| PAGE |
| Introduction by Lord Cromer | [xiii] |
| Author’s Preface | [xix] |
| PROLOGUE |
| Pangerman and William II. | [1] |
| I. The Pangerman Doctrine, [p. 1].—II. The Kaiser as originator of the Pangerman plan, [p. 5]. | |
| CHAPTER I |
| The Pangerman Plan | [11] |
| I. The Pangerman plan of 1911, [p. 11].—II. The stages by which it has been effected, [p. 16].—III. Why it has been ignored, [p. 19]. | |
| CHAPTER II |
| The Causes of the War | [26] |
| I. Why the Treaty of Bukarest suddenly raised a formidable obstacle to the Pangerman plan, [p. 26].—II. How it was that the internal state of Austria-Hungary drove Germany to let loose the dogs of war, [p. 31].—III. General view of the causes of the war, [p. 37]. | |
| CHAPTER III |
| How far the Pangerman plan was carried out at the beginning of 1916 | [45] |
| I. German pretensions in the West, [p. 45].—II. German pretensions in the East, [p. 52].—III. German pretensions in the South and South-East, [p. 56].—IV. General view of the execution of the Pangerman plan from 1911 to the beginning of 1916, [p. 62]. | |
| CHAPTER IV |
| Special features given to the war by the Pangerman plan | [66] |
| I. All the great political questions of the old world are raised and must be solved, [p. 67].—II. As the war is made by Germany in order to achieve a gigantic scheme of slavery, it follows that it is waged by her in flagrant violation of international law, [p. 69].—III. A struggle of tenacity and of duplicity on the side of Berlin versus constancy and solidarity on the side of the Allies, [p. 71]. | |
| CHAPTER V |
| The Dodge of the “Drawn Game” and the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” | [77] |
| I. What would really be the outcome of the dodge called the “Drawn Game,” [p. 78].—II. The financial consequences for the Allies of this so-called “Drawn Game,” [p. 83].—III. The Allies and the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” [p. 88].—IV. Panislamic and Asiatic consequences of the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” [p. 94].—V. Consequences for the world of the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” [p. 100]. | |
| CHAPTER VI |
| The crucial point of the whole problem | [108] |
| I. The obligation which the threat of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” imposes on the Allies, [p. 108].—II. The capital importance of the question of Austria-Hungary, [p. 114].—III. All the racial elements necessary for the destruction of the Pangerman plan exist in Central Europe, [p. 121]. | |
| CHAPTER VII |
| The Balkans and the Pangerman Plan | [131] |
| I. The connexion between the Pangerman plan and the plan of Bulgarian supremacy, [p. 132].—II. Greece and Pangerman ambitions, [p. 146].—III. Roumania and the Pangerman plan, [p. 152]. | |
| CHAPTER VIII |
| German manœuvres to play the Allies the trick of the “Drawn Game,” that is, to secure the accomplishment of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” scheme as the minimum result of the war | [158] |
| I. The exceptional importance of the economic union of the Central Empires, and the danger for the Allies of establishing a connexion between that union and their own economic measures after the war, [p. 159].—II. Reasons for the Turko-German dodge of making a separate peace between the Ottoman empire and the Allies, [p. 167].—III. Why a separate and premature peace with Bulgaria would play the Pangerman game, [p. 174]. | |
| CHAPTER IX |
| The still neutral States whose independence would be directly threatened by the achievement of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” scheme and therefore by Germany’s capture of Austria-Hungary | [183] |
| I. The example of Portugal, [p. 183].—II. Holland, [p. 187].—III. Switzerland, [p. 191].—IV. The States of South America, [p. 193].—V. The United States, [p. 198]. | |
| CONCLUSIONS |
| What has been set forth in the preceding nine chapters appears to justify the following conclusions | [213] |