing this instruction still further in those directed against the Jews.

Footnote 368:[ (return) ]

Dial. 2. sq. That Justin's Christianity is founded on theoretical scepticism is clearly shown by the introduction to the Dialogue.

Footnote 369:[ (return) ]

Dial. 8: 'ουτως δη και δια ταυτα φιλοσοφος εγω.

Footnote 370:[ (return) ]

Dial., l.c.: παρεστιν σοι τον Χριστον του Θεου επιγνοντι και τελειω γενομενω ευδαιμονειν.

Footnote 371:[ (return) ]

See particularly the closing chapter.

Footnote 372:[ (return) ]

Suppl. 2,

Footnote 373:[ (return) ]

Suppl. 4.

Footnote 374:[ (return) ]

Suppl. 5-7.

Footnote 375:[ (return) ]

Suppl. 24 (see also Aristides c. 13).

Footnote 376:[ (return) ]

Suppl, 7 fin. and many other places.

Footnote 377:[ (return) ]

E.g., Suppl. 8. 35 fin.

Footnote 378:[ (return) ]

The Crucified Man, the incarnation of the Logos etc. are wanting. Nothing at all is said about Christ.

Footnote 379:[ (return) ]

Suppl. 7.

Footnote 380:[ (return) ]

Cf. the arguments in c. 8 with c. 9 init.

Footnote 381:[ (return) ]

Suppl. 11.

Footnote 382:[ (return) ]

Suppl. 23.

Footnote 383:[ (return) ]

Suppl. 18, 23-27. He, however, as well as the others, sets forth the demon theory in detail.

Footnote 384:[ (return) ]

The Apology which Miltiades addressed to Marcus Aurelius and his fellow-emperor perhaps bore the title: 'υπερ της κατα Χριστιανους φιλοσοφιας (Euseb., H. E. V. 17. 5). It is certain that Melito in his Apology designated Christianity as 'η καθ' 'ημας φιλοσοφια (l.c., IV. 26. 7). But, while it is undeniable that this writer attempted, to a hitherto unexampled extent, to represent Christianity as adapted to the Empire, we must nevertheless beware of laying undue weight on the expression "philosophy." What Melito means chiefly to emphasise is the fact that Christianity, which in former times had developed into strength among the barbarians, began to flourish in the provinces of the Empire simultaneously with the rise of the monarchy under Augustus, that as foster-sister of the monarchy, it increased in strength with the latter, and that this mutual relation of the two institutions had given prosperity and splendour to the state. When in the fragments preserved to us he twice, in this connection, calls Christianity "philosophy," we must note that this expression alternates with the other "'ο καθ' 'ημας λογος", and that he uses the formula: "Thy forefathers held this philosophy in honour along with the other cults" προς ταις αλλαις θρησκειχις. This excludes the assumption that Melito in his Apology merely represented Christian as philosophy (see also IV. 26. 5, where the Christians are called "το των θεοσεβων γενος"). He also wrote a treatise περι κτισεως και γενεσεως Χριστου. In it (fragment in the Chron. Pasch) he called Christ Θεου λογος προ αιωνων.

Footnote 385:[ (return) ]

See my treatise "Tatian's Rede an die Griechen übers." 1884 (Giessener Programm). Daniel, Tatianus, 1837. Steuer, Die Gottes- und Logoslehre des Tatian, 1893.

Footnote 386:[ (return) ]

But see Orat. 4 init., 24 fin., 25 fin., 27 init.

Footnote 387:[ (return) ]

He not only accentuated the disagreement of philosophers more strongly than Justin, but insisted more energetically than that Apologist on the necessity of viewing the practical fruits of philosophy in life as a criterion; see Orat. 2, 3, 19, 25. Nevertheless Socrates still found grace in his eyes (c. 3). With regard to other philosophers he listened to foolish and slanderous gossip.

Footnote 388:[ (return) ]

Orat. 13, 15 fin., 20. Tatian also gave credence to it because it imparts such an intelligible picture of the creation of the world (c. 29).

Footnote 389:[ (return) ]

Orat. 12: τα της 'ημετερας παιδειας εστιν ανωτερω της κοσμικης καταληψεως. Tatian troubled himself very little with giving demonstrations. No other Apologist made such bold assertions.

Footnote 390:[ (return) ]

See Orat. 12 (p. 54 fin.), 20 (p. 90), 25 fin., 26 fin., 29, 30 (p. 116), 13 (p. 62), 15 (p. 70), 36 (p. 142), 40 (p. 152 sq.). The section cc. 12-15 of the Oratio is very important (see also c. 7 ff); for it shows that Tatian denied the natural immortality of the soul, declared the soul (the material spirit) to be something inherent in all matter, and accordingly looked on the distinction between men and animals in respect of their inalienable natural constitution as only one of degree. According to this Apologist the dignity of man does not consist in his natural endowments: but in the union of the human soul with the divine spirit, for which union indeed he was planned. But, in Tatian's opinion, man lost this union by falling under the sovereignty of the demons. The Spirit of God has left him, and consequently he has fallen back to the level of the beasts. So it is man's task to unite the Spirit again with himself, and thereby recover that religious principle on which all wisdom and knowledge rest. This anthropology is opposed to that of the Stoics and related to the "Gnostic" theory. It follows from it that man, in order to reach his destination, must raise himself above his natural endowment; see c. 15: ανθρωπον λεγω τον πορρω μεν ανθρωπτητος προς αυτον δε τον Θεον κεχωρηκοτα. But with Tatian this conception is burdened with radical inconsistency; for he assumes that the Spirit reunites itself with every man who rightly uses his freedom, and he thinks it still possible for every person to use his freedom aright (11 fin., 13 fin., 15 fin.) So it is after all a mere assertion that the natural man is only distinguished from the beast by speech. He is also distinguished from it by freedom. And further it is only in appearance that the blessing bestowed in the "Spirit" is a donum superadditum et supernaturale. For if a proper spontaneous use of freedom infallibly leads to the return of the Spirit, it is evident that the decision and consequently the realisation of man's destination depend on human freedom. That is, however, the proposition which all the Apologists maintained. But indeed Tatian himself in his latter days seems to have observed the inconsistency in which he had become involved and to have solved the problem in the Gnostic, that is, the religious sense. In his eyes, of course, the ordinary philosophy is a useless and pernicious art; philosophers make their own opinions laws (c. 27); whereas of Christians the following holds good (c. 32): λογου του δημοσιου και επιγειου κεχωρισμενοι και πειθομενοι θεου παραγγελμασι και νομω πατρος αφθαρσιας 'επομενοι, παν το εν δοξη κειμενον ανθρωπινη παραιτουμεθα.

Footnote 391:[ (return) ]

C. 31. init.: 'η 'ημετερα φιλοσοφια. 32 (p. 128): 'οι βουλομενοι φιλοσοφειν παρ' 'ημιν ανθρωποι. In c. 33 (p. 130) Christian women are designated 'αι παρ 'ημιν φιλοσοφουσαι. C. 35: 'η καθ' 'ημας βαρβαρος φιλοσοφια. 40 (p. 152): 'οι κατα Μωυσεα και 'ομοιως αυτω φιλοσοφουντες. 42: 'ο κατα βαρβαρους φιλοσοφων Τατιανος. The δογματα of the Christians: c. 1 (p. 2), 12 (p. 58), 19 (p. 86), 24 (p. 102), 27 (p. 108), 35 (p. 138), 40, 42. But Tatian pretty frequently calls Christianity "'η 'ημετερα παιδεια", once also "νομοθεσια" (12; cf. 40: 'οι 'ημετεροι νομοι), and often πολιτεια.

Footnote 392:[ (return) ]

See, e.g., c. 29 fin.: the Christian doctrine gives us ουχ 'οπερ μη ελαβομεν, αλλ' 'οπερ λαβοντες 'υπο της πλανης εχειν εκολυθημεν.

Footnote 393:[ (return) ]

Tatian gave still stronger expression than Justin to the opinion that it is the demons who have misled men and rule the world, and that revelation through the prophets is opposed to this demon rule; see c. 7 ff. The demons have fixed the laws of death; see c. 15 fin. and elsewhere.

Footnote 394:[ (return) ]

Tatian also cannot at bottom distinguish between revelation through the prophets and through Christ. See the description of his conversion in c. 29. where only the Old Testament writings are named, and c. 13 fin., 20 fin.. 12 (p. 54) etc.

Footnote 395:[ (return) ]

Knowledge and life appear in Tatian most closely connected. See, e.g., c. 13 init.: "In itself the soul is not immortal, but mortal; it is also possible, however, that it may not die. If it has not attained a knowledge of that truth it dies and is dissolved with the body; but later, at the end of the world, it will rise again with the body in order to receive death in endless duration as a punishment. On the contrary it does not die, though it is dissolved for a time, if it is equipped with the knowledge of God."

Footnote 396:[ (return) ]

Barbarian: the Christian doctrines are τα των βαρβαρων δογματα (c. 1): καθ' 'ημας βαρβαρος φιλοσοφια (c. 35); 'η βαρβαρικη νομοθεσια (c. 12); γραφαι βαρβαρικαι (c. 29); καινοτομειν τα βαρβαρων δογματα (c. 35); 'ο κατα βαρβαρους φιλοσοφων Τατιανος (c. 42); Μωυσης πασης βαρβαρου φιλοσοφιας αρχηγος (c. 31); see also c. 30, 32. In Tatian's view barbarians and Greeks are the decisive contrasts in history.

Footnote 397:[ (return) ]

See the proof from antiquity, c. 31 ff.

Footnote 398:[ (return) ]

C. 30 (p. 114): τουτων ουν την καταληψιν μεμυημενος.

Footnote 399:[ (return) ]

Tatian's own confession is very important here (c. 26): "Whilst I was reflecting on what was good it happened that there fell into my hands certain writings of the barbarians, too old to be compared with the doctrines of the Greeks, too divine to be compared with their errors. And it chanced that they convinced me through the plainness of their expressions, through the unartificial nature of their language, through the intelligible representation of the creation of the world, through the prediction of the future, the excellence of their precepts, and the summing up of all kinds under one head. My soul was instructed by God and I recognised that those Greek doctrines lead to perdition, whereas the others abolish the slavery to which we are subjected in the world, and rescue us from our many lords and tyrants, though they do not give us blessings we had not already received, but rather such as we had indeed obtained, but were not able to retain in consequence of error." Here the whole theology of the Apologists is contained in nuce; see Justin, Dial. 7-8. In Chaps. 32, 33 Tatian strongly emphasises the fact that the Christian philosophy is accessible even to the most uneducated; see Justin, Apol. II. 10; Athenag. 11 etc.

Footnote 400:[ (return) ]

The unknown author of the Λογος προς Ελληνας also formed the same judgment as Tatian (Corp. Apolog., T. III., p. 2 sq., ed. Otto; a Syrian translation, greatly amplified, is found in the Cod. Nitr. Mus. Britt. Add. 14658. It was published by Cureton, Spic. Syr., p. 38 sq. with an English translation). Christianity is an incomparable heavenly wisdom, the teacher of which is the Logos himself. "It produces neither poets, nor philosophers, nor rhetoricians; but it makes mortals immortal and men gods, and leads them away upwards from the earth into super-Olympian regions." Through Christian knowledge the soul returns to its Creator: δει γαρ αποκαταταθηναι οθεν απεστη.

Footnote 401:[ (return) ]

Nor is Plato "'ο δοκων εν αυτοις σεμνοτερον πεφιλοσοφηκεναι" any better than Epicurus and the Stoics (III. 6). Correct views which are found in him in a greater measure than in the others ('ο δοκων 'Ελληνων σοφωτερος γεγενησθαι), did not prevent him from giving way to the stupidest babbling (III. 16). Although he knew that the full truth can only be learned from God himself through the law (III. 17), he indulged in the most foolish guesses concerning the beginning of history. But where guesses find a place, truth is not to be found (III. 16: ει δε εικασμω, ουκ αρα αληθη εστιν τα 'υπ' αυτου ειρημενα).

Footnote 402:[ (return) ]

Theophilus confesses (I. 14) exactly as Tatian does: και γαρ εγω ηπιστουν τουτο εσεσθαι, αλλα νυν κατανοησας αυτα πιστευω, 'αμα και επιτυχων 'ιεραις γραφαις των αγιων προφητων, 'οι και προειπον δια πνευματος Θεου τι προγεγονοτα ω τροπω γεγονεν και τα ενεστωτα τινι τροπω γινεται, και τα επερχομενα ποια ταξει απαρτισθησεται. Αποδειξιν ουν λαβων των γινομενων και προαναπεφωνημενων ουκ απιστω; see also II. 8-10, 22, 30, 33-35: III. 10, 11, 17. Theophilus merely looks on the Gospel as a continuation of the prophetic revelations and injunctions. Of Christ, however, he did not speak at all, but only of the Logos (Pneuma), which has operated from the beginning. To Theophilus the first chapters of Genesis already contain the sum of all Christian knowledge (II. 10-32).

Footnote 403:[ (return) ]

See II. 8: 'υπο δαιμονων δε εμπνευσθεντες και 'υπ' αυτων φυσιωθεντες 'α ειπον δι' αυτων ειπον.

Footnote 404:[ (return) ]

The unknown author of the work de resurrectione, which goes under the name of Justin (Corp. Apol., Vol. III.) has given a surprising expression to the thought that it is simply impossible to give a demonstration of truth. (Ο μεν της αληθειας λογος εστιν ελευθεροστε και αυτεξουσιος, υπο μηδεμιαν βασανον ελεγχου θελων πιπτειν μηδε την παρα τοις ακουουσι δι' αποδειξεως εξετασιν 'υπομενειν. Το γαρ ευγενες αυτου και πεποιθος αυτω τω πεμψαντι πιστευεσθαι θελει). He inveighs in the beginning of his treatise against all rationalism, and on the one hand professes a sort of materialistic theory of knowledge, whilst on the other, for that very reason, he believes in inspiration and the authority of revelation; for all truth originates with revelation, since God himself and God alone is the truth. Christ revealed this truth and is for us των ολων πιστις και αποδειξις. But it is far from probable that the author would really have carried this proposition to its logical conclusion (Justin, Dial. 3 ff. made a similar start). He wishes to meet his adversaries "armed with the arguments of faith which are unconquered" (c. 1, p. 214), but the arguments of faith are still the arguments of reason. Among these he regarded it as most important that even according to the theories about the world, that is, about God and matter, held by the "so-called sages," Plato, Epicurus, and the Stoics, the assumption of a resurrection of the flesh is not irrational (c. 6, p. 228 f.). Some of these, viz., Pythagoras and Plato, also acknowledged the immortality of the soul. But, for that very reason, this view is not sufficient, "for if the Redeemer had only brought the message of the (eternal) life of the soul what new thing would he have proclaimed in addition to what had been made known by Pythagoras, Plato, and the band of their adherents?" (c. 10, p. 246.) This remark is very instructive, for it shows what considerations led the Apologists to adhere to the belief in the resurrection of the body. Zahn, (Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. VIII., pp. 1 f., 20 f.) has lately reassigned to Justin himself the fragment de resurr. His argument, though displaying great plausibility, has nevertheless not fully convinced me. The question is of great importance for fixing the relation of Justin to Paul. I shall not discuss Hermias' "Irrisio Gentilium Philosophorum," as the period when this Christian disputant flourished is quite uncertain. We still possess an early-Church Apology in Pseudo-Melito's "Oratio ad Antoninum Cæsarem" (Otto, Corp. Apol. IX., p. 423 sq.). This book is preserved (written?) in the Syrian language and was addressed to Caracalla or Heliogabalus (preserved in the Cod. Nitr. Mus. Britt. Add. 14658). It is probably dependent on Justin, but it is less polished and more violent than his Apology.

Footnote 405:[ (return) ]

Massebieau (Revue de l'histoire des religions, 1887, Vol. XV. No. 3) has convinced me that Minucius wrote at a later period than Tertullian and made use of his works.

Footnote 406:[ (return) ]

Cf. the plan of the "Octavius." The champion of heathenism here opposed to the Christian is a philosopher representing the standpoint of the middle Academy. This presupposes, as a matter of course, that the latter undertakes the defence of the Stoical position. See, besides, the corresponding arguments in the Apology of Tertullian, e.g., c. 17, as well as his tractate: "de testimonio animæ naturaliter Christianæ." We need merely mention that the work of Minucius is throughout dependent on Cicero's book, "de natura deorum." In this treatise he takes up a position more nearly akin to heathen syncretism than Tertullian.

Footnote 407:[ (return) ]

In R. Kühn's investigation ("Der Octavius des Min. Felix," Leipzig, 1882)—the best special work we possess on an early Christian Apology from the point of view of the history of dogma—based on a very careful analysis of the Octavius, more emphasis is laid on the difference than on the agreement between Minucius and the Greek Apologists. The author's exposition requires to be supplemented in the latter respect (see Theologische Litteratur-Zeitung, 1883, No. 6).

Footnote 408:[ (return) ]

C. 20: "Exposui opiniones omnium ferme philosophorum.... ut quivis arbitretur, aut nunc Christianos philosophos esse aut philosophos fuisse jam tunc Christianos."

Footnote 409:[ (return) ]

See Minucius, 31 ff. A quite similar proceeding is already found in Tertullian, who in his Apologeticum has everywhere given a Stoic colouring to Christian ethics and rules of life, and in c. 39 has drawn a complete veil over the peculiarity of the Christian societies.

Footnote 410:[ (return) ]

Tertullian has done exactly the same thing; see Apolog. 46 (and de præscr. 7.)

Footnote 411:[ (return) ]

Tertull., de testim. I.: "Sed non eam te (animam) advoco, quæ scholis formata, bibliothecis exercitata, academiis et porticibus Atticis pasta sapientiam ructas. Te simplicem et rudem et impoliitam et idioticam compello, qualem te habent qui te solam habent... Imperitia tua mihi opus est, quoniam aliquantulæ peritiæ tuæ nemo credit."

Footnote 412:[ (return) ]

Tertull., Apol. 46: "Quid simile philosophus et Christianas? Græciæ discipulus et cœli?" de præscr. 7: "Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid academiæ et ecclesiæ?" Minuc. 38.5: "Philosophorum supercilia contemnimus, quos corruptores et adulteros novimus... nos, qui non habitu sapientiam sed mente præferimus, non eloquimur magna sed vivimus, gloriamur nos consecutos, quod illi summa intentione quæsiverunt nec invenire potuerunt. Quid ingrati sumus, quid nobis invidemus, si veritas divinitatis nostri temporis ælate maturuit?"

Footnote 413:[ (return) ]

Minucius did not enter closely into the significance of Christ any more than Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus; he merely touched upon it (9. 4: 29. 2). He also viewed Christianity as the teaching of the Prophets; whoever acknowledges the latter must of necessity adore the crucified Christ. Tertullian was accordingly the first Apologist after Justin who again considered it necessary to give a detailed account of Christ as the incarnation of the Logos (see the 21st chapter of the Apology in its relation to chaps. 17-20).

Footnote 414:[ (return) ]

Among the Greek Apologists the unknown author of the work "de Monarchia," which bears the name of Justin, has given clearest expression to this conception. He is therefore most akin to Minucius (see chap. I.). Here monotheism is designated as the καθολικη δοξα which has fallen into oblivion through bad habit; for της ανθρωπινης φυσεως το κατ' αρχην συζυγιαν συνεσεως και σωτηριας λαβουσης εις επιγνωσιν αληθειας θρησκειας τε της εις τον 'ενα και παντων δεσποτην. According to this, then, only an awakening is required.

Footnote 415:[ (return) ]

But almost all the Apologists acknowledged that heathendom possessed prophets. They recognise these in the Sibyls and the old poets. The author of the work "de Monarchia" expressed the most pronounced views in regard to this. Hermas (Vis. II. 4), however, shows that the Apologists owed this notion also to an idea that was widespread among Christian people.

Footnote 416:[ (return) ]

See Justin, Apol. I. 31, Dial. 7, p. 30 etc.

Footnote 417:[ (return) ]

See Tatian, c. 31 ff.

Footnote 418:[ (return) ]

In the New Testament the content of the Christian faith is now here designated as dogma. In Clement (I. 11.), Hermas, and Polycarp the word is not found at all; yet Clement (I. 20. 4, 27. 5) called the divine order of nature τα δεδογματισμενα 'υπο Θεου. In Ignatius (ad Magn. XIII. 1) we read: σπουδαζετε ουν βεβαιωθηναι εν τοις δογμασιν του κυριου και των αποστολων, but δογματα here exclusively mean the rules of life (see Zahn on this passage), and this is also their signification in Διδαχη XI. 3. In the Epistle of Barnabas we read in several passages (I. 6: IX. 7: X. 1, 9 f.) of "dogmas of the Lord;" but by these he means partly particular mysteries, partly divine dispensations. Hence the Apologists are the first to apply the word to the Christian faith, in accordance with the language of philosophy. They are also the first who employed the ideas θεολογειν and θεολογια. The latter word is twice found in Justin (Dial. 56) in the sense of "aliquem nominare deum." In Dial. 113, however, it has the more comprehensive sense of "to make religio-scientific investigations." Tatian (10) also used the word in the first sense; on the contrary he entitled a book of which he was the author "προς τους αποφηναμενους τα περι Θεου" and not "προς τους θεολογουντας". In Athenagoras (Suppl. 10) theology is the doctrine of God and of all beings to whom the predicate "Deity" belongs (see also 20, 22). That is the old usage of the word. It was thus employed by Tertullian in ad nat. II. 1 (the threefold division of theology; in II. 2, 3 the expression "theologia physica, mythica" refers to this); Cohort, ad Gr. 3, 22. The anonymous writer in Eusebius (H. E. V. 28. 4, 5) is instructive on the point. Brilliant demonstrations of the ancient use of the word "theology" are found in Natorp, Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik (Philosophische Monatshefte, 1887, Parts I and 2, pp. 55-64). The title "theology," as applied to a philosophic discipline, was first used by the Stoics; the old poets were previously called "theologians," and the "theological" stage was the prescientific one which is even earlier than the "childhood" of "physicists" (so Aristotle speaks throughout). To the Fathers of the Church also the old poets are still 'οι παλαιοι θεολογοι. But side by side with this we have an adoption of the Stoic view that there is also a philosophical theology, because the teaching of the old poets concerning the gods conceals under the veil of myth a treasure of philosophical truth. In the Stoa arose the "impossible idea of a 'theology' which is to be philosophy, that is, knowledge based on reason, and yet to have positive religion as the foundation of its certainty." The Apologists accepted this, but added to it the distinction of a κοσμικη and θεολογικη σοφια.

Footnote 419:[ (return) ]

Christ has a relation to all three parts of the scheme, (1) as λογος; (2) as νομος, νομοθετης, and κριτης; (3) as διδασκαλος and σοτηρ.

Footnote 420:[ (return) ]

In the reproduction of the apologetical theology historians of dogma have preferred to follow Justin; but here they have constantly overlooked the fact that Justin was the most Christian among the Apologists, and that the features of his teaching to which particular value is rightly attached, are either not found in the others at all (with the exception of Tertullian), or else in quite rudimentary form. It is therefore proper to put the doctrines common to all the Apologists in the foreground, and to describe what is peculiar to Justin as such, so far as it agree with New Testament teachings or contains an anticipation of the future tenor of dogma.

Footnote 421:[ (return) ]

Cicero's proposition (de nat. deor. II. 66. 167): "nemo vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit," which was the property of all the idealistic philosophers of the age, is found in the Apologists reproduced in the most various forms (see, e.g., Tatian 29). That all knowledge of the truth, both among the prophets and those who follow their teaching, is derived from inspiration was in their eyes a matter of certainty. But here they were only able to frame a theory in the case of the prophets; for such a theory strictly applied to all would have threatened the spontaneous character of the knowledge of the truth.

Footnote 422:[ (return) ]

Justin, Apol. I. 3: 'Ημετερον ουν εργον και βιου και μαθηματων την επισκεψιν πασι παρεχειν.

Footnote 423:[ (return) ]

See the exposition of the doctrine of God in Aristides with the conclusion found in all the Apologists, that God requires no offerings and presents.

Footnote 424:[ (return) ]

Even Tatian says in c. 19: Κοσμου μεν γαρ η κατασκευη καλη, το δε εν αυτω πολιτευμα φαυλον.

Footnote 425:[ (return) ]

Tatian 5: Ουτε αναρχος η 'υλη καθαπερ 'ο Θεος, ουδε δια το αναρχον και αυτη ισοδυναμος τω Θεω γεννητη δε και ουχ 'υπο του αλλου γεγονυια μονον δε 'υπο του παντων δημιουργου προβεβλημενη. 12. Even Justin does not seem to have taught otherwise, though that is not quite certain; see Apol. I. 10, 59, 64, 67: II. 6. Theophilus I. 4: II. 4, 10, 13 says very plainly: εξ ουκ οντων τα παντα εποιησεν.... τι δε μεγα, ει 'ο θεος εξ 'υποκειμενης 'υλης εποιει τον κοσμον.

Footnote 426:[ (return) ]

Hence the knowledge of God and the right knowledge of the world are most closely connected; see Tatian 27: 'η Θεου καταληψις ην εχω περι των 'ολων.

Footnote 427:[ (return) ]

The beginning of the fifth chapter of Tatian's Oration is specially instructive here.

Footnote 428:[ (return) ]

According to what has been set forth in the text it is incorrect to assert that the Apologists adopted the Logos doctrine in order to reconcile monotheism with the divine honours paid to the crucified Christ. The truth rather is that the Logos doctrine was already part of their creed before they gave any consideration to the person of the historical Christ, and vice versâ Christ's right to divine honours was to them a matter of certainty independently of the Logos doctrine.

Footnote 429:[ (return) ]

We find the distinction of Logos (Son) and Spirit in Justin, Apol. I. 5, and in every case where he quotes formulæ (if we are not to assume the existence of interpolation in the text, which seems to me not improbable; see now also Cramer in the Theologische Studien, 1893. pp. 17 ff., 138 ff.). In Tatian 13 fin. the Spirit is represented as 'ο διακονος του πεπονθοτος Θεου. The conception in Justin, Dial. 116, is similar. Father, Word, and prophetic Spirit are spoken of in Athenag. 10. The express designation τριας is first found in Theophilus (but see the Excerpta ex Theodoto); see II. 15: 'αι τρεις 'ημεραι τυποι 'εισιν της τριαδος, του Θεου και του λογου αυτου και της σοφιας αυτου; see II. 10, 18. But it is just in Theophilus that the difficulty of deciding between Logos and Wisdom appears with special plainness (II. 10). The interposition of the host of good angels between Son and Spirit found in Justin, Apol. I. 5 (see Athenag.), is exceedingly striking. We have, however, to notice, provided the text is right, (1) that this interposition is only found in a single passage, (2) that Justin wished to refute the reproach of αθεοτης, (3) that the placing of the Spirit after the angels does not necessarily imply a position inferior to theirs, but merely a subordination to the Son and the Father common to the Spirit and the angels, (4) that the good angels were also invoked by the Christians, because they were conceived as mediators of prayer (see my remark on I. Clem, ad Corinth. LVI. 1); they might have found a place here just for this latter reason. On the significance of the Holy Spirit in the theology of Justin, see Zahn's Marcellus of Ancyra, p. 228: "If there be any one theologian of the early Church who might be regarded as depriving the Holy Spirit of all scientific raison d'etre at least on the ground of having no distinctive activity, and the Father of all share in revelation, it is Justin." We cannot at bottom say that the Apologists possessed a doctrine of the Trinity.

Footnote 430:[ (return) ]

To Justin the name of the Son is the most important; see also Athenag. 10. The Logos had indeed been already called the Son of God by Philo, and Celsus expressly says (Orig., c. Cels. II. 31); "If according to your doctrine the Word is really the Son of God then we agree with you;" but the Apologists are the first to attach the name of Son to the Logos as a proper designation. If, however, the Logos is intrinsically the Son of God, then Christ is the Son of God, not because he is the begotten of God in the flesh (early Christian), but because the spiritual being existing in him is the antemundane reproduction of God (see Justin, Apol. II. 6: 'ο 'υιος του πατρος και Θεου, 'ο μονος λεγομενος κυριως 'υιος)—a momentous expression.

Footnote 431:[ (return) ]

Athenag., 10; Tatian, Orat. 5.

Footnote 432:[ (return) ]

The clearest expression of this is in Tatian 5, which passage is also to be compared with the following: Θεος ην εν αρχη, την δε αρχην λογου δυναμιν παρειληφαμεν. 'Ο γαρ δεσποτης των 'ολων, αυτος 'υπαρχων του παντος 'η 'υποστασις, κατα μεν την μηδεπω γεγενημενην ποιησιν μονος ην, καθο δε πασα δυναμις, 'ορατων τε και αορατων αυτος 'υποστασις ην, συν αυτω τα παντα συν αυτω δια λογικης δυναμεως αυτος και 'ο λογος, 'ος ην αυτο, 'υπεστησε. Θεληματι δε της απλοτητος αυτου προπηδα λογος, 'ο δε λογος, ου κατα κενου χωρησας, εργον πρωτοτοκον του πατρος γινεται. Τουτον ισμεν του κοσμου την αρχην. Γεγονε δε κατα μερισμον, ου κατα αποκοπην το γαρ αποτμηθεν του πρωτου κεχωρισται, το δε μεριοθεν οικονομας την 'αιρεσιν προσλαβον ουκ ενδεα τον 'οθεν ειληπται πεποιηκεν. Ωσπερ γαρ αρο μιας δαδος αναπτεται μεν πυρα πολλα, της δε πρωτης δαδος δια την εξαψιν των πολλων δαδων ουκ ελαττουται το φως, 'ουτω και 'ο λογος προελθων εκ της του πατρος δυναμεως ουκ αλογον πεποιηκε τον γεγεννηκοτα. In the identification of the divine consciousness, that is, the power of God, with the force to which the world is due the naturalistic basis of the apologetic speculations is most clearly shown. Cf. Justin, Dial. 128, 129.

Footnote 433:[ (return) ]

The word "beget" (γενναν) is used by the Apologists, especially Justin, because the name "Son" was the recognised expression for the Logos. No doubt the words εξερευγεσθαι, προβαλλεσθαι, προερχεσθαι, προπηδαν and the like express the physical process more exactly in the sense of the Apologists. On the other hand, however, γενναν appears the more appropriate word in so far as the relation of the essence of the Logos to the essence of God is most clearly shown by the name "Son."

Footnote 434:[ (return) ]

None of the Apologists has precisely defined the Logos idea. Zahn, l.c., p. 233, correctly remarks: "Whilst the distinction drawn between the hitherto unspoken and the spoken word of the Creator makes Christ appear as the thought of the world within the mind of God, yet he is also to be something real which only requires to enter into a new relation to God to become an active force. Then again this Word is not to be the thought that God thinks, but the thought that thinks in God. And again it is to be a something, or an Ego, in God's thinking essence, which enters into reciprocal intercourse with something else in God; occasionally also the reason of God which is in a state of active exercise and without which he would not be rational." Considering this evident uncertainty it appears to me a very dubious proceeding to differentiate the conceptions of the Logos in Justin, Athenagoras, Tatian, and Theophilus, as is usually done. If we consider that no Apologist wrote a special treatise on the Logos, that Tatian (c. 5) is really the only one from whom we have any precise statements, and that the elements of the conception are the same in all, it appears inadvisable to lay so great stress on the difference as Zahn, for instance, has done in the book already referred to, p. 232 f. Hardly any real difference can have existed between Justin, Tatian, and Theophilus in the Logos doctrine proper. On the other hand Athenagoras certainly seems to have tried to eliminate the appearance of the Logos in time, and to emphasise the eternal nature of the divine relationships, without, however, reaching the position which Irenæus took up here.

Footnote 435:[ (return) ]

This distinction is only found in Theophilus (II. 10); but the idea exists in Tatian and probably also in Justin, though it is uncertain whether Justin regarded the Logos as having any sort of being before the moment of his begetting.

Footnote 436:[ (return) ]

Justin, Apol. II. 6., Dial. 61. The Logos is not produced out of nothing, like the rest of the creatures. Yet it is evident that the Apologists did not yet sharply and precisely distinguish between begetting and creating, as the later theologians did; though some of them certainly felt the necessity for a distinction.

Footnote 437:[ (return) ]

All the Apologists tacitly assume that the Logos in virtue of his origin has the capacity of entering the finite. The distinction which here exists between Father and Son is very pregnantly expressed by Tertullian (adv. Marc. II. 27): "Igitur quæcumque exigitis deo digna, habebuntur in patre invisibili incongressibilique et placido et, ut ita dixerim, philosophorum deo. Quæcumque autem ut indigna reprehenditis deputabuntur in filio et viso et audito et congresso, arbitro patris et ministro." But we ought not to charge the Apologists with the theologoumenon that it was an inward necessity for the Logos to become man. Their Logos hovers, as it were, between God and the world, so that he appears as the highest creature, in so far as he is conceived as the production of God; and again seems to be merged in God, in so far as he is looked upon as the consciousness and spiritual force of God. To Justin, however, the incarnation is irrational, and the rest of the Greek Apologists are silent about it.

Footnote 438:[ (return) ]

The most of the Apologists argue against the conception of the natural immortality of the human soul; see Tatian 13; Justin, Dial. 5; Theoph. II. 27.

Footnote 439:[ (return) ]

The first chapter of Genesis represented to them the sum of all wisdom, and therefore of all Christianity. Perhaps Justin had already written a commentary to the Hexaëmeron (see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2, p. 169 f.). It is certain that in the second century Rhodon (Euseb., H. E. V. 13. 8), Theophilus (see his 2nd Book ad Autol.), Candidus, and Apion (Euseb., H. E. V. 27) composed such. The Gnostics also occupied themselves a great deal with Gen. I.-III.; see, e.g., Marcus in Iren. I. 18.

Footnote 440:[ (return) ]

See Theophilus ad Aut. II. 27: Ει γαρ 'ο Θεος αθανατον τον ανθρωπον απ' αρχης πεποιηκει, Θεον αυτον πεποιηκει; παλιν ει θνητον αυτον πεποιηκει εδοκει αν 'ο Θεος αιτιος ειναι του θανατου αυτου. Ουτε ουν αθανατον αυτον εποιησεν ουτε μην θνητον, αλλα δεκτικον αμφοτερων, 'ινα, ει 'ρεψη επι τα της αθανασιας τηρησας την εντολην του Θεου, μισθον κομισηται παρ' αυτου την αθανασιαν και γενηται Θεος, ει δ' αυ τραπη επι τα του θανατου πραγματα παρακουσας του Θεου, αυτος εαυτω αιτιος η του θανατου.

