Problem 10
My dear Dick,—
The problem I am setting you to-day has to do with fire control.
You are on outpost facing in a northerly direction and are in command of a picquet consisting of the headquarters of a platoon with a Lewis gun and thirty men at G. A man who has been sent in from a group on your left tells you that a company of the enemy is moving across your front from left to right along the road A B C D E F. He says that the company is marching with an advanced guard of one platoon about 200 yards in front of it. The platoon has a couple of groups 200 yards in front of it again. Five minutes after you have received this notice, you see a group of the enemy marching from the wood at B.
Problem.
How do you appreciate the situation and what action do you intend to take?
Solution.
So long as you remain carefully concealed at G and your men do not show themselves, it is at least as likely as not that the enemy’s scouts will not discover you. If, however, they should do so, your danger will come from the enemy’s company and the platoon in front of it and not from the scouts, and it is with these larger bodies that you must make your plans to deal. At this close range you ought to be able to put them out of action in the first minute after opening fire. If your men conceal themselves properly, even if the scouts do discover you, they will not do so until the enemy’s main body is nearing the point C. Your orders should consequently be somewhat as follows:
“Let every man conceal himself.
“The Lewis gun and Nos. 1 and 2 Sections of the platoon on my command to open fire will direct their fire half left on the main body of the enemy’s company, which will be the rearmost party. No. 3 Section will deal with the platoon forming the advanced guard, and No. 4 Section, taking its orders from the section commander, will deal with isolated groups. No man will put up his head until I give the order to fire. The whole platoon will use fixed sights.”
You should at once issue these preliminary orders. If you are not discovered, do not open fire until the head of the main body has reached D.
Napoleon used to say that if you ever saw your enemy making a mistake, you should give him lots of time to make it thoroughly before punishing him. Do not pull the bait out of the pike’s mouth until he has properly gorged it. This maxim applies equally whether you are dealing with armies or only with platoons. I, myself, remember in my early days missing a tiger sixty yards off, when, if I had only waited, he would have walked right under the tree on which I was seated.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
LETTER XI
February 10, 1918.
My dear Dick,—
I hope you will master and remember the principles which govern the problem I am setting you to-day. Although very simple, it requires a little more thought than most of those which have preceded it.
The Germans have broken through our front line. Your company, with its four Lewis guns and with four Vickers guns which have been placed under your command, has been hastily thrown into the trench B, which is well constructed and well concealed, and has a good field of fire to the east. Four 18-pounder guns were in action at a hundred yards north of the trench B, but two of these guns have already been put out of action by the enemy’s artillery. The Germans are advancing in great numbers regardless of sacrifice and are now about a mile distant. Their object is evidently to take the ridge A C, and it is of the utmost importance that they should be frustrated in their endeavours. The front allotted to you to defend runs from Z Clump on the north to U Farm on the south. Other troops are responsible outside these limits. You have in the trench B 50,000 rounds of ammunition besides that which the men have on them. You are senior to the officer in command of the remaining two 18-pounders.
What action would you take? and give your reasons.
Comments on the Situation and Action adjudged Correct.
Let us first of all consider how many rounds a minute you could expect the troops under your command to fire in the following circumstances:
(a) If the fire were only to be continued for two minutes.
(b) If it were to be kept up for half an hour.
