THE FEDERALIST PAPERS

By
Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay,
James Madison

CONTENTS

[ FEDERALIST No. 1. General Introduction ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 2. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 3. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 4. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 5. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 6. Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 7. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 8. The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 9. The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 10. The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 11. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 12. The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 13. Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 14. Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 15. The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 16. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 17. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 18. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 19. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 20. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 21. Other Defects of the Present Confederation ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 22. The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 23. The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 24. The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 25. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 26. The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 27. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 28. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 29. Concerning the Militia ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 30. Concerning the General Power of Taxation ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 31. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 32. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 33. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 34. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 35. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 36. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 37. Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 38. The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 39. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 40. On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 41. General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 42. The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 43. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 44. Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 45. The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 46. The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 47. The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 48. These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 49. Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 50. Periodical Appeals to the People Considered ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 51. The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 52. The House of Representatives ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 53. The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 54. The Apportionment of Members Among the States ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 55. The Total Number of the House of Representatives ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 56. The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 57. The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 58. Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 59. Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 60. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 61. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 62. The Senate ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 63. The Senate Continued ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 64. The Powers of the Senate ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 65. The Powers of the Senate Continued ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 66. Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 67. The Executive Department ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 68. The Mode of Electing the President ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 69. The Real Character of the Executive ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 70. The Executive Department Further Considered ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 71. The Duration in Office of the Executive ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 72. The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 73. The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 74. The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 75. The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 76. The Appointing Power of the Executive ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 77. The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 78. The Judiciary Department ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 79. The Judiciary Continued ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 80. The Powers of the Judiciary ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 81. The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 82. The Judiciary Continued. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 83. The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 84. Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered. ]

[ FEDERALIST No. 85. Concluding Remarks ]

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