Footnote 441:[ (return) ]

See Justin, Apol. I. 14 ff. and the parallel passages in the other Apologists.

Footnote 442:[ (return) ]

See Tatian, Orat. II. and many other passages.

Footnote 443:[ (return) ]

Along with this the Apologists emphasise the resurrection of the flesh in the strongest way as the specific article of Christian anticipation, and prove the possibility of realising this irrational hope. Yet to the Apologists the ultimate ground of their trust in this early-Christian idea is their reliance on the unlimited omnipotence of God and this confidence is a proof of the vividness of their idea of him. Nevertheless this conception assumes that in the other world there will be a return of the flesh, which on this side the grave had to be overcome and regarded as non-existent. A clearly chiliastic element is found only in Justin.

Footnote 444:[ (return) ]

No uniform conception of this is found in the Apologists; see Wendt, Die Christliche Lehre von der menschlichen Vollkommenheit 1882, pp. 8-20. Justin speaks only of a heavenly destination for which man is naturally adapted. With Tatian and Theophilus it is different.

Footnote 445:[ (return) ]

The idea that the demon sovereignty has led to some change in the psychological condition and capacities of man is absolutely unknown to Justin (see Wendt, l.c., p. 11 f., who has successfully defended the correct view in Engelhardt's "Das Christenthum Justin's des Märtyrers" pp. 92 f. 151. f. 266 f., against Stählin, "Justin der Märtyrer und sein neuester Beurtheiler" 1880, p. 16 f.). Tatian expressed a different opinion, which, however, involved him in evident contradictions (see above, p. 191 ff.). The apologetic theology necessarily adhered to the two following propositions: (1) The freedom to do what is good is not lost and cannot be. This doctrine was opposed to philosophic determinism and popular fatalism. (2) The desires of the flesh resulting from the constitution of man only become evil when they destroy or endanger the sovereignty of reason. The formal liberum arbitrium explains the possibility of sin, whilst its actual existence is accounted for by the desire that is excited by the demons. The Apologists acknowledge the universality of sin and death, but refused to admit the necessity of the former in order not to call its guilty character in question. On the other hand they are deeply imbued with the idea that the sovereignty of death is the most powerful factor in the perpetuation of sin. Their believing conviction of the omnipotence of God, as well as their moral conviction of the responsibility of man, protected them in theory from a strictly dualistic conception of the world. At the same time, like all who separate nature and morality in their ethical system, though in other respects they do not do so, the Apologists were obliged in practice to be dualists.

Footnote 446:[ (return) ]

Death is accounted the worst evil. When Theophilus (II. 26) represents it as a blessing, we must consider that he is arguing against Marcion. Polytheism is traced to the demons; they are accounted the authors of the fables about the gods; the shameful actions of the latter are partly the deeds of demons and partly lies.

Footnote 447:[ (return) ]

The Old Testament therefore is not primarily viewed as the book of prophecy or of preparation for Christ, but as the book of the full revelation which cannot be surpassed. In point of content the teaching of the prophets and of Christ is completely identical. The prophetical details in the Old Testament serve only to attest the one truth. The Apologists confess that they were converted to Christianity by reading the Old Testament. Cf. Justin's and Tatian's confessions. Perhaps Commodian (Instruct. I. 1) is also be understood thus.

Footnote 448:[ (return) ]

The Oratio of Tatian is very instructive in this respect. In this book he has nowhere spoken ex professo of the incarnation of the Logos in Christ; but in c. 13 fin. he calls the Holy Spirit "the servant of God who has suffered," and in c. 21 init. he says: "we are not fools and do not adduce anything stupid, when we proclaim that God has appeared in human form." Similar expressions are found in Minucius Felix. In no part of Aristides' Apology is there any mention of the pre-Christian appearance of the Logos. The writer merely speaks of the revelation of the Son of God in Jesus Christ.

Footnote 449:[ (return) ]

We seldom receive an answer to the question as to why this or that particular occurrence should have been prophesied. According to the ideas of the Apologists, however, we have hardly a right to put that question; for, since the value of the historical consists in its having been predicted, its content is of no importance. The fact that Jesus finds the she-ass bound to a vine (Justin, Apol. I. 32) is virtually quite as important as his being born of a virgin. Both occurrences attest the prophetic teachings of God, freedom, etc.

Footnote 450:[ (return) ]

In Justin's polemical works this must have appeared in a still more striking way. Thus we find in a fragment of the treatise προς Μαρκιωνα, quoted by Irenæus (IV. 6. 2), the sentence "unigenitus filius venit ad nos, suum plasma in semetipsum recapitulans." So the theologoumenon of the recapitulatio per Christum already appeared in Justin. (Vide also Dial. c. Tryph. 100.) If we compare Tertullian's Apologeticum with his Antignostic writings we easily see how impossible it is to determine from that work the extent of his Christian faith and knowledge. The same is probably the case, though to a less extent, with Justin's apologetic writings.

Footnote 451:[ (return) ]

Christians do not place a man alongside of God, for Christ is God, though indeed a second God. There is no question of two natures. It is not the divine nature that Justin has insufficiently emphasised—or at least this is only the case in so far as it is a second Godhead—but the human nature; see Schultz, Gottheit Christi, p. 39 ff.

Footnote 452:[ (return) ]

We find allusions in Justin where the various incidents in the history of the incarnate Logos are conceived as a series of arrangements meant to form part of the history of salvation, to paralyse mankind's sinful history, and to regenerate humanity. He is thus a forerunner of Irenæus and Melito.

Footnote 453:[ (return) ]

Even the theologoumenon of the definite number of the elect, which must be fulfilled, is found in Justin (Apol. I. 28, 45). For that reason the judgment is put off by God (II. 7). The Apology of Aristides contains a short account of the history of Jesus; his conception, birth, preaching, choice of the 12 Apostles, crucifixion, resurrection, ascension, sending out of the 12 Apostles are mentioned.

Footnote 454:[ (return) ]

"To Justin faith is only an acknowledgment of the mission and Sonship of Christ and a conviction of the truth of his teaching. Faith does not justify, but is merely a presupposition of the justification which is effected through repentance, change of mind, and sinless life. Only in so far as faith itself is already a free decision to serve God has it the value of a saving act, which is indeed of such significance that one can say, 'Abraham was justified by faith.' In reality, however, this took place through μετανοια." The idea of the new birth is exhausted in the thought: Θεος καλει εις μετανοιαν, that of the forgiveness of sins in the idea: "God is so good that he overlooks sins committed in a state of ignorance, if man has changed his mind." Accordingly, Christ is the Redeemer in so far as he has brought about all the conditions which make for repentance.

Footnote 455:[ (return) ]

This is in fact already the case in Justin here and there, but in the main there are as yet mere traces of it: the Apologists are no mystics.

Footnote 456:[ (return) ]

If we consider how largely the demons bulked in the ideas of the Apologists, we must rate very highly their conviction of the redeeming power of Christ and of his name, a power continuously shown in the victories over the demons. See Justin Apol. II. 6, 8; Dial. II, 30, 35, 39, 76, 85, 111, 121; Tertull., Apol. 23, 27, 32, 37 etc. Tatian also (16 fin.) confirms it, and c. 12, p. 56, line 7 ff. (ed. Otto) does not contradict this.

Footnote 457:[ (return) ]

Von Engelhardt, Christenthum Justin's, p. 432 f., has pronounced against its genuineness; see also my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2, p. 158. In favour of its genuineness see Hilgenfeld, Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1883, p. 26 f. The fragment is worded as follows: Πλασας 'ο Θεος κατ' αρχας τον ανθρωπον της γνωμης αυτου τα της φυσεως απηωρησεν εντολη μια ποιησαμενος την διαπειραν. Φυλαξαντα μεν γαρ ταυτην της αθαντου ληξεως πεποιηκεν εσεσθαι, παραβαντα δε της εναντιας. Ουτω γεγονως 'ο ανθρωπος και προς την παραβασιν ευθυς ελθων την φθοραν φυσικως εισεδεξατο. Φυσει δε της φθορας προσγενομενης ανανκαιον ην 'οτι σωσαι βουλομενος ην την φθοροποιον ουσιαν αφανισας. Τουτο δε ουκ ην 'ετερος γενεσθαι, ει μηπερ 'η κατα φυσιν ζωη προσεπλακη τω την φθοραν δεξαμενω, αφανιζουσα μεν την φθοραν, αθανατον δε του λοιπου το δεξαμενον διατηρουσα. Δια τουτο τον λογον εδεησεν εν σωματι γενεσθαι, 'ινα (του θανατου) της κατα φυσιν 'ημας φθορας ελευθερωση. Ει γαρ, 'ως φατε, νευματι μονον τον θανατον 'ημων απεκωλυσεν, ου προσηι μεν δια την βουλησιν 'ο θανατος, ουδεν δε ηττον φθαρτοι παλιν ημεν φυικην εν 'εαυτοις την φθοραν περιφεροντες.

Footnote 458:[ (return) ]

Weizsäcker, Jahrbücher fur deutsche Theologie, 1867, p. 119, has with good reason strongly emphasised this element. See also Stählin, Justin der Martyrer, 1880, p. 63 f., whose criticism of Von Engelhardt's book contains much that is worthy of note, though it appears to me inappropriate in the main.

Footnote 459:[ (return) ]

Loofs continues: "The Apologists, viewing the transference of the concept 'Son' to the preëxistent Christ as a matter of course, enabled the Christological problem of the 4th century to be started. They removed the point of departure of the Christological speculation from the historical Christ back into the preëxistence and depreciated the importance of Jesus' life as compared with the incarnation. They connected the Christology with the cosmology, but were not able to combine it with the scheme of salvation. Their Logos doctrine is not a 'higher' Christology than the prevailing form; it rather lags behind the genuine Christian estimate of Christ. It is not God who reveals himself in Christ, but the Logos, the depotentiated God, who as God is subordinate to the supreme Deity."

CHAPTER V.

THE BEGINNINGS OF AN ECCLESIASTICO-THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION AND REVISION OF THE RULE OF FAITH IN OPPOSITION TO GNOSTICISM ON THE BASIS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT AND THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF THE APOLOGISTS: MELITO, IRENÆUS, TERTULLIAN, HIPPOLYTUS, NOVATIAN.[⁴⁶⁰]

1. The theological position of Irenæus and the later contemporary Church teachers.

Gnosticism and the Marcionite Church had compelled orthodox Christianity to make a selection from tradition and to make this binding on Christians as an apostolical law. Everything that laid claim to validity had henceforth to be legitimised by the faith, i.e., the baptismal confession and the New Testament canon of Scripture (see above, chap. 2, under A and B). However, mere "prescriptions" could no longer suffice here. But the baptismal confession was no "doctrine;" if it was to be transformed into such it required an interpretation. We have shown above that the interpreted baptismal confession was instituted as the guide for the faith. This interpretation took its matter from the sacred books of both Testaments. It owed its guiding lines, however, on the one hand to philosophical theology, as set forth by the Apologists, and on the other to the earnest endeavour to maintain and defend against all attacks the traditional convictions and hopes of believers, as professed in the past generation by the enthusiastic forefathers of the Church. In addition to this, certain interests, which had found expression in the speculations of the so-called Gnostics, were adopted in an increasing degree among all thinking Christians, and also could not but influence the ecclesiastical teachers.[⁴⁶¹] The theological labours, thus initiated, accordingly bear the impress of great uniqueness and complexity. In the first place, the old Catholic Fathers, Melito,[⁴⁶²] Rhodon,[⁴⁶³] Irenæus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian were in every case convinced that all their expositions contained the universal Church faith itself and nothing else. Though the faith is identical with the baptismal confession, yet every interpretation of it derived from the New Testament is no less certain than the shortest formula.[⁴⁶⁴] The creation of the New Testament furnished all at once a quite unlimited multitude of conceptions, the whole of which appeared as "doctrines" and offered themselves for incorporation with the "faith."[⁴⁶⁵] The limits of the latter therefore seem to be indefinitely extended, whilst on the other hand tradition, and polemics too in many cases, demanded an adherence to the shortest formula. The oscillation between this brief formula, the contents of which, as a rule, did not suffice, and that fulness, which admitted of no bounds at all, is characteristic of the old Catholic Fathers we have mentioned. In the second place, these fathers felt quite as much need of a rational proof in their arguments with their christian opponents, as they did while contending with the heathen;[⁴⁶⁶] and, being themselves children of their time, they required this proof for their own assurance and that of their fellow-believers. The epoch in which men appealed to charisms, and "knowledge" counted as much as prophecy and vision, because it was still of them same nature, was in the main a thing of the past.[⁴⁶⁷] Tradition and reason had taken the place of charisms as courts of appeal. But this change had neither come to be clearly recognized,[⁴⁶⁸] nor was the right and scope of rational theology alongside of tradition felt to be a problem. We can indeed trace the consciousness of the danger in attempting to introduce new termini and regulations not prescribed by the Holy Scriptures.[⁴⁶⁹] The bishops themselves in fact encouraged this apprehension in order to warn people against the Gnostics,[⁴⁷⁰] and after the deluge of heresy, representatives of Church orthodoxy looked with distrust on every philosophic-theological formula.[⁴⁷¹] Such propositions of rationalistic theology as were absolutely required, were, however, placed by Irenæus and Tertullian on the same level as the hallowed doctrines of tradition, and were not viewed by them as something of a different nature. Irenæus uttered most urgent warnings against subtle speculations;[⁴⁷²] but yet, in the naivest way, associated with the faithfully preserved traditional doctrines and fancies of the faith theories which he likewise regarded as tradition and which, in point of form, did not differ from those of the Apologists or Gnostics.[⁴⁷³] The Holy Scriptures of the New Testament were the basis on which Irenæus set forth the most important doctrines of Christianity. Some of these he stated as they had been conceived by the oldest tradition (see the eschatology), others he adapted to the new necessities. The qualitative distinction between the fides credenda and theology was noticed neither by Irenæus nor by Hippolytus and Tertullian. According to Irenæus I. 10. 3 this distinction is merely quantitative. Here faith and theological knowledge are still completely intermixed. Whilst stating and establishing the doctrines of tradition with the help of the New Testament, and revising and fixing them by means of intelligent deduction, the Fathers think they are setting forth the faith itself and nothing else. Anything more than this is only curiosity not unattended with danger to Christians. Theology is interpreted faith.[⁴⁷⁴]

Corresponding to the baptismal confession there thus arose at the first a loose system of dogmas which were necessarily devoid of strict style, definite principle, or fixed and harmonious aim. In this form we find them with special plainness in Tertullian.[⁴⁷⁵] This writer was still completely incapable of inwardly connecting his rational (Stoic) theology, as developed by him for apologetic purposes, with the Christological doctrines of the regula fidei, which, after the example of Irenæus, he constructed and defended from Scripture and tradition in opposition to heresy. Whenever he attempts in any place to prove the intrinsic necessity of these dogmas, he seldom gets beyond rhetorical statements, holy paradoxes, or juristic forms. As a systematic thinker, a cosmologist, moralist, and jurist rather than a theosophist, as a churchman, a masterly defender of tradition, as a Christian exclusively guided in practical life by the strict precepts and hopes of the Gospel, his theology, if by that we understand his collective theological disquisitions, is completely devoid of unity, and can only be termed a mixture of dissimilar and, not unfrequently, contradictory propositions, which admit of no comparison with the older theology of Valentinus or the later system of Origen.[⁴⁷⁶] To Tertullian everything lies side by side; problems which chance to turn up are just as quickly solved. The specific faith of Christians is indeed no longer, as it sometimes seems to be in Justin's case, a great apparatus of proof for the doctrines of the only true philosophy; it rather stands, in its own independent value, side by side with these, partly in a crude, partly in a developed form; but inner principles and aims are nearly everywhere sought for in vain.[⁴⁷⁷] In spite of this he possesses inestimable importance in the history of dogma; for he developed and created, in a disconnected form and partly in the shape of legal propositions, a series of the most important dogmatic formulæ, which Cyprian, Novatian, Hosius, and the Roman bishops of the fourth century, Ambrosius and Leo I., introduced into the general dogmatic system of the Catholic Church. He founded the terminology both of the trinitarian and of the Christological dogma; and in addition to this was the first to give currency to a series of dogmatic concepts (satisfacere, meritum, sacramentum, vitium originis etc., etc.). Finally it was he who at the very outset imparted to the type of dogmatic that arose in the West its momentous bias in the direction of auctoritas et ratio, and its corresponding tendency to assume a legal character (lex, formal and material), peculiarities which were to become more and more clearly marked as time went on.[⁴⁷⁸] But, great as is his importance in this respect, it has no connection at all with the fundamental conception of Christianity peculiar to himself, for, as a matter of fact, this was already out of date at the time when he lived. What influenced the history of dogma was not his Christianity, but his masterly power of framing formulæ.

It is different with Irenæus. The Christianity of this man proved a decisive factor in the history of dogma in respect of its content. If Tertullian supplied the future Catholic dogmatic with the most important part of its formulæ, Irenæus clearly sketched for it its fundamental idea, by combining the ancient notion of salvation with New Testament (Pauline) thoughts.[⁴⁷⁹] Accordingly, as far as the essence of the matter is concerned, the great work of Irenæus is far superior to the theological writings of Tertullian. This appears already in the task, voluntarily undertaken by Irenæus, of giving a relatively complete exposition of the doctrines of ecclesiastical Christianity on the basis of the New Testament, in opposition to heresy. Tertullian nowhere betrayed a similar systematic necessity, which indeed, in the case of the Gallic bishop too, only made its appearance as the result of polemical motives. But Irenæus to a certain degree succeeded in amalgamating philosophic theology and the statements of ecclesiastical tradition viewed as doctrines. This result followed (1) because he never lost sight of a fundamental idea to which he tried to refer everything, and (2) because he was directed by a confident view of Christianity as a religion, that is, a theory of its purpose. The first fundamental idea, in its all-dominating importance, was suggested to Irenæus by his opposition to Gnosticism. It is the conviction that the Creator of the world and the supreme God are one and the same.[⁴⁸⁰] The other theory as to the aim of Christianity, however, is shared by Irenæus with Paul, Valentinus, and Marcion. It is the conviction that Christianity is real redemption, and that this redemption was only effected by the appearance of Christ. The working out of these two ideas is the most important feature in Irenæus' book. As yet, indeed, he by no means really succeeded in completely adapting to these two fundamental thoughts all the materials to be taken from Holy Scripture and found in the rule of faith; he only thought with systematic clearness within the scheme of the Apologists. His archaic eschatological disquisitions are of a heterogeneous nature, and a great deal of his material, as, for instance, Pauline formulæ and thoughts, he completely emptied of its content, inasmuch as he merely contrived to turn it into a testimony of the oneness and absolute causality of God the Creator; but the repetition of the same main thoughts to an extent that is wearisome to us, and the attempt to refer everything to these, unmistakably constitute the success of his work.[⁴⁸¹] God the Creator and the one Jesus Christ are really the middle points of his theological system, and in this way he tried to assign an intrinsic significance to the several historical statements of the baptismal confession. Looked at from this point of view, his speculations were almost of an identical nature with the Gnostic.[⁴⁸²] But, while he conceives Christianity as an explanation of the world and as redemption, his Christocentric teaching was opposed to that of the Gnostics. Since the latter started with the conception of an original dualism they saw in the empiric world a faulty combination of opposing elements,[⁴⁸³] and therefore recognised in the redemption by Christ the separation of what was unnaturally united. Irenæus, on the contrary, who began with the idea of the absolute causality of God the Creator, saw in the empiric world faulty estrangements and separations, and therefore viewed the redemption by Christ as the reunion of things unnaturally separated—the "recapitulatio" (ανακεφαλαιωσις).[⁴⁸⁴] This speculative thought, which involved the highest imaginable optimism in contrast to Gnostic pessimism, brought Irenæus into touch with certain Pauline trains of thought,[⁴⁸⁵] and enabled him to adhere to the theology of the Apologists. At the same time it opened up a view of the person of Christ, which supplemented the great defect of that theology,[⁴⁸⁶] surpassed the Christology of the Gnostics,[⁴⁸⁷] and made it possible to utilise the Christological statements contained in certain books of the New Testament.[⁴⁸⁸]

So far as we know at least, Irenæus is the first ecclesiastical theologian after the time of the Apologists (see Ignatius before that) who assigned a quite specific significance to the person of Christ and in fact regarded it as the vital factor.[⁴⁸⁹] That was possible for him because of his realistic view of redemption. Here, however, he did not fall into the abyss of Gnosticism, because, as a disciple of the "elders", he adhered to the early-Christian eschatology, and because, as a follower of the Apologists, he held, along with the realistic conception of salvation, the other dissimilar theory that Christ, as the teacher, imparts to men, who are free and naturally constituted for fellowship with God, the knowledge which enables them to imitate God, and thus by their own act to attain communion with him. Nevertheless to Irenæus the pith of the matter is already found in the idea that Christianity is real redemption, i.e., that the highest blessing bestowed in Christianity is the deification of human nature through the gift of immortality, and that this deification includes the full knowledge and enjoying of God (visio dei). This conception suggested to him the question as to the cause of the incarnation as well as the answer to the same. The question "cur deus—homo", which was by no means clearly formulated in the apologetic writings, in so far as in these "homo" only meant appearance among men, and the "why" was answered by referring to prophecy and the necessity of divine teaching, was by Irenæus made the central point. The reasons why the answer he gave was so highly satisfactory may be stated as follows: (1) It proved that the Christian blessing of salvation was of a specific kind. (2) It was similar in point of form to the so-called Gnostic conception of Christianity, and even surpassed it as regards the promised extent of the sphere included in the deification. (3) It harmonised with the eschatological tendency of Christendom, and at the same time was fitted to replace the material eschatological expectations that were fading away. (4) It was in keeping with the mystic and Neoplatonic current of the time, and afforded it the highest imaginable satisfaction. (5) For the vanishing trust in the possibility of attaining the highest knowledge by the aid of reason it substituted the sure hope of a supernatural transformation of human nature which would even enable it to appropriate that which is above reason. (6) Lastly, it provided the traditional historical utterances respecting Christ, as well as the whole preceding course of history, with a firm foundation and a definite aim, and made it possible to conceive a history of salvation unfolding itself by degrees οικονομια Θεου. According to this conception the central point of history was no longer the Logos as such, but Christ as the incarnate God, while at the same time the moralistic interest was balanced by a really religious one. An approach was thus made to the Pauline theology, though indeed in a very peculiar way and to some extent only in appearance. A more exact representation of salvation through Christ has, however, been given by Irenæus as follows: Incorruptibility is a habitus which is the opposite of our present one and indeed of man's natural condition. For immortality is at once God's manner of existence and his attribute; as a created being man is only "capable of incorruption and immortality" ("capax incorruptionis et immortalitatis");[⁴⁹⁰] thanks to the divine goodness, however, he is intended for the same, and yet is empirically "subjected to the power of death" ("sub condicione mortis"). Now the sole way in which immortality as a physical condition can be obtained is by its possessor uniting himself realiter with human nature, in order to deify it "by adoption" ("per adoptionem"), such is the technical term of Irenæus. The deity must become what we are in order that we may become what he is. Accordingly, if Christ is to be the Redeemer, he must himself be God, and all the stress must fall upon his birth as man. "By his birth as man the eternal Word of God guarantees the inheritance of life to those who in their natural birth have inherited death."[⁴⁹¹] But this work of Christ can be conceived as recapitulatio because God the Redeemer is identical with God the Creator; and Christ consequently brings about a final condition which existed from the beginning in God's plan, but could not be immediately realised in consequence of the entrance of sin. It is perhaps Irenæus' highest merit, from a historical and ecclesiastical point of view, to have worked out this thought in pregnant fashion and with the simplest means, i.e., without the apparatus of the Gnostics, but rather by the aid of simple and essentially Biblical ideas. Moreover, a few decades later, he and Melito, an author unfortunately so little known to us, were already credited with this merit. For the author of the so-called "Little Labyrinth" (Euseb., H. E. V. 28. 5) can indeed boast with regard to the works of Justin, Miltiades, Tatian, Clement, etc., that they declared Christ to be God, but then continues: Τα Ειρηναιου τε και Μελιτωνος και των λοιπων τις αγνοει βιβλια, θεον και ανθρωπον καταγγελλοντα τον Χριστον ("Who is ignorant of the books of Irenæus, Melito, and the rest, which proclaim Christ to be God and man"). The progress in theological views is very precisely and appropriately expressed in these words. The Apologists also professed their belief in the full revelation of God upon earth, that is, in revelation as the teaching which necessarily leads to immortality;[⁴⁹²] but Irenæus is the first to whom Jesus Christ, God and man, is the centre of history and faith.[⁴⁹³] Following the method of Valentinus, he succeeded in sketching a history of salvation, the gradual realising of the οικονομια Θεου culminating in the deification of believing humanity, but here he always managed to keep his language essentially within the limits of the Biblical. The various acting æons of the Gnostics became to him different stages in the saving work of the one Creator and his Logos. His system seemed to have absorbed the rationalism of the Apologists and the intelligible simplicity of their moral theology, just as much as it did the Gnostic dualism with its particoloured mythology. Revelation had become history, the history of salvation; and dogmatics had in a certain fashion become a way of looking at history, the knowledge of God's ways of salvation that lead historically to an appointed goal.[⁴⁹⁴]

But, as this realistic, quasi-historical view of the subject was by no means completely worked out by Irenæus himself, since the theory of human freedom did not admit of its logical development, and since the New Testament also pointed in other directions, it did not yet become the predominating one even in the third century, nor was it consistently carried out by any one teacher. The two conceptions opposed to it, that of the early Christian eschatology and the rationalistic one, were still in vogue. The two latter were closely connected in the third century, especially in the West, whilst the mystic and realistic view was almost completely lacking there. In this respect Tertullian adopted but little from Irenæus. Hippolytus also lagged behind him. Teachers like Commodian, Arnobius, and Lactantius, however, wrote as if there had been no Gnostic movement at all, and as if no Antignostic Church theology existed. The immediate result of the work carried on by Irenæus and the Antignostic teachers in the Church consisted in the fixing of tradition and in the intelligent treatment of individual doctrines, which gradually became established. The most important will be set forth in what follows. On the most vital point, the introduction of the philosophical Christology into the Church's rule of faith, see Chapter 7.

The manner in which Irenæus undertook his great task of expounding and defending orthodox Christianity in opposition to the Gnostic form was already a prediction of the future. The oldest Christian motives and hopes; the letter of both Testaments, including even Pauline thoughts; moralistic and philosophical elements, the result of the Apologists' labours; and realistic and mystical features balance each other in his treatment. He glides over from the one to the other; limits the one by the other; plays off Scripture against reason, tradition against the obscurity of the Scriptures; and combats fantastic speculation by an appeal sometimes to reason, sometimes to the limits of human knowledge. Behind all this and dominating everything, we find his firm belief in the bestowal of divine incorruptibility on believers through the work of the God-man. This eclectic method did not arise from shrewd calculation. It was equally the result of a rare capacity for appropriating the feelings and ideas of others, combined with the conservative instincts that guided the great teacher, and the consequence of a happy blindness to the gulf which lay between the Christian tradition and the world of ideas prevailing at that time. Still unconscious of the greatest problem, Irenæus with inward sincerity sketched out that future dogmatic method according to which the theology compiled by an eclectic process is to be nothing else than the simple faith itself, this being merely illustrated and explained, developed and by that very process established, as far as "stands in the Holy Scripture," and—let us add—as far as reason requires. But Irenæus was already obliged to decline answering the question as to how far unexplained faith can be sufficient for most Christians, though nothing but this explanation can solve the great problems, "why more covenants than one were given to mankind, what was the character of each covenant, why God shut up every man unto unbelief, why the Word became flesh and suffered, why the advent of the Son of God only took place in the last times etc." (I. 10. 3). The relation of faith and theological Gnosis was fixed by Irenæus to the effect that the latter is simply a continuation of the former.[⁴⁹⁵] At the same time, however, he did not clearly show how the collection of historical statements found in the confession can of itself guarantee a sufficient and tenable knowledge of Christianity. Here the speculative theories are as a matter of fact quite imbedded in the historical propositions of tradition. Will these obscurities remain when once the Church is forced to compete in its theological system with the whole philosophical science of the Greeks, or may it be expected that, instead of this system of eclecticism and compromise, a method will find acceptance which, distinguishing between faith and theology, will interpret in a new and speculative sense the whole complex of tradition? Irenæus' process has at least this one advantage over the other method: according to it everything can be reckoned part of the faith, providing it bears the stamp of truth, without the faith seeming to alter its nature. It is incorporated in the theology of facts which the faith here appears to be.[⁴⁹⁶] The latter, however, imperceptibly becomes a revealed system of doctrine and history; and though Irenæus himself always seeks to refer everything again to the "simple faith" (φιλη πιστις), and to believing simplicity, that is, to the belief in the Creator and the Son of God who became man, yet it was not in his power to stop the development destined to transform the faith into knowledge of a theological system. The pronounced hellenising of the Gospel, brought about by the Gnostic systems, was averted by Irenæus and the later ecclesiastical teachers by preserving a great portion of the early Christian tradition, partly as regards its letter, partly as regards its spirit, and thus rescuing it for the future. But the price of this preservation was the adoption of a series of "Gnostic" formulæ. Churchmen, though with hesitation, adopted the adversary's way of looking at things, and necessarily did so, because as they became ever further and further removed from the early-Christian feelings and thoughts, they had always more and more lost every other point of view. The old Catholic Fathers permanently settled a great part of early tradition for Christendom, but at the same time promoted the gradual hellenising of Christianity.

2. The Doctrines of the Church.

In the following section we do not intend to give a presentation of the theology of Irenæus and the other Antignostic Church teachers, but merely to set forth those points of doctrine to which the teachings of these men gave currency in succeeding times.

Against the Gnostic theses[⁴⁹⁷] Irenæus and his successors, apart from the proof from prescription, adduced the following intrinsic considerations: (1) In the case of the Gnostics and Marcion the Deity lacks absoluteness, because he does not embrace everything, that is, he is bounded by the kenoma or by the sphere of a second God; and also because his omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence have a corresponding limitation.[⁴⁹⁸] (2) The assumption of divine emanations and of a differentiated divine pleroma represents the Deity as a composite, i.e.,[⁴⁹⁹] finite being; and, moreover, the personification of the divine qualities is a mythological freak, the folly of which is evident as soon as one also makes the attempt to personify the affections and qualities of man in a similar way.[⁵⁰⁰] (3) The attempt to make out conditions existing within the Godhead is in itself absurd and audacious.[⁵⁰¹] (4) The theory of the passion and ignorance of Sophia introduces sin into the pleroma itself, i.e., into the Godhead.[⁵⁰²] With this the weightiest argument against the Gnostic cosmogony is already mentioned. A further argument against the system is that the world and mankind would have been incapable of improvement, if they had owed their origin to ignorance and sin.[⁵⁰³] Irenæus and Tertullian employ lengthy arguments to show that a God who has created nothing is inconceivable, and that a Demiurge occupying a position alongside of or below the Supreme Being is self-contradictory, inasmuch as he sometimes appears higher than this Supreme Being, and sometimes so weak and limited that one can no longer look on him as a God.[⁵⁰⁴] The Fathers everywhere argue on behalf of the Gnostic Demiurge and against the Gnostic supreme God. It never occurs to them to proceed in the opposite way and prove that the supreme God may be the Creator. All their efforts are rather directed to show that the Creator of the world is the only and supreme God, and that there can be no other above this one. This attitude of the Fathers is characteristic; for it proves that the apologetico-philosophical theology was their fundamental assumption. The Gnostic (Marcionite) supreme God is the God of religion, the God of redemption; the Demiurge is the being required to explain the world. The intervention of the Fathers on his behalf, that is, their assuming him as the basis of their arguments, reveals what was fundamental and what was accidental in their religious teaching. At the same time, however, it shows plainly that they did not understand or did not feel the fundamental problem that troubled and perplexed the Gnostics and Marcion, viz., the qualitative distinction between the spheres of creation and redemption. They think they have sufficiently explained this distinction by the doctrine of human freedom and its consequences. Accordingly their whole mode of argument against the Gnostics and Marcion is, in point of content, of an abstract, philosophico-rational kind.[⁵⁰⁵] As a rule they do not here carry on their controversy with the aid of reasons taken from the deeper views of religion. As soon as the rational argument fails, however, there is really an entire end to the refutation from inner grounds, at least in the case of Tertullian; and the contest is shifted into the sphere of the rule of faith and the Holy Scriptures. Hence, for example, they have not succeeded in making much impression on the heretical Christology from dogmatic considerations, though in this respect Irenæus was still very much more successful than Tertullian.[⁵⁰⁶] Besides, in adv. Marc. II. 27, the latter betrayed what interest he took in the preëxistent Christ as distinguished from God the Father. It is not expedient to separate the arguments advanced by the Fathers against the Gnostics from their own positive teachings, for these are throughout dependent on their peculiar attitude within the sphere of Scripture and tradition.

