CHAPTER XIII
THE SECOND ATTEMPT AND RETURN. PREPARING FOR
THE THIRD ATTEMPT. REWRITING THE ORDERS.
GERMAN OPTIMISM
I will not weary the reader with a repetition of our life at the Swin—the second edition differed little from the first. There were still chances of a new start during the present period. The weather, however, was most unkind. We summoned up all the patience that we could muster. The news from the battle front in France was becoming increasingly serious. We felt that somehow or other, we didn't quite know how, a successful operation on our part might help to stem the German advance. If only we could get started!
At last our second chance came. The wind had changed back to a northerly direction. The "stand-by" order was received. "Carry on" followed. Once again we started off, as enthusiastic as ever; if our previous determination had not increased it was because no increase was possible.
Hindustan cheered us out again, and, in our inmost thoughts, we thanked them. Soon after we had cleared the Swin anchorage a destroyer hove in sight and signalled that she had a letter for Vindictive. We ordered her to stop a couple of miles ahead of us and transfer the letter by boat. Commander Brock came on board with it; we had thought he had been prevented from joining us. "We must push in to-night," that was the tenor of the letter. The message was passed round the ship and down the line of blockships. It reflected our own feelings—"We must push in to-night." Once again we passed many merchant vessels with their crews crowded on deck to view the unusual spectacle which we made. The wind had gradually increased in strength, an uncomfortable sea was rising. The prospects appeared none too rosy for the small craft. Some twenty miles had been covered when the almost inevitable became a certainty—the operation was once more postponed.
The open sea had become so rough as to render the use of small craft quite impracticable. There was nothing for it, back we had to go once more.
Little enough was said on the subject this time; we were learning to hide disappointment. The reaction from all our hopeful optimism caused us to wonder if any other chance would be offered us. Surely this enterprise was not to be stillborn after all the signs of life that it had shown. It is advisable, perhaps, not to analyse our thoughts too fully, but they tended to breed fatalism. We tried to look upon the turn of events as a "rub of the green"; we endeavoured to appear unruffled.
The men were wonderful; their behaviour was beyond praise. If there was any discontent it was carefully hidden. The Vice-Admiral visited us at the earliest opportunity and explained the situation to the officers and men. That gracious act was enormously appreciated; we all felt, more than ever, that if he could not bring off this operation nobody would ever do so.
The first period of favourable tides was over. The next period would not commence yet awhile. Drills and practices were restarted. A second battleship was sent to the Swin to relieve the congestion in the Hindustan. Vindictive, Iris, and Daffodil had no accommodation for the Marine storming parties, which had to be transferred to the Hindustan and her sister depot. The waiting period was not wasted.
Lessons of First Attempt
Opportunity now offered for embodying in the instructions the various suggestions for improvements. Each was fully discussed and considered from all points of view. Even further experiments with the artificial fog were carried out. It was then decided to rewrite all the previous instructions which required modification as a result of the experience gained during the two attempts. This was a welcome change from the confined life on board. The Admiralty clerk reappeared at the Admiral's office.
A most important discussion was held concerning the chances of the secret having leaked out. At first sight one might have thought that the operation ought to be cancelled altogether, for had we not been seen, and almost certainly reported, by a large number of neutral vessels? Such an eventuality was by no means outside the pale of probability, and we also had to reckon with the chances of having been seen by German aircraft and submarines. Nevertheless, this obstacle to our future success was imaginary rather than real. To begin with, what value would have been placed on such reports? It would naturally depend upon the source of the information.
Submarines or aircraft might have been mistaken; anyhow, their reports could hardly provide conclusive evidence of our intentions. Information received by the Germans from neutral sources might have been specially intended to mislead. The probable effect of such latter "intelligence" depends to a certain extent on the psychology of the recipient. The Germans were past-masters at chicanery; the first inclination of such individuals is to disbelieve others; a prevaricator always labours under that disadvantage.
There could, therefore, be no certainty that our two abortive attempts had given birth to a new obstacle. History relates many failures resulting from the imagination of difficulties which had no real existence in fact. One of the best examples, curiously enough, was connected with the Walcheren expedition, where the imaginary difficulties had loomed large, only a few miles to the eastward of Zeebrugge. It is no exaggeration to state that if we had allowed our imagination to create half the obstacles which might have existed we should never have decided upon the enterprise at all.
The drafting, typing, duplication, and distribution of the new editions of instructions were completed in two or three days. The dates of the next period were worked out and a new time table issued.
It has already been shown that the chances of being discovered en route largely depended upon the number of daylight hours which would be involved in the passage of the expedition. Daylight, in itself, does not necessarily imply a high degree of visibility. If the weather were sufficiently misty to reduce visibility, without militating against safe navigation, daylight would not be so disadvantageous. In making out the period, therefore, we included an extra day at its commencement for use if misty weather obtained; should that day be clear it would be inadvisable to attempt the enterprise. That decision was strictly in accordance with the principles on which the enterprise was based. But principles are intended as guides; it is a false idea that they may never be departed from. In an operation of this description, depending upon a rather delicate combination of circumstances and conditions, it was necessary to consider just how far we should be justified in ignoring one unsuitable condition if all others were favourable.
Once more we summoned up all the patience that we could muster.
Their Lordships Visit
The First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Eric Geddes, accompanied by Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, who had relieved Lord Jellicoe as First Sea Lord, paid a visit to Vindictive and some of the blockships; it is probable that they were exceedingly struck at the optimism of all concerned.
An incident, illustrating the spirit of the men, may be worth recording. It came to my ears that certain of the engine-room personnel did not propose to remain below whilst the ship was alongside the Mole; as they put it "they intended to land on the Mole for a run round." Of course, that would never do, so the ship's company were informed that, however much their spirits might actuate their intentions, any man who left his post during the action would be summarily dealt with. They knew what that meant. Shortly afterwards some stokers requested to interview their officer. The interview was somewhat as follows: "Me and my mates, sir, understand that we ain't allowed to leave the stokehold and have a go at the Hun," said their spokesman. "Of course not," interposed the officer; "you would be deserting your post in action." "Well, sir," continued the stoker, "we wants to know if we may guard the prisoners in the stokehold." The request was not granted; it spelt too much discomfort for the prisoners.
Soon the first possible date drew near.
In view of the eventual results it may be of interest to recall the fact that on April 19th (three days before we actually started) Admiral von Capelle, Secretary for the German Navy, made a speech in which he said: "Even the greatest pessimist must say that the position of our opponents is deteriorating rapidly, and that any doubt regarding the final success of the U-boat war is unjustified."
I wonder if von Capelle remained an optimist much longer.
Another German of high culture and position had previously said, "Questions of right or wrong, justification or no justification, do not concern us. The chief thing is that we are the stronger, and that if anyone questions this fact we should smite him on the mouth till he grows wiser."
Well, we did question the fact, and not only questioned it, but we put it to the test.