THE CREDULITY OF THE ALLIES
The heads of the Allied governments, moved by the best intentions but completely taken by surprise by the war, are carrying it on far too much in accordance with the ordinary procedure of times of peace—negotiations, declarations, speeches. Notably in the gigantic palaver into which Maximalist Russia has developed, men fancy that they have acted when they have talked. The events of three years of war prove conclusively that the Boches, turning to their profit the predilection of the Allied leaders for verbal negotiations and manifestations,—a predilection complicated by ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme,—have succeeded in nullifying to an extraordinary degree the effect of the sacrifices of the Entente.
Until the Russian Revolution, Berlin brought to bear on the diplomacy of the Entente those allies of Germany who were then regarded by the Entente as neutrals. Indeed, the declarations of Radoslavoff, confirmed by the recently published Greek White Book, have conclusively established the fact that the agreements between Germany, Bulgaria, Turkey, and King Constantine, in contemplation of this war, antedated the opening of hostilities—that certain ones of them go back as far as April, 1914. Now, it is known that the Entente diplomacy had no knowledge of this situation, and that it allowed itself to be hoodwinked for three months by the Turks, for thirteen months by the Bulgarians, for thirty months by the King of Greece, the Kaiser’s brother-in-law, and even, to a certain degree, down to a very recent period by Charles I of Hapsburg, certain Allied diplomatists having persisted in coddling the chimera of a peace with Austria against Germany.
Unhappily, to solve the present problems, which are, above all, technical, the best intentions, or even the most genuine natural intelligence, are insufficient. It is necessary to know how, and one cannot know how without having learned. The Allied Socialists who have placed themselves in the spotlight have shown themselves to be, generally speaking, utopists, entirely ignorant of Germany, of the German mind, of geography, ethnography, and political economy, pinning their faith, before all else, to formulas, and knowing even less than the official diplomats of the technique of the multifold problems imposed by war and peace. As the anti-Prussian German, Dr. Rosemeier, has stated it so fairly in the New York Times, these idealists, by reason of their radical failure to grasp the inflexible facts, are doing as much harm to the world in general as the Russian extremists and their German agents.
It is undeniable that Berlin has found it easy to profit by the state of mind of the idealistic Socialists of the Entente by causing its own Social Democrats to put forth the soi-disant ‘democratic’ peace formulas, which for some months past have been infecting the Allied countries with ideas that are most pernicious because they are impossible of realization. Despite the efforts of realist Socialists, men like Plekhanoff, Kropotkin, Guesde, Compère-Morel, Gompers, and their like, the Stockholm lure, notwithstanding its clumsiness, has helped powerfully to lead Russia to the brink of the abyss, and hence to prolong the war and the sacrifices of the Allies. In France and England a few Socialists have been so genuinely insane as to say that the occupations of territory by Germany are of slight importance; that we can begin to think about peace; that Germany is already conquered morally, and so forth. In view of such results, due to the astounding credulity of the idealistic Socialists of the Entente, it is quite natural that Germany should pursue her so-called ‘pacifist’ manœuvres.
Late in 1916, the Frankfort Gazette advised its readers of the spirit in which these intrigues were to be conducted by Berlin. ‘The point of view is as follows: to put forward precise demands in the East, and in the West to negotiate on bases that may be modified. Negotiation is not synonymous with renunciation.’
This last sentence summarizes the whole of German tactics. All the proposals of Berlin have but a single object: to deceive and sow discord among the Allies by means of negotiations which would be followed by non-execution of the terms agreed upon, Germany retaining the essential positions of to-day’s war-map which would assure her, strategically and economically, the domination of Europe and the world.
Now, it is an astounding fact that the warnings given by the Germans themselves—the occupation of more than 500,000 square kilometres by the Kaiser’s troops, the burglarizing of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey by the government of Berlin—have not yet availed to prevent a considerable proportion of the Allies from continuing to be enormously deceived. At the very moment when the German General Staff is strengthening the fortifications of Belgium, especially about Antwerp, there are those among the Allies who seriously believe that, by opening negotiations, they will succeed in inducing Germany to evacuate that ill-fated country and to repair the immense damage that she has inflicted on her.
There are those who wonder what the objects of the war on Germany’s part can be, when the occupations of territory by Germany, corresponding exactly to the Pangermanist scheme dating back twenty-two years, make these objects as clear as day.
There are those who attach importance to such declarations as the German Chancellor may choose to make, when every day that passes forces us to take note of monumental and never-ending German lies and of the unwearying duplicity of Berlin.
There are those who are willing to listen to talk about a peace by negotiation, when the facts prove that Germany respects no agreement, that a treaty signed by Berlin is of no value, and that, furthermore, it is the Germans themselves who so declare. At the very outbreak of the war Maximilian Harden said, ‘A single principle counts—Force.’ And the Frankfort Gazette printed these words: ‘Law has ceased to exist. Force alone reigns, and we still have forces at our disposal.’ To Mr. Gerard, United States Ambassador to Germany, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin said, ‘We snap our fingers at treaties.’
After such facts and such declarations, the persistent credulity of a certain fraction of the Allies is a profoundly distressing thing, for which the remedy must be found in a popular documentary propaganda, thoroughly and powerfully prepared.
The pacifist German intrigues are manifest enough. We can particularize six leading examples, employed by Berlin, either separately or in combination.
III