Irenæus and Hippolytus have been rightly named Scripture theologians; but it is a strange infatuation to think that this designation characterises them as evangelical. If indeed we here understand "evangelical" in the vulgar sense, the term may be correct, only in this case it means exactly the same as "Catholic." But if "evangelical" signifies "early-Christian," then it must be said that Scripture theology was not the primary means of preserving the ideas of primitive Christianity; for, as the New Testament Scriptures were also regarded as inspired documents and were to be interpreted according to the regula, their content was just for that reason apt to be obscured. Both Marcion and the chiefs of the Valentinian school had also been Scripture theologians. Irenæus and Hippolytus merely followed them. Now it is true that they very decidedly argued against the arbitrary method of interpreting the Scriptures adopted by Valentinus, and compared it to the process of forming the mosaic picture of a king into the mosaic picture of a fox, and the poems of Homer into any others one might choose;[⁵⁰⁷] but they just as decidedly protested against the rejection by Apelles and Marcion of the allegorical method of interpretation,[⁵⁰⁸] and therefore were not able to set up a canon really capable of distinguishing their own interpretation from that of the Gnostics.[⁵⁰⁹] The Scripture theology of the old Catholic Fathers has a twofold aspect. The religion of the Scripture is no longer the original form; it is the mediated, scientific one to be constructed by a learned process; it is, on its part, the strongest symptom of the secularisation that has begun. In a word, it is the religion of the school, first the Gnostic then the ecclesiastical. But it may, on the other hand, be a wholesome reaction against enthusiastic excess and moralistic frigidity; and the correct sense of the letter will from the first obtain imperceptible recognition in opposition to the "spirit" arbitrarily read into it, and at length banish this "spirit" completely. Irenæus certainly tried to mark off the Church use of the Scriptures as distinguished from the Gnostic practice. He rejects the accommodation theory of which some Gnostics availed themselves;[⁵¹⁰] he emphasises more strongly than these the absolute sufficiency of the Scriptures by repudiating all esoteric doctrines;[⁵¹¹] he rejects all distinction between different kinds of inspiration in the sacred books;[⁵¹²] he lays down the maxim that the obscure passages are to be interpreted from the clear ones, not vice versa;[⁵¹³] but this principle being in itself ambiguous, it is rendered quite unequivocal by the injunction to interpret everything according to the rule of faith[⁵¹⁴] and, in the case of all objectionable passages, to seek the type.[⁵¹⁵] Not only did Irenæus explain the Old Testament allegorically, in accordance with traditional usage;[⁵¹⁶] but according to the principle: "with God there is nothing without purpose or due signification" ("nihil vacuum neque sine signo apud deum") (IV. 21. 3), he was also the first to apply the scientific and mystical explanation to the New Testament, and was consequently obliged to adopt the Gnostic exegesis, which was imperative as soon as the apostolic writings were viewed as a New Testament. He regards the fact of Jesus handing round food to those lying at table as signifying that Christ also bestows life on the long dead generations;[⁵¹⁷] and, in the parable of the Samaritan, he interprets the host as the Spirit and the two denarii as the Father and Son.[⁵¹⁸] To Irenæus and also to Tertullian and Hippolytus all numbers, incidental circumstances, etc., in the Holy Scriptures are virtually as significant as they are to the Gnostics, and hence the only question is what hidden meaning we are to give to them. "Gnosticism" is therefore here adopted by the ecclesiastical teachers in its full extent, proving that this "Gnosticism" is nothing else than the learned construction of religion with the scientific means of those days. As soon as Churchmen were forced to bring forward their proofs and proceed to put the same questions as the "Gnostics," they were obliged to work by their method. Allegory, however, was required in order to establish the continuity of the tradition from Adam down to the present time—not merely down to Christ—against the attacks of the Gnostics and Marcion. By establishing this continuity a historical truth was really also preserved. For the rest, the disquisitions of Irenæus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus were to such an extent borrowed from their opponents that there is scarcely a problem that they propounded and discussed as the result of their own thirst for knowledge. This fact not only preserved to their works an early-Christian character as compared with those of the Alexandrians, but also explains why they frequently stop in their positive teachings, when they believe they have confuted their adversaries. Thus we find neither in Irenæus nor Tertullian a discussion of the relation of the Scriptures to the rule of faith. From the way in which they appeal to both we can deduce a series of important problems, which, however, the Fathers themselves did not formulate and consequently did not answer.[⁵¹⁹]

The doctrine of God was fixed by the old Catholic Fathers for the Christendom of succeeding centuries, and in fact both the methodic directions for forming the idea of God and their results remained unchanged. With respect to the former they occupy a middle position between the renunciation of all knowledge—for God is not abyss and silence—and the attempt to fathom the depths of the Godhead.[⁵²⁰] Tertullian, influenced by the Stoics, strongly emphasised the possibility of attaining a knowledge of God. Irenæus, following out an idea which seems to anticipate the mysticism of later theologians, made love a preliminary condition of knowledge and plainly acknowledged it as the principle of knowledge.[⁵²¹] God can be known from revelation,[⁵²²] because he has really revealed himself, that is, both by the creation and the word of revelation. Irenæus also taught that a sufficient knowledge of God, as the creator and guide, can be obtained from the creation, and indeed this knowledge always continues, so that all men are without excuse.[⁵²³] In this case the prophets, the Lord himself, the Apostles, and the Church teach no more and nothing else than what must be already plain to the natural consciousness. Irenæus certainly did not succeed in reconciling this proposition with his former assertion that the knowledge of God springs from love resting on revelation. Irenæus also starts, as Apologist and Antignostic, with the God who is the First Cause. Every God who is not that is a phantom;[⁵²⁴] and every sublime religious state of mind which does not include the feeling of dependence upon God as the Creator is a deception. It is the extremest blasphemy to degrade God the Creator, and it is the most frightful machination of the devil that has produced the blasphemia creatoris.[⁵²⁵] Like the Apologists, the early Catholic Fathers confess that the doctrine of God the Creator is the first and most important of the main articles of Christian faith;[⁵²⁶] the belief in his oneness as well as his absoluteness is the main point.[⁵²⁷] God is all light, all understanding, all Logos, all active spirit;[⁵²⁸] everything anthropopathic and anthropomorphic is to be conceived as incompatible with his nature.[⁵²⁹] The early-Catholic doctrine of God shows an advance beyond that of the Apologists, in so far as God's attributes of goodness and righteousness are expressly discussed, and it is proved in opposition to Marcion that they are not mutually exclusive, but necessarily involve each other.[⁵³⁰]

In the case of the Logos doctrine also, Tertullian and Hippolytus simply adopted and developed that of the Apologists, whilst Irenæus struck out a path of his own. In the Apologeticum (c. 21) Tertullian set forth the Logos doctrine as laid down by Tatian, the only noteworthy difference between him and his predecessor consisting in the fact that the appearance of the Logos in Jesus Christ was the uniform aim of his presentation.[⁵³¹] He fully explained his Logos doctrine in his work against the Monarchian Praxeas.[⁵³²] Here he created the formulæ of succeeding orthodoxy by introducing the ideas "substance" and "person" and by framing, despite of the most pronounced subordinationism and a purely economical conception of the Trinity, definitions of the relations between the persons which could be fully adopted in the Nicene creed.[⁵³³] Here also the philosophical and cosmological interest prevails; the history of salvation appears only to be the continuation of that of the cosmos. This system is distinguished from Gnosticism by the history of redemption appearing as the natural continuation of the history of creation and not simply as its correction. The thought that the unity of the Godhead is shown in the una substantia and the una dominatio was worked out by Tertullian with admirable clearness. According to him the unfolding of this one substance into several heavenly embodiments, or the administration of the divine sovereignty by emanated persons cannot endanger the unity; the "arrangement of the unity when the unity evolves the trinity from itself" ("dispositio unitatis, quando unitas ex semetipsa [trinitatem] derivat") does not abolish the unity, and, moreover, the Son will some day subject himself to the Father, so that God will be all in all.[⁵³⁴] Here then the Gnostic doctrine of æons is adopted in its complete form, and in fact Hippolytus, who in this respect agrees with Tertullian, has certified that the Valentinians "acknowledge that the one is the originator of all" ("τον 'ενα 'ομολογουσιν αιτιον των παντων"), because with them also, "the whole goes back to one" ("το παν εις 'ενα ανατρεχει").[⁵³⁵] The only difference is that Tertullian and Hippolytus limit the "economy of God" (οικονομια του Θεου) to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, while the Gnostics exceed this number.[⁵³⁶] According to Tertullian "a rational conception of the Trinity constitutes truth, an irrational idea of the unity makes heresy" ("trinitas rationaliter expensa veritatem constituit, unitas irrationaliter collecta hæresim facit") is already the watchword of the Christian dogmatic. Now what he considers a rational conception is keeping in view the different stages of God's economy, and distinguishing between dispositio, distinctio, numerus on the one hand and divisio on the other. At the beginning God was alone, but ratio and sermo existed within him. In a certain sense then, he was never alone, for he thought and spoke inwardly. If even men can carry on conversations with themselves and make themselves objects of reflection, how much more is this possible with God.[⁵³⁷] But as yet he was the only person.[⁵³⁸] The moment, however, that he chose to reveal himself and sent forth from himself the word of creation, the Logos came into existence as a real being, before the world and for the sake of the world. For "that which proceeds from such a great substance and has created such substances cannot itself be devoid of substance." He is therefore to be conceived as permanently separate from God "secundus a deo consititutus, perseverans in sua forma"; but as unity of substance is to be preserved ("alius pater, alius filius, alius non aliud"—"ego et pater unum sumus ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem dictum est"—"tres unum sunt, non unus"—"the Father is one person and the Son is another, different persons not different things", "I and the Father are one refers to unity of substance, not to singleness in number"—"the three are one thing not one person"), the Logos must be related to the Father as the ray to the sun, as the stream to the source, as the stem to the root (see also Hippolytus, c. Noëtum 10).[⁵³⁹] For that very reason "Son" is the most suitable expression for the Logos that has emanated in this way (κατα μερισμον). Moreover, since he (as well as the Spirit) has the same substance as the Father ("unius substantia" = 'ομοουσιος) he has also the same power[⁵⁴⁰] as regards the world. He has all might in heaven and earth, and he has had it ab initio, from the very beginning of time.[⁵⁴¹] On the other hand this same Son is only a part and offshoot; the Father is the whole; and in this the mystery of the economy consists. What the Son possesses has been given him by the Father; the Father is therefore greater than the Son; the Son is subordinate to the Father.[⁵⁴²] "Pater tota substantia est, filius vero derivatio totius et portio".[⁵⁴³] This paradox is ultimately based on a philosophical axiom of Tertullian: the whole fulness of the Godhead, i.e., the Father, is incapable of entering into the finite, whence also he must always remain invisible, unapproachable, and incomprehensible. The Divine Being that appears and works on earth can never be anything but a part of the transcendent Deity. This Being must be a derived existence, which has already in some fashion a finite element in itself, because it is the hypostatised Word of creation, which has an origin.[⁵⁴⁴] We would assert too much, were we to say that Tertullian meant that the Son was simply the world-thought itself; his insistance on the "unius substantiæ" disproves this. But no doubt he regards the Son as the Deity depotentiated for the sake of self-communication; the Deity adapted to the world, whose sphere coincides with the world-thought, and whose power is identical with that necessary for the world. From the standpoint of humanity this Deity is God himself, i.e., a God whom men can apprehend and who can apprehend them; but from God's standpoint, which speculation can fix but not fathom, this Deity is a subordinate, nay, even a temporary one. Tertullian and Hippolytus know as little of an immanent Trinity as the Apologists; the Trinity only appears such, because the unity of the substance is very vigorously emphasised; but in truth the Trinitarian process as in the case of the Gnostics, is simply the background of the process that produces the history of the world and of salvation. This is first of all shown by the fact that in course of the process of the world and of salvation the Son grows in his sonship, that is, goes through a finite process;[⁵⁴⁵] and secondly by the fact that the Son himself will one day restore the monarchy to the Father.[⁵⁴⁶] These words no doubt are again spoken not from the standpoint of man, but from that of God; for so long as history lasts "the Son continues in his form." In its point of departure, its plan, and its details this whole exposition is not distinguished from the teachings of contemporaneous and subsequent Greek philosophers,[⁵⁴⁷] but merely differs in its aim. In itself absolutely unfitted to preserve the primitive Christian belief in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, its importance consists in its identification of the historical Jesus with this Logos. By its aid Tertullian united the scientific, idealistic cosmology with the utterances of early Christian tradition about Jesus in such a way as to make the two, as it were, appear the totally dissimilar wings of one and the same building,[⁵⁴⁸] With peculiar versatility he contrived to make himself at home in both wings.

It is essentially otherwise with the Logos doctrine of Irenæus.[⁵⁴⁹] Whereas Tertullian and Hippolytus developed their Logos doctrine without reference to the historical Jesus, the truth rather being that they simply add the incarnation to the already existing theory of the subject, there is no doubt that Irenæus, as a rule, made Jesus Christ, whom he views as God and man, the starting-point of his speculation. Here he followed the Fourth Gospel and Ignatius. It is of Jesus that Irenæus almost always thinks when he speaks of the Logos or of the Son of God; and therefore he does not identify the divine element in Christ or Christ himself with the world idea or the creating Word or the Reason of God.[⁵⁵⁰] That he nevertheless makes Logos (μονογενης, πρωτοτοκος, "only begotten," "first born") the regular designation of Christ as the preëxistent One can only be explained from the apologetic tradition which in his time was already recognised as authoritative by Christian scholars, and moreover appeared justified and required by John I. 1. Since both Irenæus and Valentinus consider redemption to be the special work of Christ, the cosmological interest in the doctrine of the second God becomes subordinate to the soteriological. As, however, in Irenæus' system (in opposition to Valentinus) this real redemption is to be imagined as recapitulatio of the creation, redemption and creation are not opposed to each other as antitheses; and therefore the Redeemer has also his place in the history of creation. In a certain sense then the Christology of Irenæus occupies a middle position between the Christology of the Valentinians and Marcion on the one hand and the Logos doctrine of the Apologists on the other. The Apologists have a cosmological interest, Marcion only a soteriological, whereas Irenæus has both; the Apologists base their speculations on the Old Testament, Marcion on a New Testament, Irenæus on both Old and New.

Irenæus expressly refused to investigate what the divine element in Christ is, and why another deity stands alongside of the Godhead of the Father. He confesses that he here simply keeps to the rule of faith and the Holy Scriptures, and declines speculative disquisitions on principle. He does not admit the distinction of a Word existing in God and one coming forth from him, and opposes not only ideas of emanation in general, but also the opinion that the Logos issued forth at a definite point of time. Nor will Irenæus allow the designation "Logos" to be interpreted in the sense of the Logos being the inward Reason or the spoken Word of God. God is a simple essence and always remains in the same state; besides we ought not to hypostatise qualities.[⁵⁵¹] Nevertheless Irenæus, too, calls the preëxistent Christ the Son of God, and strictly maintains the personal distinction between Father and Son. What makes the opposite appear to be the case is the fact that he does not utilise the distinction in the interest of cosmology.[⁵⁵²] In Irenæus' sense we shall have to say: The Logos is the revelation hypostasis of the Father, "the self-revelation of the self-conscious God," and indeed the eternal self-revelation. For according to him the Son always existed with God, always revealed the Father, and it was always the full Godhead that he revealed in himself. In other words, he is God in his specific nature, truly God, and there is no distinction of essence between him and God.[⁵⁵³] Now we might conclude from the strong emphasis laid on "always" that Irenæus conceived a relationship of Father and Son in the Godhead, conditioned by the essence of God himself and existing independently of revelation. But the second hypostasis is viewed by him as existing from all eternity, just as much in the quality of Logos as in that of Son, and his very statement that the Logos has revealed the Father from the beginning shows that this relationship is always within the sphere of revelation. The Son then exists because he gives a revelation. Little interested as Irenæus is in saying anything about the Son, apart from his historical mission, naïvely as he extols the Father as the direct Creator of the universe, and anxious as he is to repress all speculations that lead beyond the Holy Scriptures, he could not altogether avoid reflecting on the problems: why there is a second deity alongside of God, and how the two are related to one another. His incidental answers are not essentially different from those of the Apologists and Tertullian; the only distinction is this incidental character. Irenæus too looked on the Son as "the hand of God," the mediator of creation; he also seems in one passage to distinguish Father and Son as the naturally invisible and visible elements of God; he too views the Father as the one who dominates all, the head of Christ, i.e., he who bears the creation and his Logos.[⁵⁵⁴] Irenæus had no opportunity of writing against the Monarchians, and unfortunately we possess no apologetic writings of his. It cannot therefore he determined how he would have written, if he had had less occasion to avoid the danger of being himself led into Gnostic speculations about æons. It has been correctly remarked that with Irenæus the Godhead and the divine personality of Christ merely exist beside each other. He did not want to weigh the different problems, because, influenced as he was by the lingering effects of an early-Christian, anti-theological interest, he regarded the results of this reflection as dangerous; but, as a matter of fact, he did not really correct the premises of the problems by rejecting the conclusions. We may evidently assume (with Zahn) that, according to Irenæus, "God placed himself in the relationship of Father to Son, in order to create after his image and in his likeness the man who was to become his Son;"[⁵⁵⁵] but we ought not to ask if Irenæus understood the incarnation as a definite purpose necessarily involved in the Sonship, as this question falls outside the sphere of Patristic thinking. No doubt the incarnation constantly formed the preëminent interest of Irenæus, and owing to this interest he was able to put aside or throw a veil over the mythological speculations of the Apologists regarding the Logos, and to proceed at once to the soteriological question.[⁵⁵⁶]

Nothing is more instructive than an examination of Irenæus' views with regard to the destination of man, the original state, the fall, and sin; because the heterogeneous elements of his "theology," the apologetic and moralistic the realistic, and the Biblical (Pauline), are specially apparent here, and the inconsistencies into which he was led are very plain. But these very contradictions were never eliminated from the Church doctrinal system of succeeding centuries and did not admit of being removed; hence his attitude on these points is typical.[⁵⁵⁷] The apologetic and moralistic train of thought is alone developed with systematic clearness. Everything created is imperfect, just from the very fact of its having had a beginning; therefore man also. The Deity is indeed capable of bestowing perfection on man from the beginning, but the latter was incapable of grasping or retaining it from the first. Hence perfection, i.e., incorruptibility, which consists in the contemplation of God and is conditional on voluntary obedience, could only be the destination of man, and he must accordingly have been made capable of it.[⁵⁵⁸] That destination is realised through the guidance of God and the free decision of man, for goodness not arising from free choice has no value. The capacity in question is on the one hand involved in man's possession of the divine image, which, however, is only realised in the body and is therefore at bottom a matter of indifference; and, on the other, in his likeness to God, which consists in the union of the soul with God's Spirit, but only comes about when man is obedient to him. Along with this Irenæus has also the idea that man's likeness consists in freedom. Now, as man became disobedient immediately after the creation, this likeness to God did not become perfect.[⁵⁵⁹] Through the fall he lost the fellowship with God to which he was destined, i.e., he is forfeit to death. This death was transmitted to Adam's whole posterity.[⁵⁶⁰] Here Irenæus followed sayings of Paul, but adopted the words rather than the sense; for, in the first place, like the Apologists, he very strongly emphasises the elements that palliate man's fall[⁵⁶¹] and, secondly, he contemplates the fall as having a teleological significance. It is the fall itself and not, as in Paul's case, the consequences of the fall, that he thus views; for he says that disobedience was conducive to man's development. Man had to learn by experience that disobedience entails death, in order that he might acquire wisdom and choose freely to fulfil the commandments of God. Further, man was obliged to learn through the fall that goodness and life do not belong to him by nature as they do to God.[⁵⁶²] Here life and death are always the ultimate question to Irenæus. It is only when he quotes sayings of Paul that he remembers sin in connection with redemption; and ethical consequences of the fall are not mentioned in this connection. "The original destination of man was not abrogated by the fall, the truth rather being that the fall was intended as a means of leading men to attain this perfection to which they were destined."[⁵⁶³] Moreover, the goodness of God immediately showed itself both in the removal of the tree of life and in the sentence of temporal death.[⁵⁶⁴] What significance belongs to Jesus Christ within this conception is clear: he is the man who first realised in his person the destination of humanity; the Spirit of God became united with his soul and accustomed itself to dwell in men. But he is also the teacher who reforms mankind by his preaching, calls upon them to direct their still existing freedom to obedience to the divine commandments, thereby restoring, i.e., strengthening, freedom, so that humanity is thus rendered capable of receiving incorruptibility.[⁵⁶⁵] One can plainly see that this is the idea of Tatian and Theophilus, with which Irenæus has incorporated utterances of Paul. Tertullian and Hippolytus taught essentially the same doctrine;[⁵⁶⁶] only Tertullian beheld the image and likeness of God expressly and exclusively in the fact that man's will and capacity are free, and based on this freedom an argument in justification of God's ways.[⁵⁶⁷]

But, in addition to this, Irenæus developed a second train of thought. This was the outcome of his Gnostic and realistic doctrine of recapitulation, and evinces clear traces of the influence of Pauline theology. It is, however, inconsistent with the moralistic teachings unfolded above, and could only be united with them at a few points. To the Apologists the proposition: "it is impossible to learn to know God without the help of God" ("impossibile est sine deo discere deum") was a conviction which, with the exception of Justin, they subordinated to their moralism and to which they did not give a specifically Christological signification. Irenæus understood this proposition in a Christological sense,[⁵⁶⁸] and at the same time conceived the blessing of salvation imparted by Christ not only as the incorruptibility consisting in the beholding of God bestowed on obedience IV. 20. 5-7: IV. 38, but also as the divine sonship which has been won for us by Christ and which is realised in constant fellowship with God and dependence on him.[⁵⁶⁹] No doubt he also viewed this divine sonship as consisting in the transformation of human nature; but the point of immediate importance here is that it is no longer human freedom but Christ that he contemplated in this connection. Corresponding to this he has now also a different idea of the original destination of man, of Adam, and of the results of the fall. Here comes in the mystical Adam-Christ speculation, in accordance with the Epistles to the Ephesians and Corinthians. Everything, that is, the "longa hominum expositio," was recapitulated by Christ in himself; in other words he restored humanity to what it originally was and again included under one head what was divided.[⁵⁷⁰] If humanity is restored, then it must have lost something before and been originally in good condition. In complete contradiction to the other teachings quoted above, Irenæus now says: "What we had lost in Adam, namely, our possession of the image and likeness of God, we recover in Christ."[⁵⁷¹] Adam, however, is humanity; in other words, as all humanity is united and renewed through Christ so also it was already summarised in Adam. Accordingly "the sin of disobedience and the loss of salvation which Adam consequently suffered may now be viewed as belonging to all mankind summed up in him, in like manner as Christ's obedience and possession of salvation are the property of all mankind united under him as their head."[⁵⁷²] In the first Adam we offended God by not fulfilling his commandments; in Adam humanity became disobedient, wounded, sinful, bereft of life; through Eve mankind became forfeit to death; through its victory over the first man death descended upon us all, and the devil carried us all away captive etc.[⁵⁷³] Here Irenæus always means that in Adam, who represents all mankind as their head, the latter became doomed to death. In this instance he did not think of a hereditary transmission, but of a mystic unity[⁵⁷⁴] as in the case of Christ, viewed as the second Adam. The teachings in III. 21. 10-23[⁵⁷⁵] show what an almost naturalistic shape the religious quasi-historical idea assumed in Irenæus' mind. This is, however, more especially evident from the assertion, in opposition to Tatian, that unless Adam himself had been saved by Christ, God would have been overcome by the devil.[⁵⁷⁶] It was merely his moralistic train of thought that saved him from the conclusion that there is a restoration of all individual men.

This conception of Adam as the representative of humanity corresponds to Irenæus' doctrine of the God-man. The historical importance of this author lies in the development of the Christology. At the present day, ecclesiastical Christianity, so far as it seriously believes in the unity of the divine and human in Jesus Christ and deduces the divine manhood from the work of Christ as his deification, still occupies the same standpoint as Irenæus did. Tertullian by no means matched him here; he too has the formula in a few passages, but he cannot, like Irenæus, account for its content. On the other hand we owe to him the idea of the "two natures," which remain in their integrity—that formula which owes its adoption to the influence of Leo I. and at bottom contradicts Irenæus' thought "the Son of God became the Son of man," ("filius dei factus filius hominis"). Finally, the manner in which Irenæus tried to interpret the historical utterances about Jesus Christ from the standpoint of the Divine manhood idea, and to give them a significance in regard to salvation is also an epoch-making fact.

"Filius dei filius hominis factus," "it is one and the same Jesus Christ, not a Jesus and a Christ, nor a mere temporary union of an æon and a man, but one and the same person, who created the world, was born, suffered, and ascended"—this along with the dogma of God the Creator is the cardinal doctrine of Irenæus:[⁵⁷⁷] "Jesus Christ truly man and truly God" ("Jesus Christus, vere homo, vere deus").[⁵⁷⁸] It is only the Church that adheres to this doctrine, for "none of the heretics hold the opinion that the Word of God became flesh" ("secundum nullam sententiam hæreticorum verbum dei caro factum est").[⁵⁷⁹] What therefore has to be shown is (1) that Jesus Christ is really the Word of God, i.e., is God, (2) that this Word really became man and (3) that the incarnate Word is an inseparable unity. Irenæus maintains the first statement as well against the "Ebionites" as against the Valentinians who thought that Christ's advent was the descent of one of the many æons. In opposition to the Ebionites he emphasises the distinction between natural and adopted Sonship, appeals to the Old Testament testimony in favour of the divinity of Christ,[⁵⁸⁰] and moreover argues that we would still be in the bondage of the old disobedience, if Jesus Christ had only been a man.[⁵⁸¹] In this connection he also discussed the birth from the virgin.[⁵⁸²] He not only proved it from prophecy, but his recapitulation theory also suggested to him a parallel between Adam and Eve on the one hand and Christ and Mary on the other, which included the birth from the virgin.[⁵⁸³] He argues in opposition to the Valentinians that it was really the eternal Word of God himself, who was always with God and always present to the human race, that descended.[⁵⁸⁴] He who became man was not a being foreign to the world—this is said in opposition to Marcion—but the Lord of the world and humanity, the Son of God, and none other. The reality of the body of Christ, i.e., the essential identity of the humanity of Christ with our own, was continually emphasised by Irenæus, and he views the whole work of salvation as dependent on this identity.[⁵⁸⁵] In the latter he also includes the fact that Jesus must have passed through and been subjected to all the conditions of a complete human life from birth to old age and death.[⁵⁸⁶] Jesus Christ is therefore the Son of God who has really become the Son of man; and these are not two Christs but one, in whom the Logos is permanently united with humanity.[⁵⁸⁷] Irenæus called this union "union of the Word of God with the creature" ("adunitio verbi dei ad plasma")[⁵⁸⁸] and "blending and communion of God and man" ("commixtio et communio dei et hominis")[⁵⁸⁹] without thereby describing it any more clearly.[⁵⁹⁰] He views it as perfect, for, as a rule, he will not listen to any separation of what was done by the man Jesus and by God the Word.[⁵⁹¹] The explicit formula of two substances or natures in Christ is not found in Irenæus; but Tertullian already used it. It never occurred to the former, just because he was not here speaking as a theologian, but expressing his belief.[⁵⁹²] In his utterances about the God-man Tertullian closely imitates Irenæus. Like the latter he uses the expression "man united with God" ("homo deo mixtus")[⁵⁹³] and like him he applies the predicates of the man to the Son of God.[⁵⁹⁴] But he goes further, or rather, in the interest of formal clearness, he expresses the mystery in a manner which shows that he did not fully realise the religious significance of the proposition, "the Son of God made Son of man" ("filius dei filius hominis factus"). He speaks of a "corporal and spiritual, i.e., divine, substance of the Lord", ("corporalis et spiritalis (i.e., divina) substantia domini")[⁵⁹⁵] of "either substance of the flesh and spirit of Christ" ("utraque substantia et carnis et spiritus Christi"), of the "creation of two substances which Christ himself also possesses," ("conditio duarum substantiarum, quas Christus et ipse gestat")[⁵⁹⁶] and of the "twofold condition not blended but united in one person—God and man" ("duplex status non confusus sed conjunctus in una persona—deus et homo".)[⁵⁹⁷] Here we already have in a complete form the later Chalcedonian formula of the two substances in one person.[⁵⁹⁸] At the same time, however, we can clearly see that Tertullian went beyond Irenæus in his exposition.[⁵⁹⁹] He was, moreover, impelled to combat an antagonistic principle. Irenæus had as yet no occasion to explain in detail that the proposition "the Word became flesh" ("verbum caro factum") denoted no transformation. That he excludes the idea of change, and that he puts stress on the Logos' assumption of flesh from the Virgin is shown by many passages.[⁶⁰⁰] Tertullian, on the other hand, was in the first place confronted by (Gnostic) opponents who understood John's statement in the sense of the Word's transforming himself into flesh, and therefore argued against the "assumption of flesh from the Virgin" ("assumptio carnis ex virgine");[⁶⁰¹] and, in the second place, he had to do with Catholic Christians who indeed admitted the birth from the Virgin, but likewise assumed a change of God into flesh, and declared the God thus invested with flesh to be the Son.[⁶⁰²] In this connection the same Tertullian, who in the Church laid great weight on formulæ like "the crucified God," "God consented to be born" ("deus crucifixus," "nasci se voluit deus") and who, impelled by opposition to Marcion and by his apologetic interest, distinguished the Son as capable of suffering from God the Father who is impassible, and imputed to him human weaknesses—which was already a further step,—sharply emphasised the "distinct function" ("distincte agere") of the two substances in Christ and thus separated the persons. With Tertullian the interest in the Logos doctrine, on the one hand, and in the real humanity, on the other, laid the basis of that conception of Christology in accordance with which the unity of the person is nothing more than an assertion. The "deus factus homo" ("verbum caro factus") presents quite insuperable difficulties, as soon as "theology" can no longer be banished. Tertullian smoothed over these difficulties by juristic distinctions, for all his elucidations of "substance" and "person" are of this nature.

A somewhat paradoxical result of the defence of the Logos doctrine in the struggle against the "Patripassians" was the increased emphasis that now began to be laid on the integrity and independence of the human nature in Christ. If the only essential result of the struggle with Gnosticism was to assert the substantial reality of Christ's body, it was Tertullian who distinguished what Christ did as man from what he did as God in order to prove that he was not a tertium quid. The discriminating intellect which was forced to receive a doctrine as a problem could not proceed otherwise. But, even before the struggle with Modalism, elements were present which repressed the naïve confidence of the utterances about the God-man. If I judge rightly, there were two features in Irenæus both of which resulted in a splitting up of the conception of the perfect unity of Christ's person. The first was the intellectual contemplation of the perfect humanity of Jesus, the second was found in certain Old and New Testament texts and the tradition connected with these.[⁶⁰³] With regard to the first we may point out that Irenæus indeed regarded the union of the human and divine as possible only because man, fashioned from the beginning by and after the pattern of the Logos, was an image of the latter and destined for union with God. Jesus Christ is the realisation of our possession of God's image;[⁶⁰⁴] but this thought, if no further developed, may be still united with the Logos doctrine in such a way that it does not interfere with it, but serves to confirm it. The case becomes different when it is not only shown that the Logos was always at work in the human race, but that humanity was gradually more and more accustomed by him (in the patriarchs and prophets) to communion with God,[⁶⁰⁵] till at last the perfect man appeared in Christ. For in this view it might appear as if the really essential element in Jesus Christ were not the Logos, who has become the new Adam, but the new Adam, who possesses the Logos. That Irenæus, in explaining the life of Jesus as that of Adam according to the recapitulation theory, here and there expresses himself as if he were speaking of the perfect man, is undeniable: If the acts of Christ are really to be what they seem, the man concerned in them must be placed in the foreground. But how little Irenæus thought of simply identifying the Logos with the perfect man is shown by the passage in III. 19. 3 where he writes: "'ωσπερ γαρ ην ανθρωπος 'ινα πειρασθη, 'ουτω και λογος 'ινα δοξασθη. ησυχαζοντος μεν του λογου εν τω πειραζεσθαι και σταυρουσθαι και αποθνησκειν συγγινομενου δε τω ανθρωπω εν τω νικαν και 'υπομενειν και χρηστευεσθαι και ανιστασθαι και αναλαμβανεσθαι" ("For as he was man that he might be tempted, so also he was the Logos that he might be glorified. The Logos remained quiescent during the process of temptation, crucifixion and death, but aided the human nature when it conquered, and endured, and performed deeds of kindness, and rose again from the dead, and was received up into heaven"). From these words it is plain that Irenæus preferred to assume that the divine and human natures existed side by side, and consequently to split up the perfect unity, rather than teach a mere ideal manhood which would be at the same time a divine manhood. The "discrete agere" of the two natures proves that to Irenæus the perfect manhood of the incarnate Logos was merely an incidental quality he possessed. In reality the Logos is the perfect man in so far as his incarnation creates the perfect man and renders him possible, or the Logos always exists behind Christ the perfect man. But nevertheless this very way of viewing the humanity in Christ already compelled Irenæus to limit the "deus crucifixus" and to lay the foundation for Tertullian's formulæ. With regard to the second point we may remark that there were not a few passages in both Testaments where Christ appeared as the man chosen by God and anointed with the Spirit. These as well as the corresponding language of the Church were the greatest difficulties in the way of the Logos Christology. Of what importance is an anointing with the Spirit to him who is God? What is the meaning of Christ being born by the power of the Holy Ghost? Is this formula compatible with the other, that he as the Logos himself assumed flesh from the Virgin etc.? Irenæus no doubt felt these difficulties. He avoided them (III. 9. 3) by referring the bestowal of the Spirit at baptism merely to the man Jesus, and thus gave his own approval to that separation which appeared to him so reprehensible in the Gnostics.[⁶⁰⁶] This separation indeed rescued to future ages the minimum of humanity that was to be retained in the person of Christ, but at the same time it laid the foundation of those differentiating speculations, which in succeeding times became the chief art and subject of dispute among theologians. The fact is that one cannot think in realistic fashion of the "deus homo factus" without thinking oneself out of it. It is exceedingly instructive to find that, in some passages, even a man like Irenæus was obliged to advance from the creed of the one God-man to the assumption of two independent existences in Christ, an assumption which in the earlier period has only "Gnostic" testimony in its favour. Before Irenæus' day, in fact, none but these earliest theologians taught that Jesus Christ had two natures, and ascribed to them particular actions and experiences. The Gnostic distinction of the Jesus patibilis ("capable of suffering") and the Christ απαθης ("impassible") is essentially identical with the view set forth by Tertullian adv. Prax., and this proves that the doctrine of the two natures is simply nothing else than the Gnostic, i.e., scientific, adaptation of the formula: "filius dei filius hominis factus." No doubt the old early-Christian interest still makes itself felt in the assertion of the one person. Accordingly we can have no historical understanding of Tertullian's Christology or even of that of Irenæus without taking into account, as has not yet been done, the Gnostic distinction of Jesus and Christ, as well as those old traditional formulæ: "deus passus, deus crucifixus est" ("God suffered, God was crucified").[⁶⁰⁷]

