FOOTNOTES:
[1] Die Philosophie der Griechen, III., a, pp. 5 f.
[2] If I remember rightly, Polybius makes the same observation, but I cannot recall the exact reference.
[3] Sophist, 243, A.
[4] See especially the interesting note on the subject in his recent work, Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt, Vorrede, pp x. ff.
[5] Plato, Rep. IV., 435, E; Aristotle, Pol. VII., 1327, b., 29.
[6] Nem. III. 40-42. (Donaldson.)
[7] Nem. VI. sub in.
[8] The word differentiation (ἑτεροίωσις) seems to have been first used by Diogenes Apolloniates. Simpl. Phys. fol. 326 ff., quoted by Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil., p. 126 (6th ed.)
[9] Ritter and Preller, p. 112.
[10] Ritter and Preller p. 8.
[11] Die Philosophie der Griechen, I. p. 401 (3rd ed.)
[12] Ritter and Preller, p. 54.
[13] Ritter and Preller, p. 54.
[14] Ib.
[15] Metaph. I. v.
[16] Ritter and Preller, p. 63.
[17] Op. cit. p. 475.
[18] The tendency which it has been attempted to characterise as a fundamental moment of Greek thought can only be called analytical in default of a better word. It is a process by which two related terms are at once parted and joined together by the insertion of one or more intermediary links; as, for instance, when a capital is inserted between column and architrave, or when a proposition is demonstrated by the interposition of a middle term between its subject and predicate. The German words Vermitteln and Vermittelung express what is meant with sufficient exactitude. They play a great part in Hegel’s philosophy, and it will be remembered that Hegel was the most Hellenic of modern thinkers. So understood, there will cease to be any contradiction between the Eleates and Greek thought generally, at least from one point of view, as their object was to fill up the vacant spaces supposed to separate one mode of existence from another.
[19] Ritter and Preller, p. 62.
[20] For the originals of this and the succeeding quotations from Heracleitus, see Ritter and Preller, pp. 14-23.
[21] Τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος ὢν, τοῖς δ’ ἔργοις ὕστερος. Metaph. I. iii.
[22] Ritter and Preller, p. 90.
[23] Prantl, Aristoteles’ Physik, p. 484.
[24] Ritter and Preller, p. 11.
[25] Since the above remarks were first published, Mr. Wallace, in his work on Epicureanism, has stated that, according to Epicurus, ‘the very animals which are found upon the earth have been made what they are by slow processes of selection and adaptation through the experience of life;’ and he proceeds to call the theory in question, ‘ultra-Darwinian’ (Epicureanism, p. 114). Lucretius—the authority quoted—says nothing about ‘slow processes of adaptation,’ nor yet does he say that the animals were ‘made what they are’ by ‘selection,’ but by the procreative power of the earth herself. Picking out a ready-made pair of boots from among a number which do not fit is a very different process from manufacturing the same pair by measure, or wearing it into shape. To call the Empedoclean theory ultra-Darwinian, is like calling the Democritean or Epicurean theory of gravitation ultra-Newtonian. And Mr. Wallace seems to admit as much, when he proceeds to say on the very same page, ‘Of course in this there is no implication of the peculiarly Darwinian doctrine of descent or development of kind from kind with structure modified and complicated to meet changing circumstances.’ (By the way, this is not a peculiarly Darwinian doctrine, for it originated with Lamarck, spontaneous variation and selection being the additions made by the English naturalists). But what becomes then of the ‘slow processes of adaptation’ and the ‘ultra-Darwinian theory’ spoken of just before?
[26] By a curious coincidence, the atomic constitution of matter still finds its strongest proof in optical phenomena. Light is propagated by transverse waves, and such waves are only possible in a discontinuous medium. But if the luminiferous ether is composed of discrete particles, so also must be the matter which it penetrates in all directions.
[27] Ar. De Gen. et Corr., I., viii., 325, b, 5.
[28] Eurip. Frag. Incert. Fab., CXXXVI. Didot, p. 850. [I am indebted for this version to Miss A. M. F. Robinson, the translator of the Crowned Hippolytus.]
[29] Curtius, Griechische Geschichte, 342-5 (3rd ed.).
[30] Zeller, op. cit., p. 791.
[31] Ar. De Coelo, III., iii., 302, a, 28.
[32] M. Antoninus, XII., 28.
[33] Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., III., b, p. 669.
[34] Even regulating the calendar by the sun instead of by the moon seems to have been regarded as a dangerous and impious innovation by the more conservative Athenians—at least judging from the half-serious pleasantry of Aristophanes, Nub., 608-26. (Dindorf.)
