Pictorial history of the war for the Union, volume 2 (of 2)

by Ann S. Stephens

GENERAL M’CLELLAN AND THE GOVERNMENT.

Here the advance was stayed. As early as the 10th of May, General McClellan, well assured of the strength of his foe, and of the nature and place of the opposition that would be made by the rebels, had represented to the War Department the comparative numerical weakness of his army, and the necessity for its reinforcement. Much correspondence now ensued, between him and the President, on this subject. It was General McClellan’s desire to rest his army on the James river, to receive his reinforcements by that channel, and to move on Richmond from that quarter. On the other hand, it was the opinion of the President, and the Secretary-of-War, that his army ought to rest upon the Pamunkey, receive reinforcements by land, if at all, and move on Richmond by means of bridges across the Chickahominy. General McDowell, at the head of between 35,000 and 40,000 men, was, at this time, in the neighborhood of Fredericksburg. The proper disposition of this force was also a point in controversy between General McClellan and the authorities at the capital. The former requested that McDowell’s troops might be sent to him, and sent by water. The latter dreaded to send them, lest, by so doing, they might uncover the City of Washington, and expose it to a rebel raid. On the part of General McClellan it was urged that no such apprehension need be entertained; that the bulk of the enemy’s forces were massed for the defence of Richmond; that to conquer the rebels there, would be the surest method of securing the safety of Washington; that the presence of McDowell’s corps would so strengthen his hands as to make victory certain; that, should the rebels attempt a raid on Washington, their route would be by way of Gordonsville and Manassas, on which they could readily be checked; and, finally, that the coming of McDowell’s troops by land would render their timely arrival less certain than it would be in the event of their coming by water, while it would equally render them unavailable for the defense of Washington. The opinion of the Government, however, prevailed; and, in the end, the plan of General McClellan’s campaign was materially changed. He had designed to approach Richmond by the east and south. Resting on the Pamunkey, his purpose was now to approach it by the north. This change in the plan of the campaign necessitated the division of his army by the Chickahominy river, and the bridging of that river in many places. On the 18th of May the Secretary-of-War notified him that General McDowell’s corps would be sent forward by land from Fredericksburg, to form a junction with the right wing of the Array of the Potomac. Awaiting this reinforcement, General McClellan employed himself in strengthening his position, and in building the necessary bridges across the Chickahominy. On the 24th of May he was notified that the critical position of General Banks’ troops, consequent upon a sudden raid, by Stonewall Jackson, up the Valley of the Shenandoah river, had occasioned the recall of General McDowell, and that the Army of the Potomac must proceed without reinforcements.

General McClellan has been bitterly censured for his alleged slothfulness and hesitation, at this juncture; nor can it be denied that his advance towards Richmond was made slowly and with extreme caution. It must be remembered, however, that to march through sloughs of mire, in the face of a powerful and well intrenched foe, is far less easy than to advance on paper, and conquer enemies with printers’ ink. This is not a partisan history—its design is simply to record facts and to do justice. Subsequent events have shed much light upon General McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign. That he had not over-estimated the power of the rebel forces, was conclusively shown in the bloody and terrible seven days’ battles. That he was obliged to deviate from his own chosen plan is evident, and is not denied: yet that plan was the same which was ultimately adopted by General Grant, in the final campaign of the war. Richmond when finally taken, was approached from the east and south, and not from the north. General McClellan may have been overcautious; but his tactics were wise, and his patriotism stainless.

The following is the language of General McClellan’s Report, as to several essential points: “The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the junction; and as the order for General McDowell’s march was soon countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of my campaign. Had General McDowell joined me by water, I could have approached Richmond by the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body, instead of being necessarily divided by that stream....

“In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy, and the liability of its bottom land to sudden inundations, it became necessary to construct between Bottom’s Bridge and Mechanicsville, eleven new bridges, all new and difficult, with extensive by-way approaches.

“The entire army could, probably, have been thrown across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated upon the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was for many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing a single day’s supplies in advance, the troops must have gone without rations, and the animals without forage, and the army would have been paralyzed.

“It is true I might have abandoned my communications and pushed forward toward Richmond, trusting to the speedy defeat of the enemy and the consequent fall of the city, for a renewal of supplies; but the approaches were fortified, and the town itself was surrounded with a strong line of intrenchments, requiring a greater length of time to reduce than our troops could have dispensed with rations.

“Under these circumstances, I decided to retain a portion of the army on the left bank of the river until our bridges were completed.”