But beyond doubt the prevailing conception of Christ in Irenæus is the idea that there was the most complete unity between his divine and human natures; for it is the necessary consequence of his doctrine of redemption, that "Jesus Christus factus est, quod sumus nos, uti nos perficeret esse quod et ipse"[⁶⁰⁸] ("Jesus Christ became what we are in order that we might become what he himself is"). But, in accordance with the recapitulation theory, Irenæus developed the "factus est quod sumus nos" in such a way that the individual portions of the life of Christ, as corresponding to what we ought to have done but did not do, receive the value of saving acts culminating in the death on the cross. Thus he not only regards Jesus Christ as "salvation and saviour and saving" ("salus et salvator et salutare"),[⁶⁰⁹] but he also views his whole life as a work of salvation. All that has taken place between the conception and the ascension is an inner necessity in this work of salvation. This is a highly significant advance beyond the conception of the Apologists. Whilst in their case the history of Jesus seems to derive its importance almost solely from the fulfilment of prophecy, it acquires in Irenæus an independent and fundamental significance. Here also we recognise the influence of "Gnosis," nay, in many places he uses the same expressions as the Gnostics, when he sees salvation accomplished, on the one hand, in the mere appearance of Jesus Christ as the second Adam, and on the other, in the simple acknowledgment of this appearance.[⁶¹⁰] But he is distinguished from them by the fact that he decidedly emphasises the personal acts of Jesus, and that he applies the benefits of Christ's work not to the "pneumatic" ipso facto, but in principle to all men, though practically only to those who listen to the Saviour's words and adorn themselves with works of righteousness.[⁶¹¹] Irenæus presented this work of Christ from various points of view. He regards it as the realisation of man's original destiny, that is, being in communion with God, contemplating God, being imperishable like God; he moreover views it as the abolition of the consequences of Adam's disobedience, and therefore as the redemption of men from death and the dominion of the devil; and finally he looks upon it as reconciliation with God. In all these conceptions Irenæus fell back upon the person of Christ. Here, at the same time, he is everywhere determined by the content of Biblical passages; in fact it is just the New Testament that leads him to these considerations, as was first the case with the Valentinians before him. How uncertain he still is as to their ecclesiastical importance is shown by the fact that he has no hesitation in reckoning the question, as to why the Word of God became flesh and suffered, among the articles that are a matter of consideration for science, but not for the simple faith (I. 10. 3). Here, therefore, he still maintains the archaic standpoint according to which it is sufficient to adhere to the baptismal confession and wait for the second coming of Christ along with the resurrection of the body. On the other hand, Irenæus did not merely confine himself to describing the fact of redemption, its content and its consequences; but he also attempted to explain the peculiar nature of this redemption from the essence of God and the incapacity of man, thus solving the question "cur deus homo" in the highest sense.[⁶¹²] Finally, he adopted from Paul the thought that Christ's real work of salvation consists in his death on the cross; and so he tried to amalgamate the two propositions, "filius dei filius hominis factus est propter nos" ("the Son of God became Son of man for us") and "filius dei passus est propter nos" ("the Son of God suffered for us") as the most vital ones. He did not, however, clearly show which of these doctrines is the more important. Here the speculation of Irenæus is already involved in the same ambiguity as was destined to be the permanent characteristic of Church speculation as to Christ's work in succeeding times. For on the one hand, Paul led one to lay all the emphasis on the death on the cross, and on the other, the logical result of dogmatic thinking only pointed to the appearance of God in the flesh, but not to a particular work of Christ that had not been already involved in the appearance of the Divine Teacher himself. Still, Irenæus contrived to reconcile the discrepancy better than his successors, because, being in earnest with his idea of Christ as the second Adam, he was able to contemplate the whole life of Jesus as redemption in so far as he conceived it as a recapitulation. We see this at once not only from his conception of the virgin birth as a fact of salvation, but also from his way of describing redemption as deliverance from the devil. For, as the birth of Christ from the Virgin Mary is the recapitulating counterpart of Adam's birth from the virgin earth, and as the obedience of the mother of Jesus is the counterpart of Eve's disobedience, so the story of Jesus' temptation is to him the recapitulating counterpart of the story of Adam's temptation. In the way that Jesus overcame the temptation by the devil (Matt. IV.) Irenæus already sees the redemption of mankind from Satan; even then Jesus bound the strong one. But, whereas the devil seized upon man unlawfully and deceitfully, no injustice, untruthfulness, or violence is displayed in the means by which Jesus resisted Satan's temptation.[⁶¹³] As yet Irenæus is quite as free from the thought that the devil has real rights upon man, as he is from the immoral idea that God accomplished his work of redemption by an act of deceit. But, on the strength of Pauline passages, many of his teachings rather view redemption from the devil as accomplished by the death of Christ, and accordingly represent this death as a ransom paid to the "apostasy" for men who had fallen into captivity. He did not, however, develop this thought any further.[⁶¹⁴]

His idea of the reconciliation of God is just as rudimentary, and merely suggested by Biblical passages. He sometimes saw the means of reconciliation solely in obedience and in the "righteous flesh" as such, at other times in the "wood." Here also the recapitulation theory again appears: through disobedience at the tree Adam became a debtor to God, and through obedience at the tree God is reconciled.[⁶¹⁵] But teachings as to vicarious suffering on the part of Christ are not found in Irenæus, and his death is seldom presented from the point of view of a sacrifice offered to God.[⁶¹⁶] According to this author the reconciliation virtually consists in Christ's restoring man to communion and friendship with God and procuring forgiveness of sins; he very seldom speaks of God being offended through Adam's sin (V. 16. 3). But the incidental mention of the forgiveness of sins resulting from the redemption by Christ has not the meaning of an abolition of sin. He connects the redemption with this only in the form of Biblical and rhetorical phrases; for the vital point with him is the abolition of the consequences of sin, and particularly of the sentence of death.[⁶¹⁷] Here we have the transition to the conception of Christ's work which makes this appear more as a completion than as a restoration. In this connection Irenæus employed the following categories: restoring of the likeness of God in humanity; abolition of death; connection and union of man with God; adoption of men as sons of God and as gods; imparting of the Spirit who now becomes accustomed to abide with men;[⁶¹⁸] imparting of a knowledge of God culminating in beholding him; bestowal of everlasting life. All these are only the different aspects of one and the same blessing, which, being of a divine order, could only be brought to us and implanted in our nature by God himself. But inasmuch as this view represents Christ not as performing a reconciling but a perfecting work, his acts are thrust more into the background; his work is contained in his constitution as the God-man. Hence this work has a universal significance for all men, not only as regards the present, but as regards the past from Adam downwards, in so far as they "according to their virtue in their generation have not only feared but also loved God, and have behaved justly and piously towards their neighbours, and have longed to see Christ and to hear his voice."[⁶¹⁹] Those redeemed by Jesus are immediately joined by him into a unity, into the true humanity, the Church, whose head he himself is.[⁶²⁰] This Church is the communion of the Sons of God, who have attained to a contemplation of him and have been gifted with everlasting life. In this the work of Christ the God-man is fulfilled.

In Tertullian and Hippolytus, as the result of New Testament exegesis, we again find the same aspects of Christ's work as in Irenæus, only with them the mystical form of redemption recedes into the background.[⁶²¹]

Nevertheless the eschatology as set forth by Irenæus in the fifth Book by no means corresponds to this conception of the work of Christ as a restoring and completing one; it rather appears as a remnant of antiquity directly opposed to the speculative interpretation of redemption, but protected by the regula fidei, the New Testament, especially Revelation, and the material hopes of the great majority of Christians. But it would be a great mistake to assume that Irenæus merely repeated the hopes of an earthly kingdom just because he still found them in tradition, and because they were completely rejected by the Gnostics and guaranteed by the regula and the New Testament.[⁶²²] The truth rather is that he as well as Melito, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Lactantius, Commodian, and Victorinus lived in these hopes no less than did Papias, the Asia Minor Presbyters and Justin.[⁶²³] But this is the clearest proof that all these theologians were but half-hearted in their theology, which was forced upon them, in defence of the traditional faith, by the historical situation in which they found themselves. The Christ, who will shortly come to overcome Antichrist, overthrow the Roman empire, establish in Jerusalem a kingdom of glory, and feed believers with the fat of a miraculously fruitful earth, is in fact a quite different being from the Christ who, as the incarnate God, has already virtually accomplished his work of imparting perfect knowledge and filling mankind with divine life and incorruptibility. The fact that the old Catholic Fathers have both Christs shows more clearly than any other the middle position that they occupy between the acutely hellenised Christianity of the theologians, i.e., the Gnostics, and the old tradition of the Church. We have indeed seen that the twofold conception of Christ and his work dates back to the time of the Apostles, for there is a vast difference between the Christ of Paul and the Christ of the supposedly inspired Jewish Apocalypses; and also that the agency in producing this conjunction may be traced back to the oldest time; but the union of a precise Christological Gnosis, such as we find in Irenæus and Tertullian, with the retention in their integrity of the imaginative series of thoughts about Antichrist, Christ as the warrior hero, the double resurrection, and the kingdom of glory in Jerusalem, is really a historical novelty. There is, however, no doubt that the strength of the old Catholic theology in opposition to the Gnostics lies in the accomplishment of this union, which, on the basis of the New Testament, appeared to the Fathers possible and necessary. For it is not systematic consistency that secures the future of a religious conception within a church, but its elasticity, and its richness in dissimilar trains of thought. But no doubt this must be accompanied by a firm foundation, and this too the old Catholic Fathers possessed—the church system itself.

As regards the details of the eschatological hopes, they were fully set forth by Irenæus himself in Book V. Apart from the belief that the returning Nero would be the Antichrist, an idea spread in the West during the third century by the Sibylline verses and proved from Revelation, the later teachers who preached chiliastic hopes did not seriously differ from the Gallic bishop; hence the interpretation of Revelation is in its main features the same. It is enough therefore to refer to the fifth Book of Irenæus.[⁶²⁴] There is no need to show in detail that chiliasm leads to a peculiar view of history, which is as much opposed to that resulting from the Gnostic theory of redemption, as this doctrine itself forbids the hope of a bliss to be realised in an earthly kingdom of glory. This is not the proper place to demonstrate to what extent the two have been blended, and how the chiliastic scheme of history has been emptied of its content and utilised in the service of theological apologetics.

But the Gnostics were not the only opponents of chiliasm. Justin, even in his time, knew orthodox Christians who refused to believe in an earthly kingdom of Christ in Jerusalem, and Irenæus (V. 33 ff.), Tertullian, and Hippolytus[⁶²⁵] expressly argued against these. Soon after the middle of the second century, we hear of an ecclesiastical party in Asia Minor, which not only repudiated chiliasm, but also rejected the Revelation of John as an untrustworthy book, and subjected it to sharp criticism. These were the so-called Alogi.[⁶²⁶] But in the second century such Christians were still in the minority in the Church. It was only in the course of the third century that chiliasm was almost completely ousted in the East. This was the result of the Montanistic controversy and the Alexandrian theology. In the West, however, it was only threatened. In this Church the first literary opponent of chiliasm and of the Apocalypse appears to have been the Roman Presbyter Caius. But his polemic did not prevail. On the other hand the learned bishops of the East in the third century used their utmost efforts to combat and extirpate chiliasm. The information given to us by Eusebius (H. E. VII. 24), from the letters of Dionysius of Alexandria, about that father's struggles with whole communities in Egypt, who would not give up chiliasm, is of the highest interest. This account shews that wherever philosophical theology had not yet made its way the chiliastic hopes were not only cherished and defended against being explained away, but were emphatically regarded as Christianity itself.[⁶²⁷] Cultured theologians were able to achieve the union of chiliasm and religious philosophy; but the "simplices et idiotæ" could only understand the former. As the chiliastic hopes were gradually obliged to recede in exactly the same proportion as philosophic theology became naturalised, so also their subsidence denotes the progressive tutelage of the laity. The religion they understood was taken from them, and they received in return a faith they could not understand; in other words, the old faith and the old hopes decayed of themselves and the authority of a mysterious faith took their place. In this sense the extirpation or decay of chiliasm is perhaps the most momentous fact in the history of Christianity in the East. With chiliasm men also lost the living faith in the nearly impending return of Christ, and the consciousness that the prophetic spirit with its gifts is a real possession of Christendom. Such of the old hopes as remained were at most particoloured harmless fancies which, when allowed by theology, were permitted to be added to dogmatics. In the West, on the contrary, the millennial hopes retained their vigour during the whole third century; we know of no bishop there who would have opposed chiliasm. With this, however, was preserved a portion of the earliest Christianity which was to exercise its effects far beyond the time of Augustine.

Finally, we have still to treat of the altered conceptions regarding the Old Testament which the creation of the New produced among the early-Catholic Fathers. In the case of Barnabas and the Apologists we became acquainted with a theory of the Old Testament which represented it as the Christian book of revelation and accordingly subjected it throughout to an allegorical process. Here nothing specifically new could be pointed out as having been brought by Christ. Sharply opposed to this conception was that of Marcion, according to which the whole Old Testament was regarded as the proclamation of a Jewish God hostile to the God of redemption. The views of the majority of the Gnostics occupied a middle position between the two notions. These distinguished different components of the Old Testament, some of which they traced to the supreme God himself and others to intermediate and malevolent beings. In this way they both established a connection between the Old Testament, and the Christian revelation and contrived to show that the latter contained a specific novelty. This historico-critical conception, such as we specially see it in the epistle of Ptolemy to Flora, could not be accepted by the Church because it abolished strict monotheism and endangered the proof from prophecy. No doubt, however, we already find in Justin and others the beginning of a compromise, in so far as a distinction was made between the moral law of nature contained in the Old Testament—the Decalogue—and the ceremonial law; and in so far as the literal interpretation of the latter, for which a pedagogic significance was claimed, was allowed in addition to its typical or Christian sense. With this theory it was possible, on the one hand, to do some sort of justice to the historical position of the Jewish people, and on the other, though indeed in a meagre fashion, to give expression to the novelty of Christianity. The latter now appears as the new law or the law of freedom, in so far as the moral law of nature had been restored in its full purity without the burden of ceremonies, and a particular historical relation to God was allowed to the Jewish nation, though indeed more a wrathful than a covenant one. For the ceremonial regulations were conceived partly as tokens of the judgment on Israel, partly as concessions to the stiffneckedness of the people in order to protect them from the worst evil, polytheism.

Now the struggle with the Gnostics and Marcion, and the creation of a New Testament had necessarily a double consequence. On the one hand, the proposition that the "Father of Jesus Christ is the creator of the world and the God of the Old Testament" required the strictest adherence to the unity of the two Testaments, so that the traditional apologetic view of the older book had to undergo the most rigid development; on the other hand, as soon as the New Testament was created, it was impossible to avoid seeing that this book was superior to the earlier one, and thus the theory of the novelty of the Christian doctrine worked out by the Gnostics and Marcion had in some way or other to be set forth and demonstrated. We now see the old Catholic Fathers engaged in the solution of this twofold problem; and their method of accomplishing it has continued to be the prevailing one in all Churches up to the present time, in so far as the ecclesiastical and dogmatic practice still continues to exhibit the inconsistencies of treating the Old Testament as a Christian book in the strict sense of the word and yet elevating the New above it, of giving a typical interpretation to the ceremonial law and yet acknowledging that the Jewish people had a covenant with God.

With regard to the first point, viz., the maintenance of the unity of the two Testaments, Irenæus and Tertullian gave a most detailed demonstration of it in opposition to Marcion,[⁶²⁸] and primarily indeed with the same means as the older teachers had already used. It is Christ that prophesied and appeared in the Old Testament; he is the householder who produced both Old and New Testaments.[⁶²⁹] Moreover, as the two have the same origin, their meaning is also the same. Like Barnabas the early Catholic Fathers contrived to give all passages in the Old Testament a typical Christian sense: it is the same truth which we can learn from the prophets and again from Christ and the Apostles. With regard to the Old Testament the watchword is: "Seek the type" ("Typum quæras").[⁶³⁰] But they went a step further still. In opposition to Marcion's antitheses and his demonstration that the God of the Old Testament is a petty being and has enjoined petty, external observances, they seek to show in syntheses that the same may be said of the New. (See Irenæus IV. 21-36). The effort of the older teachers to exclude everything outward and ceremonial is no longer met with to the same extent in Irenæus and Tertullian, at least when they are arguing and defending their position against the Gnostics. This has to be explained by two causes. In the first place Judaism (and Jewish Christianity) was at bottom no longer an enemy to be feared; they therefore ceased to make such efforts to avoid the "Jewish" conception of the Old Testament. Irenæus, for example, emphasised in the most naïve manner the observance of the Old Testament law by the early Apostles and also by Paul. This is to him a complete proof that they did not separate the Old Testament God from the Christian Deity.[⁶³¹] In connection with this we observe that the radical antijudaism of the earliest period more and more ceases. Irenæus and Tertullian admitted that the Jewish nation had a covenant with God and that the literal interpretation of the Old Testament was justifiable. Both repeatedly testified that the Jews had the right doctrine and that they only lacked the knowledge of the Son. These thoughts indeed do not attain clear expression with them because their works contain no systematic discussions involving these principles. In the second place the Church itself had become an institution where sacred ceremonial injunctions were necessary; and, in order to find a basis for these, they had to fall back on Old Testament commandments (see Vol. I., chap. 6, p. 291 ff.). In Tertullian we find this only in its most rudimentary form;[⁶³²] but in the course of the third century these needs grew mightily[⁶³³] and were satisfied. In this way the Old Testament threatened to become an authentic book of revelation to the Church, and that in a quite different and much more dangerous sense than was formerly the case with the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists.

With reference to the second point, we may remark that just when the decay of antijudaism, the polemic against Marcion, and the new needs of the ecclesiastical system threatened the Church with an estimate of the Old Testament hitherto unheard of, the latter was nevertheless thrust back by the creation and authority of the New Testament, and this consequently revived the uncertain position in which the sacred book was henceforth to remain. Here also, as in every other case, the development in the Church ends with the complexus oppositorum, which nowhere allows all the conclusions to be drawn, but offers the great advantage of removing every perplexity up to a certain point. The early-Catholic Fathers adopted from Justin the distinction between the Decalogue, as the moral law of nature, and the ceremonial law; whilst the oldest theologians (the Gnostics) and the New Testament suggested to them the thought of the (relative) novelty of Christianity and therefore also of the New Testament. Like Marcion they acknowledged the literal sense of the ceremonial law and God's covenant with the Jews; and they sought to sum up and harmonise all these features in the thought of an economy of salvation and of a history of salvation. This economy and history of salvation which contained the conception of a divine accommodation and pedagogy, and which accordingly distinguished between constituent parts of different degrees of value (in the Old Testament also), is the great result presented in the main work of Irenæus and accepted by Tertullian. It is to exist beside the proof from prophecy without modifying it;[⁶³⁴] and thus appears as something intermediate between the Valentinian conception that destroyed the unity of origin of the Old Testament and the old idea which neither acknowledged various constituents in the book nor recognised the peculiarities of Christianity. We are therefore justified in regarding this history of salvation approved by the Church, as well as the theological propositions of Irenæus and Tertullian generally, as a Gnosis "toned down" and reconciled with Monotheism. This is shown too in the faint gleam of a historical view that still shines forth from this "history of salvation" as a remnant of that bright light which may be recognised in the Gnostic conception of the Old Testament.[⁶³⁵] Still, it is a striking advance that Irenæus has made beyond Justin and especially beyond Barnabas. No doubt it is mythological history that appears in this history of salvation and the recapitulating story of Jesus with its saving facts that is associated with it; and it is a view that is not even logically worked out, but ever and anon crossed by the proof from prophecy; yet for all that it is development and history.

The fundamental features of Irenæus' conception are as follow: The Mosaic law and the New Testament dispensation of grace both emanated from one and the same God, and were granted for the salvation of the human race in a form appropriate to the times.[⁶³⁶] The two are in part different; but the difference must be conceived as due to causes[⁶³⁷] that do not affect the unity of the author and of the main points.[⁶³⁸] We must make the nature of God and the nature of man our point of departure. God is always the same, man is ever advancing towards God; God is always the giver, man always the receiver;[⁶³⁹] God leads us ever to the highest goal; man, however, is not God from the beginning, but is destined to incorruptibility, which he is to attain step by step, advancing from the childhood stage to perfection (see above, p. 267 f.). This progress, conditioned by the nature and destination of man, is, however, dependent on the revelation of God by his Son, culminating in the incarnation of the latter and closing with the subsequent bestowal of the Spirit on the human race. In Irenæus therefore the place of the many different revelation-hypostases of the Valentinians is occupied by the one God, who stoops to the level of developing humanity, accommodates himself to it, guides it, and bestows on it increasing revelations of grace.[⁶⁴⁰] The fundamental knowledge of God and the moral law of nature, i.e., natural morality, were already revealed to man and placed in his heart[⁶⁴¹] by the creator. He who preserves these, as for example the patriarchs did, is justified. (In this case Irenæus leaves Adam's sin entirely out of sight). But it was God's will to bring men into a higher union with himself; wherefore his Son descended to men from the beginning and accustomed himself to dwell among them. The patriarchs loved God and refrained from injustice towards their neighbours; hence it was not necessary that they should be exhorted with the strict letter of the law, since they had the righteousness of the law in themselves.[⁶⁴²] But, as far as the great majority of men are concerned, they wandered away from God and fell into the sorriest condition. From this moment Irenæus, keeping strictly to the Old Testament, only concerns himself with the Jewish people. These are to him the representatives of humanity. It is only at this period that the training of the human race is given to them; but it is really the Jewish nation that he keeps in view, and through this he differs very decidedly from such as Barnabas.[⁶⁴³] When righteousness and love to God died out in Egypt, God led his people forth so that man might again become a disciple and imitator of God. He gave him the written law (the Decalogue), which contains nothing else than the moral law of nature that had fallen into oblivion.[⁶⁴⁴] But when they made to themselves a golden calf and chose to be slaves rather than free men, then the Word, through the instrumentality of Moses, gave to them, as a particular addition, the commandments of slavery (the ceremonial law) in a form suitable for their training. These were bodily commandments of bondage which did not separate them from God, but held them in the yoke. The ceremonial law was thus a pedagogic means of preserving the people from idolatry; but it was at the same time a type of the future. Each constituent of the ceremonial law has this double signification, and both of these meanings originate with God, i.e., with Christ; for "how is Christ the end of the law, if he be not the beginning of it?" ("quomodo finis legis Christus, si non et initium eius esset") IV. 12. 4. Everything in the law is therefore holy, and moreover we are only entitled to blame such portions of the history of the Jewish nation as Holy Scripture itself condemns. This nation was obliged to circumcise itself, keep Sabbaths, offer up sacrifices, and do whatever is related of it, so far as its action is not censured. All this belonged to the state of bondage in which men had a covenant with God and in which they also possessed the right faith in the one God and were taught before hand to follow his Son (IV. 12, 5; "lex prædocuit hominem sequi oportere Christum"). In addition to this, Christ continually manifested himself to the people in the prophets, through whom also he indicated the future and prepared men for his appearance. In the prophets the Son of God accustomed men to be instruments of the Spirit of God and to have fellowship with the Father in them; and in them he habituated himself to enter bodily into humanity.[⁶⁴⁵] Hereupon began the last stage, in which men, being now sufficiently trained, were to receive the "testamentum libertatis" and be adopted as Sons of God. By the union of the Son of God with the flesh the agnitio filii first became possible to all; that is the fundamental novelty. The next problem was to restore the law of freedom. Here a threefold process was necessary. In the first place the Law of Moses, the Decalogue, had been disfigured and blunted by the "traditio seniorum". First of all then the pure moral law had to be restored; secondly, it was now necessary to extend and fulfil it by expressly searching out the inclinations of the heart in all cases, thus unveiling the law in its whole severity; and lastly the particularia legis, i.e., the law of bondage, had to be abolished. But in the latter connection Christ and the Apostles themselves avoided every transgression of the ceremonial law, in order to prove that this also had a divine origin. The non-observance of this law was first permitted to the Gentile Christians. Thus, no doubt, Christ himself is the end of the law, but only in so far as he has abolished the law of bondage and restored the moral law in its whole purity and severity, and given us himself.

The question as to the difference between the New Testament and the Old is therefore answered by Irenæus in the following manner. It consists (1) in the agnitio filii and consequent transformation of the slaves into children of God; and (2) in the restoration of the law, which is a law of freedom just because it excludes bodily commandments, and with stricter interpretation lays the whole stress on the inclinations of the heart.[⁶⁴⁶] But in these two respects he finds a real addition, and hence, in his opinion, the Apostles stand higher than the prophets. He proves this higher position of the Apostles by a surprising interpretation of 1 Cor. XII. 28, conceiving the prophets named in that passage to be those of the Old Testament.[⁶⁴⁷] He therefore views the two Testaments as of the same nature, but "greater is the legislation which confers liberty than that which brings bondage" ("maior est legisdatio quæ in libertatem, quam quæ data est in servitutem"). Through the two covenants the accomplishment of salvation was to be hastened "for there is one salvation and one God; but the precepts that form man are numerous, and the steps that lead man to God are not a few;" ("una est enim salus et unus deus; quæ autem formant hominem, præcepta multa et non pauci gradus, qui adducunt hominem ad deum"). A worldly king can increase his benefits to his subjects; and should it not also be lawful for God, though he is always the same, to honour continually with greater gifts those who are well pleasing to him? (IV. 9. 3). Irenæus makes no direct statement as to the further importance which the Jewish people have, and in any case regards them as of no consequence after the appearance of the covenant of freedom. Nor does this nation appear any further even in the chiliastic train of thought. It furnishes the Antichrist and its holy city becomes the capital of Christ's earthly kingdom; but the nation itself, which, according to this theory, had represented all mankind from Moses to Christ, just as if all men had been Jews, now entirely disappears.[⁶⁴⁸]

This conception, in spite of its want of stringency, made an immense impression, and has continued to prevail down to the present time. It has, however, been modified by a combination with the Augustinian doctrine of sin and grace. It was soon reckoned as Paul's conception, to which in fact it has a distant relationship. Tertullian had already adopted it in its essential features, amplified it in some points, and, in accordance with his Montanist ideas, enriched it by adding a fourth stage (ab initio—Moses—Christ—Paraclete). But this addition was not accepted by the Church.[⁶⁴⁹]

3. Results to ecclesiastical Christianity.

As we have shown, Irenæus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus had no strictly systematised theology; they formulated theological propositions because their opponents were theologians. Hence the result of their labours, so far as this was accepted by the Western Church of the third century, does not appear in the adoption of a systematic philosophical dogmatic, but in theological fragments, namely, the rule of faith fixed and interpreted in an antignostic sense[⁶⁵⁰]. As yet the rule of faith and theology nowhere came into collision in the Western Churches of the third century, because Irenæus and his younger contemporaries did not themselves notice any such discrepancies, but rather imagined all their teachings to be expositions of the faith itself, and did not trouble their heads about inconsistencies. If we wish to form a notion as to what ideas had become universally prevalent in the Church in the middle of the third century let us compare Cyprian's work "Testimonia", written for a layman, with Novatian's work "De Trinitate".

In the "Testimonia" the doctrine of the two Testaments, as developed by Irenæus, forms the framework in which the individual dogmas are set. The doctrine of God, which should have been placed at the beginning, has been left out in this little book probably because the person addressed required no instruction on the point. Some of the dogmas already belong to philosophical theology in the strict sense of the word; in others we have merely a precise assertion of the truth of certain facts. All propositions are, however, supported by passages from the two Testaments and thereby proved.[⁶⁵¹] The theological counterpart to this is Novatian's work "De Trinitate". This first great Latin work that appeared in Rome is highly important. In regard to completeness, extent of Biblical proofs, and perhaps also its influence on succeeding times, it may in many respects be compared with Origen's work περι αρχων. Otherwise indeed it differs as much from that work, as the sober, meagre theology of the West, devoid of philosophy and speculation, differs in general from that of the East. But it sums up in classic fashion the doctrines of Western orthodoxy, the main features of which were sketched by Tertullian in his antignostic writings and the work against Praxeas. The old Roman symbol forms the basis of the work. In accordance with this the author gives a comprehensive exposition of his doctrine of God in the first eight chapters. Chapters 9-28 form the main portion; they establish the correct Christology in opposition to the heretics who look on Christ as a mere man or as the Father himself; the Holy Scriptures furnish the material for the proofs. Chapter 29 treats of the Holy Spirit. Chapters 30 and 31 contain the recapitulation and conclusion. The whole is based on Tertullian's treatise against Praxeas. No important argument in that work has escaped Novatian; but everything is extended, and made more systematic and polished. No trace of Platonism is to be found in this dogmatic; on the contrary he employs the Stoic and Aristotelian syllogistic and dialectic method used also by his Monarchian opponents. This plan together with its Biblical attitude gives the work great outward completeness and certainty. We cannot help concluding that this work must have made a deep impression wherever it was read, although the real difficulties of the matter are not at all touched upon, but veiled by distinctions and formulæ. It probably contributed not least to make Tertullian's type of Christology the universal Western one. This type, however, as will be set forth in greater detail hereafter, already approximates closely to the resolutions of Nicæa and Chalcedon.[⁶⁵²] Novatian adopted Tertullian's formulæ "one substance, three persons" ("una substantia, tres personæ"), "from the substance of God" ("ex substantia dei"), "always with the Father" ("semper apud patrem"), "God and man" ("deus et homo"), "two substances" ("duæ substantiæ"), "one person" ("una persona"), as well as his expressions for the union and separation of the two natures adding to them similar ones and giving them a wider extension.[⁶⁵³] Taking his book in all we may see that he thereby created for the West a dogmatic vademecum, which, from its copious and well-selected quotations from Scripture, must have been of extraordinary service.

The most important articles which were now fixed and transferred to the general creed along with the necessary proofs, especially in the West, were: (1) the unity of God, (2) the identity of the supreme God and the creator of the world, that is, the identity of the mediators of creation and redemption, (3) the identity of the supreme God with the God of the Old Testament, and the declaration that the Old Testament is God's book of revelation, (4) the creation of the world out of nothing, (5) the unity of the human race, (6) the origin of evil from freedom, and the inalienable nature of freedom, (7) the two Testaments, (8) Christ as God and Man, the unity of his personality, the truth of his divinity, the actuality of his humanity, the reality of his fate, (9) the redemption and conclusion of a covenant through Christ as the new and crowning manifestation of God's grace to all men, (10) the resurrection of man in soul and body. But the transmission and interpretation of these propositions, by means of which the Gnostic theses were overthrown, necessarily involved the transmission of the Logos doctrine; for the doctrine of the revelation of God and of the two Testaments could not have prevailed without this theory. How this hypothesis gained acceptance in the course of the third century, and how it was the means of establishing and legitimising philosophical theology as part of the faith, will be shown in the seventh chapter. We may remark in conclusion that the religious hope which looked forward to an earthly kingdom of Christ was still the more widely diffused among the Churches of the third century;[⁶⁵⁴] but that the other hope, viz., that of being deified, was gaining adherents more and more. The latter result was due to men's increasing indifference to daily life and growing aspiration after a higher one, a longing that was moreover nourished among the more cultured by the philosophy which was steadily gaining ground. The hope of deification is the expression of the idea that this world and human nature do not correspond to that exalted world which man has built up within his own mind and which he may reasonably demand to be realised, because it is only in it that he can come to himself. The fact that Christian teachers like Theophilus, Irenæus, and Hippolytus expressly declared this to be a legitimate Christian hope and held out a sure prospect of its fulfilment through Christ, must have given the greatest impulse to the spread and adoption of this ecclesiastical Christianity. But, when the Christian religion was represented as the belief in the incarnation of God and as the sure hope of the deification of man, a speculation that had originally never got beyond the fringe of religious knowledge was made the central point of the system and the simple content of the Gospel was obscured.[⁶⁵⁵]

Footnote 460:[ (return) ]

Authorities: The works of Irenæus (Stieren's and Harvey's editions), Melito (Otto, Corp. Apol. IX.), Tertullian (Oehler's and Reiflerscheid's editions), Hippolytus (Fabricius', Lagarde's, Duncker's and Schneidewin's editions), Cyprian (Hartel's edition), Novatian (Jackson). Biographies of Bohringer, Die Kirche Christi und ihre Zeugen, 1873 ff. Werner, Der Paulinismus des Irenäus, 1889. Nöldechen, Tertullian, 1890. Döllinger, "Hippolytus und Kallistus," 1853. Many monographs on Irenæus and Tertullian.

Footnote 461:[ (return) ]

The following exposition will show how much Irenæus and the later old Catholic teachers learned from the Gnostics. As a matter of fact the theology of Irenæus remains a riddle so long as we try to explain it merely from the Apologists and only consider its antithetical relations to Gnosis. Little as we can understand modern orthodox theology from a historical point of view—if the comparison be here allowed—without keeping in mind what it has adopted from Schleiermacher and Hegel, we can just as little understand the theology of Irenæus without taking into account the schools of Valentinus and Marcion.

Footnote 462:[ (return) ]

That Melito is to be named here follows both from Eusebius, H. E. V. 28. 5, and still more plainly from what we know of the writings of this bishop; see Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur, I. 1, 2, p. 24 ff. The polemic writings of Justin and the Antignostic treatise of that "ancient" quoted by Irenæus (see Patr. App. Opp. ed. Gebhardt etc. I. 2, p. 105 sq.) may in a certain sense be viewed as the precursors of Catholic literature. We have no material for judging of them with certainty. The New Testament was not yet at the disposal of their authors, and consequently there is a gap between them and Irenæus.

Footnote 463:[ (return) ]

See Eusebius, H. E. V. 13.

Footnote 464:[ (return) ]

Tertullian does indeed say in de præscr. 14: "Ceterum manente forma regulæ fidei in suo ordine quantumlibet quæras, et trades, et omnem libidinem curiositatis effundas, si quid tibi videtur vel ambiguitate pendere vel obscuritate obumbrari"; but the preceding exposition of the regula shows that scarcely any scope remained for the "curiositas," and the one that follows proves that Tertullian did not mean that freedom seriously.

Footnote 465:[ (return) ]

The most important point was that the Pauline theology, towards which Gnostics, Marcionites, and Encratites had already taken up a definite attitude, could now no longer be ignored. See Overbeck's Basler Univ.—Programm, 1877. Irenæus immediately shows the influence of Paulinism very clearly.

Footnote 466:[ (return) ]

See what Rhodon says about the issue of his conversation with Appelles in Euseb., H. E. V. 13. 7: εγω δε γελασας κατεγνων αυτου, διοτι δεδασκαλος ειναι λεγων ουν ηδει το διδασκομενον 'υπ' αυτου κρατυνειν.