[35] σύμβολον δ’ οὔ πώ τις ἐπιχθονίων πιστὸν ἀμφὶ πράξιος ἐσσομένας εὗρεν θεόθεν.—Ol., XII., 8-9.
[36] Frag., 102.
[37] Griechische Geschichte, ii., 112-3 (3rd ed.).
[38] Aristophanes, Vesp., 1176.
[39] Herod., VII., 204; IX., 64.
[40] Agam., 750-71.
[41] Ib., 311.
[42] Ol., XIII., 17 (Donaldson).
[43] ‘Thou shalt not take that which is mine, and may I do to others as I would that they should do to me’ (Plato, Legg., 913, A. Jowett’s Transl., vol. V., p. 483). Isocrates makes a king addressing his governors say: ‘You should be to others what you think I should be to you’ (Nicocles, 49). And again: ‘Do not to others what it makes you angry to suffer yourselves’ (Ibid., 61). A similar observation is attributed to Thales, doubtless by an anachronism (Diogenes Laertius, I., i., 36).
[44] We gladly avail ourselves of the masterly translation given by Prof. Jebb. The whole of this splendid passage will be found in his Attic Orators, vol. II., pp. 78-79.
[45] Symposium, 211, C; Jowett’s Transl., vol. II.
[46] Aesch., Sep. con. Theb., 592.
[47] Legg., 727, E; Jowett’s Transl., V, 299.
[48] See Plato’s Charmides; and Euripides’ Medea, 635 (Dindorf).
[49] Pindar uses καιρός and μέτρον as synonymous terms.
[50] Opp. et D., 271.
[51] Hom. Il., IV., 160, 235; VII., 76, 411; XVI., 386. Hes., Opp. et D., 265. These references are copied from Welcker, Griechische Götterlehre, I., p. 178, q. v.
[52] See Maine’s Ancient Law, chap. X., The Early History of Delict and Crime.
[53] Preller, Griechische Mythologie, I., p. 523 (3rd ed.), with which cf. Welcker, op. cit., I., 234; and Mr. Walter Pater’s Demeter and Persephone, and A Study of Dionysus, in the Fortnightly Review for Jan., Feb., and Dec. 1876. From their popular character, the country gods were favoured by the despots (Curtius, Gr. Gesch., I., p. 338).
[54] Cf. Wordsworth—
‘Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,
And the most ancient heavens through thee are fresh and strong.’
Ode to Duty.
[55] Pindar, Olymp., II., 57 ff.; and Fragm., 1-4 (Donaldson).
[56] Sep. con. Theb., 662-71.
[57] Phoenissae, 503-23.
Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλῳ γ’ ὑπακούσαιμεν τῶν νῦν μετεωροσοφιστῶν
πλὴν η Προδίκῳ, τῷ μὲν σοφίας καὶ γνώμης οὕνεκα κ.τ.λ.—
Nub., 361-2. Cf. Av., 692.
[59] Plato, Protagoras, 337, D; Jowett’s Transl., vol. I., p. 152.
[60] Nem., VI., sub. in.
[61] Prom., 518.
[62] Phoenissae, 536-47. There is a delicious parody of this method in the Clouds. A creditor asks Strepsiades, who has been taking lessons in philosophy, to pay him the interest on a loan. Strepsiades begs to know whether the sea is any fuller now than it used to be. ‘No,’ replies the other, ‘for it would not be just,’ (οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον πλείον εἶναι). ‘Then, you wretch,’ rejoins his debtor, ‘do you suppose that the sea is not to get any fuller although all the rivers are flowing into it, and that your money is to go on increasing?’ (1290-95.)
[63] Xenophon, Memor., IV., iv., 19.
[64] Pol., I., ii.
[65] The Hippias Minor.
[66] Diog. L., IX., viii., 54.
[67] Diog. L., IX., viii., 51.
[68] Plato, Protagoras, 327; Jowett’s Transl., vol. I., p. 140. On the superior morality which accompanies advancing civilisation, as evinced by the great increase of mutual trust, see Maine’s Ancient Law, pp. 306-7.
[69] This point is noticed by Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., II., 22.
[70] This phase of Greek life is well illustrated by the addresses of Theognis to Cyrnus.
[71] Eristicism had also points of contact with the philosophies of Parmenides and Socrates which will be indicated in a future chapter.
[72] Ph. d. Gr., I., 903 (3rd ed.).
[73] See Plato’s Meno, sub. in.
[74] Lord Beaconsfield recently [written in February 1880] spoke of the Balkans as forming an ‘intelligible’ frontier for Turkey. Continental telegrams substituted ‘natural frontier.’ The change was characteristic and significant.
[75] Aristoph., Pax, 697.
[76] ‘As Mr. Grote remarks, there is no reason to suspect any greater moral corruption in the age of Demosthenes than in the age of Pericles.’ (The Dialogues of Plato, vol. IV., p. 380.) We do not remember that Grote commits himself to such a sweeping statement, nor was it necessary for his purpose to do so. No one would have been more surprised than Demosthenes himself to hear that the Athenians of his generation equalled the contemporaries of Pericles in public virtue. (Cf. Grote’s Plato, II., 148.)
[77] Geschichte der Entwickelung der Griechischen Philosophie, I., p. 204.
[78] Philosophie d. Gr., I., p. 943 (3rd ed.).
[79] The invention of memoir-writing is claimed by Prof. Mahaffy (Hist. Gr. Lit., II., 42) for Ion of Chios and his contemporary Stesimbrotus. But—apart from their questionable authenticity—the sketches attributed to these two writers do not seem to have aimed at presenting a complete picture of a single individual, which is what was attempted with considerable success in Xenophon’s Memorabilia.
[80] Cf. Havet, Le Christianisme et ses Origines, I., 167.
[81] Gesch. d. Phil., II., 47.
[82] The oracle quoted in the Apologia Socratis attributed to Xenophon praises Socrates not for wisdom but for independence, justice, and temperance. Moreover, the work in question is held to be spurious by nearly every critic.
[83] Mem., IV., vi., 1.
[84] Mem., IV., iv., 10.
[85] Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., II., a, 103, note 3 sub fin.
[86] It may possibly be asked, Why, if Plato gave only an ideal picture of Socrates, are we to accept his versions of the Sophistic teaching as literally exact? The answer is that he was compelled, by the nature of the case, to create an imaginary Socrates, while he could have no conceivable object in ascribing views which he did not himself hold to well-known historical personages. Assuming an unlimited right of making fictitious statements for the public good, his principles would surely not have permitted him wantonly to calumniate his innocent contemporaries by foisting on them odious theories for which they were not responsible. Had nobody held such opinions as those attributed to Thrasymachus in the Republic there would have been no object in attacking them; and if anybody held them, why not Thrasymachus as well as another? With regard to the veracity of the Apologia, Grote, in his work on Plato (I. 291), quotes a passage from Aristeides the rhetor, stating that all the companions of Socrates agreed about the Delphic oracle, and the Socratic disclaimer of knowledge. This, however, proves too much, for it shows that Aristeides quite overlooked the absence of any reference to either point in Xenophon, and therefore cannot be trusted to give an accurate report of the other authorities.
[87] Ph. d. Gr., II., a, 93 ff.
[88] In the conversation with Hippias already referred to.
[89] Mem., III., ix., 4.
[90] Mem., III., vi.
[91] Mem., IV., ii.
[92] Mem., IV., iii.
[93] Mem., III., ix., 10.
[94] Mem., IV., vi., 14.
[95] Xenophon, Mem., III., vii. We may incidentally notice that this passage is well worth the attention of those who look on the Athenian Dêmos as an idle and aristocratic body, supported by slave labour.
[96] Metaph., XIII., iv.
[97] Mem., I., iv.
[98] ‘Il sait que, dans l’intérêt même du bien, il ne faut pas imposer le bien d’une manière trop absolue, le jeu libre de la liberté étant la condition de la vie humaine.... poursuite en toutes choses du bien public, non des applaudissements.’—Renan, Marc-Aurèle, pp. 18, 19.
[99] Il., IX., 337.
[100] Ib., XXI., 106.
[101] In the preface to the Data of Ethics.
[102] Mem., III., x.
[103] Curtius, Griechische Geschichte, III., 526-30 (3rd ed.), where, however, the revolution in art is attributed to the influence of the Sophists.
[104] Xenoph., Oeconom., iii., 12.
[105] Mure, History of Grecian Literature, IV., 451.
[106] Mem., III., xi.
[107] Oeconom., vii., 4 ff.
[108] Mem., II., i.
[109] Gesch. d. Ph., II., 100 ff.
[110] Written in the spring of 1880. The allusion is to Father Didon, who was at that time rusticated in Corsica.
[111] Ph. d. Gr., II., a, 192.
[112] In the Apologia, attributed to Xenophon.
[113] Hist. of Gr. Lit., IV., App. A.
[114] The Dialogues of Plato translated into English. By B. Jowett, M. A. 2nd ed., 1875. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen. Zweiter Theil, erste Abtheilung. Plato und die alte Academie, 3rd ed., 1875.
[115] Krohn, Der Platonische Staat, Halle 1876. [I know this work only through Chiapelli, Della Interpretazione panteistica di Platone, Florence, 1881.]
[116] III., 418.
[117] Phaedr., p. 274 B ff.
[118] See Zeller’s note on the θεία μοῖρα, op. cit. p. 497.
[119] The Charmides, Laches, Euthyphro, and Lysis.
[120] P. 49, A ff. Zeller, 142.
[121] Charmides, 161 E; Lysis, 212 C.
[122] Pensieri, lxxxiv and lxxxv.
[123] Repub., 586, A. Jowett, III, p. 481.
[124] Zeller, op. cit., 777-8.
[125] Repub., VIII. and IX.
[126] Xenophon, Mem., III., v., 18.
[127] Gorgias, 515, C., ff. Jowett, II., 396-400.
[128] Theaetêtus, 173, A. Jowett, IV., 322.
[129] The lecture on Plato in Representative Man.
[130] Legg. 819, D. Jowett, V., 390.
[131] Theaet., 144. Jowett’s Transl.
[132] This expression is borrowed from Prof. Bain. See the chapter on Association by Resemblance in The Senses and the Intellect.
[133] Legg. 716, C.
[134] See the chapter on the Metaphysics of Sexual Love in Schopenhauer’s Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.
[135] Cf. for the whole following passage Havet, Le Christianisme et ses Origines, I., 286-8. It was, however, written before the author had become acquainted with M. Havet’s work.
[136] In order to avoid misconception it may be as well to mention that the above remarks apply only to mystical passion assuming the form of religion; they have nothing to do with intellectual and moral convictions.
[137] Phaedr., 266, B. Jowett, II., 144. According to Teichmüller (Literarische Fehden im vierten Jahrhundert vor Chr., p. 135)—the god here spoken of is no other than Plato himself. Even granting the pantheistic interpretation of Platonism to be true, this seems a somewhat strained application of it.
[138] Adapting Plato’s formula to modern ideas we might say: A literary education: knowledge of the world: mathematics: physical science.
[139] Phaedo, 69, A. Jowett, I., 442.
[140] Repub., I., 348, B ff.; Zeller, op. cit., 507-8.
[141] See especially the argument with Callicles in the Gorgias.
[142] Repub., II., 379, A; 380, D.
[143] Zeller, 678-8.
[144] ‘Un monde qui est l’injustice même.’—Ernest Renan, L’Église Chrétienne, p. 139.
[145] Cf. Lysis, 210, E. Jowett, I., 54.
[146] Meno, 71, E. Jowett, I., 270.
[147] Gesch. d. Ph., II., 272.
[148] Op. cit., p. 777.
[149] Timaeus, 24, A. Jowett, III., 608.
[150] Cf. the excellent remarks of Teichmüller, Lit. Fehden, p. 107.
[151] Repub., V., 471, D.
[152] He mentions as one of the worst effects of a democracy that it made them assume airs of equality with men. Repub., 563, B.; cf. 569, E. Timaeus, 90, E. It is to be feared that Plato regarded woman as the missing link.
[153] In his Vorträge und Abhandlungen, first series, p. 68.
[154] Legg., 739, B. Jowett, V., 311.
[155] [Since the above was first published, Teichmüller has brought forward new arguments to prove that it was Plato’s scheme of Communism which Aristophanes intended to satirise (Lit. Fehden, pp. 14, ff.); but I do not think that even the first half of the Republic could possibly have been composed at such an early date as that assigned to it by this learned and ingenious critic.]
[156] [Here, also, the recent arguments of Teichmüller (Lit. Fehden, p. 51) deserve attention, but they have failed to convince me that an earlier date should be assigned to the Euthydêmus.]
[157] We may even say that they are reduced to two; for Existence is a product of Sameness and Difference.
[158] Gesch. d. Ph., II., 175.
[159] In the work already referred to, Teichmüller advances the startling theory that Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics was published before the completion of the Laws, and that Plato took the opportunity thus offered him for replying to the criticisms of his former pupil. (Lit. Fehden, pp. 194-226).
[160] Legg., 887-8. Jowett, V., 456.
[161] Aristotelis Opera. Edidit Academia Regia Borussica. Berlin. 1831-70.
[162] Die Philosophie der Griechen. Zweiter Theil, Zweite Abtheilung: Aristoteles u. d. alten Peripatetiker. By Dr. Eduard Zeller. Leipzig. 1879.
[163] Aristoteles. By Christian Aug. Brandis. Berlin. 1853-57.
[164] Aristotle. By Sir Alexander Grant, Bart., LL.D. Edinburgh and London. 1877.
[165] Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle. Compiled by Edwin Wallace, M.A. Oxford and London. 1880.
[166] De la Métaphysique: Introduction à la Métaphysique d’ Aristote. By Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire. Paris. 1879.
[167] Wallace’s Outlines, preface, pp. vi-viii.
[168] As will be shown in the next chapter.
[169] Outlines, pp. 29 and 38.
[170] Zeller, op. cit., p. 513.
[171] Ibid., p. 407.
[172] Written before the appearance of Teichmüller’s Lit. Fehden (already referred to in the preceding chapter).
[173] Zeller’s opinion that all the Platonic Dialogues except the Laws were composed before Aristotle’s arrival in Athens, does not seem to be supported by any satisfactory evidence. [Since the above was first published I have found that a similar view of the Parmenides had already been maintained by Tocco (Ricerche Platoniche, p. 105); and afterwards, but independently, by Teichmüller (Neue Studien, III. 363). See Chiapelli, Della Interpretazione panteistica di Platone, p. 152.]
[174] Teichmüller infers, from certain expressions in the Panathenaicus of Isocrates, that Aristotle had returned from Mitylênê to Athens and resumed his former position as a teacher of rhetoric when the summons to Pella reached him. (Lit. Fehden, 261.)
[175] Gesch. d. Phil., II., 302.
[176] Zeller, op. cit., p. 25.
[177] Cf. Teichmüller, Lit. Fehden, 192.
[178] Zeller, p. 38.
[179] Ritter and Preller, Hist. Ph., p. 329.
[180] Zeller, p. 41, note 2.
[181] Diog. L., V., 17-21.
[182] Grant’s Aristotle, p. 7.
[183] We think, however, that Mr. Edwin Wallace has overstated the case, when he makes Aristotle say that ‘democracy is not unlikely with the spread of population to become the ultimate form of government; and may be anticipated without dread by considering that the collective voice of a people is as likely to be sound in state administration as in criticisms on art,’ pp. 57-8. In the first place, the expressions of opinion which are brought together in Mr. Wallace’s summary are separated in the original text by a considerable interval—an important circumstance when we are dealing with so inconsistent a writer; then what Aristotle says about the collective wisdom of the people, besides being advanced with extreme hesitation, is not a reassurance against any danger to be dreaded from their supremacy, but an answer to the argument that the few had a natural right to political power from their greater wealth and better education; the whole question being, in this connexion, one of political justice, not of political expediency; finally, not only is ‘ultimate form of government’ a very strong rendering of the Greek words, but what Aristotle says on the subject in his third book is virtually retracted in the fifth, where oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny are regarded as succeeding each other in any order indifferently, and Plato (or the Platonic Socrates) is censured for assuming a constant sequence of revolutions. The explanation of this change seems to be that when Aristotle wrote his third book he was only acquainted with the history of Athens and a few other of the greater states, but that subsequently a vast collection of facts bearing on the subject came to his knowledge, showing that each form of government embraced more varieties and admitted of more mutations than he had been originally aware of; and this led to a complete recast of his opinions.
[184] Many of the topics noted are not only trite enough, but have no possible bearing on the subject under which they stand. For instance, in discussing judicial eloquence Aristotle goes into the motives for committing crime; among these are pleasurable feelings of every kind, including the remembrance of past trouble. Even the hero of a spasmodic tragedy would hardly have committed an offence for the purpose of procuring himself this form of experience.
[185] Poet., xv., p. 1454, a, 20.
Μάτην ἄρ’ εἰς γυναῖκας ἐξ ἀνδρῶν ψόγος
Ψάλλει κενὸν τόξευμα καὶ κακῶς λέγει.
αἱ δ’ εἴς’ ἀμείνους ἀρσένων, ἐγω λέγω.
Euripides, Frag. 512. (Didot.)
[187] Poet., xiii., p. 1453, a, 8.
[188] Pol., VIII., vii., p. 1342, a, 10.
[189] Zeller, p. 780.
[190] As an illustration of the stimulating effect produced by the study of Aristotle’s logic, we quote the following anecdote from the notes to Whately’s edition of Bacon’s Essays:—‘The late Sir Alexander Johnstone, when acting as temporary Governor of Ceylon (soon after its cession), sat once as judge in a trial of a prisoner for a robbery and murder; and the evidence seemed to him so conclusive, that he was about to charge the jury (who were native Cingalese) to find a verdict of guilty. But one of the jurors asked and obtained permission to examine the witnesses himself. He had them brought in one by one, and cross-examined them so ably as to elicit the fact that they were themselves the perpetrators of the crime, which they afterwards had conspired to impute to the prisoner. And they were accordingly put on their trial and convicted. Sir Alexander Johnstone was greatly struck by the intelligence displayed by this juror, the more so as he was only a small farmer, who was not known to have had any remarkable advantages of education. He sent for him, and after commending the wonderful sagacity he had shown, inquired eagerly what his studies had been. The man replied that he had never read but one book, the only one he possessed, which had long been in his family, and which he delighted to study in his leisure hours. This book he was prevailed on to show to Sir Alexander Johnstone, who put it into the hands of one who knew the Cingalese language. It turned out to be a translation into that language of a large portion of Aristotle’s Organon. It appears that the Portuguese, when they first settled in Ceylon and other parts of the East, translated into the native languages several of the works then studied in the European Universities, among which were the Latin versions of Aristotle. The Cingalese in question said that if his understanding had been in any degree cultivated and improved, it was to that book that he owed it. It is likely, however (as was observed to me [Whately] by the late Bishop Copleston), that any other book, containing an equal amount of close reasoning and accurate definition, might have answered the same purpose in sharpening the intellect of the Cingalese.’ Possibly, but not to the same effect. What the Cingalese got into his hands was a triple-distilled essence of Athenian legal procedure. The cross-examining elenchus was first borrowed by Socrates from the Athenian courts and applied to philosophical purposes; it was still further elaborated by Plato, and finally reduced to abstract rules by Aristotle; so that in using it as he did the juror was only restoring it to its original purposes.
