1.The Muḥásibís.
They are the followers of Abú `Abdalláh Ḥárith b. Asad al-Muḥásibí, who by consent of all his contemporaries was a man of approved spiritual influence and mortified passions (maqbúl al-nafas ú maqtúl al-nafs), versed in theology, jurisprudence, and mysticism. He discoursed on detachment from the world and Unification, while his outward and inward dealings (with God) were beyond reproach. The peculiarity of his doctrine is this, that he does not reckon satisfaction (riḍá) among the “stations” (maqámát), but includes it in the “states” (aḥwál). He was the first to hold this view, which was adopted by the people of Khurásán. The people of `Iráq, on the contrary, asserted that satisfaction is one of the “stations”, and that it is the extreme of trust in God (tawakkul). The controversy between them has gone on to the present day.[[110]]
Discourse on the true nature of Satisfaction and the explanation of this doctrine.
In the first place I will establish the true nature of satisfaction and set forth its various kinds; then, secondly, I will explain the real meaning of “station” (maqám) and “state” (ḥál) and the difference between them.
Satisfaction is of two kinds: (a) the satisfaction of God with Man, and (b) the satisfaction of Man with God. Divine satisfaction really consists in God’s willing that Man should be recompensed (for his good works) and in His bestowing grace (karámat) upon him. Human satisfaction really consists in Man’s performing the command of God and submitting to His decree. Accordingly, the satisfaction of God precedes that of Man, for until Man is divinely aided he does not submit to God’s decree and does not perform His command, because Man’s satisfaction is connected with God’s satisfaction and subsists thereby. In short, human satisfaction is equanimity (istiwá-yi dil) towards Fate, whether it withholds or bestows, and spiritual steadfastness (istiqámat) in regarding events, whether they be the manifestation of Divine Beauty (jamál) or of Divine Majesty (jalál), so that it is all one to a man whether he is consumed in the fire of wrath or illuminated by the light of mercy, because both wrath and mercy are evidences of God, and whatever proceeds from God is good in His eyes. The Commander of the Faithful, Husayn b. `Alí, was asked about the saying of Abú Dharr Ghifárí: “I love poverty better than riches, and sickness better than health.” Ḥusayn replied: “God have mercy on Abú Dharr! but I say that whoever surveys the excellent choice made by God for him does not desire anything except what God has chosen for him.” When a man sees God’s choice and abandons his own choice, he is delivered from all sorrow. This, however, does not hold good in absence from God (ghaybat); it requires presence with God (ḥuḍúr), because “satisfaction expels sorrows and cures heedlessness”, and purges the heart of thoughts relating to other than God and frees it from the bonds of tribulation; for it is characteristic of satisfaction to deliver (rahánídan).
From the standpoint of ethics, satisfaction is the acquiescence of one who knows that giving and withholding are in God’s knowledge, and firmly believes that God sees him in all circumstances. There are four classes of quietists: (1) those who are satisfied with God’s gift (`aṭá), which is gnosis (ma`rifat); (2) those who are satisfied with happiness (nu`má), which is this world; (3) those who are satisfied with affliction (balá), which consists of diverse probations; and (4) those who are satisfied with being chosen (iṣṭifá), which is love (maḥabbat). He who looks away from the Giver to the gift accepts it with his soul, and when he has so accepted it trouble and grief vanish from his heart. He who looks away from the gift to the Giver loses the gift and treads the path of satisfaction by his own effort. Now effort is painful and grievous, and gnosis is only realized when its true nature is divinely revealed; and inasmuch as gnosis, when sought by effort, is a shackle and a veil, such gnosis is non-cognition (nakirat). Again, he who is satisfied with this world, without God, is involved in destruction and perdition, because the whole world is not worth so much that a friend of God should set his heart on it or that any care for it should enter his mind. Happiness is happiness only when it leads to the Giver of happiness; otherwise, it is an affliction. Again, he who is satisfied with the affliction that God sends is satisfied because in the affliction he sees the Author thereof and can endure its pain by contemplating Him who sent it; nay, he does not account it painful, such is his joy in contemplating his Beloved. Finally, those who are satisfied with being chosen by God are His lovers, whose existence is an illusion alike in His anger and His satisfaction; whose hearts dwell in the presence of Purity and in the garden of Intimacy; who have no thought of created things and have escaped from the bonds of “stations” and “states” and have devoted themselves to the love of God. Their satisfaction involves no loss, for satisfaction with God is a manifest kingdom.
Section.
It is related in the Traditions that Moses said: “O God, show me an action with which, if I did it, Thou wouldst be satisfied.” God answered: “Thou canst not do that, O Moses!” Then Moses fell prostrate, worshipping God and supplicating Him, and God made a revelation to him, saying: “O son of `Imrán, My satisfaction with thee consists in thy being satisfied with My decree,” i.e. when a man is satisfied with God’s decrees it is a sign that God is satisfied with him.
Bishr Ḥáfí asked Fuḍayl b. `Iyáḍ whether renunciation (zuhd) or satisfaction was better. Fuḍayl replied: “Satisfaction, because he who is satisfied does not desire any higher stage,” i.e. there is above renunciation a stage which the renouncer desires, but there is no stage above satisfaction that the satisfied man should wish for it. Hence the shrine is superior to the gate. This story shows the correctness of Muḥásibí’s doctrine, that satisfaction belongs to the class of “states” and Divine gifts, not to the stages that are acquired (by effort). It is possible, however, that the satisfied man should have a desire. The Apostle used to say in his prayers: “O God, I ask of Thee satisfaction after the going forth of Thy ordinance (al-riḍá ba`d al-qaḍá),” i.e. “keep me in such a condition that when the ordinance comes to me from Thee, Destiny may find me satisfied with its coming”. Here it is affirmed that satisfaction properly is posterior to the advent of Destiny, because, if it preceded, it would only be a resolution to be satisfied, which is not the same thing as actual satisfaction. Abu ´l-`Abbás b. `Aṭá says: “Satisfaction is this, that the heart should consider the eternal choice of God on behalf of His creature,” i.e. whatever befalls him, he should recognize it as the eternal will of God and His past decree, and should not be distressed, but should accept it cheerfully. Ḥárith Muḥásibí, the author of the doctrine, says: “Satisfaction is the quiescence (sukún) of the heart under the events which flow from the Divine decrees.” This is sound doctrine, because the quiescence and tranquillity of the heart are not qualities acquired by Man, but are Divine gifts. And as an argument for the view that satisfaction is a “state”, not a “station”, they cite the story of `Utba al-Ghulám, who one night did not sleep, but kept saying: “If Thou chastise me I love Thee, and if Thou have mercy on me I love Thee,” i.e. “the pain of Thy chastisement and the pleasure of Thy bounty affect the body alone, whereas the agitation of love resides in the heart, which is not injured thereby”. This corroborates the view of Muḥásibí. Satisfaction is the result of love, inasmuch as the lover is satisfied with what is done by the Beloved. Abú `Uthmán Ḥírí says: “During the last forty years God has never put me in any state that I disliked, or transferred me to another state that I resented.” This indicates continual satisfaction and perfect love. The story of the dervish who fell into the Tigris is well known. Seeing that he could not swim, a man on the bank cried out to him: “Shall I tell some one to bring you ashore?” The dervish said, “No.” “Then do you wish to be drowned?” “No.” “What, then, do you wish?” The dervish replied: “That which God wishes. What have I to do with wishing?”
The Ṣúfí Shaykhs have uttered many sayings on satisfaction, which differ in phraseology but agree in the two principles that have been mentioned.
The distinction between a “State” (ḥál) and a “Station” (maqám).
You must know that both these terms are in common use among Ṣúfís, and it is necessary that the student should be acquainted with them. I must discuss this matter here, although it does not belong to the present chapter.
“Station” (maqám) denotes anyone’s “standing” in the Way of God, and his fulfilment of the obligations appertaining to that “station” and his keeping it until he comprehends its perfection so far as lies in a man’s power. It is not permissible that he should quit his “station” without fulfilling the obligations thereof. Thus, the first “station” is repentance (tawbat), then comes conversion (inábat), then renunciation (zuhd), then trust in God (tawakkul), and so on: it is not permissible that anyone should pretend to conversion without repentance, or to renunciation without conversion, or to trust in God without renunciation.
“State” (ḥál), on the other hand, is something that descends from God into a man’s heart, without his being able to repel it when it comes, or to attract it when it goes, by his own effort. Accordingly, while the term “station” denotes the way of the seeker, and his progress in the field of exertion, and his rank before God in proportion to his merit, the term “state” denotes the favour and grace which God bestows upon the heart of His servant, and which are not connected with any mortification on the latter’s part. “Station” belongs to the category of acts, “state” to the category of gifts. Hence the man that has a “station” stands by his own self-mortification, whereas the man that has a “state” is dead to “self” and stands by a “state” which God creates in him.
Here the Shaykhs are at variance. Some hold that a “state” may be permanent, while others reject this view. Ḥárith Muḥásibí maintained that a “state” may be permanent. He argued that love and longing and “contraction” (qabḍ) and “expansion” (basṭ) are “states”: if they cannot be permanent, then the lover would not be a lover, and until a man’s “state” becomes his attribute (ṣifat) the name of that “state” is not properly applied to him. It is for this reason that he holds satisfaction to be one of the “states”, and the same view is indicated by the saying of Abú `Uthmán: “During the last forty years God has never put me in a ‘state’ that I disliked.” Other Shaykhs deny that a “state” can be permanent. Junayd says: “‘States’ are like flashes of lightning: their permanence is merely a suggestion of the lower soul (nafs).” Some have said, to the same effect: “‘States’ are like their name,” i.e. they vanish almost as soon as they descend (taḥillu) on the heart. Whatever is permanent becomes an attribute, and attributes subsist in an object which must be more perfect than the attributes themselves; and this reduces the doctrine that “states” are permanent to an absurdity. I have set forth the distinction between “state” and “station” in order that you may know what is signified by these terms wherever they occur in the phraseology of the Ṣúfís or in the present work.
In conclusion, you must know that satisfaction is the end of the “stations” and the beginning of the “states”: it is a place of which one side rests on acquisition and effort, and the other side on love and rapture: there is no “station” above it: at this point mortifications (mujáhadát) cease. Hence its beginning is in the class of things acquired by effort, its end in the class of things divinely bestowed. Therefore it may be called either a “station” or a “state”.
This is the doctrine of Muḥásibí as regards the theory of Ṣúfiism. In practice, however, he made no difference, except that he used to warn his pupils against expressions and acts which, though sound in principle, might be thought evil. For example, he had a “king-bird” (sháhmurghí), which used to utter a loud note. One day Abú Ḥamza of Baghdád, who was Ḥárith’s pupil and an ecstatic man, came to see him. The bird piped, and Abú Ḥamza gave a shriek. Ḥárith rose up and seized a knife, crying, “Thou art an infidel,” and would have killed him if the disciples had not separated them. Then he said to Abú Ḥamza: “Become a Moslem, O miscreant!” The disciples exclaimed: “O Shaykh, we all know him to be one of the elect saints and Unitarians: why does the Shaykh regard him with suspicion?” Ḥárith replied: “I do not suspect him: his opinions are excellent, and I know that he is a profound Unitarian, but why should he do something which resembles the actions of those who believe in incarnation (ḥulúliyán) and has the appearance of being derived from their doctrine? If a senseless bird pipes after its fashion, capriciously, why should he behave as though its note were the voice of God? God is indivisible, and the Eternal does not become incarnate, or united with phenomena or commingled with them.” When Abú Ḥamza perceived the Shaykh’s insight, he said: “O Shaykh, although I am right in theory, nevertheless, since my action resembled the actions of heretics, I repent and withdraw.”
May God keep my conduct above suspicion! But this is impossible when one associates with worldly formalists whose enmity is aroused by anyone who does not submit to their hypocrisy and sin.