| Rounds. | |
| (a) If it were to be kept up for two minutes only, you might expect 100 infantrymen to fire from fifteen to twenty rounds a minute (let us say) | 3,200 |
| Four Lewis guns to fire 600 rounds each in the two minutes | 2,400 |
| Four Vickers to fire 750 rounds each in two minutes | 3,000 |
| 8,600 | |
| (b) If the fire were to be kept up for half an hour you might justly expect infantry to fire at an average rate of five rounds a minute | 15,000 |
| It would be unwise to attempt to exceed this average rate of fire, for even if your men were muscularly able to continue firing at a greater rate, it is a known thing that the nervous strain of firing is such that there are but few men who can fire 200 rounds consecutively without breaking down, and it is of paramount importance that you should keep a certain amount of reserve force in hand in case the enemy gets to a really close range. | |
| Four Lewis guns would during the half-hour be able to fire 600 rounds each, and if these rounds were fired at fairly long ranges would still be in a position to fire 600 rounds rapid when the enemy got to close quarters. The platoon commanders would, however, be well advised to regard these Lewis guns as their reserves and to do nothing to risk their being ready to fire 600 rounds at the critical moment. They should, therefore, use them very sparingly at medium ranges | 2,400 |
| Four Vickers Maxims should be able to fire at an average rate of 200 rounds a minute | 24,000 |
In other words, in the two minutes you could fire at the average rate of over 4,000 rounds a minute, but for half an hour could only keep up an average rate of about 800 rounds a minute. Another thing to be considered is that your average of hits at the closer ranges would be greater than they would be at the farther ranges. There is, however, no reason why you should not inflict as much loss as possible on the enemy at medium and long ranges, provided you know at what distance to fire. We used to consider in South Africa that when we were advancing against a position held by the enemy, he used to shoot straighter at 500 yards than he did at 200, for, fine shots as the Boers were, their excitement at our near approach disturbed their accurate shooting. You may therefore expect that your men will shoot comparatively better when the enemy is at medium ranges than when he is very close, provided that they know the distance.
It cannot be expected that you will go in for such a long disquisition at a moment when you are called upon to act, but you should have considered these points beforehand, at all events to such an extent that you would have decided to open fire when the enemy was still at comparatively long ranges, but to increase this fire as he got closer and to reserve the maximum rate of fire until you can pour it in with deadly effect. You must always remember that you are dealing with human beings who have nerves and not with machines. As I have previously said, the above principles should be those on which you decide to act, but the first thing you should do would be to send to the officer commanding the section of guns and inquire from him the ranges of any objects within rifle shot which he has ascertained, and you should at the same time desire him to obtain for you the ranges of any other prominent objects near which the enemy must pass, so that if his remaining guns are knocked out you will know what sights to use. Whilst this is being done, you should divide your front between your platoon commanders. The Lewis guns should remain with their platoons, but you would be wise to keep the Vickers Maxims under your own special command, so that you can turn them on to any portion of the advancing line which seems especially to threaten you. In fact, you should look on these as your reserve. Having thus considered the situation, you should issue the following orders:
“Fire fronts are allotted as under:
No. 1 Platoon to the right of Farm U.
No. 2 Platoon from farm U to Y tree.
No. 3 Platoon from Y tree to farm W.
No. 4 Platoon to the left of farm W.”
Order No. 2.—“Ranges are being ascertained from the artillery and will be passed to platoon commanders. Platoon commanders can open fire at their own discretion, but must bear in mind the enormous importance of being ready in all respects to use the full power of their fire should the enemy succeed in getting to close ranges. The four Vickers Maxim guns will, under my orders, fire at any portion of the enemy’s advance which appears to be especially threatening.”
The majority of regimental officers now serving do not at all appreciate the enormous effect of rifle and machine-gun fire at medium and long ranges, nor the importance of taking every step in their power to obtain the accurate ranges as soon as they have taken up a position. The effect of the fire of a fairly good company in such circumstances as those above depicted and acting on the above carefully considered fire orders would be enormous, whereas if the fire fronts were not properly allotted and if ranges were unknown, it would be of comparatively little value.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
LETTER XII
February 20, 1918.
My dear Dick,—
What would you do in the following circumstances?
A force is retiring in a north-westerly direction. The River Lea shown on the map is unfordable. Two companies are acting as the point of the rearguard. Their orders are to hold the bridges at A and B. The bridge at B is to be held until 10 a.m. and the bridge at A until 10.30 a.m. If they can hold out until these hours, it is estimated that it will enable the main body to get away unmolested. The trees shown on the map are mostly oak, and are on an average forty feet high. The roads marked on the map are metalled and good. The farm buildings at D are strong. You are commanding B Company of your battalion, which is at B bridge, and are senior to Captain A., a reliable officer, who is occupying A trench just south of A wood. At 9.15 a.m. two scouts mounted on motor bicycles inform you that they have patrolled to the front and that none of the enemy are within three miles of you except a few companies near E, who are acting as support to an attack which is being made against A bridge. At 9.20 a.m. you receive the following message from Captain A., dated 9 a.m.: “Please do whatever you can to support me. I am being heavily shelled, and infantry are trying to push across A bridge. I fear that there is no chance of my being able to hold out until 10.30 a.m.”