[191] Metaph., XII., vii., p. 1072, b, 13.
[192] Eth. Nic., X., vii. (somewhat condensed).
[193] It is perfectly possible that Aristotle was not acquainted at first hand with human anatomy. But Sir A. Grant is hardly justified in observing that the words quoted above ‘do not show the hardihood of the practised dissecter’ (Aristotle, p 3). Aristotle simply takes the popular point of view in order to prove that the internal structure of the lower animals is no more offensive to the eye than that of man. And, as he took so much delight in the former, nothing but want of opportunity is likely to have prevented him from extending his researches to the latter.
[194] De Part. An., I. v.
[195] Compare the arguments in Phys., IV., ix.
[196] The hypothesis of the earth’s diurnal rotation had clearly been suggested by a celebrated passage in Plato’s Timaeus, though whether Plato himself held it is still doubtful. That he accepted the revolution of the celestial spheres is absolutely certain; but while to our minds the two beliefs are mutually exclusive, Grote thinks that Plato overlooked the inconsistency. It seems probable that the one was at first actually a generalisation from the other; it was thought that the earth must revolve because the crystal spheres revolved; then the new doctrine, thus accidentally struck out, was used to destroy the old one.
[197] De Coel., II., viii., 290, a, 26.
[198] Zeller, p. 469.
[199] De Sens., vi., 446, a, 26.
[200] De Coel., I., viii., 277, b, 2.
[201] De Respir., i. and ii.
[202] De Gen. An., I., xvii.
[203] Outlines, p. 30.
[204] There is a passage in the Politics (I., ii., sub. in.) in which Aristotle distinctly inculcates the method of studying things by observing how they are first produced, and how they grow; but this is quite inconsistent with the more deliberate opinion referred to in the text (De Part. An., I., i., p. 640, a, 10). Perhaps, in writing the first book of the Politics he was more immediately under the influence of Plato, who preferred the old genetic method in practice, though not in theory.
[205] Meteor., II., iii., 357, a, 15 ff.
[206] Hist. An., IX., xxxix., sub fin.
[207] De Part. An., III., iv., sub in.
[208] This characterisation applies neither to the Antigone nor to the Oedipus in Colônus, the first and the last extant dramas of Sophocles. The reason is that the one is still half Aeschylean, and the other distinctly an imitation of Euripides.
[209] Cf. the memorable declaration of Mr. F. Pollock: ‘To me it amounts to a contradiction in terms to speak of unknowable existence or unknowable reality in an absolute sense. I cannot tell what existence means if not the possibility of being known or perceived.’—Spinoza, p. 163.
[210] Aristoteles von d. Zeugung u. Entwickelung d. Thiere. Aubert u. Wimmer, Einleitung, p. 15.
[211] De Gen. An., II., iii., 736, b, 1.
[212] Ibid., I., xviii., 725, b, 25.
[213] De Respir., 477, a, 18.
[214] De Part. An., I., vii., sub. in.
[215] Ibid., II., x., 656, a, 4.
[216] Ibid., IV., vi., 683, a, 25.
[217] Ibid., II., i.
[218] Ibid., IV., v., 682, a, 8; De Long., vi., 467, a, 18; De Ingr. An., vii., 707, a, 24.
[219] De Part. An., II., ix., 664, b, 11; Zeller, p. 522.
[220] Hist. An., VIII., i., sub in.
[221] Zeller, p. 553.
[222] Phys., II., viii., p. 198, b, 24.
[223] The late Father Secchi, for example.
[224] Phys., II., iv., p. 196, a, 28; De Coel., II., xii.
[225] Phys., II., viii., p. 199, b, 14.
[226] Metaph., I., iii., sub in.; Anal. Post., II., xi., sub in. Bekker. (cap. x., in the Tauchnitz ed.); Phys. II., iii.; De Gen. An., I., i. sub in.
[227] Metaph., VIII., iv., p. 1044, b, 1; De Gen. An., I., i., p, 715, a, 6; ib. II., i., 732, a, 4; Phys., II., vii., p. 198, a, 24 ff.
[228] Phys., II., iii., p. 195, a, 32 ff.; Metaph., IX., viii., p. 1049, b, 24.
[229] That is, according to the traditional view, which, however, will have to be considerably modified if we accept the conclusions embodied in Teichmüller’s Literarische Fehden.
[230] Parmen., 130, A ff.; Tim., 28, A.
[231] As we may infer from a passage in the Rhetoric (II., ii., p. 1379, a, 35), where partisans of the Idea are said to be exasperated by any slight thrown on their favourite doctrine.
[232] Repeated in the Metaphysics, I., ix., p. 993, a, 1.
[233] This may seem inconsistent with our former assertion, that Hegel holds in German philosophy a place analogous to that held by Aristotle in Greek philosophy. Such analogies, however, are always more or less incomplete; and, so far as he attributes a self-moving power to ideas, Hegel is a Platonist rather than an Aristotelian. Similarly, as an evolutionist, Mr. Herbert Spencer stands much nearer to early Greek thought than to Aristotle, whom, in other respects, he so much resembles.
[234] Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., II., b, 297 f.
[235] Metaph. IV., iii. and viii.
[236] Ibid. VI., ii., p. 1026, b, 21.
[237] Metaph., VI., iv., p. 1027, b, 29.
[238] Ibid., VI., iv.
[239] Ibid., VI., ii., sub in.; VII., i., sub in.; Topic., I., ix.
[240] These are τί, ποιόν, ποσόν, ποῦ, ποτέ, and πῶς. Τί is associated with πρός in the question πρὸς τί, which has no simple English equivalent. Apparently it was suggested to Aristotle by ποσόν, how much? in connexion with which it means, in relation to what standard? If we were told that a thing was double, we should ask, double what? Again, the Greeks had a simply compound question, τί παθών, meaning, what was the matter with him? or, what made him do it? From this Aristotle extracted πάσχειν, a wider notion than our passion, meaning whatever is done or happens to anything; which again would suggest ποιεῖν, what it does. Finally, πῶς, taken alone, is too vague a question for any answer, but must be taken in its simplest compounds πῶς διακείμενον and πῶς ἔχον, which give the two rarely-occurring categories ἔχειν and κεῖσθαι, for which it is on one occasion substituted (Soph. El., xxii., p. 178, b, 39). Διὰ τί does not figure among the categories, because it is reserved for the special analysis of οὐσία.
[241] As Grote has shown in his chapter on the Categories.
[242] Eth. Nic., I., iv., p. 1096, a, 24, where six are enumerated.
[243] Metaph., VII. passim.
[244] Metaph., VII., vi., p. 1031, b, 18 ff.
[245] Zeller, Phil. d. Gr., II., b, 309.
[246] For the general theory of Actuality and Possibility, see Metaph., VIII.
[247] Grant’s Aristotle, p. 176.
[248] Metaph., XII., viii., p. 1074, a, 36.
[249] Grant’s Aristotle, p. 176.
[250] ‘The rational attitude of a thinking mind towards the supernatural, whether in natural or revealed religion, is that of scepticism, as distinguished from belief on the one hand and atheism on the other.’—Mill’s Essays on Religion, p. 242.
[251] Grant’s Aristotle, p. 177.
[252] τὸ δ’ εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδενί· οὐ γὰρ γένος τὸ ὄν.—An. Post., II., vii., p. 92, b, 13.
[253] Metaph., XIII., x.
[254] ‘Non pensar oltre lei [la terra] essere un corpo senza alma e vita et anche feccia tra le sustanze corporali.’ Giordano Bruno, Cena de le Ceneri, p. 130 (Opere, ed. Wagner). ‘Non dovete stimar ... che il corpo terreno sia vile e più degli altri ignobile.’—De l’Infinito Universo e Mondi, p. 54 (ib.).
[255] This conjecture of Empedocles deserves more attention than it has as yet received. It illustrates once more the superior insight of the early thinkers as compared with Aristotle.
[256] De Coelo, II., 1.
[257] Lewes, quoted by Zeller, p. 524.
[258] So Trendelenburg, Brandis, Kampe, and apparently also Zeller. Grote speaks of it rather vaguely as an intelligence pervading the celestial sphere. Schwegler vacillates between the theological and the psychological explanation.
[259] The last chapter of the Posterior Analytics sets forth a much more developed and definite theory of the process by which general ideas are formed. We think that it was composed at a considerably later date than the rest of the work, and probably after the treatise on the Soul, to which we should almost suspect an allusion in the word πάλαι (p. 100, a, 14), did philology permit. The reference can hardly be to the first part of the chapter (as is generally supposed); nor has the subject under discussion been touched on in any other part of the Analytics.
[260] Grote and Kampe think that Aristotle assigns a portion of aether as an extended, if not precisely a material, substratum to the rational soul; but the arguments of Zeller (p. 569) seem decisive against this view.
[261] De Gen. An., II., iii., p. 736, b, 15.
[262] Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle, p. 45.
[263] The word θεῖον, at any rate, does not mean ‘almost God,’ for Aristotle applies it to the intelligence of bees, and also to the heavenly bodies (De Gen. An., III., x., p. 761, a, 5; De Coelo, II., xii., p. 292, b, 32).
[264] Principal Caird.
[265] Outlines, Preface, p. viii.
[266] Metaph., VII., xiii., p. 1039, a, 4.
[267] De An., III., ii., p. 426, a, 20; 425, b, 25 ff. What Aristotle means by saying that the εἶναι of object and sensation is not the same, appears from a passage in his tract on Memory (p. 450, b, 20), where he employs the illustration of a portrait and its original, which are the same, although their εἶναι is different.
[268] Metaph., IV., v., sub fin.
[269] De An., III., iv., sub fin.
[270] De An., II., ii., p. 414, a, 20.
[271] De An., III., i., p. 425, a, 13.
[272] See Zeller pp. 602-606, where the whole subject is thoroughly discussed.
[273] Anal. Pr., I., i., sub in.; ii., sub in.; Top., I., viii., Bekker (in the Tauchnitz ed., vi.).
[274] Anal. Pr., I., xxiii., 41, a, 11 (in the Tauchnitz ed., xxii., 8).
[275] This point is well brought out in F. A. Lange’s Logische Untersuchungen.
[276] Anal. Pr., I., xxxi.; Anal. Post., II., v.
[277] Metaph., IV., iii., sub in.
[278] Anal. Post., I., x.
[279] ‘Die Wissenschaft soll die Erscheinungen aus ihren Gründen erklären, welche näher in den allgemeinen Ursachen und Gesetzen zu suchen sind’ (Zeller, p. 203). ‘Induction is the method of proceeding from particular instances to general laws’ (Wallace, p. 13). ‘It seems to have been his [Aristotle’s] idea that after gathering facts up to a certain point, a flash of intuition would supervene, telling us “This is a law”’ (Grant, p. 68). Apropos of the discussion whence this last passage is extracted, we may observe that Sir A. Grant is quite mistaken in saying that Aristotle ‘omits to provide for verification.’ Aristotle is, on the contrary, most anxious to show that his theories agree with all the known facts. See in particular his memorable declaration (De Gen. An., III., x., p. 760, b, 27), that facts are more to be trusted than reasonings.
The emphasis laid by Aristotle on concepts as distinguished from laws is noticed by J. H. v. Kirchmann, in his German translation of the Metaphysics, p. 13.
[280] De An., III., vi., sub in., taken together with Anal. Post., I., vi.
[281] Anal. Post., I., xxxiv.; II., ii.
[282] Anal. Post., II., xii., p. 95, a, 36.
[283] Wallace’s Outlines, p. 14.
[284] Ibid., Preface, pp. viii.-ix.
[285] As if Mill wrote exclusively for Oxford tutors, and as if other philosophers had not constantly elucidated their arguments by concrete examples. One does not see why the village matron should be more deserving of contempt than Aristotle’s Thebans and Phocians.
[286] That is, knowledge which has never been actualised.
[287] It is a mistake to translate νόησις, as the Germans do, by Anschauung. The Nous does not intuite ideas, but is converted into and consists of them.
[288] For Analogy, see Top., II., x., sub in.; Disjunction, II., vi., sub in.; Hypothetical Reasoning, II., x., p. 115, a, 15; Method of Differences, II., xi., sub in.; Method of Residues, VI., xi., sub in.; Concomitant Variations, II., x., p. 114, b, 37; V., viii., sub in.; VI., vii., sub in. The Method of Agreement occurs An. Prior., II., xxvii., sub fin.; and An. Post., II., xiii., p. 97, b, 7.
[289] It may possibly be urged that the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics is of doubtful authenticity. Still the dilemma remains that Aristotle either omitted the most important of all moral questions from his ethics, or that he treated it in a miserably inadequate manner.
[290] Eth. Nic., V., iii.; Rhet., I., vi., p. 1362, b, 28; ix., p. 1366, b, 4.
[291] P. 753.