Footnote 467:[ (return) ]

On the old "prophets and teachers" see my remarks on the Διδαχη, c. 11 ff., and the section, pp. 93-137, of the prolegomena to my edition of this work. The διδασκαλοι αποστολικοι και προφητικοι (Ep. Smyrn. ap. Euseb., H. E. IV. 15. 39) became lay-teachers who were skilful in the interpretation of the sacred traditions.

Footnote 468:[ (return) ]

In the case of Irenæus, as is well known, there was absolutely no consciousness of this, as is well remarked by Eusebius in H. E. V. 7. In support of his own writings, however, Irenæus appealed to no charisms.

Footnote 469:[ (return) ]

See the passage already quoted on p. 63, note 1.

Footnote 470:[ (return) ]

Irenæus and Tertullian scoffed at the Gnostic terminology in the most bitter way.

Footnote 471:[ (return) ]

Tertullian, adv. Prax. 3: "Simplices enim quique, ne dixerim imprudentes et idiotæ, quæ major semper credentium pars est, quoniam et ipsa regula fidei a pluribus diis sæculi ad unicum et verum deum transfert, non intellegentes unicum quidem, sed cum sua οικονομια esse credendum, expavescunt ad οικονομιαν." Similar remarks often occur in Origen. See also Hippol., c. Noet 11.

Footnote 472:[ (return) ]

The danger of speculation and of the desire to know everything was impressively emphasised by Irenæus, II. 25-28. As a pronounced ecclesiastical positivist and traditionalist, he seems in these chapters disposed to admit nothing but obedient and acquiescent faith in the words of Holy Scripture, and even to reject speculations like those of Tatian, Orat. 5. Cf. the disquisitions II. 25. 3: "Si autem et aliquis non invenerit causam omnium quæ requiruntur, cogitet, quia homo est in infinitum minor deo et qui ex parte (cf. II. 28.) acceperit gratiam et qui nondum æqualis vel similis sit factori"; II. 26. 1: Αμεινον και συμφορωτερον ιδιωτας και ολιγομαθεις 'υπαρχειν, και δια της αγαπης πλησιον γενεσθαι του Θεου η πολυμαθεις και εμπειρους δοκουντας ειναι, βλασφημους εις τον 'εαυτων 'ευρισκεσθαι δεσποτην, and in addition to this the close of the paragraph, II. 27. 1: Concerning the sphere within which we are to search (the Holy Scriptures and "quæ ante oculos nostros occurrunt", much remains dark to us even in the Holy Scriptures II. 28. 3); II. 28. 1 f. on the canon which is to be observed in all investigations, namely, the confident faith in God the creator, as the supreme and only Deity; II. 28. 2-7: specification of the great problems whose solution is hid from us, viz., the elementary natural phenomena, the relation of the Son to the Father, that is, the manner in which the Son was begotten, the way in which matter was created, the cause of evil. In opposition to the claim to absolute knowledge, i.e., to the complete discovery of all the processes of causation, which Irenæus too alone regards as knowledge, he indeed pointed out the limits of our perception, supporting his statement by Bible passages. But the ground of these limits, "ex parte accepimus gratiam," is not an early-Christian one, and it shows at the same time that the bishop also viewed knowledge as the goal, though indeed he thought it could not be attained on earth.

Footnote 473:[ (return) ]

The same observation applies to Tertullian, Cf. his point blank repudiation of philosophy in de præse. 7, and the use he himself nevertheless made of it everywhere.

Footnote 474:[ (return) ]

In point of form this standpoint is distinguished from the ordinary Gnostic position by its renunciation of absolute knowledge, and by its corresponding lack of systematic completeness. That, however, is an important distinction in favour of the Catholic Fathers. According to what has been set forth in the text I cannot agree with Zahn's judgment (Marcellus of Ancyra, p. 235 f.): "Irenæus is the first ecclesiastical teacher who has grasped the idea of an independent science of Christianity, of a theology which, in spite of its width and magnitude, is a branch of knowledge distinguished from others; and was also the first to mark out the paths of this science."

Footnote 475:[ (return) ]

Tertullian seems even to have had no great appreciation for the degree of systematic exactness displayed in the disquisitions of Irenæus. He did not reproduce these arguments at least, but preferred after considering them to fall back on the proof from prescription.

Footnote 476:[ (return) ]

The more closely we study the writings of Tertullian, the more frequently we meet with inconsistencies, and that in his treatment both of dogmatic and moral questions. Such inconsistencies could not but make their appearance, because Tertullian's dogmatising was only incidental. As far as he himself was concerned, he did not feel the slightest necessity for a systematic presentation of Christianity.

Footnote 477:[ (return) ]

With reference to certain articles of doctrine, however, Tertullian adopted from Irenæus some guiding principles and some points of view arising from the nature of faith; but he almost everywhere changed them for the worse. The fact that he was capable of writing a treatise like the de præscr. hæret., in which all proof of the intrinsic necessity and of the connection of his dogmas is wanting, shows the limits of his interests and of his understanding.

Footnote 478:[ (return) ]

Further references to Tertullian in a future volume. Tertullian is at the same time the first Christian individual after Paul, of whose inward life and peculiarities we can form a picture to ourselves. His writings bring us near himself, but that cannot be said of Irenæus.

Footnote 479:[ (return) ]

Consequently the spirit of Irenæus, though indeed strongly modified by that of Origen, prevails in the later Church dogmatic, whilst that of Tertullian is not to be traced there.

Footnote 480:[ (return) ]

The supreme God is the Holy and Redeeming One. Hence the identity of the creator of the world and the supreme God also denotes the unity of nature, morality, and revelation.

Footnote 481:[ (return) ]

What success the early-Christian writings of the second century had is almost completely unknown to us; but we are justified in saying that the five books "adv. hæreses" of Irenæus were successful, for we can prove the favourable reception of this work and the effects it had in the 3rd and 4th centuries (for instance, on Hippolytus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Victorinus, Marcellus of Ancyra, Epiphanius, and perhaps Alexander of Alexandria and Athanasius). As is well known, we no longer possess a Greek manuscript, although it can be proved that the work was preserved down to middle Byzantine times, and was quoted with respect. The insufficient Christological and especially the eschatological disquisitions spoiled the enjoyment of the work in later times (on the Latin Irenæus cf. the exhaustive examination of Loof: "The Manuscripts of the Latin translation of Irenæus", in the "Studies of Church History" dedicated to Reuter, 1887). The old Catholic works written against heretics by Rhodon, Melito, Miltiades, Proculus, Modestus, Musanus, Theophilus, Philip of Gortyna, Hippolytus, and others have all been just as little preserved to us as the oldest book of this kind, the Syntagma of Justin against heresies, and the Memorabilia of Hegesippus. If we consider the criticism to which Tatian's Christology was subjected by Arethas in the 10th century (Oratio 5; see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2 p. 95 ff.), and the depreciatory judgment passed on Chiliasm from the 3rd century downwards, and if we moreover reflect that the older polemical works directed against heretics were supplanted by later detailed ones, we have a summary of the reasons for the loss of that oldest Catholic literature. This loss indeed makes it impossible for us to form an exact estimate of the extent and intensity of the effect produced by any individual writing, even including the great work of Irenæus.

Footnote 482:[ (return) ]

People are fond of speaking of the "Asia Minor" theology of Irenæus, ascribe it already to his teachers, Polycarp and the presbyters, then ascend from these to the Apostle John, and complete, though not without hesitation, the equation: John—Irenæus. By this speculation they win simply everything, in so far as the Catholic doctrine now appears as the property of an "apostolic" circle, and Gnosticism and Antignosticism are thus eliminated. But the following arguments may be urged against this theory: (1) What we know of Polycarp by no means gives countenance to the supposition that Irenæus learned more from him and his fellows than a pious regard for the Church tradition and a collection of historical traditions and principles. (2) The doctrine of Irenæus cannot be separated from the received canon of New Testament writings; but in the generation before him there was as yet no such compilation. (3) The presbyter from whom Irenæus adopted important lines of thought in the 4th book did not write till after the middle of the second century. (4) Tertullian owes his Christocentric theology, so far as he has such a thing, to Irenæus (and Melito?).

Footnote 483:[ (return) ]

Marcion, as is well known, went still further in his depreciatory judgment of the world, and therefore recognised in the redemption through Christ a pure act of grace.

Footnote 484:[ (return) ]

See Molwitz, De Ανακεφαλαιωσεως in Irenæi theologia potestate, Dresden, 1874.

Footnote 485:[ (return) ]

See, e.g., the Epistle to the Ephesians and also the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians.

Footnote 486:[ (return) ]

But see the remark made above, p. 220, note 1. We might without loss give up the half of the Apologies in return for the preservation of Justin's chief Antignostic work.

Footnote 487:[ (return) ]

According to the Gnostic Christology Christ merely restores the status quo ante, according to that of Irenæus he first and alone realises the hitherto unaccomplished destination of humanity.

Footnote 488:[ (return) ]

According to the Gnostic conception the incarnation of the divine, i.e., the fall of Sophia, contains, paradoxically expressed, the element of sin; according to Irenæus' idea the element of redemption. Hence we must compare not only the Gnostic Christ, but the Gnostic Sophia, with the Christ of the Church. Irenæus himself did so in II. 20. 3.

Footnote 489:[ (return) ]

After tracing in II. 14 the origin of the Gnostic theologoumena to the Greek philosophers Irenæus continues § 7: "Dicemus autem adversus eos: utramne hi omnes qui prædicti sunt, cum quibus eadem dicentes arguimini (Scil. "ye Gnostics with the philosophers"), cognoverunt veritatem aut non cognoverunt? Et si quidem cognoverunt, superflua est salvatoris in hunc mundum descensio. Ut (lege "ad") quid enim descendebat?" It is characteristic of Irenæus not to ask what is new in the revelations of God (through the prophets and the Logos), but quite definitely: "Cur descendit salvator in hunc mundum?" See also lib. III. præf.: "veritas, hoc est dei filii doctrina", III. 10. 3: "Hæc est salutis agnitio quæ deerat eis, quæ est filii del agnitio ... agnitio salutis erat agnitio filii dei, qui et salus et salvator et salutare vere et dicitur et est." III. 11. 3: III. 12. 7: IV. 24.

Footnote 490:[ (return) ]

See II. 24. 3, 4: "Non enim ex nobis neque ex nostra natura vita est; sed secundum gratiam dei datur." Cf. what follows. Irenæus has in various places argued that human nature inclusive of the flesh is capax incorruptibilitatis, and likewise that immortality is at once a free gift and the realisation of man's destiny.

Footnote 491:[ (return) ]

Book V. pref.: "Iesus Christus propter immensam suam dilectionem factus est quod sumus nos, uti nos perficeret esse quod et ipse": III. 6. I: "Deus stetit in synagoga deorum ... de patre et filio et de his, qui adoptionem perceperunt, dicit: hi autem sunt ecclesia. Hæc enim est synagoga dei," etc.; see also what follows III. 16. 3: "Filius dei hominis filius factus, ut per eum adoptionem percipiamus portante homine et capiente et compleciente filium dei." III. 16. 6: "Dei verbum unigenitus, qui semper humano generi adest, unitus et consparsus suo plasmati secundum placitum patris et caro factus, ipse est Iesus Christus dominus noster ... unus Iesus Christus, veniens per universam dispositionem et omnia in semetipsum recapitulans. In omnibus autem est et homo plasmatio dei, et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis, et impassibilis passibilis, et verbum homo, universa in semetipsum recapitulans ... in semetipsum primatum assumens,.. universa attrahat ad semetipsum apto in tempore." III. 18. 1: "Quando incarnatus est filius homo et homo factus longam hominum expositionem in se ipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem præstans, ut quod perdideramus in Adam id est secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse dei, hoc in Christo Iesu reciperemus." Cf. the whole 18th chapter where the deepest thoughts of the Pauline Gnosis of the death on the cross are amalgamated with the Gnosis of the incarnation; see especially 18. 6, 7: "Ηνωσεν ουν τον ανθρωπον τω Θεω. Ει γαρ μη ανθρωπος ενικησεν την αντιπαλον του ανθρωπου, ουκ αν δικαιως ενικηθη 'ο εχθρος. Παλιν τε, ει μη 'ο Θεος εδωρησατο την σωτηριαν, ουκ αν βεβαιως εσχομεν αυτην. Και ει μη συνηνωθη 'ο ανθρωπος τω Θεω, ουκ αν ηδυνηθη μετασχειν της αφθαρσιας. Εδει γαρ τον μεσιτην Θεου τε και ανθρωπων δια της ιδιας προς 'εκατερους οικειοτητος εις φιλιαν και 'ομονοιαν τους αμφοτερους συναγωγειν; και Θεω μεν παραστησαι τον αντρωπον ανθρωποις δε γνωρισαι τον Θεον. Qua enim ratione filiorum adoptionis eius participes esse possemus, nisi per filium eam quæ est ad ipsura recepissemus ab eo communionem, nisi verbum eius communicasset nobis caro factum? Quapropter et per omnem venit ætatem, omnibus restituens eam quæ est ad deum communionem." The Pauline ideas about sin, law, and bondage are incorporated by Irenæus in what follows. The disquisitions in capp. 19-23 are dominated by the same fundamental idea. In cap. 19 Irenæus turns to those who hold Jesus to be a mere man, "perseverantes in servitute pristinæ inobedientiæ moriuntur, nondum commixti verbo dei patris neque per filium percipientes libertatem ... privantur munere eius, quod est vita æsterna: non recipientes autem verbum incorruptionis perseverant in carne mortali, et sunt debitores mortis, antidotum vitæ non accipientes. Ad quos verbum ait, suum munus gratiæ? narrans: Εγω ειπα, 'υιοι 'υψιστου εστε παντες και θεοι; 'υμεις δε 'ως ανθρωποι αποθνησκετε. Ταυτα λεγει προς τους μη δεξαμενους την δωρεαν της 'υιοθεσιας, αλλ' ατιμαζοντας την σαρκωσιν της καθαρας γεννησεως του λογου του Θεου ... Εις τουτο γαρ 'ο λογος ανθρωπος et qui filius dei est filius hominis factus est, 'ινα 'ο ανθρωπος τον λογον χωρησας και την 'υιοθεσιαν λαβων 'υιος γενηται Θεου. Non enim poteramus aliter incorruptelam et immortalitatem percipere, nisi adunati fuissemus incorruptelæ et immortalitati. Quemadmodum autem adunari possumus incorruptelæ et immortalitati, nisi prius incorruptela et immortalitas facta fuisset id quod et nos, ut absorbet*etur quod erat corruptibile ab incorruptela et quod erat mortale ab immortalitate, ut filiorum adoptionem perciperemus?" III. 21. 10: Ει τοινυν 'ο πρωτος Αδαμ εσχε πατερα ανθρωπον και εκ σπερματος εγεννηθη, εικος ην και δευτερον Αδαμ λεγειν εξ Ιωσηφ γεγεννησθαι. Ει δε εκεινος εκ γης εληφθη, πλαστης δε αυτου 'ο Θεος, εδει και τον ανακεφαλαιουμενον εις αυτον 'υπο του Θεου πεπλασμενον ανθρωπον την αυτην εκεινω της γεννησεως εχειν 'ομοιοτητα. Εις τι ουν παλιν ουκ ελαβε χουν 'ο Θεος, αλλ' εκ Μαριας ενηργησε την πλασιν γενεσθαι. 'Ινα μη αλλη πλασις γενηται μηδε αλλο το σωζομενον η, αλλ' αυτος εκεινος ανακεφαλαιωθη τηρουμενης της 'ομοιοτητος; III. 23. 1: IV. 38: V. 36: IV. 20: V. 16, 19-21, 22. In working out this thought Irenæus verges here and there on soteriological naturalism (see especially the disquisitions regarding the salvation of Adam, opposed to Tatian's views, in III. 23). But he does not fall into this for two reasons. In the first place, as regards the history, of Jesus, he has been taught by Paul not to stop at the incarnation, but to view the work of salvation as only completed by the sufferings and death of Christ (See II. 20. 3: "dominus per passionem mortem destruxit et solvit errorem corruptionemque exterminavit, et ignorantiam destruxit, vitam autem manifestavit et ostendit veritatem et incorruptionem donavit"; III. 16. 9: III. 18. 1-7 and many other passages), that is, to regard Christ as having performed a work. Secondly, alongside of the deification of Adam's children, viewed as a mechanical result of the incarnation, he placed the other (apologetic) thought, viz., that Christ, as the teacher, imparts complete knowledge, that he has restored, i.e., strengthened the freedom of man, and that redemption (by which he means fellowship with God) therefore takes place only in the case of those children of Adam that acknowledge the truth proclaimed by Christ and imitate the Redeemer in a holy life (V. 1. 1.: "Non enim aliter nos discere poteramus quæ sunt dei, nisi magister noster, verbum exsistens, homo factus fuisset. Neque enim alias poterat enarrare nobis, quæ sunt patris, nisi proprium ipsius verbum ... Neque rursus nos aliter discere poteramus, nisi magistrum nostrum videntes et per auditum nostrum vocem eius percipientes, ut imitatores quidem operum, factores autem sermonum eius facti, communionem habeamus cum ipso", and many other passages). We find a combined formula in III. 5. 3: "Christus libertatem hominibus restauravit et attribuit incorruptelæ hæreditatem."

Footnote 492:[ (return) ]

Theophilus also did not see further, see Wendt, l.c., 17 ff.

Footnote 493:[ (return) ]

Melito's teaching must have been similar. In a fragment attributed to him (see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2 p. 255 ff.) we even find the expression "'αι δυο ουσιαι Χριστου". The genuineness of the fragment is indeed disputed, but, as I think, without grounds. It is certainly remarkable that the formula is not found in Irenæus (see details below). The first Syriac fragment (Otto IX. p. 419) shows that Melito also views redemption as reunion through Christ.

Footnote 494:[ (return) ]

The conception of the stage by stage development of the economy of God and the corresponding idea of "several covenants" (I. 10. 3: III. 11-15 and elsewhere) denote a very considerable advance, which the Church teachers owe to the controversy with Gnosticism, or to the example of the Gnostics. In this case the origin of the idea is quite plain. For details see below.

Footnote 495:[ (return) ]

It would seem from some passages as if faith and theological knowledge were according to Irenæus simply related as the "is" and the "why." As a matter of fact, he did express himself so without being really able to maintain the relationship thus fixed; for faith itself must also to some extent include a knowledge of the reason and aim of God's ways of salvation. Faith and theological knowledge are therefore, after all, closely interwoven with each other. Irenæus merely sought for a clear distinction, but it was impossible for him to find it in his way. The truth rather is that the same man, who, in opposition to heresy, condemned an exaggerated estimate of theoretical knowledge, contributed a great deal to the transformation of that faith into a monistic speculation.

Footnote 496:[ (return) ]

See 1. 10. 2: Και ουτε 'ο πανυ δυνατος εν λογω των εν ταις εκκλησιαις προεστωτων τουτων (scil. than the regula sidei) επει ουδεις γαρ υπερ τον διδασκαλον ουτε 'ο ασθενης εν τω λογω ελαττωσει την παραδοσιν. Μιας γαρ και της αυτης πιστεως ουσης ουτε 'ο πολυ περι αυτης δυναμενος ειπειν επλεονασεν, ουτε 'ο το ολιγον ηλαττονησε.

Footnote 497:[ (return) ]

See Bohringer's careful reviews of the theology of Irenæus and Tertullian (Kirchengeschichte in Biographien, Vol. I. 1st section, 1st half (2nd ed.), pp. 378-612, 2nd half, pp. 484-739).

Footnote 498:[ (return) ]

To the proof from prescription belong the arguments derived from the novelty and contradictory multiplicity of the Gnostic doctrines as well as the proofs that Greek philosophy is the original source of heresy. See Iren. II. 14. 1-6; Tertull. de præscr. 7; Apolog. 47 and other places; the Philosophoumena of Hippolytus. On Irenæus' criticism of Gnostic theology see Kunze, Gotteslehre des Irenäus, Leipzig, 1891. p. 8 ff.

Footnote 499:[ (return) ]

See Irenæus II. 1. 2-4: II. 31. 1. Tertull., adv. Marc. I. 2-7. Tertullian proves that there can be neither two morally similar, nor two morally dissimilar Deities; see also I. 15.

Footnote 500:[ (return) ]

See Irenæus II. 13. Tertullian (ad Valent. 4) very appropriately defined the æons of Ptolemy as "personales substantias extra deum determinatas, quas Valentinus in ipsa summa divinitatis ut sensus et affectus motus incluserat."

Footnote 501:[ (return) ]

See Irenæus, l.c., and elsewhere in the 2nd Book, Tertull. adv. Valent. in several passages. Moreover, Irenæus still treated the first 8 Ptolemaic æons with more respect than the 22 following, because here at least there was some appearance of a Biblical foundation. In confuting the doctrine of æons he incidentally raised several questions (II. 17. 2), which Church theologians discussed in later times, with reference to the Son and Spirit. "Quæritur quemadmodum emissi sunt reliqui æones? Utrum uniti ei qui emiserit, quemadmodum a sole radii, an efficabiliter et partiliter, uti sit unusquisque eorum separatim et suam figurationem habens, quemadmodum ab homine homo ... Aut secundum germinationem, quemabmodum ab arbore rami? Et utrum eiusdem substantiæ exsistebant his qui se emiserunt, an ex altera quadam substantia substantiam habentes? Et utrum in eodem emissi sunt, ut eiusdem temporis essent sibi?... Et utrum simplices quidam et uniformes et undique sibi æquales et similes, quemadmodum spiritus et lumina emissa sunt, an compositi et differentes"? See also II. 17. 4: "Si autem velut a lumine lumina accensa sunt... velut verbi gratia a facula faculæ, generatione quidem et magnitudine fortasse distabunt ab invicem; eiusdem autem substantive cum sint cum principe emissionis ipsorum, aut omnes impassibiles perseverant aut et pater ipsorum participabit passiones. Neque enim quæ postea accensa est facula, alterum lumen habebit quam illud quod ante eam fuit." Here we have already a statement of the logical reasons, which in later times were urged against the Arian doctrine.

Footnote 502:[ (return) ]

See Iren. II. 17. 5 and II. 18.

Footnote 503:[ (return) ]

See Iren. II. 4. 2.

Footnote 504:[ (return) ]

Tertullian in particular argued in great detail (adv. Marc. I. 9-19) that every God must, above all, have revealed himself as a creator. In opposition to Marcion's rejection of all natural theology, he represents this science as the foundation of all religious belief. In this connection he eulogised the created world (I. 13) and at the same time (see also the 2nd Book) argued in favour of the Demiurge, i.e., of the one true God. Irenæus urged a series of acute and weighty objections to the cosmogony of the Valentinians (see II. 1-5), and showed how untenable was the idea of the Demiurge as an intermediate being. The doctrines that the Supreme Being is unknown (II. 6), that the Demiurge is the blind instrument of higher æons, that the world was created against the will of the Supreme God, and, lastly, that our world is the imperfect copy of a higher one were also opposed by him with rational arguments. His refutation of the last conception is specially remarkable (II. 7). On the idea that God did not create the world from eternal matter see Tertull., adv. Hermog.

Footnote 505:[ (return) ]

But this very method of argument was without doubt specially impressive in the case of the educated, and it is these alone of whom we are here speaking. On the decay of Gnosticism after the end of the 2nd century, see Renan, Origines, Vol. VII., p. 113 ff.

Footnote 506:[ (return) ]

See his arguments that the Gnostics merely assert that they have only one Christ, whereas they actually possess several, III. 16. 1, 8 and elsewhere.

Footnote 507:[ (return) ]

See Iren., I. 9 and elsewhere; Tertull., de præscr. 39, adv. Valent. passim.

Footnote 508:[ (return) ]

See Tertull., adv. Marc. II. 19, 21, 22: III. 5, 6, 14, 19: V. 1.; Orig. Comm. in Matth., T. XV. 3, Opp. III., p. 655: Comm. in ep. ad Rom., T. II. 12. Opp. IV., p. 494 sq.; Pseudo-Orig. Adamantius, De recta in deum fide; Orig. I. pp. 808, 817.

Footnote 509:[ (return) ]

For this reason Tertullian altogether forbade exegetic disputes with the Gnostics, see de præscr. 16-19: "Ego non ad scripturas provocandum est nec in his constituendum certamen, in quibus aut milla aut incerta victoria est aut parum certa."

Footnote 510:[ (return) ]

See Iren., III. 5. 1: III. 12. 6.

Footnote 511:[ (return) ]

See Iren., III. 14. 2: III. 15. 1; Tertull., de præscr. 25: "Scripturæ quidem perfectæ sunt, quippe a verbo dei et spiritu eius dictæ, nos autem secundum quod minores sumus et novissimi a verbo dei et spiritu eius, secundum hoc et scientia niysteriorum eius indigenus."

Footnote 512:[ (return) ]

See Iren. II. 35. 2: IV. 34, 35 and elsewhere. Irenæus also asserted that the translation of the Septuagint (III. 21. 4) was inspired. The repudiation of different kinds of inspiration in the Scriptures likewise involved the rejection of all the critical views of the Gnostics that were concealed behind that assumption. The Alexandrians were the first who again to some extent adopted these critical principles.

Footnote 513:[ (return) ]

See Iren. II. 10. 1: II. 27. 1, 2.

Footnote 514:[ (return) ]

See Iren. II. 25. I.

Footnote 515:[ (return) ]

Irenæus appropriates the words of an Asia Minor presbyter when he says (IV. 31. 1): "De his quidem delictis, de quibus ipsæ scripturæ increpant patriarchas et prophetas, nos non oportere exprobare eis ... de quibus autem scripturæ non inciepant (scil. delictis), sed simpliciter sunt positæ, nos non debere fieri accusatores, sed typum quærere."

Footnote 516:[ (return) ]

See, e.g., IV. 20. 12 where he declares the three spies whom Rahab entertained to be Father, Son. and Spirit.

Footnote 517:[ (return) ]

See Iren. IV. 22. 1.

Footnote 518:[ (return) ]

See Iren. III. 17. 3.

Footnote 519:[ (return) ]

Justin had already noted certain peculiarities of the Holy Scriptures as distinguished from profane writings. Tertullian speaks of two proprietates iudaicæ literaturæ in adv. Marc. III. 5. 6. But the Alexandrians were the first to propound any kind of complete theories of inspiration.

Footnote 520:[ (return) ]

See above p. 233, note 2, Kunze, l.c.

Footnote 521:[ (return) ]

See Iren, II. 26. 1, 13. 4: "Sic et in reliquis omnibus nulli similis erit omnium pater hominum pusillitati: et dicitur quidem secundum hæc propter delectionem, sentitur autem super hæc secundum magnitudinem." Irenæus expressly says that God cannot be known as regards his greatness, i.e. absolutely, but that he can be known as regards his love, IV. 20. 1: "Igitur secundum magnitudem non est cognoscere deum, impossibile est enim mensurari patrem; secundum autem dilectionem eius—hæc est enim quæ nos per verbum eius perducit ad deum—obedientes ei semper discimus quoniam est tantus deus etc."; in IV. 20. 4 the knowledge of God "secundum dilectionem" is more closely defined by the words "per verbum eius Iesum Christum." The statements in §§ 5 and 6 are, however, specially important: they who are pure in heart will see God. God's omnipotence and goodness remove the impossibility of man knowing him. Man comes to know him gradually, in proportion as he is revealed and through love, until he beholds him in a state of perfection. He must be in God in order to know God: 'ωσπερ 'οι βλεποντες το φως εντος εισι του φωτος και της λαμπροτητος αυτου μετεχουσιν, 'ουτως 'οι βλεποντες τον Θεον εντος εισι του Θεου, μετεχοντες αυτου της λαμπροτητος. Και δια τουτο 'ο αχωρητος και ακαταληπτος και αορατος 'ορωμενον 'εαυτον ... τοις πιστοις παρεσχεν, 'ινα ζωοποιηση τους χωρουντας και βλεποντας αυτον δια πιστεως. See also what follows down to the words: μετοχη Θεου εστι το γινωσκειν Θεον και απολαυειν της χρηστοτητος αυτου, et homines igitur videbunt deum, ut vivant, per visionem immortales facti et pertingentes usque in deum. Sentences of this kind where rationalism is neutralised by mysticism we seek for in Tertullian in vain.

Footnote 522:[ (return) ]

See Iren., IV. 6. 4: Εδιδαξεν 'ημας 'ο κυριος, 'οτι Θεον ειδεναι ουδεις δυναται, μη ουχι Θεου διδαξαντος, τουτεστιν, ανευ Θεου μη γινωσκεσθαι τον Θεον; αυτο δε το γινωσκεσθαι τον Θεον θελημα ειναι του πατρος, Γνωσονται γαρ αυτον 'οις αν αποκαλυψη 'ο 'υιος.

Footnote 523:[ (return) ]

Iren. II. 6. 1, 9. 1, 27. 2: III. 25. 1: "Providentiam habet deus omnium propter hoc et consilium dat: consilium autem dans adest his, qui morum providentiam habent. Necesse est igitur ea quæ providentur et gubernantur cognoscere suum directorem; quæ quidem non sunt irrationalia neque vana, sed habent sensibilitatem perceptam de providentia dei. Et propter hoc ethnicorum quidam, qui minus illecebris ac voluptatibus servierunt, et non in tantum superstitione idolorum coabducti sunt, providentia eius moti licet tenuiter, tamen conversi sunt, ut dicererit fabricatorem huiuss universitatis patrem omnium providentem et disponentem secundum nos mundum." Tertull., de testim. animæ; Apolog. 17.

Footnote 524:[ (return) ]

See Iren., IV. 6. 2; Tertull., adv. Marc. I, II.

Footnote 525:[ (return) ]

See Iren., V. 26. 2.

Footnote 526:[ (return) ]

See Iren., II. 1. I and the Hymn II. 30. 9.

Footnote 527:[ (return) ]

See Iren., III. 8. 3. Very pregnant are Irenæus' utterances in II. 34. 4 and II. 30. 9: "Principari enim debet in omnibus et dominari voluntas dei, reliqua autem omnia huic cedere et subdita esse et in servitium dedita" ... "substantia omnium voluntas dei;" see also the fragment V. in Harvey, Iren., Opp. II. p. 477 sq. Because everything originates with God and the existence of eternal metaphysical contrasts is therefore impossible the following proposition (IV. 2, 4), which is proved from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, holds, good: "ex una substantia esse omnia, id est Abraham et Moysem et prophetas, etiam ipsum dominum."

Footnote 528:[ (return) ]

See Iren. II. 28. 4, 5: IV. 11. 2.

Footnote 529:[ (return) ]

Tertullian also makes the same demand (e.g. adv. Marc. II. 27); for his assertion "deum corpus esse" (adv. Prax. 7: "Quis enim negabil, deum corpus esse, etsi deus spiritus est? spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie") must be compared with his realistic doctrine of the soul (de anima 6) as well as with the proposition formulated in de carne 11: "omne quod est, corpus est sui generis; nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est." Tertullian here followed a principle of Stoic philosophy, and in this case by no means wished to teach that the Deity has a human form, since he recognised that man's likeness to God consists merely in his spiritual qualities. On the contrary Melito ascribed to God a corporeal existence of a higher type (Eusebius mentions a work of this bishop under the title "'ο περι ενσωματου Θεου λογος,") and Origen reckoned him among the teachers who recognised that man had also a likeness to God in form (in body); see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1. 2, pp. 243, 248. In the second century the realistic eschatological ideas no doubt continued to foster in wide circles the popular idea that God had a form and a kind of corporeal existence. A middle position between these ideas and that of Tertullian and the Stoics seems to have been taken up by Lactantius (Instit. div. VII. 9, 21; de ira dei 2. 18.).

Footnote 530:[ (return) ]

See Iren., III. 25. 2; Tertull., adv. Marc. I. 23-28: II. 11 sq. Hippolytus briefly defined his doctrine of God in Phil. X. 32. The advance beyond the Apologists' idea of God consists not only in the thorough discussion of God's attributes of goodness and righteousness, but also in the view, which is now much more vigorously worked out, that the Almighty Creator has no other purpose in his world than the salvation of mankind. See the 10th Greek fragment of Irenæus (Harvey, II. p. 480); Tertull., de orat. 4: "Summa est voluntatis dei salus eorum, quos adoptavit"; de paenit. 2: "Bonorum dei unus est titulus, salus hominum"; adv. Marc. II. 27: "Nihil tam dignum deo quam salus hominis." They had here undeniably learned from Marcion; see adv. Marc. I. 17. In the first chapters of the work de orat., however, in which Tertullian expounds the Lord's Prayer, he succeeded in unfolding the meaning of the Gospel in a way such as was never possible for him elsewhere. The like remark may be made of Origen's work de orat., and, in general, in the case of most authors who interpreted the Lord's Prayer in the succeeding period. This prayer kept alive the knowledge of the deepest meaning of the Gospel.

Footnote 531:[ (return) ]

Apol. 21: "Necesse et igitur pauca de Christo ut deo ... Jam ediximus deum universitatem hanc mundi verbo et ratione et virtute molitum. Apud vestros quoque sapientes Λογον, id est sermonem et rationem, constat artificem videri universitatis." (An appeal to Zeno and Cleanthes follows). "Et nos autem sermoni atque rationi itemque virtuti, per quæ omnia molitum deum ediximus, propriam substantiam spiritum inscribimus, cui et sermo insit pronuntianti et ratio adsit disponenti et virtus præsit perficienti. Hunc ex deo prolatum didicimus et prolatione generatum et idcirco filium dei et deum dictum ex unitate substantiæ, nam et deus spiritus (that is, the antemundane Logos is the Son of God). Et cum radius ex sole porrigitur, portio ex summa; sed sol erit in radio, quia solis est radius nec separatur substantia sed extenditur (cf. adv. Prax. 8). Ita de spiritu spiritus et deo deus ut lumen de lumine accensum. Manet integra et indefecta materiæ matrix, etsi plures inde traduces qualitatis mutueris: ita et quod de deo profectum est, deus est et dei filius et unus ambo. Ita et de spiritu spiritus et de deo deus modulo alternum numerum, gradu non statu fecit, et a matrice non necessit sed excessit. Iste igitur dei radius, ut retro semper prædicabatur, delapsus in virginem quandam et in utero eius caro figuratus nascitur homo deo mixtus. Caro spiritu instructa nutritur, adolescit, adfatur, docet, operatur et Christus est." Tertullian adds: "Recipite interim hanc fabulam, similis est vestris." As a matter of fact the heathen must have viewed this statement as a philosophical speculation with a mythological conclusion. It is very instructive to ascertain that in Hippolytus' book against Noëtus "the setting forth of the truth" (c. 10 ff.) he begins with the proposition: Θεος εβουληθη κοσμον κτισαι. The Logos whose essence and working are described merely went forth to realise this intention.

Footnote 532:[ (return) ]

See Hagemann, Die römische Kirche (1864), p. 172 ff.

Footnote 533:[ (return) ]

See my detailed exposition of the orthodox side of Tertullian's doctrine of the Trinity ("orthodox" in the later sense of the word), in Vol. IV. There it is also shown that these formulæ were due to Tertullian's juristic bias. The formulæ, "una substantia, tres personæ", never alternates in his case with the others, "una natura, tres personæ"; and so it remained for a long time in the West; they did not speak of "natures" but of "substances" ("nature" in this connection is very rare down to the 5th century). What makes this remarkable is the fact that Tertullian always uses "substance" in the concrete sense "individual substance" and has even expressed himself precisely on the point. He says in de anima 32: "aliud est substantia, aliud natura substantiæ; siquidem substantia propria est rei cuiusque, natura vero potest esse communis. Suscipe exemplum: substantia est lapis, ferrum; duritia lapidis et ferri natura substantiæ est. Duritia (natura) communicat, substantia discordat. Mollitia lanæ, mollitia plumæ pariant naturalia eorum, substantiva non pariant ... Et tune naturæ similitudo notatur, cum substantiæ dissimilitudo conspicitur. Men and animals are similar natura, but not substantia." We see that Tertullian in so far as he designated Father, Son, and Spirit as one substance expressed their unity as strongly as possible. The only idea intelligible to the majority was a juristic and political notion, viz., that the Father, who is the tota substantia, sends forth officials whom he entrusts with the administration of the monarchy. The legal fiction attached to the concept "person" aided in the matter here.

Footnote 534:[ (return) ]

See adv. Prax. 3: "Igitur si et monarchia divina per tot legiones et exercitus angelorum administratur, sicut scriptum est: Milies centies centena milia adsistebant ei, et milies centena milia apparebant ei, nec ideo unius esse desiit, ut desinat monarchia esse, quia per tanta milia virtutum procuratur: quale est ut deus divisionem et dispersionem pati videatur in filio et spiritu sancto, secundum et tertium sortitis locum, tam consortibus substantiæ patris, quam non patitur in tot angelorum numero?" (!!) c. 4: "Videmus igitur non obesse monarchiæ filium, etsi hodie apud filium est, quia et in suo statu est apud filium, et cum suo statu restituetur patri a filio." L.c.: "Monarchia in tot nominibus constituta est, in quot deus voluit."

Footnote 535:[ (return) ]

See Hippol., c. Noetum II. According to these doctrines the unity is sufficiently preserved (1) if the separate persons have one and the same substance, (2) if there is one possessor of the whole substance, i.e., if everything proceeds from him. That this is a remnant of polytheism ought not to be disputed.

Footnote 536:[ (return) ]

Adv. Prax. 8: "Hoc si qui putaverit, me προβολην aliquam introducere id est prolationem rei alterius ex altera, quod facit Valentinus, primo quidem dicam tibi, non ideo non utatur et veritas vocabulo isto et re ac censu eius, quia et hæresis utitur; immo hæresis potius ex veritate accepit quod ad mendacium suum strueret"; cf. also what follows. Thus far then theologians had got already: "The economy is founded on as many names as God willed" (c. 4).

Footnote 537:[ (return) ]

See adv. Prax. 5.

Footnote 538:[ (return) ]

Tertull., adv. Hermog. 3: "fuit tempus, cum ei filius non fuit."

Footnote 539:[ (return) ]

Novatian (de trin. 23) distinguishes very decidedly between "factum esse" and "procedere".

Footnote 540:[ (return) ]

Adv. Prax. 2: "Custodiatur οικονομιας sacramentum, quæ unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens, tres autem non statu, sed gradu, nec substantia, sed forma, nec potestate, sed specie, unius autem substantiæ et unius status et potestatis."

Footnote 541:[ (return) ]

See the discussions adv. Prax. 16 ff.

Footnote 542:[ (return) ]

Tertull., adv. Marc. III. 6: "filius portio plenitudinis." In another passage Tertullian has ironically remarked in opposition to Marcion (IV. 39): "Nisi Marcion Christum non subiectum patri infert."

Footnote 543:[ (return) ]

Adv. Prax. 9.

Footnote 544:[ (return) ]

See the whole 14th chap. adv. Prax. especially the words: "I am ergo alius erit qui videbatur, quia non potest idem invisibilis definiri qui videbatur, et consequens erit, ut invisibilem patrem intellegamus pro plenitudine maiestatis, visibilem vero filium agnoscamus pro modulo derivationis." One cannot look at the sun itself, but, "toleramus radium eius pro temperatura portionis, quæ in terram inde porrigitur." The chapter also shows how the Old Testament theophanies must have given an impetus to the distinction between the Deity as transcendent and the Deity as making himself visible. Adv. Marc. II. 27: "Quæcunque exigitis deo digna, habebuntur in patre invisibili incongressibilique et placido et, ut ita dixerim, philosophorum deo. Quæcunque autem ut indigna reprehenditis, deputabuntur in filio et viso et audito et congresso, arbitro patris et ministro, miscente in semetipso hominem et deum in virtutibus deum, in pusillitatibus hominem, ut tantum homini conferat quantum deo detrahit." In adv. Prax. 29 Tertullian showed in very precise terms that the Father is by nature impassible, but the Son is capable of suffering. Hippolytus does not share this opinion; to him the Logos in himself is likewise απαθης (see c. Noetum 15).

Footnote 545:[ (return) ]

According to Tertullian it is certainly an essential part of the Son's nature to appear, teach, and thus come into connection with men; but he neither asserted the necessity of the incarnation apart from the faulty development of mankind, nor can this view be inferred from his premises.

Footnote 546:[ (return) ]

See adv. Prax. 4. the only passage, however, containing this idea, which is derived from 1 Cor. XV.

Footnote 547:[ (return) ]

Cf. specially the attempts of Plotinus to reconcile the abstract unity which is conceived as the principle of the universe with the manifoldness and fulness of the real and the particular (Ennead. lib. III.-V.). Plotinus employs the subsidiary notion μερισμος in the same way as Tertullian; see Hagemann l.c. p. 186 f. Plotinus would have agreed with Tertullian's proposition in adv. Marc. III. 15: "Dei nomen quasi naturale divinitatis potest in omnes communicari quibus divinitas vindicatur." Plotinus' idea of hypostasis is also important, and this notion requires exact examination.

Footnote 548:[ (return) ]

Following the baptismal confession, Tertullian merely treated the Holy Ghost according to the scheme of the Logos doctrine without any trace of independent interest. In accordance with this, however, the Spirit possesses his own "numerus"—"tertium numen divinitatis et tertium nomen maiestatis",—and he is a person in the same sense as the Son, to whom, however, he is subordinate, for the subordination is a necessary result of his later origin. See cc. 2, 8: "tertius est spiritus a deo et filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus a frutice, et tertius a fonte rivus a flumine et tertius a sole apex ex radio. Nihil tamen a matrice alienatur a qua proprietates suas ducit. Ita trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a patre decurrens et monarchiæ nihil obstrepit et οικονομιας statum protegit"; de pudic. 21. In de præscr. 13 the Spirit in relation to the Son is called "vicaria vis". The element of personality in the Spirit is with Tertullian merely a result arising from logical deduction; see his successor Novatian de trin. 29. Hippolytus did not attribute personality to the Spirit, for he says (adv. Noet. 14): 'Ενα Θεον ερω, προσωπα δε δυο, οικονομια δε τριτην την χαριν του 'αγιου πνευματος; πατηρ μεν γαρ εις, προσωπα δε δυο, 'οτι και 'ο 'υιος, το δε τριτον το 'αγιον πνευμα. In his Logos doctrine apart from the express emphasis he lays on the creatureliness of the Logos (see Philos. X. 33: Ει γαρ Θεον σε ηθελησε ποιησαι 'ο Θεος, εδυνατο; εχεις του λογου το παραδειγμα) he quite agrees with Tertullian. See ibid.; here the Logos is called before his coming forth "ενδιαθετος του παντος λογισμος"; he is produced εκ των οντων, i.e., from the Father who then alone existed; his essence is "that he bears in himself the will of him who has begotten him" or "that he comprehends in himself the ideas previously conceived by and resting in the Father." Cyprian in no part of his writings took occasion to set forth the Logos doctrine in a didactic way; he simply kept to the formula: "Christus deus et homo", and to the Biblical expressions which were understood in the sense of divinity and preëxistence; see Testim. II. 1-10. Lactantius was still quite confused in his Trinitarian doctrine and, in particular, conceived the Holy Ghost not as a person but as "sanctificatio" proceeding from the Father or from the Son. On the contrary, Novatian, in his work de trinitate reproduced Tertullian's views. For details see Dorner Entwickelungsgeschichte I. pp. 563-634, Kahnis, Lehre vom heiligen Geiste; Hagemann, l.c., p. 371 ff. It is noteworthy that Tertullian still very frequently called the preëxistent Christ dei spiritus; see de oral. I: "Dei spiritus et dei sermo et dei ratio, sermo rationis et ratio sermonis et spiritus, utrumque Iesus Christus." Apol. 21: adv. Prax. 26; adv. Marc. I. 10: III. 6, 16: IV. 21.

Footnote 549:[ (return) ]

See Zahn, Marcellus of Ancyra, pp. 235-244. Duncker, Des heiligen Irenaus Christologie, 1843.

Footnote 550:[ (return) ]

Zahn, l.c., p. 238.

Footnote 551:[ (return) ]

See Iren., II. 13. 8: II. 28. 4-9: II. 12. 2: II. 13. 2, and also the important passage II. 29. 3 fin.

Footnote 552:[ (return) ]

A great many passages clearly show that Irenæus decidedly distinguished the Son from the Father, so that it is absolutely incorrect to attribute modalistic ideas to him. See III. 6. 1 and all the other passages where Irenæus refers to the Old Testament theophanies. Such are III. 6. 2: IV. 5. 2 fin.: IV. 7. 4, where the distinction is particularly plain: IV. 17. 6: II. 28. 6.

Footnote 553:[ (return) ]

The Logos (Son) is the administrator and bestower of the divine grace as regards humanity, because he is the revealer of this grace, see IV. 6 (§ 7: "agnitio patris filius, agnitio autem filii in patre et per filium revelata"): IV. 5: IV. 16. 7: IV. 20. 7. He has been the revealer of God from the beginning and always remains so, III. 16. 6: IV. 13. 4 etc.: he is the antemundane revealer to the angel world, see II. 30. 9: "semper autem coëxsistens filius patri, olim et ab initio semper revelat patrem et angelis et archangelis et potestatibus et virtutibus et omnibus, quibus vult revelari deus;" he has always existed with the Father, see II. 30. 9: III. 18. 1: "non tunc cœpit filius dei, exsistens semper apud patrem"; IV. 20. 3, 7, 14. 1: II. 25. 3: "non enim infectus es, o homo, neque semper coëxsistebas deo, sicut proprium eius verbum." The Logos is God as God, nay, for us he is God himself, in so far as his work is the work of God. Thus, and not in a modalistic sense, we must understand passages like II. 30. 9: "fabricator qui fecit mundum per semitipsum, hoc est per verbum et per sapientiam suam," or hymnlike statements such as III. 16. 6: "et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis et impassibilis passibilis et verbum homo" (see something similar in Ignatius and Melito, Otto, Corp. Apolog. IX, p. 419 sq.). Irenæus also says in III. 6. 2: "filius est in patre et habet in se patrem," III. 6. 1.: "utrosque dei appellatione signavit spiritus, et eum qui ungitur filium et eum, qui ungit, id est patrem." He not only says that the Son has revealed the Father, but that the Father has revealed the Son (IV. 6. 3: IV. 7. 7). He applies Old Testament passages sometimes to Christ, sometimes to God, and hence in some cases calls the Father the creator, and in others the Son ("pater generis humani verbum dei", IV. 31. 2). Irenæus (IV. 4. 2) appropriated the expression of an ancient "immensum patrem in filio mensuratum; mensura enim patris filius, quoniam et capit eum." This expression is by no means intended to denote a diminution, but rather to signify the identity of Father and Son. In all this Irenæus adhered to an ancient tradition; but these propositions do not admit of being incorporated with a rational system.

Footnote 554:[ (return) ]

Logos and Sophia are the hands of God (III. 21. 10: IV. 20): also IV. 6. 6: "Invisibile filii pater, visibile autem patris filius." Judging from this passage, it is always doubtful whether Irenæus, like Tertullian, assumed that transcendency belonged to the Father in a still higher sense than to the Son, and that the nature of the Son was more adapted for entering the finite than that of the Father (on the contrary see IV. 20. 7 and especially IV. 24. 2: "verbum naturaliter quidem invisibile"). But it ought not to have been denied that there are passages, in which Irenæus hints at a subordination of the Son, and deduces this from his origin. See II. 28. 8 (the knowledge of the Father reaches further than that of the Son and the Father is greater than the Son); III. 6. 1 (the Son receives from the Father the sovereignty); IV. 17. 6 (a very important passage: the Father owns the name of Jesus Christ as his, first, because it is the name of his Son, and, secondly, because he gave it himself); V. 18. 21, 3 ("pater conditionem simul et verbum suum portans"—"verbum portatum a patre"—"et sic unus deus pater ostenditur, qui est super omnia et per omnia et in omnibus; super omnia pater quidem et ipse est caput Christi"—"verbum universorum potestatem habet a patre"). "This is not a subordination founded on the nature of the second person, but an inequality that has arisen historically," says Zahn (l.c., p. 241); but it is doubtful whether such a distinction can be imputed to Irenæus. We have rather simply to recognise the contradiction, which was not felt by Irenæus because, in his religious belief, he places Christ on a level with God, but, as a theologian, merely touched on the problem. So also he shows remarkable unconcern as to the proof of the unity of God in view of the distinction between Father and Son.

Footnote 555:[ (return) ]

Irenæus very frequently emphasises the idea that the whole economy of God refers to mankind, see, e.g., I. 10. 3: εκδιηγεισθαι την πραγματειαν και οικονομιαν του Θεου την επι τη ανθρωποτητι γενομενην, IV, 20. 7: "Verbum dispensator paternæ gratiæ factus est ad utilitatem hominum, propter quos fecit tantas dispositiones." God became a creator out of goodness and love; see the beautiful expression in IV. 20. 7: "Gloria dei vivens homo, vita autem hominis visio dei," or III. 20. 2: "Gloria hominis deus, operationes vero dei et omnis sapientias eius et virtutis receptaculum homo." V. 29. 1: "Non homo propter conditionem, sed conditio facta est propter hominem."

Footnote 556:[ (return) ]

Irenæus speaks about the Holy Spirit in numerous passages. No doubt he firmly believes in the distinction of the Spirit (Holy Spirit, Spirit of God, Spirit of the Father, Spirit of the Son, prophetic Spirit, Wisdom) from the Father and Son, and in a particular significance belonging to the Spirit, as these doctrines are found in the regula. In general the same attributes as are assigned to the Son are everywhere applicable to him; he was always with the Father before there was any creation (IV. 20. 3; Irenæus applies Prov. III. 19: VIII. 22 to the Spirit and not to the Son); like the Son he was the instrument and hand of the Father (IV. pref. 4, 20. 1: V. 6. 1.). That Logos and Wisdom are to be distinguished is clear from IV. 20. 1-12 and particularly from § 12: IV. 7. 4: III. 17. 3 (the host in the parable of the Good Samaritan is the Spirit). Irenæus also tried by reference to Scripture to distinguish the work of the Spirit from that of the Logos. Thus in the creation, the guidance of the world, the Old Testament history, the incarnation, the baptism of Jesus, the Logos is the energy, the Spirit is wisdom. He also alluded to a specific ministry of the Spirit in the sphere of the new covenant. The Spirit is the principle of the new knowledge in IV. 33. 1, 7, Spirit of fellowship with God in V. I. 1, pledge of immortality in V. 8. 1, Spirit of life in V. 18. 2. But not only does the function of the Spirit remain very obscure for all that, particularly in the incarnation, where Irenæus was forced by the canon of the New Testament to unite what could not be united (Logos doctrine and descent of the Spirit upon Mary—where, moreover, the whole of the Fathers after Irenæus launched forth into the most wonderful speculations), but even the personality of the Spirit vanishes with him, e.g., in III. 18. 3: "unguentem patrem et unctum filium et unctionem, qui est spiritus" (on Isaiah LXI. 1); there is also no mention of the Spirit in IV. pref. 4 fin., and IV. 1. 1, though he ought to have been named there. Father, Son, and Spirit, or God, Logos, and Sophia are frequently conjoined by Irenæus, but he never uses the formula τριας, to say nothing of the abstract formulas of Tertullian. In two passages (IV. 20. 5: V. 36. 2) Irenæus unfolded a sublime speculation, which is inconsistent with his usual utterances. In the first passage he says that God has shown himself prophetically through the Spirit (in the Old Testament), then adoptively through the Son, and will finally show himself paternally in the kingdom of heaven; the Spirit prepares man for the Son of God, the Son leads him to the Father, but the Father confers on him immortality. In the other passage he adopts the saying of an old presbyter (Papias?) that we ascend gradually through the Spirit to the Son, and through the Son to the Father, and that in the end the Son will deliver up everything to the Father, and God will be all in all. It is remarkable that, as in the case of Tertullian (see above), it is 1 Cor. XV. 23-28 that has produced this speculation. This is another clear proof, that in Irenæus the equality of Father, Son, and Spirit is not unconditional and that the eternity of Son and Spirit is not absolute. Here also we plainly perceive that the several disquisitions in Irenæus were by no means part of a complete system. Thus, in IV. 38. 2, he inverts the relationship and says that we ascend from the Son to the Spirit: Και δια τουτο Παυλος Κορινθιοις φησι: γαλα 'υμας εποτισα, ου Βρωμα, ουδε γαρ ηδυνασθε βασταζειν; τουτεστι, την μεν κατα ανθρωπον παρουσιαν του κυριου εμαθητευθητε, ουδηπου δε το του πατρος πνευμα επαναπαυεται εφ' 'υμας δια την 'υμων ασθενειαν. Here one of Origen's thoughts appears.

Footnote 557:[ (return) ]

The opinions advanced here are, of course, adumbrations of the ideas about redemption. Noldechen (Zeitschrift fur wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1885, p. 462 ff): "Die Lehre vom ersten Menschen bei den christlichen Lehrern des 2 Jahrhunderts."

Footnote 558:[ (return) ]

Here the whole 38th chapter of the 4th Book is to be examined. The following sentences are perhaps the most important: Ει δε λεγει τις ουκ ηδυνατο 'ο Θεος απ' αρχης τελειον αναδειξαι τον ανθρωπον, Γνωτω, 'οτι τω μεν Θεω, αει κατα τα αυτα οντι και αγεννητω 'υπαρχοντι, 'ως προς 'εαυτον, παντα δυνατα; τα δε γεγοντα, καθο μετεπειτα γενεσεως αρχην ιδιαν εσχε, κατα τουτο και 'υστερεισθαι δει αυτα του πεποιηκοτος; ου γαρ ηδυναντο αγεννητα ειναι τα νεωστι γεγεννημενα. Καθο δε μη εστιν αγεννητα, κατα τουτο και 'υστερουνται του τελειου. Καθο δε νεωτερα, κατα τουτο και νηπια, κατα τουτο και ασυνηθη και αγυμναστα προς την τελειαν αγωγην. The mother can no doubt give strong food to the child at the very beginning, but the child cannot stand it: ανθρωπος αδυνατος λαβειν αυτο; νηπιος γαρ ην, see also § 2-4: "Non ab initio dii facti sumus, sed primo quidem homines, tunc demum dii, quamvis deus secundum simplicitatem bonitatis suæ hoc fecerit, nequis eum putet invidiosum aut impræstantem." "Ego," inquit, "dixi, dii estis et filii excelsi omnes, nobis autem potestatem divinitatis baiulare non sustinentibus" ... "Oportuerat autem primo naturam apparere, post deinde vinci et absorbi mortale ab immortalitate et corruptibile ab incorruptibilitate, et fieri hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem dei, agnitione accepta boni et mali." Ibid.: 'υποταγη Θεου απθαρσια, και παραμονη απθαρσιας δοξα αγεννητος ... 'ορασις Θεου περιποιητικη απθαρσιας; απθαρσια δε εγγυς ειναι ποιει Θεου. In this chapter Irenæus contemplates the manner of appearance of the Logos (as man) from the point of view of a συννηπιαζειν. His conception of the capacity and destination of man enabled him to develop his ideas about the progressive training of the human race and about the different covenants (see below). On this point cf. also IV. 20. 5-7. The fact that, according to this way of looking at things, the Good and Divine appeared only as the destination of man—which was finally to be reached through divine guidance—but not as his nature, suggested both to Irenæus and Tertullian the distinction between "natura" and "gratia" or between "substantia" and "fides et iustitia." In other words, they were led to propound a problem which had occurred to the Gnostics long before, and had been solved by them in a dualistic sense. See Irenæus II. 29. 1: "Si propter substantiam omnes succedunt animæ in refrigerium, et superfluum est credere, superflua autem et discessio salvatoris; si autem propter iustitiam, iam non propter id, quod sint animæ sed quoniam sunt iustæ ... Si enim natura et substantia salvat, omnes salvabuntur animæ; si autem iustitia et fides etc." II. 34. 3: "Non enim ex nobis neque ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundum gratiam dei datur," II. 34. 4. Tertullian adv. Marc. III. 15: "Christi nomen non ex natura veniens, sed ex dispositione." In Tertullian these ideas are not unfrequently opposed to each other in this way; but the relationship between them has by no means been made clear.

Footnote 559:[ (return) ]

On the psychology of Irenæus see Bohringer, p. 466 f., Wendt p. 22. The fact that in some passages he reckoned the πνευμα in man as the latter's inalienable nature (e.g. II. 33-5), though as a rule (like Tatian) he conceives it as the divine Spirit, is an evident inconsistency on his part. The εικων is realised in the body, the 'ομοιωσις is not given by nature, but is brought about by the union with the Spirit of God realised through obedience (V. 6. 1). The 'ομοιωσις is therefore subject to growth, and was not perfect at the beginning (see above, IV. 38. 4, where he opposes Tatian's opinion). It is clear, especially from V. 12. 2, that it is only the πνοη, not the πνευμα, that is to be conceived as an original possession. On this point Irenæus appealed to 1 Cor. XV. 45. It is plain from the 37th chapter of the 4th Book, that Irenæus also views everything as ultimately dependent on man's inalienable freedom. Alongside of this God's goodness has scope for displaying itself in addition to its exercise at the creation, because it guides man's knowledge through counsel; see § 1. On Matth. XXIII. 37 Irenæus remarks: "veterem legem libertatis hominis manifestavit, quia liberum eum deus fecit ab initio, habentem suam potestatem sicut et suam animam ad utendum sententia dei voluntarie et non coactum a deo ... posuit in homine potestatem electionis quemadmodum in angelis (et enim angeli rationabiles), ut hi quidem qui obedissent iuste bonum sint possidentes, datum quidem a deo, servatum vero ab ipsis." An appeal to Rome II. 4-7 (!) follows. In § 2 Irenæus inveighs violently against the Gnostic doctrines of natural goodness and wickedness: παντες της αυτης εισι φυσεως. In § 4 he interprets the Pauline: "omnia licent, sed non omnia expediunt," as referring to man's inalienable freedom and to the way in which it is abused in order to work evil(!): "liberæ sententiæ ab initio est homo et liberæ sententiæ est deus, cuius ad similitudinem factus est." § 5: "Et non tantum in operibus, sed etiam in fide, liberum et suæ potestatis arbitrium hominis servavit (that is, respected) dominus, dicens: Secundum fidem tuam fiat tibi." § 4: "deus consilium dat continere bonum, quod perficitur ex obedientia." § 3: "το αυτεξουσιον του ανθρωπου και το συμβουλευτικον του Θεου μη βιαζομενου." IV. 4. 3: "homo rationabilis et secundum hoc similis deo liber in arbitrio factus et suæ potestatis, ipse sibi causa est, ut aliquando quidem frumentum aliquando autem palea fiat."

Footnote 560:[ (return) ]

As a matter of fact this view already belongs to the second train of thought; see particularly III. 21-23. Here in reality this merely applies to the particular individuals who chose disobedience, but Irenæus almost everywhere referred back to the fall of Adam. See, however, V. 27. 2: "Quicunque erga eum custodiunt dilectionem, suam his præstat communionem. Communio autem dei vita et lumen et fruitio eorum quæ sunt apud deum bonorum. Quicumque autem absistunt secundum sententiam suam ab eo, his eam quæ electa est ab ipsis separationem inducit. Separatio autem dei mors, et separatio lucis tenebræ, et separatio dei amissio omnium quæ sunt apud eum bonorum." V. 19. 1, 1. 3, 1. 1. The subjective moralism is very clearly defined in IV. 15. 2: "Id quod erat semper liberum et suæ potestatis in homine semper servavit deus et sua exhortatio, ut iuste iudicentur qui non obediunt ei quoniam non obedierunt, et qui obedierunt et crediderunt ei, honorentur incorruptibilitate."

Footnote 561:[ (return) ]

Man's sin is thoughtlessness; he is merely led astray (IV. 40. 3). The fact that he let himself be seduced under the pretext of immortality is an excuse for him; man was infans, (See above; hence it is said, in opposition to the Gnostics, in IV. 38. 4: "supergredieutes legem humani generis et antequam fiant homines, iam volunt similes esse factori deo et nullam esse differentiam infecti dei et nunc facti hominis." The same idea is once more very clearly expressed in IV. 39. 3; "quemadmodum igitur erit homo deus, qui nondum factus est homo?" i.e., how could newly created man be already perfect as he was not even man, inasmuch as he did not yet know how to distinguish good and evil?). Cf. III. 23. 3, 5: "The fear of Adam was the beginning of wisdom; the sense of transgression led to repentance; but God bestows his grace on the penitent" ... "eum odivit deus, qui seduxit hominem, ei vero qui seductus est, sensim paullatimque misertus est." The "pondus peccati" in the sense of Augustine was by no means acknowledged by Irenæus, and although he makes use of Pauline sayings, and by preference such as have a quite different sense, he is very far from sharing Paul's view.

Footnote 562:[ (return) ]

See IV. 37. 7: "Alias autem esset nostrum insensatum bonum, quod esset inexercitatum. Sed et videre non tantum nobis esset desiderabile, nisi cognovissemus quantum esset malum non videre; et bene valere autem male valentis experientia honorabilius efficit, et lucem tenebrarum comparatio et vitam mortis. Sic et cœleste regnum honorabilius est his qui cognoverunt terrenum." The main passage is III. 20. 1, 2, which cannot be here quoted. The fall was necessary in order that man might not believe that he was "naturaliter similis deo." Hence God permitted the great whale to swallow man for a time. In several passages Irenæus has designated the permitting of evil as kind generosity on the part of God, see, e.g., IV. 39. 1, 37. 7.

Footnote 563:[ (return) ]

See Wendt, l.c., p. 24.

Footnote 564:[ (return) ]

See III. 23. 6.

Footnote 565:[ (return) ]

See V. I. 1: "Non enim aliter nos discere poteramus quæ sunt dei, nisi magister noster, verbum exsistens, homo factus fuisset ... Neque rursus nos aliter discere poteramus, nisi magistrum nostrum videntes," etc.; III. 23. 2, 5. 3: "libertatem restauravit"; IV. 24. 1: "reformavit humamum genus"; III. 17. 1: "spiritus sanctus in filium dei, filium hominis factum, descendit cum ipso assuescens habitare in genere humano." III. 19. 1: IV. 38. 3: 39. 1, 2. Wendt's summary, l.c., p. 24: "By the Logos becoming man, the type of the perfect man made its appearance," formulates Irenæus' meaning correctly and excludes the erroneous idea that he viewed the Logos himself as the prototype of humanity. A real divine manhood is not necessary within this train of thought; only a homo inspiratus is required.

Footnote 566:[ (return) ]

See Hippol. Philos. X. 33 (p. 538 sq.): Επι τουτοις τον παντων αρχοντα δημιουργων εκ πασων συνθετων ουσιων εσκευασεν, ου Θεων θελων ποιειν εσφηλεν, ουδε αγγελον, αλλ' ανθρωπον. Ει γαρ Θεον σε ηθελησε ποιησαι, εδυνατο; εχεις του λογου το παραδειγμα; ανθρωπον θελων, ανθρωπον σε εποιησεν; ει δε θελεις και Θεος γενεσθαι, 'υπακουε τω πεποιηκοτι. The famous concluding chapter of the Philosophoumena with its prospect of deification is to be explained from this (X. 34).

Footnote 567:[ (return) ]

See Tertull. adv. Marc. II. 4-11; his undiluted moralism appears with particular clearness in chaps. 6 and 8. No weight is to be attached to the phrase in chapter 4 that God by placing man in Paradise really even then put him from Paradise into the Church. This is contrary to Wendt's opinion, l.c., p. 67. ff., where the exposition of Tertullian is speciosior quam verior. In adv. Marc. II. 4 ff. Wendt professes to see the first traces of the scholastic and Romish theory, and in de anima 16, 41 the germ of the subsequent Protestant view.

Footnote 568:[ (return) ]

See IV. 5. 1, 6. 4.

Footnote 569:[ (return) ]

See IV 14. 1: "In quantum enim deus nullius indiget, in tantum homo indiget dei communione. Hæc enim gloria hominis, perseverare et permanere in dei servitute." This statement, which, like the numerous others where Irenæus speaks of the adoptio, is opposed to moralism, reminds us of Augustine. In Irenæus' great work, however, we can point out not a few propositions which, so to speak, bear the stamp of Augustine; see IV. 38. 3: 'υποταγη Θεου αφθαρσια.

Footnote 570:[ (return) ]

See the passages quoted above, p. 241 f.

Footnote 571:[ (return) ]

See III. 18. 1. V. 16. 1 is very remarkable: Εν τοις προσθεν χρονοις ελεγετο μεν κατ' εικονα Θεου γεγονεναι τον ανθρωπον, ουκ εδεικνυτο δε, ετι γαρ αορατος ην 'ο λογος, ου κατ' εικονα 'ο ανθρωπος εγεγονει. δια τουτο δη και την 'ομοιωσιν ιαδιως απεβαλεν; see also what follows. In V. I. 1 Irenæus even says: "Quoniam iniuste dominabatur nobis apostasia, et cum natura essemus dei omnipotentis, alienavit nos contra naturam diabolus." Compare with this the contradictory passage IV. 38: "oportuerat autem primo naturam apparere" etc. (see above, p. 268), where natura hominis is conceived as the opposite of the divine nature.

Footnote 572:[ (return) ]

See Wendt, l.c., p. 29, who first pointed out the two dissimilar trains of thought in Irenæus with regard to man's original state, Duncker having already done so in regard to his Christology. Wendt has rightly shown that we have here a real and not a seeming contradiction; but, as far as the explanation of the fact is concerned, the truth does not seem to me to have been arrived at. The circumstance that Irenæus did not develop the mystic view in such a systematic way as the moralistic by no means justifies us in supposing that he merely adopted it superficially (from the Scriptures): for its nature admits of no systematic treatment, but only of a rhetorical and contemplative one. No further explanation can be given of the contradiction, because, strictly speaking, Irenæus has only given us fragments.

Footnote 573:[ (return) ]

See V. 16. 3: εν τω πρωτω Αδαμ προσεκοψαμεν, μη ποιησαντες αυτου την εντολην. IV. 34. 2: "homo initio in Adam inobediens per mortem percussus est;" III. 18. 7-23: V. 19. 1: V. 21. 1: V. 17. 1 sq.

Footnote 574:[ (return) ]

Here also Irenæus keeps sin in the background; death and life are the essential ideas. Bohringer l.c., p. 484 has very rightly remarked: "We cannot say that Irenæus, in making Adam's conduct and suffering apply to the whole human race had started from an inward, immediate experience of human sinfulness and a feeling of the need of salvation founded on this." It is the thoughts of Paul to which Irenæus tried to accommodate himself without having had the same feeling about the flesh and sin as this Apostle. In Tertullian the mystic doctrine of salvation is rudimentary (but see, e.g. de anima 40: "ita omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur donec in Christo recenseatur," and other passages); but he has speculations about Adam (for the most part developments of hints given in Irenæus; see the index in Oehler's edition), and he has a new realistic idea as to a physical taint of sin propagated through procreation. Here we have the first beginning of the doctrine of original sin (de testim. 3: "per diabolum homo a primordio circumventus, ut præceptum dei excederet, et propterea in mortem datus exinde totum genus de suo semine infectum suæ etiam damnationis traducem fecit." Compare his teachings in de anima 40, 41, 16 about the disease of sin that is propagated "ex originis vitio" and has become a real second nature). But how little he regards this original sin as guilt is shown by de bapt. 18: "Quaie innocens ætas festinat ad baptismum." For the rest, Tertullian discussed the relationship of flesh and spirit, sensuousness and intellect, much more thoroughly than Irenæus; he showed that flesh is not the seat of sin (de anima 40). In the same book (but see Bk. V. c. 1) he expressly declared that in this question also sure results are only to be obtained from revelation. This was an important step in the direction of secularising Christianity through "philosophy" and of emasculating the understanding through "revelation." In regard to the conception of sin Cyprian followed his teacher. De op. et eleem. 1 reads indeed like an utterance of Irenæus ("dominus sanavit illa quæ Adam portaverat vulnera"); but the statement in ep. 64. 5: "Recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquæ prima nativitate contraxit" is quite in the manner of Tertullian, and perhaps the latter could also have agreed with the continuation: "infanti remittuntur non propria sed aliena peccata." Tertullian's proposition that absolutely no one but the Son of God could have remained without sin was repeated by Cyprian (see, e.g., de op. et eleem. 3).