What action would you take? State your reasons for the manner in which you would act and then definitely say what you intend to do.
Comments on the Situation and Action adjudged Correct.
What you should always aim at is to obey the spirit of an order rather than its letter. You know Captain A. to be a reliable officer, and he says that he fears that he cannot hold out until 10.30. If the enemy seize A trench before that hour, not only will your retreat be cut off, but the object of ordering A and B Companies to hold the bridges so as to enable the main body to get a good start will be defeated. The nearest hostile infantry to you, at E, is some two miles off, that is to say, some forty minutes’ march. In the circumstances it is your duty to go to the assistance of A Company. The next thing is to consider how you can best help him to carry out his retirement and also how you can best prevent the enemy from following up your main body. If you were to march straight to A wood, it is doubtful whether you would help him very materially. The artillery firing from the south of the river would deal with the reinforcements you brought up and placed in A trench, similarly to the way it dealt with B Company. By far your better plan will be to march as quickly as possible to D wood and occupy the strong buildings at D farm. From the farm buildings you will be able to prevent the enemy marching along the road from A to X, and should be able to comply with the spirit of the order, and by the delay you will thus entail on the enemy’s movements you will be able to effect the same purpose as if you had actually prevented him from crossing A bridge before 10.30. You should be able to hold on to D farm until artillery are brought up to A wood, and should then be able to slip away along the road B X. Without aeroplane observation, hostile artillery could not observe the effect of their fire from the S. of the river, as trees intercept their view.
Orders.
B Company will at once march to D wood and occupy D farm.
Order to Officer Commanding A Company.
I am marching immediately to D farm, which I hope to reach before 10 a.m. From this place I shall be in a position to facilitate your retreat and prevent your being pursued farther than A wood. You may retire as soon as you see that I have established myself in the farm buildings. Having accomplished the object for which we have been sent out, I shall continue my retirement to X.
* * * * *
These twelve little schemes I have set you are, as I think you will admit, all very simple, but I am willing to wager that you have not answered all of them correctly, even though they were only applications of the axioms which I gave in the letter which preceded them. The difficulty is, in the heat of the moment, to decide correctly which of the axioms deals with the special situation, and nothing but practice will get over this difficulty.
You should always take every opportunity of discussing with your comrades little tactical situations which have occurred, or those which may occur. In talking over the former, do not do so with the object of passing censure, but merely with the view of learning what to do and what not to do should you find yourself in a similar situation.
Whenever you have an opportunity, carefully explain the situation to your men. This is necessary if you expect them to co-operate intelligently in bringing about your designs.
In the solution of any little scheme which you may set to your subordinates, insist on definite orders being given and do not be content with vague disquisitions. When any little problem which you have set has been unsatisfactorily solved, let another leader fall in, take command, and do it again properly. This is the best way to ensure the proper solution being thoroughly understood and remembered for application on a future occasion. So long as you do not censure a superior in front of his men, it is a good thing to make your remarks in such a way that everybody can hear them.
You must guard against technical instructors giving wrong impressions. The bombing sergeant is inclined to impress on the men that there is no such weapon as the bomb. The instructors in the rifle grenade and the Lewis gun are also apt to talk so much of the value of the weapons in which they instruct that their pupils come away with very false ideas. The Lewis-gun sergeant, although he never fails to tell the men that the Lewis gun can fire at the rate of 600 rounds a minute, very often does forget to inform them that after firing 600 rounds it takes twenty minutes or half an hour to cool before it is capable of firing any more. It is all very well for these men to be enthusiasts, but you must see that they abide strictly by the truth and avoid giving false impressions.
I will close this letter with a few remarks on the moral forces. As Napoleon said, these are, compared with the physical, as three is to one. Men’s courage and determination and the will to conquer are more than half the battle. The situation to-day is no less serious than it was when I ended the last of my Twelve Letters to you, and it behoves you to devote the whole of your time and your energy to making yourself in every way efficient, and you must always bear in mind that it is possible that the little action in the winning or losing of which your right or wrong decision may be the principal factor may be the turning-point of a great battle.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; one unbalanced quotation mark was remedied.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.