I. RUSSIA AND FRANCE ADVANCING.
Influx of treaty Powers—Diversion of Chinese foreign policy into new channels—Aggrandisement of Russia—And France—At the expense of China—Affecting whole policy of China for thirty years—The rise of German influence—And Japanese.
Up to this stage the foreign relations of China have been traced from what is practically a single point of view—the English—without sensible distortion of their true proportions. But the events of 1857-60, and the treaties by which they were crowned, introduced new factors and a wider ramification of international connections. The arms of England and France opened the door to an influx of Powers eager to reap where they had not sown; and though the full effect was not realised till many years later, the shifting of foreign intercourse from an essentially Anglo-Chinese to a Sino-cosmopolitan basis became a potential reality on the day that Peking surrendered to the Allies. Foreseeing such a result, the negotiators of the treaties of 1858 advisedly refrained from pressing the Chinese Government more than was essential to the freedom of commerce, on the ground that other Powers less restrained than the authors of the treaties by a sense of moral responsibility might take undue advantage of concessions extorted from the vanquished. This prevision has been borne out by events, for the original "three treaty Powers" soon became thirteen, and the old solicitude for the conservation of China was gradually discovered to be confined to the small minority who had a substantial commercial stake in the country. With the increase in their number there naturally also appeared diversity of interest, scarce perceptible in the beginning, but ever widening with the progress of events until at length a stage of violent antagonism in the policy of the Powers was reached. The division among their enemies, which Chinese statesmen have deplored their inability to compass, has thus been brought about without their aid; but so far from realising the Chinese dream of ruling the barbarians, the division has only exposed the empire to the ravages of rival spoilers.
It is impossible to do more than glance at the several channels into which the foreign relations of China have branched off since 1860. Yet they intersect each other at so many points as to form a network which can only be intelligently considered as a whole. The quasi-biographical form of the present work may be appropriately dropped, so far as China is concerned, with the beginning of 1870, when the more immediate subject of it disappears from the stage of action to reappear as a perspicacious critic surveying the scene from a distant but commanding standpoint.
Two developments of far-reaching importance found their proximate starting-point, though not their origin, in the crisis which laid China prostrate in 1858 and 1860. These were the extension of the Russian empire to the Pacific Ocean, and the creation of that Asiatic empire which had been the dream of France for two centuries. China being by these vast territorial aggressions placed between the upper and the nether millstone, the anticipated advance of the two Powers has exerted an influence on her destiny scarcely less potent than the Japanese war itself, with which it so effectively co-operated. The soldier-statesmen of Russia foreseeing, what the war of 1854-55 was soon to demonstrate, that the sea route to their Pacific possessions was at the mercy of the maritime Powers, resolved to make a dash for a line of communication by land, and in pursuance of this adventurous conception forced their way down the Amur in spite of the feeble remonstrance of the Chinese wardens of the marches. What was thus taken by the strong hand in 1854 was formally ceded in 1858, when, first, the Amur province, with the free navigation of the river, and, next, an undefined condominium in the Usuri province, were granted by treaty to Russia. This was but a step towards the absolute cession, two years later, of that territory, including the whole Manchurian sea-coast, 600 miles in length. These extensive cessions, giving Russia the command of North-Eastern Asia, were extorted from China while in extremis as a direct result of the Anglo-French victories.
So with the French establishment in the south-eastern section of the Continent. The expedition sent to the Far East in conjunction with that of Great Britain was, on completion of its work in China, withdrawn to Cochin-China, and, in an alliance of brief duration with Spain, invaded that dependency of the empire of Annam—a vassal of China—and captured Saigon. The Spanish partnership being thereupon dissolved, the French empire of "Indo-China" was inaugurated with a free hand. Zeal for religion was the motive of the invasion: "The emperor wished to put a stop to the constantly recurring persecutions of Christians in Cochin-China, and to secure them the efficacious protection of France." The record of the phenomenal progress of the new French empire since the treaty of Saigon in 1862 has been related by many eloquent pens. M. F. Garnier, the heroic explorer; M. de Carné, his colleague; M. Lanier, M. Deschamps, M. de Lanessan, and a host of enthusiastic French writers, have depicted in glowing terms not only the process, but the motives and aspirations, of the French "empire-builders."[21]
The pressure, latent and active, of these two powerful neighbours has given its tone to the policy of China during thirty years, and in such a way that her relations with the commercial nations who did not menace her integrity have been relegated to a secondary place.
The new German influence in the Far East, which had its modest beginnings in the treaties so reluctantly concluded by the Japanese and Chinese in 1861, has grown in importance pari passu with the rapid development of the German empire itself, ably seconded, it must always be allowed, by the personal qualities of the Ministers who have been successively chosen to represent the Fatherland at Peking and Tokio. The first resident Minister to China was Baron Rehfues, who opened the Legation in Peking in 1866, under the treaty of 1861.
Another nation destined to play a leading rôle among the Powers in the Western Pacific was during the same period rising like the sun in the eastern sky. Nor was it very long before the nascent Power of Japan began to make its weight felt in the conflicts and concerts of the Far Eastern world.
It is obvious that under these various influences operating from without, and the reflex action set up within the State itself, the character of China as a political and diplomatic entity could not any longer be what it had been in the years before the war. What had been simple became complex; no international issue could be raised in an isolated form; nor could China make any move, whether voluntary or involuntary, without facing the critical observation of many interested parties. This multiple responsibility to Powers by no means at one in their aims, and each assuming over her a status of superiority, could have no other effect than to reduce to nullity any efforts China might make either to improve herself or please the Powers. It was impossible to please them all. Decades before the Japanese war, more than one of them had offered her armed assistance in thwarting the designs of a third,—which things Chinese statesmen pondered in silence.