FOOTNOTES:
[17] Cd. 7626, No. 12.
[18] Cd. 7626, No. 14.
[19] Cd. 7626, No. 16.
[20] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 11.
[21] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 25.
[22] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 34.
[23] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 11.
[24] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 36.
[25] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 43.
[26] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 75.
[27] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 84.
[28] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 107.
[29] Great Britain and the European Crisis, Nos. 85 and 101.
[30] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 43.
[31] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 84.
[32] Cd. 7626, No. 38.
[33] Cd. 7626, No. 45.
[34] Cd. 7626, No. 60.
[35] Cd. 7626, No. 67.
[36] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 131.
[37] Cd. 7626, No. 73.
[38] Cd. 7626, No. 70.
[39] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 161.
GERMAN MILITARISM WINS.
Thus Germany rejected all suggestions, while Austria, supported by Germany, was determined on war. The Serbian episode was clearly an excuse. Germany's alliance with Austria was "defensive." She was bound to join with Austria only in case of the latter being attacked by Russia. Austria claimed that because Russia would not stand idle while Serbia was crushed, therefore Russia was the aggressor. Germany was a party to the Austrian attack on Serbia. The British Ambassador at Vienna on July 30 says: "I have private information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."[40]
Germany, therefore, chose this moment to send a challenge to Russia knowing that Russia must fight unless she were willing to be humiliated and disgraced in the eyes, not only of men of the Slav race in the Balkans, but in the eyes of the whole world.
The French Foreign Minister, telegraphing on July 31 to the French Ambassador in London as to Germany's aggressive steps on the Franco-German frontier, said: "All my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday (July 25)."[41] What has actually happened in the war goes to show that this must have been the case.
The precise situation at this point is well shown in the British Foreign Office introduction to Great Britain and the European Crisis:—
"At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August. France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable."