REPLY TO REV. A. J. BRAY
It is a great relief to a Freethinker to find a man among the clergy like Mr. Bray, in point of religious liberality. It is like coming upon an oasis in the waste desert of orthodox bigotry and intolerance.
Mr. Bray is the able editor of the Canadian Spectator, of Montreal; and also preaches, I believe, every Sunday in Zion Church in that city. Unlike his clerical brethren generally, when Mr. Ingersoll lectured in Montreal, in April last, Mr. Bray went to hear him, and answered him from his pulpit the two following Sundays. These "Discourses" were published in the succeeding numbers of his paper, the Spectator. Hear him on free speech:—
"In a free country all kinds of freedom must be allowed, and Mr. Ingersoll had just as much right to come here and say his say in his own manner, and according to his own discretion, as Mr. Hammond has to come and preach and teach in his way. If men are free to agree with us, they are also free to differ with us; to differ a little, to differ much, to differ altogether. If the Mayor had found a law by which he could prohibit Ingersoll from lecturing against our religious beliefs, I would have started an agitation at once for the repeal of that absurd and antiquated law. If hearing arguments against our faith is likely to unsettle us, then we had better be unsettled. We are badly off with all our religious literature and preaching, if we cannot endure any kind of criticism, and witticism, and argument."
These are brave words, and every fair-minded man in this Dominion will agree with Mr. Bray in his liberal and courageous utterances. They are timely words to go forth in that city where the war of sects has waxed so hot and virulent of late. Montreal needs more men like Bray in her churches, to mollify the bigotry, and stamp out the bitter feuds, and fierce antagonism of Christian against Christian.
As this pamphlet has already reached a much greater length than originally intended, I have but little space to devote to Mr. Bray's Reply to Ingersoll. One or two points, however, must be noticed.
Mr. Bray falls into the same error as "Bystander" in accusing
Ingersoll of attacking a theology which, he tells us, is "opposed to all reason," and now "well nigh obsolete." I would simply say if it is "obsolete," it is the stock in trade of the Christian Church today. Take away from it this obsolete theology (which is "opposed to all reason,") and there is nothing left of Christianity worth speaking of; for the morality Christianity contains does not of right belong to it It is Pagan. It has been appropriated by Christianity, and is not original with it. There is not a single moral precept in the Bible, but was taught before that book was written. (For proof of this, see Sir Wm. Jones, Max Muller, Lord Amberly, and "Supernatural Religion.") Therefore, when you take away the dogmas of Christianity—its "obsolete theology"—you take away Christianity itself to all intents and purposes. And hence the utter inconsistency and absurdity of our opponents in taxing us with merely attacking a dead theology, when that dead theology is all there is of a religion which they defend and wish to perpetuate. Seeing, then, that the theology of Christianity is admittedly dead, why not give it up and come over to us? for all you have left—the brotherhood of man—belongs to us: it is our RELIGION OF HUMANITY.
As the only salient point, to my mind, in Mr. Bray's reply to Ingersoll is dealt with in the following letter, which I addressed to the Spectator, and which appeared in its columns, I have only space here to reproduce that letter:—
To the Editor of the Canadian Spectator:
Sir,—In your issue of the 10th instant, in a discourse in reply to Col. Ingersoll, I find the following:—
"The lecturer, who seemed to imagine that he understood everything else, was compelled to acknowledge that he did not understand why there should be so much hunger and pain and misery. Why, the world over, life should live upon life. When he has cast Jehovah out of the Universe, he is pained and puzzled to account for the presence of wrong and sorrow. With God he cannot account for it; without God he cannot account for it. If Col. Ingersoll, or any other of that school, can give me an intelligent theory of life, and satisfactory solution of the problem of the presence of evil and pain without God, I am prepared to consider it."
Now, Sir, having the honor (or dishonor, as the case may be,) to belong to that school, I venture to take up the gauntlet thus thrown down. From our stand-point we are able, we think, to give an intelligent theory of these things; and although it may not be wholly devoid of mystery, we claim it is less mysterious than the Christian theory. We claim that the Materialistic explanation of the Universe and its phenomena is more reasonable and less mysterious than the Theistic; and this is why we find ourselves compelled to adopt it and become Atheists. On the Materialistic hypothesis of development and evolution we are certainly not "puzzled to account for the presence of wrong and sorrow," however much we may be pained at their fearful prevalence. It is only on the hypothesis of being under the governance of an omnipotent and infinitely benevolent Being that we are utterly unable to account for such-a state of things. Although the ultimate tendency of the forces of the-Universe seems to be towards a higher, and higher, and more perfect condition, not only for man, but all animals, and even plants, yet these-forces are, as Science abundantly proves, utterly without mercy—without pity for man or any other animal. Therefore, on the evolution philosophy of things, we can reasonably predicate pain, sorrow, and wrong; and are not puzzled at their existence. It is only on the theory of a good God controlling the Universe that we stand dumb with confusion and wonderment in the presence of all this woe, pain, misery, and wrong-with which the world is filled—this terrible "struggle for life," where the-strong prey upon the weak, where animal eats animal, and man eats-man!
The theologians have had upwards of two thousand years to reduce the Materialistic paradoxes of Epicurus on the existence of evil, but have they done so? If there be a God, and He is all-powerful, He could remove the surplus evil and pain from the world, and if He is all-good He would remove it, is an argument which has never yet been answered by a Paley, a Butler, a Dawson, or any other Christian Theist or Bible apologist. I use the phrase "surplus evil and pain" for this reason: As a sort of apology for the rank malevolence abroad in the world, and as an argument for the existence of a beneficent God, Christian Theists tell us that pain is necessary as an antecedent to the proper enjoyment of pleasure; that it is necessary to the growth and development of character; that the storm of the ocean is an essential pre-requisite to the adequate enjoyment of the subsequent calm; that all smooth sailing would be monotonous and insipid. Now, we will admit this for the sake of the argument; but there yet remains the mass of surplus evil to be accounted for, which is wholly unnecessary for such corrective and distributive purposes. It may, perhaps, be necessary that the tempest toss the ship about on the bosom of the ocean in order that the living freight may have a keener appreciation of the succeeding calm, and also to develop awe and sublimity in their breasts; but to accomplish this it is scarcely to the purpose to send all to the bottom of the ocean! That we may have a proper relish for our food and a due appreciation of the blessings of a good appetite, it may be necessary that we feel the pangs of hunger and starvation occasionally; but to give us this wholesome discipline it would seem hardly necessary that millions of human beings should actually be starved to death!
Now, on the theory of inexorable law* instead of a beneficent Providence, we are not surprised that a ship which is not strong enough to ride the storm should go to the bottom, even though five hundred bishops and clergymen be aboard supplicating an unknown God for succor. On the theory of inexorable and merciless law in which we are fast bound, we are not "puzzled" that millions of human beings should starve to death when these laws or conditions of Nature are violated in over-population and a false political and social economy. Or when a Tay bridge goes down with its living freight under the pressure of train and tempest, the Atheist is neither surprised nor puzzled: but the Christian, who worships a benevolent (?) God and believes that not a hair falls from his head without His notice, can only look at such a malevolent horror in dumb silence and amazement—he has no explanation. Our theory of the presence of evil in the world is, therefore, at least rational; but, is the Christian theory rational? Is it rational to-suppose that all the pain, sorrow, and evil in the world have been caused by the puerile circumstance of a woman eating an apple? This would be as monstrously unjust as it is irrational and absurd.
As to the origin and maintenance of life "without God," it is quite as comprehensible and rational without God as with one with the Christian conditions and qualifications. An universe of matter containing the "promise and potency of all forms and qualities of life" is as intelligible and comprehensible as a God outside the Universe embodying the potency of all life. From the time that Lucretius declared that "Nature is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself without the meddling of the Gods," and Bruno that matter is the "universal mother who brings forth all things as the fruit of her own womb," down to Prof. Tyndall, who discerns in matter "the promise and potency of every form and quality of life," scientists have never been able to discover the least intrusion of any creative power into the operations of
* Materialists, in using the phrase "law of Nature," use a
popular expression, but not in the popular sense as
presupposing a law-giver. By "law of Nature" we simply mean
natural sequence—the uniformity of Nature's operations.
Nature and the affairs of this world, or the least trace of interference by any God or gods. In the primeval ages of ignorance and barbarism the gods were supposed to do everything, from the production of wind, rain, tempest, thunder and lightning, earthquakes, &c, down to dyspepsia and potato-bugs. Science now explains all these things and a thousand others. Indeed, in modern philosophy there is no room for the gods in the Universe, and nothing left for them to do. And there cannot be any room beyond it for them, for "above Nature we cannot rise."
The Materialistic theory (and to it we subscribe) is that there is but one existence, the Universe, and that it is eternal—without beginning or end—that the matter of the Universe never could have been created, for ex nihilo nihil fit, (from nothing nothing can come,) and that it contains within itself the potency adequate to the production of all phenomena. This we think to be more conceivable and intelligent than the Christian theory that there are two existences—God and the Universe—and that there was a time when there was but one existence, God, and that after an indefinite period of quiescence and "masterly inactivity" He finally created a Universe either out of Himself or out of nothing—either one of which propositions is philosophically absurd. And in either case, to say that God would be infinite would be equally absurd.
Respectfully,
ALLEN PRINGLE.
Napanee, Ont., April 23, 1880.