Footnote 575:[ (return) ]

III. 22. 4 has quite a Gnostic sound ... "eam quæ est a Maria in Evam recirculationem significans; quia non aliter quod colligatum est solveretur, nisi ipsæ compagines alligationis reflectantur retrorsus, ut primæ coniunctiones solvantur per secundas, secundæ rursus liberent primas. Et evenit primam quidem compaginem a secunda colligatione solvere, secundam vero colligationem primæ solutionis habere locum. Et propter hoc dominus dicebat primos quidem novissimos futuros et novissimos primos." Irenæus expresses a Gnostic idea when he on one occasion plainly says (V. 12. 3): Εν τω Αδαμ παντες αποθνησκομεν, 'οτι ψυχικοι. But Paul, too, made an approach to this thought.

Footnote 576:[ (return) ]

See III. 23. 1, 2, a highly characteristic statement.

Footnote 577:[ (return) ]

See, e.g., III. 9. 3, 12. 2, 16. 6-9, 17. 4 and repeatedly 8. 2: "verbum dei, per quem facta sunt omnia, qui est dominus noster Jesus Christus."

Footnote 578:[ (return) ]

See IV. 6. 7.

Footnote 579:[ (return) ]

See III. 11. 3.

Footnote 580:[ (return) ]

See III. 6.

Footnote 581:[ (return) ]

See III. 19. 1, 2: IV. 33. 4: V. 1. 3; see also Tertullian against "Ebion" de carne 14, 18, 24; de præser. 10. 33.

Footnote 582:[ (return) ]

See III. 21, 22: V. 19-21.

Footnote 583:[ (return) ]

See the arguments, l.c., V. 19. 1: "Quemadmodum adstrictum est morti genus humanum per virginem, salvatur per virginem, æqua lance disposita virginalis inobedientia per virginalem obedientiam," and other similar ones. We find the same in Tertull., de carne 17, 20. In this connection we find in both very extravagant expressions with regard to Mary (see, e.g. Tertull., l.c. 20 fin.: "uti virgo esset regeneratio nostra spiritaliter ab omnibus inquinamentis sanctificata per Christum." Iren. III. 21. 7: "Maria cooperans dispositioni (dei);" III. 22. 4 "Maria obediens et sibi et universo generi humano causa facta est salutis" ... "quod alligavit virgo Eva per incredulitatem, hoc virgo Maria solvit per fidem"). These, however, have no doctrinal significance; in fact the same Tertullian expressed himself in a depreciatory way about Mary in de carne 7. On the other hand it is undeniable that the later Mariolatry has one of its roots in the parallel between Eve and Mary. The Gnostic invention of the virginitas Mariæ in partu can hardly be traced in Irenæus III. 21. 4. Tertullian (de carne 23) does not seem to know anything about it as yet, and very decidedly assumed the natural character of the process. The popular conception as to the reason of Christ's birth from a virgin, in the form still current to-day, but beneath all criticism, is already found in Tertullian de carne 18: "Non competebat ex semine humano dei filium nasci, ne, si totus esset filius hominis, non esset et dei filius, nihilque haberet amplius Salomone, ut de Hebionis opinione credendus erat Ergo iam dei filius ex patris dei semine, id est spiritu, ut esset et hominis filius, caro ei sola competebat ex hominis carne sumenda sine viri semine. Vacabat enim semen viri apud habentem dei semen." The other theory existing side by side with this, viz., that Christ would have been a sinner if he had been begotten from the semen, whereas he could assume sinless flesh from woman is so far as I know scarcely hinted at by Irenæus and Tertullian. The fact of Christ's birth was frequently referred to by Tertullian in order to prove Christ's kinship to God the Creator, e.g., adv. Marc. III. 11. Hence this article of the regula fidei received a significance from this point of view also. An Encratite explanation of the birth from the Virgin is found in the old treatise de resurr. bearing Justin's name (Otto, Corp. Apol. III., p. 220.)

Footnote 584:[ (return) ]

See, e.g., III. 18. 1 and many other places. See the passages named in note, p. 276.

Footnote 585:[ (return) ]

So also Tertullian. See adv. Marc. III. 8: The whole work of salvation is destroyed by Docetism; cf. the work de carne Christi. Tertullian exclaims to the Docetist Marcion in c. 5: "Parce unicæ spei totius orbis." Irenæus and Tertullian mean that Christ's assumption of humanity was complete, but not unfrequently express themselves in such a manner as to convey the impression that the Logos only assumed flesh. This is particularly the case with Tertullian, who, moreover, in his earlier time had probably quite naive Docetic ideas and really looked upon the humanity of Christ as only flesh. See Apolog. 21: "spiritum Christus cum verbo sponte dimisit, prævento carnincis officio." Yet Irenæus in several passages spoke of Christ's human soul (III. 22. 1: V. 1. 1) as also did Melito (το αληθες και αφανταστον της ψυχης Χριστου και του σωματος, της καθ' 'ημας ανθρωπινης φυσεως Otto, l.c., IX., p. 415) and Tertullian (de carne 10 ff. 13; de resurr. 53). What we possess in virtue of the creation was assumed by Christ (Iren., l.c., III. 22. 2.) Moreover, Tertullian already examined how the case stands with sin in relation to the flesh of Christ. In opposition to the opinion of the heretic Alexander, that the Catholics believe Jesus assumed earthly flesh in order to destroy the flesh of sin in himself, he shows that the Saviour's flesh was without sin and that it is not admissible to teach the annihilation of Christ's flesh (de carne 16; see also Irenæus V. 14. 2, 3): "Christ by taking to himself our flesh has made it his own, that is, he has made it sinless." It was again passages from Paul (Rom. VIII. 3 and Ephes. II. 15) that gave occasion to this discussion. With respect to the opinion that it may be with the flesh of Christ as it is with the flesh of angels who appear, Tertullian remarks (de carne 6) that no angel came to die; that which dies must be born; the Son of God came to die.

Footnote 586:[ (return) ]

This conception was peculiar to Irenæus, and for good reasons was not repeated in succeeding times; see II. 22: III. 17. 4. From it also Irenæus already inferred the necessity of the death of Christ and his abode in the lower world, V. 31. 1, 2. Here we trace the influence of the recapitulation idea. It has indeed been asserted (very energetically by Schultz, Gottheit Christi, p. 73 f.) that the Christ of Irenæus was not a personal man, but only possessed humanity. But that is decidedly incorrect, the truth merely being that Irenæus did not draw all the inferences from the personal humanity of Christ.

Footnote 587:[ (return) ]

See Iren. V. 31. 2: "Surgens in carne sic ascendit ad patrem." Tertullian, de carne 24: "Bene quod idem veniet de cælis qui est passus ... et agnoscent qui eum confixerunt, utique ipsam carnem in quam sævierunt, sine qua nee ipse esse poterit et agnosci;" see also what follows.

Footnote 588:[ (return) ]

See Iren. IV. 33. 11.

Footnote 589:[ (return) ]

See Iren. IV. 20. 4; see also III. 19. 1.

Footnote 590:[ (return) ]

He always posits the unity in the form of a confession without describing it. See III. 16. 6, which passage may here stand for many. "Verbum unigenitus, qui semper humano generi adest, unitus et consparsus suo plasmati secundum placitum patris et caro factus ipse est Iesus Christus dominus noster, qui et passus est pro nobis et ressurrexit propter nos.... Unus igitur deus pater, quemadmodum ostendimus, et unus Christus Iesus domiuns noster, veniens per universam dispositionem et omnia in semelipsum recapitulans. In omnibus autem est et homo plasmatio del, et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis et impassibilis passibilis et verbum homo." V. 18. 1: "Ipsum verbum dei incarnatum suspensum est super lignum."

Footnote 591:[ (return) ]

Here Irenæus was able to adopt the old formula "God has suffered" and the like; so also Melito, see Otto l.c., IX. p. 416: 'ο Θεος πεπονυεν 'υπο δεξιας Ισραηλιτιδος (p. 422): "Quidnam est hoc novum mysterium? iudex iudicatur et quietus est; invisibilis videtur neque erubescit: incomprehensibilis prehenditur neque indignatur, incommensurabilis mensuratur neque repugnat; impassibilis patitur neque ulciscitur; immortalis moritur, neque respondit verbum, cœlestis sepelitur et id fert." But let us note that these are not "doctrines," but testimonies to the faith, as they were always worded from the beginning and such as could, if need were, be adapted to any Christology. Though Melito in a fragment whose genuineness is not universally admitted (Otto, l.c., p. 415 sq.) declared in opposition to Marcion, that Christ proved his humanity to the world in the 30 years before his baptism; but showed the divine nature concealed in his human nature during the 3 years of his ministry, he did not for all that mean to imply that Jesus' divinity and humanity are in any way separated. But, though Irenæus inveighed so violently against the "Gnostic" separation of Jesus and Christ (see particularly III. 16. 2, where most weight is laid on the fact that we do not find in Matth.: "Iesu generatio sic erat" but "Christi generatio sic erat"), there is no doubt that in some passages he himself could not help unfolding a speculation according to which the predicates applying to the human nature of Jesus do not also hold good of his divinity, in fact he actually betrayed a view of Christ inconsistent with the conception of the Saviour's person as a perfect unity. We can indeed only trace this view in his writings in the form of an undercurrent, and what led to it will be discussed further on. Both he and Melito, as a rule adhered to the simple "filius dei filius hominis factus" and did not perceive any problem here, because to them the disunion prevailing in the world and in humanity was the difficult question that appeared to be solved through this very divine manhood. How closely Melito agreed with Irenæus is shown not only by the proposition (p. 419): "Propterea misit pater filium suum e cœlo sine corpore (this is said in opposition to the Valentinian view), ut, postquam incarnatus esset in, utero virginis et natus esset homo, vivificaret hominem et colligeret membra eius quæ mors disperserat, quum hominem divideret," but also by the "propter hominem iudicatus est iudex, impassibilis passus est?" (l.c.).

Footnote 592:[ (return) ]

The concepts employed by Irenæus are deus, verbum, filius dei, homo, filius hominis, plasma dei. What perhaps hindered the development of that formula in his case was the circumstance of his viewing Christ, though he had assumed the plasma dei, humanity, as a personal man who (for the sake of the recapitulation theory) not only had a human nature but was obliged to live through a complete human life. The fragment attributed to Irenæus (Harvey II., p. 493) in which occur the words, του Θεου λογου 'ενωοει τη καθ' 'υποστασιν φυσικη 'ενωθεντος τη σακρι, is by no means genuine. How we are to understand the words: 'ινα εξ αμφοτερων το περιφανες των φυσεων παραδειχθη in fragment VIII. (Harvey II., p. 479), and whether this piece belongs to Irenæus, is uncertain. That Melito (assuming the genuineness of the fragment) has the formula of the two natures need excite no surprise; for (1) Melito was also a philosopher, which Irenæus was not, and (2) it is found in Tertullian, whose doctrines can be shown to be closely connected with those of Melito (see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2, p. 249 f.). If that fragment is genuine Melito is the first Church teacher who has spoken of two natures.

Footnote 593:[ (return) ]

See Apol. 21: "verbum caro figuratus ... homo deo mixtus;" adv. Marc. II. 27: "filius dei miscens in semetipso hominem et deum;" de carne 15: "homo deo mixtus;" 18: "sic homo cum deo, dum caro hominis cum spiritu dei." On the Christology of Tertullian cf. Schulz, Gottheit Christi, p. 74 ff.

Footnote 594:[ (return) ]

De carne 5: "Crucifixus est dei filius, non pudet quia pudendum est; et mortuus est dei filius, prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est; et sepultus resurrexit, certum est, quia impossible est;" but compare the whole book; c. 5 init.: "deus crucifixus," "nasci se voluit deus". De pat. 3: "nasci se deus in utero patitur." The formula: 'ο γεννηθεις, 'ο μεγας Θεος is also found in Sibyll. VII. 24.

Footnote 595:[ (return) ]

De carne I, cf. ad nat. II. 4: "ut iure consistat collegium nominis communione substantiæ."

Footnote 596:[ (return) ]

De carne 18 fin.

Footnote 597:[ (return) ]

Adv. Prax. 27: "Sed enim invenimus illum diiecto et deum et hominem expositum, ipso hoc psalmo suggerente (Ps. LXXXVII. 5) ... hic erit homo et filius hominis, qui definitus est filius dei secundum spiritum ... Videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed coniunctum in una persona deum et hominem Iesum. De Christo autem differo. Et adeo salva est utriusque proprietas substantiæ, ut et spiritus res suas egerit in illo, id est virtutes et opera et signa, et caro passiones suas functa sit, esuriens sub diabolo ... denique et mortua est. Quodsi tertium quid esset, ex utroque confusum, ut electrum, non tam distincta documenta parerent utrinsque substantiæ." In what follows the actus utriusque substantiæ are sharply demarcated: "ambæ substantiæ in statu suo quæque distincte agebant, ideo illis et operæ et exitus sui occurrerunt ... neque caro spiritus fit neque spiritus caro: in uno plane esse possunt." See also c. 29: "Quamquam cum duæ substantiæ censeantur in Christo Iesu, divina et humana, constet autem immortalem esse divinam" etc.

Footnote 598:[ (return) ]

Of this in a future volume. Here also two substances in Christ are always spoken of (there are virtually three, since, according to de anima 35, men have already two substances in themselves) I know only one passage where Tertullian speaks of natures in reference to Christ, and this passage in reality proves nothing; de carne 5: "Itaque utriusque substantiæ census hominem et deum exhibuit, hinc natum, inde non natum (!), hinc carneum, inde spiritalem" etc. Then: "Quæ proprietas conditionum, divinæ et humanæ, æqua utique naturæ cuiusque veritate disjuncta est."

Footnote 599:[ (return) ]

In the West up to the time of Leo I. the formula "deus et homo," or, after Tertullian's time "duæ substantiæ," was always a simple expression of the facts acknowledged in the Symbol, and not a speculation derived from the doctrine of redemption. This is shown just from the fact of stress being laid on the unmixedness. With this was associated a theoretic and apologetic interest on the part of theologians, so that they began to dwell at greater length on the unmixedness after the appearance of that Patripassianism, which professed to recognise the filius dei in the caro, that is in the deus so far as he is incarnatus or has changed himself into flesh. As to Tertullian's opposition to this view see what follows. In contradistinction to this Western formula the monophysite one was calculated to satisfy both the salvation interest and the understanding. The Chalcedonian creed, as is admitted by Schulz, l.c., pp. 64 ff., 71 ff., is consequently to be explained from Tertullian's view, not from that of the Alexandrians. Our readers will excuse us for thus anticipating.

Footnote 600:[ (return) ]

"Quare," says Irenæus III. 21. 10—"igitur non iterum sumpsit limum deus sed ex Maria operatus est plasmationem fieri? Ut non alia plasmatio fieret neque alia, esset plasmatio quæ salvaietur, sed eadem ipsa recapitularetur, servata similitudine?"

Footnote 601:[ (return) ]

See de carne 18. Oehler has misunderstood the passage and therefore mispointed it. It is as follows: "Vox ista (Joh. I. 14) quid caro factum sit contestatur, nec tamen periclitatur, quasi statim aliud sit (verbum), factum caro, et non verbum.... Cum scriptura non dicat nisi quod factum sit, non et unde sit factum, ergo ex alio, non ex semetipso suggerit factum" etc.

Footnote 602:[ (return) ]

Adv. Prax. 27 sq. In de carne 3 sq. and elsewhere Tertullian indeed argues against Marcion that God in contradistinction to all creatures can transform himself into anything and yet remain God. Hence we are not to think of a transformation in the strict sense, but of an adunitio.

Footnote 603:[ (return) ]

So I think I ought to express myself. It does not seem to me proper to read a twofold conception into Irenæus' Christological utterances under the pretext that Christ according to him was also the perfect man, with all the modern ideas that are usually associated with this thought (Bohringer, l.c., p. 542 ff., see Thomasius in opposition to him).

Footnote 604:[ (return) ]

See, e.g., V. 1. 3. Nitzch, Dogmengeschichte I. p. 309. Tertullian, in his own peculiar fashion, developed still more clearly the thought transmitted to him by Irenæus. See adv. Prax. 12: "Quibus faciebat deus hominem similem? Filio quidem, qui erat induturus hominem.... Erat autem ad cuius imaginem faciebat, ad filii scilicet, qui homo futurus certior et verior imaginem suam fecerat dici hominem, qui tunc de limo formari habebat, imago veri et similitudo." Adv. Marc. V. 8: "Creator Christum, sermonem suum, intuens hominem futurum, Faciamus, inquit, hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram"; the same in de resurr. 6. But with Tertullian, too, this thought was a sudden idea and did not become the basis of further speculation.

Footnote 605:[ (return) ]

Iren. IV. 14. 2; for further particulars on the point see below, where Irenæus' views on the preparation of salvation are discussed. The views of Dorner, l.c., 492 f., that the union of the Son of God with humanity was a gradual process, are marred by some exaggerations, but are correct in their main idea.

Footnote 606:[ (return) ]

"Secundum id quod verbum dei homo erat ex radice lesse et filius Abrabæ, secunum hoc requiescebat spiritus dei super eum ... secundum autem quod deus erat, non secundum gloriam iudicabat." All that Irenæus said of the Spirit in reference to the person of Christ is to be understood merely as an exegetical necessity and must not be regarded as a theoretical principle (this is also the case with Tertullian). Dorner (l.c., p. 492 f.) has failed to see this, and on the basis of Irenæus' incidental and involuntary utterances has attempted to found a speculation which represents the latter as meaning that the Holy Ghost was the medium which gradually united the Logos, who was exalted above growing and suffering, into one person with the free and growing man in Jesus Christ. In III. 12. 5-7 Irenæus, in conformity with Acts IV. 27: X. 38, used the following other formulæ about Christ: 'ο Θεος, 'ο ποιησας τον ουρανον k.t.l., και 'ο τουτου παις, ον εχρισεν 'ο Θεος—"Petrus Iesum ipsum esse filium dei testificatus est, qui et unctus Spiritu Sancto Iesus dicitur." But Irenæus only expressed himself thus because of these passages, whereas Hippolytus not unfrequently calls Christ παις Θεος.

Footnote 607:[ (return) ]

On Hippolytus' views of the incarnation see Dorner, l.c., I. p. 609 ff.—an account to be used with caution—and Overbeck, Quæst. Hippol. Specimen (1864), p. 47 sq. Unfortunately the latter has not carried out his intention to set forth the Christology of Hippolytus in detail. In the work quoted he has, however, shown how closely the latter in many respects has imitated Irenæus in this case also. It is instructive to see what Hippolytus has not adopted from Irenæus or what has become rudimentary with him. As a professional and learned teacher he is at bottom nearer to the Apologists as regards his Christology than Irenæus. As an exegete and theological author he has much in common with the Alexandrians, just as he is in more than one respect a connecting link between Catholic controversialists like Irenæus and Catholic scholars like Origen. With the latter he moreover came into personal contact. See Hieron., de vir. inl. 61: Hieron., ep. ad Damas. edit. Venet. I., ep. 36 is also instructive. These brief remarks are, however, by no means intended to give countenance to Kimmel's untenable hypothesis (de Hippol. vita et scriptis, 1839) that Hippolytus was an Alexandrian. In Hippolytus' treatise c. Noët. we find positive teachings that remind us of Tertullian. An important passage is de Christo et Antichristo 3 f.: εις γαρ και 'ο του Θεου (Iren.), δι' ου και 'ημεις τυχοντες την δια του 'αγιου πνευματος αναγεννεσιν εις ενα τελειον και επουρανιον ανθρωπον 'οι παντες καταντησαι επιθυμουμεν (see Iren.) Επειδη γαρ 'ο λογος του Θεου ασαρκος ων (see Melito, Iren., Tertull.) ενεδυσατο την 'αγιαν σαρκα εκ της 'αγιας παρθενου; 'ως νυμφιος 'ιματιον εξυφανας 'εαυτω ην τω σταυρικω παθει (Irenæus and Tertullian also make the death on the cross the object of the assumption of the flesh), 'οπως συγκερασας το θνητον 'εμων σωμα τη 'εαυτου δυναμει και μιξας (Iren., Tertull.) τω αφθαρτω το φθαρτον και το ασθενες τω ισχυρω σωσε τον απολλυμενον ανθρωπον (Iren.). The succeeding disquisition deserves particular note, because it shows that Hippolytus has also borrowed from Irenæus the idea that the union of the Logos with humanity had already begun in a certain way in the prophets. Overbeck has rightly compared the αναπλασσειν δι' 'ευτου τον Αδαμ l.c., c. 26, with the ανακεφαλαιουν of Irenæus and l.c., c. 44, with Iren. II. 22, 4. For Hippolytus' Christology Philosoph. X. 33, p. 542 and c. Noet. 10 ff. are the chief passages of additional importance. In the latter passage it is specially noteworthy that Hippolytus, in addition to many other deviations from Irenæus and Tertullian, insists on applying the full name of Son only to the incarnate Logos. In this we have a remnant of the more ancient idea and at the same time a concession to his opponents who admitted an eternal Logos in God, but not a pre-temporal hypostasis of the Son. See c. 15: ποιον ουν 'υιον 'εαυτου 'ο Θεος δια της σαρκος κατεπεμψεν αλλ' 'η τον λογον; 'ον 'υιον προσηγορευε δια το μελλειν αυτον γενεσθαι, και το κοινον ονομα της εις ανθρωπους φιλοστοργιας αναλαμβανει 'ο 'υιος (καιτοι τελειος λογος ων μονογενες). ουδ' 'η σαρξ καθ' 'εαυτην διχα του λογου 'υποστηναι ηδυνατο δια το εν λογω την συστασιν εχειν 'ουτως ουν εις 'υιος τελειος Θεου εφανερωθη. Hippolytus partook to a much greater extent than his teacher Irenæus of the tree of Greek knowledge and he accordingly speaks much more frequently than the latter of the "divine mysteries" of the faith. From the fragments and writings of this author that are preserved to us the existence of very various Christologies can be shown; and this proves that the Christology of his teacher Irenæus had not by any means yet become predominant in the Church, as we might suppose from the latter's confident tone. Hippolytus is an exegete and accordingly still yielded with comparative impartiality to the impressions conveyed by the several passages. For example he recognised the woman of Rev. XII. as the Church and the Logos as her child, and gave the following exegesis of the passage (de Christo et Antichristo 61): ου παυσεται 'η εκκλησια γεννωσα εκ καρδιας τον λογον του εν κοσμω 'υπο απιστων διωκομενον. "και ετεκε", φησιν, "'υιον αρρενα, 'ος μελλει ποιμαινειν παντα τα εθνη", τον αρρενα και τελειος Χριστον, παιδα Θεου, Θεον και ανθρωπον καταγγελλομενον αει τικτουσα 'η εκκλησια διδασκει παντα τα εθνη. If we consider how Irenæus' pupil is led by the text of the Holy Scriptures to the most diverse "doctrines," we see how the "Scripture" theologians were the very ones who threatened the faith with the greatest corruptions. As the exegesis of the Valentinian schools became the mother of numerous self-contradictory Christologies, so the same result was threatened here—"doctrinæ inolescentes in silvas iam exoleverunt Gnosticorum." From this standpoint Origen's undertaking to subject the whole material of Biblical exegesis to a fixed theory appears in its historical greatness and importance.

Footnote 608:[ (return) ]

See other passages on p. 241, note 2. This is also reëchoed in Cyprian. See, for example, ep. 58. 6: "filius dei passus est ut nos filios dei faceret, et filius hominis (scil. the Christians) pati non vult esse dei filius possit."

Footnote 609:[ (return) ]

See III. 10. 3.

Footnote 610:[ (return) ]

See the remarkable passage in IV. 36. 7: 'η γνωσις του 'υιου του Θεου, 'ητις ην αφθαρσια. Another result of the Gnostic struggle is Irenæus' raising the question as to what new thing the Lord has brought (IV. 34. 1): "Si autem subit vos huiusmodi sensus, ut dicatis: Quid igitur novi dominus attulit veniens? cognoscite, quoniam omnem novitatem attulit semetipsum afferens, qui fuerat annuntiatus." The new thing is then defined thus: "Cum perceperunt eam quæ ab eo est libertatem et participant visionem eius et audierunt sermones eius et fruiti sunt muneribus ab eo, non iam requiretur, quid novius attulit rex super eos, qui annuntiaverunt advenum eius ... Semetipsum enim attulit et ea quæ prædicta sunt bona."

Footnote 611:[ (return) ]

See IV. 36. 6: "Adhuc manifestavit oportere nos cum vocatione (i.e., μετα την κλησιν) et iustitiæ operibus adornari, uti requiescat super nos spiritus dei"—we must provide ourselves with the wedding garment.

Footnote 612:[ (return) ]

The incapacity of man is referred to in III. 18. 1: III. 21. 10; III. 21-23 shows that the same man that had fallen had to be led to communion with God; V. 21. 3: V. 24. 4 teach that man had to overcome the devil; the intrinsic necessity of God's appearing as Redeemer is treated of in III. 23. 1: "Si Adam iam non reverteretur ad vitam, sed in totum proiectus esset morti, victus esset deus et superasset serpentis nequitia voluntatem dei. Sed quoniam deus invictus et magnanimis est, magnanimem quidem se exhibuit etc." That the accomplishment of salvation must be effected in a righteous manner, and therefore be as much a proof of the righteousness as of the immeasurable love and mercy of God, is shown in V. 1. 1: V. 21.

Footnote 613:[ (return) ]

Irenæus demonstrated the view in V. 21 in great detail. According to his ideas in this chapter we must include the history of the temptation in the regula fidei.

Footnote 614:[ (return) ]

See particularly V. 1. 1: "Verbum potens et homo verus sanguine suo rationabiliter redimens nos, redemptionem semetipsum dedit pro his, qui in captivitatem ducti sunt ... del verbum non deficiens in sua iustitia, iuste etiam adversus ipsam conversus est apostasiam, ea quæ sunt sua redimens ab ea, non cum vi, quemadmodum ilia initio dominabatur nostri, ea quæ non erant sua insatiabiliter rapiens, sed secundum suadelam, quemadmodum decebat deum suadentem et non vim inferentem, accipere quæ vellet, ut neque quod est iustum confringeretur neque antiqua plasmatio dei deperiret." We see that the idea of the blood of Christ as ransom does not possess with Irenæus the value of a fully developed theory, but is suggestive of one. But even in this form it appeared suspicious and, in fact, a Marcionite idea to a Catholic teacher of the 3rd century. Pseudo-Origen (Adamantius) opposed it by the following argument (De recta in deum fide, edit Wetstein 1673, Sectio I. p. 38 sq. See Rufinus' translation in Caspari's Kirchenhistorische Anecdota Vol. I. 1883, p. 34 sq., which in many places has preserved the right sense): Τον πριωμενον εφης, ειναι τον Χριστον, 'ο πεπρακως τις εστιν; ηλθεν εις σε 'ο απλους μυθος; 'οτι 'ο πωλων και 'ο αγοραζων αδελφοι εισιν; ει κακος ων 'ο διαβολος τω αγαθω πεπρακεν, ουκ εστι κακος αλλα αγαθος; 'ο γαρ απ' αρχης φθονησας τω ανθρωπω, νυν ουκ ετι 'υπο φθονου αγεται, τω αγαθω την νομην παραδους. εσται ουν δικαιος 'ο του φθονου και παντος κακου παυσαμενος. αυτος γουν 'ο Θεος 'ευρισκεται πωλησας; μαλλον δε 'οι 'ημαρτηκοτες 'εαυτους απηλλοτριωσαν 'οι ανθρωποι δια τας 'αμαρτιας αυτων; παλιν δε ελυτρωθησαν δια την ευσπλαγχνιαν αυτου. τουτο γαρ φησιν 'ο προφητης; Ταις 'αμαρτιαις 'υμων επραθητε και ταις ανομιαις εξαπεστειλα την μητερα 'υμων. Και αλλος παλιν; Δωρεαν επραθητε, και ου μετα αργυριου λυτρωθησεσθε. το, ουδε μετα αργυριου; δηλονοτι, του 'αιματος του Χριστου. τουτο γαρ φασκει 'ο προφητης (Isaiah, LIII. 5 follows). Εικος δε 'οτι κατα σε επριατο δους 'εαυτου το 'αιμα; πως ουν και εκ νεκρων ηγειρετο; ει γαρ 'ο λαβων την τιμην των ανθρωπων, το 'αιμα, απεδωκεν, ουκετι επωλησεν. Ει δε μη απεδωκε, πως ανεστη Χριστος, ουκετι ουν το, Εξουσιαν εχω θειναι και εξουσιαν εχω λαβειν, 'ισταται; 'ο γουν διαβολος κατεχει το 'αιμα του Χριστου αντι της τιμης των ανθρωπων; πολλη βλασφημιος ανοια! Φευ των κακων! Απεθανεν, ανεστη 'ως δυνατος; εθηκεν 'ο ελαβεν; αυτη ποια πρασις; του προφητου λεγοντος; Αναστητω 'ο Θεος και διασκορπισθητωσαν 'οι εχθροι αυτου, Οπου αναστασις, εκει θανατοσ! That is an argument as acute as it is true and victorious.

Footnote 615:[ (return) ]

See Iren. V. 2, 3, 16. 3, 17-4. In III. 16. 9 he says: "Christus per passionem reconciliavit nos deo." It is moreover very instructive to compare the way in which Irenæus worked out the recapitulation theory with the old proof from prophecy ("this happened that the Scripture might be fulfilled"). Here we certainly have an advance; but at bottom the recapitulation theory may also be conceived as a modification of that proof.

Footnote 616:[ (return) ]

See, e.g., IV. 5. 4: προθυμως Αβρααμ τον ιδιον μονογενη και αγαπητον παραχωρησας θυσιαν τω Θεω, 'ινα και 'ο Θεος ευδοκηση 'υπερ του σπερματος αυτου παντος τον ιδιον μονογενη και αγαπητον 'υιον θυσιαν παρασχειν εις λυτρωσιν 'ημετεραν.

Footnote 617:[ (return) ]

There are not a few passages where Irenæus said that Christ has annihilated sin, abolished Adam's disobedience, and introduced righteousness through his obedience (III. 18. 6, 7: III. 20. 2: V. 16-21); but he only once tried to explain how that is to be conceived (III. 18. 7), and then merely reproduced Paul's thoughts.

Footnote 618:[ (return) ]

Irenæus has no hesitation in calling the Christian who has received the Spirit of God the perfect, the spiritual one, and in representing him, in contrast to the false Gnostic, as he who in truth judges all men, Jews, heathen, Marcionites, and Valentinians, but is himself judged by no one; see the great disquisition in IV. 33 and V. 9. 10. This true Gnostic, however, is only to be found where we meet with right faith in God the Creator, sure conviction with regard to the God-man Jesus Christ, true knowledge as regards the Holy Spirit and the economy of salvation, the apostolic doctrine, the right Church system in accordance with the episcopal succession, the intact Holy Scripture, and its uncorrupted text and interpretation (IV. 33. 7, 8). To him the true believer is the real Gnostic.

Footnote 619:[ (return) ]

See IV. 22. In accordance with the recapitulation theory Christ must also have descended to the lower world. There he announced forgiveness of sins to the righteous, the patriarchs and prophets (IV. 27. 2). For this, however, Irenæus was not able to appeal to Scripture texts, but only to statements of a presbyter. It is nevertheless expressly asserted, on the authority of Rom. III. 23, that these pre-Christian just men also could only receive justification and the light of salvation through the arrival of Christ among them.

Footnote 620:[ (return) ]

See III. 16. 6: "In omnibus autem est et homo plasmatio dei; et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis et impassibilis passibilis, et verbum homo, universa in semetipsum recapitulans, uti sicut in supercaelestibus et spiritalibus et invisibilibus princeps est verbum dei, sic et in visibilibus et corporalibus principatum habeat, in semetipsum primatum assumens et apponens semetipsum caput ecclesiæ, universa attrahat ad semetipsum apto in tempore."

Footnote 621:[ (return) ]

There are innumerable passages where Tertullian has urged that the whole work of Christ is comprised in the death on the cross, and indeed that this death was the aim of Christ's mission. See, e.g., de pat. 3: "Taceo quod figitur; in hoc enim venerat"; de bapt. II: "Mors nostra dissolvi non potuit, nisi domini passione, nee vita restitui sine resurrectione ipsius"; adv. Marc. III. 8: "Si mendacium deprehenditur Christi caro... nec passiones Christi fidem merebuntur. Eversum est igitur totum dei opus. Totum Christiani nominis et pondus et fructus, mors Christi, negatur, quam iam impresse apostolus demendat, utique veram, summum eam fundamentum evangelii constituens et salutis nostræ et prædictionis suae," 1 Cor. XV. 3, 4; he follows Paul here. But on the other hand he has also adopted from Irenæus the mystical conception of redemption—the constitution of Christ is the redemption—though with a rationalistic explanation. See adv. Marc. II. 27: "filius miscens in semetipso hominem et deum, ut tantum homini conferat, quantum deo detrahit. Conversabatur deus, ut homo divina agere doceretur. Ex æquo agebat deus cum homine, ut homo ex æquo agere cum deo posset." Here therefore the meaning of the divine manhood of the Redeemer virtually amounts to divine teaching. In de resurr. 63 Christ is called "fidelissimus sequester dei et hominum, qui et homini deum et hominem deo reddet." Note the future tense. It is the same with Hippolytus who in Philos. X. 34 represents the deification of men as the aim of redemption, but at the same time merely requires Christ as the lawgiver and teacher: "Και ταυτα μεν εκφευξη Θεον τον οντα διδαχθεις, εξεις δε αθανατον το σωμα και αφθαρτον 'αμα ψυχη, βασιλειαν ουρανων αποληψη, 'ο εν γη βιους και επουρανιον βασιλεα επιγνους, εση δε 'ομιλητης Θεου και συγκληρονομος Χριστου, ουκ επιθυμιαις η παθεσι και νοσοις δουλουμενος. Γεγονας γαρ Θεος 'οσα γαρ 'υπεμεινας παθη ανθρωπος ων, ταυτα εδιδου, 'οτι ανθρωπος εις, 'οσα δε παρακολουθει Θεω, ταυτα παρεχειν επηγγελται Θεος, 'οτι εθεοποιηθης, αθανατος γεννηθεις. Τουτεστι το Γνωθι σεαυτον, επιγνους του πεποιηκοτα Θοεν. Το γαρ επιγνωναι 'εαυτον επιγνωσθηναι συμβεβηκε τω καλουμενω 'υπ' αυτου. Μη φιλεχθρησητε τοινυν 'εαυτοις, ανθρωποι, μηδε το παλινδρομειν διστασητε. Χριστος γαρ εστιν 'ο κατα παντων Θεος, ος την 'αμαρτιαν εξ ανθρωπων αποπλυνειν προεταξε, νεον τον παλαιον ανθρωπον αποτελων, εικονα τουτον καλεσας απ' αρχης, δια τυπου την εις σε επιδεικνυμενος στοργην, ου προσταγμασιν 'υπακουσας σεμνοις, και αγαθου αγαθος γενομενος μιμητης, εση 'ομοιος 'υπ' αυτου τιμηθεις. Ου γαρ πτωχευει Θεος και σε Θεον ποιησας εις δοξαν αυτου." It is clear that with a conception like this, which became prevalent in the 3rd century, Christ's death on the cross could have no proper significance; nothing but the Holy Scriptures preserved its importance. We may further remark that Tertullian used the expression "satisfacere deo" about men (see, e.g., de bapt. 20; de pud. 9), but, so far as I know, not about the work of Christ. This expression is very frequent in Cyprian (for penances), and he also uses it about Christ. In both writers, moreover, we find "meritum" (e.g., Scorp. 6) and "promereri deum". With them and with Novatian the idea of "culpa" is also more strongly emphasised than it is by the Eastern theologians. Cf. Novatian de trin. 10: "quoniam cum caro et sanguis non obtinere regnum dei scribitur, non carnis substantia damnata est, quæ divinis manibus ne periret, exstructa est, sed sola carnis culpa merito reprehensa est." Tertullian de bapt. 5 says: "Exempto reatu eximitur et poena." On the other hand he speaks of fasting as "officia humiliationis", through which we can "inlicere" God. Among these Western writers the thought that God's anger must be appeased both by sacrifices and corresponding acts appears in a much more pronounced form than in Irenæus. This is explained by their ideas as practical churchmen and by their actual experiences in communities that were already of a very secular character. We may, moreover, point out in a general way that the views of Hippolytus are everywhere more strictly dependent on Scripture texts than those of Irenæus. That many of the latter's speculations are not found in Hippolytus is simply explained by the fact that they have no clear scriptural basis; see Overbeck, Quæst, Hippol., Specimen p. 75, note 29. On a superficial reading Tertullian seems to have a greater variety of points of view than Irenæus; he has in truth fewer, he contrived to work the grains of gold transmitted to him in such a way as to make the form more valuable than the substance. But one idea of Tertullian, which is not found in Irenæus, and which in after times was to attain great importance in the East (after Origen's day) and in the West (after the time of Ambrosius), may be further referred to. We mean the notion that Christ is the bridegroom and the human soul (and also the human body) the bride. This theologoumenon owes its origin to a combination of two older ones, and subsequently received its Biblical basis from the Song of Solomon. The first of these older theologoumena is the Greek philosophical notion that the divine Spirit is the bridegroom and husband of the human soul. See the Gnostics (e.g., the sublime description in the Excerpta ex Theodoto 27); Clem. ep. ad Jacob. 4. 6; as well as Tatian, Orat. 13; Tertull., de anima 41 fin.: "Sequitur animam nubentem spiritui caro; o beatum connubium"; and the still earlier Sap. Sal. VIII. 2 sq. An offensively realistic form of this image is found in Clem. Horn. III. 27: νυμφη γαρ εστιν 'ο πας ανθρωπος, 'οποταν του αληθους προφητου λευκω λογω αληθειας σπειρομενος φωτιζηται τον νουν. The second is the apostolic notion that the Church is the bride and the body of Christ. In the 2nd Epistle of Clement the latter theologoumenon is already applied in a modified form. Here it is said that humanity as the Church, that is human nature (the flesh), belongs to Christ as his Eve (c. 14; see also Ignat. ad Polyc. V. 2; Tertull. de monog. II, and my notes on Διδαχη XI. 11). The conclusion that could be drawn from this, and that seemed to have a basis in certain utterances of Jesus, viz., that the individual human soul together with the flesh is to be designated as the bride of Christ, was, so far as I know, first arrived at by Tertullian de resurr. 63: "Carnem et spiritum iam in semetipso Christus fœderavit, sponsam sponso et sponsum spousæ; comparavit. Nam et si animam quis contenderit sponsam, vel dotis nomine sequetur animam caro ... Caro est sponsa, quæ in Christo spiritum sponsum per sanguinem pacta est"; see also de virg. vel. 16. Notice, however, that Tertullian continually thinks of all souls together (all flesh together) rather than of the individual soul.

Footnote 622:[ (return) ]

By the regula inasmuch as the words "from thence he will come to judge the quick and the dead" had a fixed place in the confessions, and the belief in the duplex adventus Christi formed one of the most important articles of Church belief in contradistinction to Judaism and Gnosticism (see the collection of passages in Hesse, "das Muratorische Fragment", p. 112 f.). But the belief in the return of Christ to this world necessarily involved the hope of a kingdom of glory under Christ upon earth, and without this hope is merely a rhetorical flourish.

Footnote 623:[ (return) ]

Cf. here the account already given in Book I., chap. 3, Vol. I., p. 167 ff., Book I., chap. 4, Vol. I, p. 261, Book II., chap. 3, Vol. I, p. 105 f. On Melito compare the testimony of Polycrates in Eusebius, H. E. V. 24. 5, and the title of his lost work "περι του διαβολου και της αποκαλυψεως Ιωαννου." Chiliastic ideas are also found in the epistle from Lyons in Eusebius, H. E. V. 1 sq. On Hippolytus see his work "de Christo et Antichristo" and Overbeck's careful account (l.c., p. 70 sq.) of the agreement here existing between Irenæus and Hippolytus as well as of the latter's chiliasm on which unfounded doubts have been cast. Overbeck has also, in my opinion, shown the probability of chiliastic portions having been removed at a later period both from Hippolytus' book and the great work of Irenæus. The extensive fragments of Hippolytus' commentary on Daniel are also to be compared (and especially the portions full of glowing hatred to Rome lately discovered by Georgiades). With reference to Tertullian compare particularly the writings adv. Marc. III., adv. Jud., de resurrectione carnis, de anima, and the titles of the subsequently suppressed writings de paradiso and de spe fidelium. Further see Commodian, Carmen apolog., Lactantius, Instit. div., I. VII., Victorinus, Commentary on the Apocalypse. It is very remarkable that Cyprian already set chiliasm aside; cf. the conclusion of the second Book of the Testimonia and the few passages in which he quoted the last chapters of Revelation. The Apologists were silent about chiliastic hopes, Justin even denied them in Apol. I. 11, but, as we have remarked, he gives expression to them in the Dialogue and reckons them necessary to complete orthodoxy. The Pauline eschatology, especially several passages in 1 Cor. XV. (see particularly verse 50), caused great difficulties to the Fathers from Justin downwards. See Fragm. Justini IV. a Methodic supped. in Otto, Corp. Apol. III., p. 254, Iren. V. 9, Tertull. de resurr. 48 sq. According to Irenæus the heretics, who completely abandoned the early-Christian eschatology, appealed to 1 Cor. XV. 50. The idea of a kind of purgatory—a notion which does not originate with the realistic but with the philosophical eschatology—is quite plainly found in Tertullian, e.g., in de anima 57 and 58 ("modicum delictum illuc luendum"). He speaks in several passages of stages and different places of bliss; and this was a universally diffused idea (e.g., Scorp. 6).

Footnote 624:[ (return) ]

Irenæus begins with the resurrection of the body and the proofs of it (in opposition to Gnosticism). These proofs are taken from the omnipotence and goodness of God, the long life of the patriarchs, the translation of Enoch and Elijah, the preservation of Jonah and of the three men in the fiery furnace, the essential nature of man as a temple of God to which the body also belongs, and the resurrection of Christ (V. 3-7). But Irenæus sees the chief proof in the incarnation of Christ, in the dwelling of the Spirit with its gifts in us (V. 8-16), and in the feeding of our body with the holy eucharist (V. 2. 3). Then he discusses the defeat of Satan by Christ (V. 21-23), shows that the powers that be are set up by God, that the devil therefore manifestly lies in arrogating to himself the lordship of the world (V. 24), but that he acts as a rebel and robber in attempting to make himself master of it. This brings about the transition to Antichrist. The latter is possessed of the whole power of the devil, sums up in himself therefore all sin and wickedness, and pretends to be Lord and God. He is described in accordance with the Apocalypses of Daniel and John as well as according to Matth. XXIV. and 2nd Thessalonians. He is the product of the 4th Kingdom, that is, the Roman empire; but at the same time springs from the tribe of Dan (V. 30. 2), and will take up his abode in Jerusalem etc. The returning Christ will destroy him, and the Christ will come back when 6000 years of the world's history have elapsed; for "in as many days as the world was made, in so many thousands of years will it be ended" (V. 28. 3). The seventh day is then the great world Sabbath, during which Christ will reign with the saints of the first resurrection after the destruction of Antichrist. Irenæus expressly argued against such "as pass for orthodox, but disregard the order of the progress of the righteous and know no stages of preparation for incorruptibility" (V. 31). By this he means such as assume that after death souls immediately pass to God. On the contrary he argues that these rather wait in a hidden place for the resurrection which takes place on the return of Christ, after which the souls receive back their bodies and men now restored participate in the Saviour's Kingdom (V. 31. 2). This Kingdom on earth precedes the universal judgment; "for it is just that they should also receive the fruits of their patience in the same creation in which they suffered tribulation"; moreover, the promise made to Abraham that Palestine would be given to him and to his seed, i.e., the Christians, must be fulfilled (V. 32). There they will eat and drink with the Lord in the restored body (V. 33. 1) sitting at a table covered with food (V. 33. 2) and consuming the produce of the land, which the earth affords in miraculous fruitfulness. Here Irenæus appeals to alleged utterances of the Lord of which he had been informed by Papias (V. 33. 3, 4). The wheat will be so fat that lions lying peacefully beside the cattle will be able to feed themselves even on the chaff (V. 33. 3, 4). Such and similar promises are everywhere to be understood in a literal sense. Irenæus here expressly argues against any figurative interpretation (ibid, and V. 35). He therefore adopted the whole Jewish eschatology, the only difference being that he regards the Church as the seed of Abraham. The earthly Kingdom is then followed by the second resurrection, the general judgment, and the final end.

Footnote 625:[ (return) ]

Hippolytus in the lost book 'υπερ του κατα Ιωαννην ευαγγελιου και αποκαλυψεως. Perhaps we may also reckon Melito among the literary defenders of Chiliasm.

Footnote 626:[ (return) ]

See Epiph., H. 51, who here falls back on Hippolytus.

Footnote 627:[ (return) ]

In the Christian village communities of the district of Arsinoe the people would not part with chiliasm, and matters even went the length of an "apostasy" from the Alexandrian Church. A book by an Egyptian bishop, Nepos, entitled "Refutation of the allegorists" attained the highest repute. "They esteem the law and the prophets as nothing, neglect to follow the Gospels, think little of the Epistles of the Apostles, and on the contrary declare the doctrine set forth in this book to be a really great secret. They do not permit the simpler brethren among us to obtain a sublime and grand idea of the glorious and truly divine appearance of our Lord, of our resurrection from the dead as well as of the union and assimilation with him; but they persuade us to hope for things petty, perishable, and similar to the present in the kingdom of God." So Dionysius expressed himself, and these words are highly characteristic of his own position and that of his opponents; for in fact the whole New Testament could not but be thrust into the background in cases where the chiliastic hopes were really adhered to. Dionysius asserts that he convinced these Churches by his lectures; but chiliasm and material religious ideas were still long preserved in the deserts of Egypt. They were cherished by the monks; hence Jewish Apocalypses accepted by Christians are preserved in the Coptic and Ethiopian languages.

Footnote 628:[ (return) ]

See Irenæus lib. IV. and Tertull. adv. Marc. lib. II. and III.

Footnote 629:[ (return) ]

It would be superfluous to quote passages here; two may stand for all Iren. IV. 9. 1: "Utraque testamenta unus et idem paterfamilias produxit, verbum dei, dominus noster Iesus Christus, qui et Abrahæ et Moysi collocutus est." Both Testaments are "unius et emsdem substantiæ." IV. 2. 3: "Moysis literæ sunt verba Christi."

Footnote 630:[ (return) ]

See Iren. IV. 31. 1.

Footnote 631:[ (return) ]

Iren. III. 12. 15 (on Gal. II. 11 f.): "Sic apostoli, quos universi actus et universæ doctrinæ dominus testes fecit, religiose agebant circa dispositionem legis, qnæ; est secundum Moysem, ab uno et eodem significantes esse deo"; see Overbeck "Ueber die Auffassung des Streits des Paulus mit Petrus bei den Kirchenvatern," 1877, p. 8 f. Similar remarks are frequent in Irenæus.

Footnote 632:[ (return) ]

Cf., e.g., de monog. 7: "Certe sacerdotes sumus a Christo vocati, monogarniæ debitores, ex pristina dei lege, quæ nos tune in suis sacerdotibus prophetavit." Here also Tertullian's Montanism had an effect. Though conceiving the directions of the Paraclete as new legislation, the Montanists would not renounce the view that these laws were in some way already indicated in the written documents of revelation.

Footnote 633:[ (return) ]

Very much may be made out with regard to this from Origen's works and the later literature, particularly from Commodian and the Apostolic Constitutions, lib. I.-VI.

Footnote 634:[ (return) ]

Where Christians needed the proof from prophecy or indulged in a devotional application of the Old Testament, everything indeed remained as before, and every Old Testament passage was taken for a Christian one, as has remained the case even to the present day.

Footnote 635:[ (return) ]

With the chiliastic view of history this newly acquired theory has nothing in common.

Footnote 636:[ (return) ]

Iren. III. 12. 11.

Footnote 637:[ (return) ]

See III. 12. 12.

Footnote 638:[ (return) ]

No commutatio agnitionis takes place, says Irenæus, but only an increased gift (IV. 11. 3); for the knowledge of God the Creator is "principium evangelli." (III. 11. 7).

Footnote 639:[ (return) ]

See IV. 11. 2 and other passages, e.g., IV. 20 7: IV. 26. 1: IV. 37. 7: IV. 38. 1-4.

Footnote 640:[ (return) ]

Several covenants I. 10. 3; four covenants (Adam, Noah, Moses, Christ) III. II. 8; the two Testaments (Law and New Covenant) are very frequently mentioned.

Footnote 641:[ (return) ]

This is very frequently mentioned; see e.g., IV. 13. 1: "Et quia dominus naturalia legis, per quæ homo iustificatur, quæ etiam ante legisdationem custodiebant qui fide iustificabantur et placebant deo non dissolvit etc." IV. 15, 1.

Footnote 642:[ (return) ]

Irenæus, as a rule, views the patriarchs as perfect saints; see III. II. 8: "Verbum dei illis quidem qui ante Moysem fuerunt patriarchis secundum divinitatem et gloriam colloquebatur", and especially IV. 16. 3. As to the Son's having descended from the beginning and having thus appeared to the patriarchs also, see IV. 6. 7. Not merely Abraham but all the other exponents of revelation knew both the Father and the Son. Nevertheless Christ was also obliged to descend to the lower world to the righteous, the prophets, and the patriarchs, in order to bring them forgiveness of sins (IV. 27. 2).

Footnote 643:[ (return) ]

On the contrary he agrees with the teachings of a presbyter, whom he frequently quotes in the 4th Book. To Irenæus the heathen are simply idolaters who have even forgotten the law written in the heart; wherefore the Jews stand much higher, for they only lacked the agnitio filii. See III. 5. 3: III. 10. 3: III. 12. 7, IV. 23, 24. Yet there is still a great want of clearness here. Irenæus cannot get rid of the following contradictions. The pre-Christian righteous know the Son and do not know him; they require the appearance of the Son and do not require it; and the agnitio filii seems sometimes a new, and in fact the decisive, veritas, and sometimes that involved in the knowledge of God the Creator.

Footnote 644:[ (return) ]

Irenæus IV. 16. 3. See IV. 15. 1: "Decalogum si quis non fecerit, non habet salutem".

Footnote 645:[ (return) ]

As the Son has manifested the Father from of old, so also the law, and indeed even the ceremonial law, is to be traced back to him. See IV. 6. 7: IV. 12. 4: IV. 14. 2: "his qui inquieti erant in eremo dans aptissimam legem ... per omnes transiens verbum omni conditioni congruentem et aptam legem conscribens". IV. 4. 2. The law is a law of bondage; it was just in that capacity that it was necessary; see IV. 4. 1: IV. 9. 1: IV. 13. 2, 4: IV. 14. 3: IV. 15: IV. 16: IV. 32: IV. 36. A part of the commandments are concessions on account of hardness of heart (IV. 15. 2). But Irenæus still distinguishes very decidedly between the "people" and the prophets. This is a survival of the old view. The prophets he said knew very well of the coming of the Son of God and the granting of a new covenant (IV. 9. 3: IV. 20. 4, 5: IV. 33. 10); they understood what was typified by the ceremonial law, and to them accordingly the law had only a typical signification. Moreover, Christ himself came to them ever and anon through the prophetic spirit. The preparation for the new covenant is therefore found in the prophets and in the typical character of the old. Abraham has this peculiarity, that both Testaments were prefigured in him: the Testament of faith, because he was justified before his circumcision, and the Testament of the law. The latter occupied "the middle times", and therefore come in between (IV. 25. 1). This is a Pauline thought, though otherwise indeed there is not much in Irenæus to remind us of Paul, because he used the moral categories, growth and training, instead of the religious ones, sin and grace.

Footnote 646:[ (return) ]

The law, i.e., the ceremonial law, reaches down to John, IV. 4. 2. The New Testament is a law of freedom, because through it we are adopted as sons of God, III. 5. 3: III. 10. 5: III. 12. 5: III. 12. 14: III. 15. 3: IV. 9. 1, 2: IV. 11. 1: IV. 13. 2, 4: IV. 15. 1, 2: IV. 16. 5: IV. 18: IV. 32: IV. 34. 1: IV. 36. 2. Christ did not abolish the natus alia legis, the Decalogue, but extended and fulfilled them; here the old Gentile-Christian moral conception based on the Sermon on the Mount, prevails. Accordingly Irenæus now shows that in the case of the children of freedom the situation has become much more serious, and that the judgments are now much more threatening. Finally, he proves that the fulfilling, extending, and sharpening of the law form a contrast to the blunting of the natural moral law by the Pharisees and elders; see IV. 12. 1 ff.: "Austero dei præcepto miscent seniores aquatam traditionem". IV. 13. 1. f.: "Christus naturalia legis (which are summed up in the commandment of love) extendit et implevit ... plenitudo et extensio ... necesse fuit, auferri quidem vincula servitutis, superextendi vero decreta libertatis". That is proved in the next passage from the Sermon on the Mount: we must not only refrain from evil works, but also from evil desire. IV. 16. 5: "Hæc ergo, quæ in servitutem et in signum data sunt illis, circumscripsit novo libertatis testamento. Quæ autem naturalia et liberalia et communia omnium, auxit et dilatavit, sine invidia largiter donans hominibus per adoptionem, patrem scire deum ... auxit autem etiam timorem: filios enim plus timere oportet quam servos". IV. 27. 2. The new situation is a more serious one; the Old Testament believers have the death of Christ as an antidote for their sins, "propter eos vero, qui nunc peccant, Christus non iam morietur". IV. 28. 1 f.: under the old covenant God punished "typice et temporaliter et mediocrius", under the new, on the contrary, "vere et semper et austerius" ... as under the new covenant "fides aucta est", so also it is true that "diligentia conversationis adaucta est". The imperfections of the law, the "particularia legis", the law of bondage have been abolished by Christ, see specially IV. 16, 17, for the types are now fulfilled; but Christ and the Apostles did not transgress the law; freedom was first granted to the Gentile Christians (III. 12) and circumcision and foreskin united (III. 5. 3). But Irenæus also proved how little the old and new covenants contradict each other by showing that the latter also contains concessions that have been granted to the frailty of man; see IV. 15. 2 (1 Cor. VII.).

Footnote 647:[ (return) ]

See III. II. 4. There too we find it argued that John the Baptist was not merely a prophet, but also an Apostle.

Footnote 648:[ (return) ]

From Irenæus' statement in IV. 4 about the significance of the city of Jerusalem we can infer what he thought of the Jewish nation. Jerusalem is to him the vine-branch on which the fruit has grown; the latter having reached maturity, the branch is cut off and has no further importance.

Footnote 649:[ (return) ]

No special treatment of Tertullian is required here, as he only differs from Irenæus in the additions he invented as a Montanist. Yet this is also prefigured in Irenæus' view that the concessions of the Apostles had rendered the execution of the stern new law more easy. A few passages may be quoted here. De orat. I: "Quidquid retro fuerat, aut demutatum est (per Christum), ut circumcisio, aut suppletum ut reliqua lex, aut impletum ut prophetia, aut perfectum ut fides ipsa. Omnia de carnalibus in spiritalia renovavit nova dei gratia superducto evangelio, expunctore totius retro vetustatis." (This differentiation strikingly reminds us of the letter of Ptolemy to Flora. Ptolemy distinguishes those parts of the law that originate with God, Moses, and the elders. As far as the divine law is concerned, he again distinguishes what Christ had to complete, what he had to supersede and what he had to spiritualise, that is, perficere, solvere, demutare). In the regula fidei (de præscr. 13): "Christus prædicavit novam legem et novam promissionem regni cœlorum"; see the discussions in adv. Marc. II., III., and adv. Iud.; de pat. 6: "amplianda adimplendaque lex." Scorp. 3, 8, 9; ad uxor. 2; de monog. 7: "Et quoniam quidam interdum nihil sihi dicunt esse cum lege, quam Christus non dissolvit, sed adimplevit, interdum quæ volunt legis arripiunt (he himself did that continually), plane et nos sic dicimus legem, ut onera quidem eius, secundum sententiam apostolorum, quæ nec patres sustinere valuerunt, concesserint, quæ vero ad iustitiam spectant, non tantum reservata permaneant, verum et ampliata." That the new law of the new covenant is the moral law of nature in a stricter form, and that the concessions of the Apostle Paul cease in the age of the Paraclete, is a view we find still more strongly emphasised in the Montanist writings than in Irenæus. In ad uxor. 3 Tertullian had already said: "Quod permittitur, bonum non est," and this proposition is the theme of many arguments in the Montanist writings. But the intention of finding a basis for the laws of the Paraclete, by showing that they existed in some fashion even in earlier times, involved Tertullian in many contradictions. It is evident from his writings that Montanists and Catholics in Carthage alternately reproached each other with judaising tendencies and an apostasy to heathen discipline and worship. Tertullian, in his enthusiasm for Christianity, came into conflict with all the authorities which he himself had set up. In the questions as to the relationship of the Old Testament to the New, of Christ to the Apostles, of the Apostles to each other, of the Paraclete to Christ and the Apostles, he was also of necessity involved in the greatest contradictions. This was the case not only because he went more into details than Irenæus; but, above all, because the chains into which he had thrown his Christianity were felt to be such by himself. This theologian had no greater opponent than himself, and nowhere perhaps is this so plain as in his attitude to the two Testaments. Here, in every question of detail, Tertullian really repudiated the proposition from which he starts. In reference to one point, namely, that the Law and the prophets extend down to John, see Noldechen's article in the Zeitschrift fur wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1885, p. 333 f. On the one hand, in order to support certain trains of thought, Tertullian required the proposition that prophecy extended down to John (see also the Muratorian Fragment: "completus numerus prophetarum", Sibyll. I. 386: και τοτε δη παυσις εσται μετεπειτα προφητωυ, scil. after Christ), and on the other, as a Montanist, he was obliged to assert the continued existence of prophecy. In like manner he sometimes ascribed to the Apostles a unique possession of the Holy Spirit, and at other times, adhering to a primitive Christian idea, he denied this thesis. Cf. also Baith "Tertullian's Auffassung des Apostels Paulus und seines Verhaltnisses zu den Uraposteln" (Jahrbuch fur protestantische Theologie, Vol. III. p. 706 ff.). Tertullian strove to reconcile the principles of early Christianity with the authority of ecclesiastical tradition and philosophical apologetics. Separated from the general body of the Church, and making ever increasing sacrifices for the early-Christian enthusiasm, as he understood it, he wasted himself in the solution of this insoluble problem.

Footnote 650:[ (return) ]

In addition to this, however, they definitely established within the Church the idea that there is a "Christian" view in all spheres of life and in all questions of knowledge. Christianity appears expanded to an immense, immeasurable breadth. This is also Gnosticism. Thus Tertullian, after expressing various opinions about dreams, opens the 45th chapter of his work "de anima" with the words: "Tenemur hie de sommis quoque Christianam sententiam expromere". Alongside of the antignostic rule of faith as the "doctrine" we find the casuistic system of morality and penance (the Church "disciplina") with its media of almsgiving, fasting, and prayer; see Cypr, de op et eleemos., but before that Hippol., Comm. in Daniel (Εκκλ Αληθ. 1886, p. 242): 'οι εις τυ ονομα τον Θεου πιστευοντες και δι' αγαθοεργιας το προσωπον αυτου εξιλασκομενοι.

Footnote 651:[ (return) ]

In the case of Irenæus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian we already find that they observe a certain order and sequence of books when advancing a detailed proof from Scripture.

Footnote 652:[ (return) ]

It is worthy of note that there was not a single Arian ecclesiastic of note in the Novatian churches of the 4th century, so far as we know. All Novatian's adherents, even those in the West (see Socrates' Ecclesiastical History), were of the orthodox Nicæan type. This furnishes material for reflection.

Footnote 653:[ (return) ]

Owing to the importance of the matter we shall give several Christological and trinitarian disquisitions from the work "de trinitate". The archaic attitude of this Christology and trinitarian doctrine is evident from the following considerations. (1) Like Tertullian, Novatian asserts that the Logos was indeed always with the Father, but that he only went forth from him at a definite period of time (for the purpose of creating the world). (2) Like Tertullian, he declares that Father, Son, and Spirit have one substance (that is, are 'ομοουσιοι, the homoousia of itself never decides as to equality in dignity); but that the Son is subordinate and obedient to the Father and the Spirit to the Son (cc. 17, 22, 24), since they derive their origin, essence, and function from the Father (the Spirit from the Son). (3) Like Tertullian, Novatian teaches that the Son, after accomplishing his work, will again become intermingled with the Father, that is, will cease to have an independent existence (c. 31); whence we understand why the West continued so long to be favourable to Marcellus of Ancyra; see also the so-called symbol of Sardika. Apart from these points and a few others of less consequence, the work, in its formulæ, exhibits a type which remained pretty constant in the West down to the time of Augustine, or, till the adoption of Johannes Damascenus' dogmatic. The sharp distinction between "deus" and "homo" and the use that is nevertheless made of "permixtio" and synonymous words are also specially characteristic. Cap. 9: "Christus deus dominus deus noster, sed dei filius"; c. 11: "non sic de substantia corporis ipsius exprimimus, ut solum tantum hominem illum esse dicamus, sed ut divinitate sermonis in ipsa concretione permixta etiam deum illum teneamus"; c. 11 Christ has auctoritas divina, "tam enim scriptura etiam deum adnuntiat Christum, quam etiam ipsum hominem adnuntiat deum, tam hominem descripsit Iesum Christum, quam etiam deum quoque descripsit Christum dominum." In c. 12 the term "Immanuel" is used to designate Christ as God in a way that reminds one of Athanasius; c. 13: "præsertim cum animadvertat, scripturam evangelicam utramque istam substantiam in unam nativitatis Christi fœderasse concordiam"; c. 14: "Christus ex verbi et carnis coniunctione concretus"; c. 16: "... ut neque homo Christo subtrahatur, neque divinitas negetur ... utrumque in Christo confœderatum est, utrumque coniunctum est et utrumque connexum est ... pignerata in illo divinitatis et humilitatis videtur esse concordia ... qui mediator dei et hominum effectus exprimitur, in se deum et hominem sociasse reperitur ... nos sermonem dei scimus indutum carnis substantiam ... lavit substantiam corporis et materiam carnis abluens, ex parte suscepti hominis, passione"; c. 17: "... nisi quoniam auctoritas divini verbi ad suscipiendum hominem interim conquiescens nec se suis viribus exercens, deiicit se ad tempus atque deponit, dum hominem fert, quem suscepit"; c. 18: "... ut in semetipso concordiam confibularet terrenorum pariter atque cælestium, dum utriusque partis in se connectens pignora et deum homini et hominem deo copularet, ut merito filius dei per assumptionem carnis filius hominis et filius hominis per receptionem dei verbi filius dei effici possit"; c. 19: "hic est enim legitimus dei filius qui ex ipso deo est, qui, dum sanctum illud (Luke I. 35) assumit, sibi filium hominis annectit et illum ad se rapit atque transducit, connexione sua et permixtione sociata præstat et filium illum dei facit, quod ille naturaliter non fuit (Novatian's teaching is therefore like that of the Spanish Adoptionists of the 8th century), ut principalitas nominis istius 'filius dei' in spiritu sit domini, qui descendit et venit, ut sequela nominis istius in filio dei et hominis sit, et merito consequenter his filius dei factus sit, dum non principaliter filius dei est, atque ideo dispositionem istam anhelus videns et ordinem istum sacramenti expediens non sic cuncta confundens, ut nullum vestigium distinctionis collocavit, distinctionem posuit dicendo. 'Propterea et quod nascetur ex te sanctum vocabitur filius dei'. Ne si distributionem istam cum libramentis suis non dispensasset, sed in confuso permixtum reliquisset, vere occasionem hæreticis contulisset, ut hominis filium qua homo est, eundum et dei et hominis filium pronuntiare deberent.... Filius dei, dum filium hominis in se suscepit, consequenter illum filium dei fecit, quoniam illum filius sibi dei sociavit et iunxit, ut, dum filius hominis adhæret in nativitate filio dei, ipsa permixtionem fœneratum et mutuatum teneret, quod ex natura propria possidere non posset. Ac si facta est angeli voce, quod nolunt hæretici, inter filium dei hominisque cum sua tamen sociatione distinctio, urgendo illos, uti Christum hominis filium hominem intelligant quoque dei filium et hominem dei filium id est dei verbum deum accipiant, atque ideo Christum Iesum dominum ex utroque connexum, et utroque contextum atque concretum et in eadem utriusque substantiæ concordia mutui ad invicem fœderis confibulatione sociatum, hominem et deum, scripturæ hoc ipsum dicentis veritate cognoscant". c. 21: "hæretici nolunt Christum secundam esse personam post patrem, sed ipsum patrem;" c. 22: "Cum Christus 'Ego' dicit (John X. 30), deinde patrem infert dicendo, 'Ego et pater', proprietatem personæ suæ id est filii a paterna auctoritate discernit atque distinguit, non tantummodo de sono nominis, sed etiam de ordine dispositæ potestatis ... unum enim neutraliter positum, societatis concordiam, non unitatem personæ sonat ... unum autem quod ait, ad concordiam et eandem sententiam et ad ipsam charitatis societatem pertinet, ut merito unum sit pater et filius per concordiam et per amorem et per dilectionem. Et quoniam ex patre est, quicquid illud est, filius est, manente tamen distinctione ... denique novit hanc concordiæ unitatem est apostolus Paulus cum personarum tamen distinctione." (Comparison with the relationship between Paul and Apollos! "Quos personæ ratio invicem dividit, eosdem rursus invicem religionis ratio conducit; et quamvis idem atque ipsi non sint, dum idem sentiunt, ipsum sunt, et cum duo sint, unum sunt"); c. 23: "constat hominem a deo factum esse, non ex deo processisse; ex deo autem homo quomodo nou processit, sic dei verbum processit". In c. 24 it is argued that Christ existed before the creation of the world and that not merely "predestinatione", for then he would be subsequent and therefore inferior to Adam, Abel, Enoch etc. "Sublata ergo prædestinatione quæ non est posita, in substantia fuit Christus ante mundi institutionem"; c. 31: "Est ergo deus pater omnium institutor et creator, solus originem nesciens(!), invisibilis, immensus, immortalis, æternus, unus deus(!), ... ex quo quando ipse voluit, sermo filius natus est, qui non in sono percussi aeris aut tono coactæ de visceribus vocis accipitur, sed in substantia prolatæ a deo virtutis agnoscitur, cuius sacræ et divinas nativitatis arcana nec apostolus didicit ..., filio soli nota sunt, qui patris secreta cognovit. Hic ergo cum sit genitus a patre, semper est in patre. Semper autem sic dico, ut non innatum, sed natum probem; sed qui ante omne tempus est, semper in patre fuisse discendus est, nec enim tempus illi assignari potest, qui ante tempus est; semper enim in patre, ne pater non semper sit pater: quia et pater illum etiam præcedit, quod necesse est, prior sit qua pater sit. Quoniam antecedat necesse est eum, qui habet originem, ille qui originem nescit. Simul ut hic minor sit, dum in illo esse se scit habens originem quia nascitur, et per patrem quamvis originem habet qua nascitur, vicinus in nativitate, dum ex eo patre, qui solus originem non habet, nascitur ..., substantia scilicet divina, cuius nomen est verbum ..., deus utique procedens ex deo secundam personam efficiens, sed non eripiens illud patri quod unus est deus.... Cuius sic divinitas traditur, ut non aut dissonantia aut inæqualitate divinitatis duos deos reddidisse videatur.... Dum huic, qui est deus, omnia substrata traduntur et cuncta sibi subiecta filius accepta refert patri, totam divinitatis auctoritatem rursus patri remittit, unus deus ostenditur verus et æternus pater, a quo solo hæc vis divinitatis emissa, etiam in filium tradita et directa rursus per substantiæ; communionem ad patrem revolvitur."

Footnote 654:[ (return) ]

If I am not mistaken, the production or adaptation of Apocalypses did indeed abate in the third century, but acquired fresh vigour in the 4th, though at the same time allowing greater scope to the influence of heathen literature (including romances as well as hagiographical literature).

Footnote 655:[ (return) ]

I did not care to appeal more frequently to the Sibylline oracles either in this or the preceding chapter, because the literary and historical investigation of these writings has not yet made such progress as to justify one in using it for the history of dogma. It is well known that the oracles contain rich materials in regard to the doctrine of God, Christology, conceptions of the history of Jesus, and eschatology; but, apart from the old Jewish oracles, this material belongs to several centuries and has not yet been reliably sifted.

CHAPTER VI.