INTRODUCTION
Between 1710 and 1729 Anthony Collins was lampooned, satirized, and gravely denounced from pulpit and press as England’s most insidious defiler of church and state. Yet within a year of his death he became the model of a proper country gentleman,
... he had an opulent Fortune, descended to him from his Ancestors, which he left behind him unimpair’d: He lived on his own Estate in the Country, where his Tenants paid him moderate Rents, which he never enhanced on their making any Improvements; he always oblig’d his Family to a constant attendance on Publick Worship; as he was himself a Man of the strictest Morality, for he never suffer’d any Body about him who was deficient in that Point; he exercised a universal Charity to all Sorts of People, without any Regard either to Sect or Party; being in the Commission of the Peace, he administered Justice with such Impartiality and Incorruptness, that the most distant Part of the County flock’d to his Decisions; but the chief Use he made of his Authority was in accommodating Differences;...[1]
In a comparison which likens him to Sir Roger de Coverley, there is less truth than fiction. What they did share was a love of the countryside and a “universal Charity” towards its inhabitants. For the most part, however, we can approximate Collins’s personality by reversing many of Sir Roger’s traits. Often at war with his world, as the spectatorial character was not, he managed to maintain an intellectual rapport with it and even with those who sought his humiliation. He never—as an instance—disguised his philosophical distrust of Samuel Clarke; yet during any debate he planned “most certainly [to] outdo him in civility and good manners.”[2] This decorum in no way compromised his pursuit of what he considered objective truth or his denunciation of all “methods” or impositions of spiritual tyranny. Thus, during the virulent, uneven battle which followed upon the publication of the Discourse of Free-Thinking, he ignored his own wounds in order to applaud a critic’s
suspicions that there is a sophism in what he calls my hypothesis. That is a temper that ought to go thro’ all our Inquirys, and especially before we have an opportunity of examining things to the bottom. It is safest at all times, and we are least likely to be mistaken, if we constantly suspect our selves to be under mistakes.... I have no system to defend or that I would seem to defend, and am unconcerned for the consequence that may be drawn from my opinion; and therefore stand clear of all difficultys wch others either by their opinion or caution are involved in.[3]
This is the statement of a man whose intellectual and religious commitment makes him see that his own fallibility is symptomatic of a human tendency to error. For himself, hence, he tries to avoid all manner of hard-voiced enthusiasm. Paradoxically, however, Collins searched with a zealot’s avidity for any controversy which would either assert his faith or test his disbelief. When once he found his engagement, he revelled in it, whether as the aggressor or the harassed defendant. For example, in the “Preface” to the Scheme of Literal Prophecy Considered he boastfully enumerated all the works—some twenty-nine—which had repudiated his earlier Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion. And in malicious fact he held up the publication of the Scheme for almost a year that he might add a “Postscript to the Preface” in which he identified six more pieces hostile to the Grounds and Reasons.[4]
By May of 1727 and with no visible sign of fatigue he took on a new contender; this time it was John Rogers, canon in ordinary to the Prince of Wales. At the height of their debate, in late summer, Collins made practical enquiries about methods to prolong and intensify its give-and-take. Thus, in a note to his friend Pierre Des Maizeaux, he said: “But I would be particularly informed of the success and sale of the Letter to Dr Rogers; because, if it could be, I would add to a new edition thereof two or three as sheets; which also might be sold separately to those who have already that Letter.” For all his militant polemic, he asked only that his “Adversaries” observe with him a single rule of fair play; namely, that they refrain from name-calling and petty sniping. “Personal matters,” he asserted, “tho they may some times afford useful remarks, are little regarded by Readers, who are very seldom mistaken in judging that the most impertinent subject a man can talk of is himself,” particularly when he inveighs against another.[5]
If Collins had been made to look back over the years 1676-1729, he probably would have summarized the last twenty with a paraphrase of the Popean line, “This long controversy, my life.” For several years and in such works as Priestcraft in Perfection (1710) and A Discourse of Free-Thinking (1713), he was a flailing polemicist against the entire Anglican hierarchy. Not until 1724 did he become a polished debater, when he initiated a controversy which for the next five years made a “very great noise” and which ended only with his death. The loudest shot in the persistent barrage was sounded by the Grounds and Reasons, and its last fusillade by the Discourse concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing.[6]
During those five years Collins concentrated upon a single opponent in each work and made it a rhetorical practice to change his “Adversary” in successive essays. He created in this way a composite victim whose strength was lessened by deindividualization; in this way too he ran no risk of being labelled a hobbyhorse rider or, more seriously, a persecutor. Throughout the Grounds and Reasons he laughed at, reasoned against, and satirized William Whiston’s assumption that messianic prophecies in the Old Testament were literally fulfilled in the figure and mission of Jesus. Within two years and in a new work, he substituted Edward Chandler, Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, for the mathematician. It need not have been the Bishop; any one of thirty-four others could have qualified for the role of opponent, among them people like Clarke, and Sykes, and Sherwood, and even the ubiquitous Whiston. Collins rejected them, however, to debate in the Scheme with Bishop Chandler, the author of A Defence of Christianity from the Prophecies of the old Testament, with one who was, in short, the least controversial and yet the most orthodox of his many assailants.
Early in 1727 the Anglican establishment came to the abrupt realization that the subject of the continuing debate—the reliability of the argument from prophecy—was inconclusive, that it could lead only to pedantic wrangling and hair-splitting with each side vainly clutching victory. Certainly the devotion of many clergymen to biblical criticism was secondary to their interest in orthodoxy as a functional adjunct of government, both civil and canonical. It was against this interest, as it was enunciated in Rogers’s Eight Sermons concerning the Necessity of Revelation (1727) and particularly in its vindictive preface, that Collins chose to fight.[7] The debate had now taken a happy turn for him. As he saw it, the central issue devolved upon man’s natural right to religious liberty. At least he made this the theme of his Letter to Dr. Rogers. In writing to Des Maizeaux about the success of this work, he obviously enjoyed his own profane irony:
I have had particular compliments made me by the BP of Salisbury, and by Dr Clark, who among other things sayd, that the Archbp of Canterbury might have writ all that related to Toleration in it: to say nothing of what I hear from others. Dr Rogers himself has acknowledg[ed] to his Bookseller who sent it to him into the Country, that he has receivd it; but says that he is so engaged in other affairs, that he has no thought at present of answering it; tho he may perhaps in time do so.[8]
In time Rogers did. He counterattacked on 2 February 1728 with a Vindication of the Civil Establishment of Religion.[9] For Collins this work was a dogged repetition of what had gone before, and so it could be ignored except for one of its appendices, A Letter from the Rev. Dr. Marshall jun. To the Rev. Dr. Rogers, upon Occasion of his Preface to his Eight Sermons. Its inclusion seemed an afterthought; yet it altered the dimensions of the debate by narrowing and particularizing the areas of grievance which separated the debaters. Collins, therefore, rebutted it some fourteen months later in A Discourse concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing. He had great hopes for this pamphlet, preparing carefully for its reception. He encouraged the republication of his three preceding works, which find their inevitable conclusion, even their exoneration, in this last performance, and he probably persuaded his bookseller to undertake an elaborate promotional campaign. For the new editions were advertised on seven different days between 10 January and 27 February 1729 in the Daily Post. He wanted no one to miss the relationship between the Discourse concerning Ridicule and Irony and these earlier pieces or to overlook its presence when it finally appeared in the pamphlet shops on 17 March.
Collins was animated by his many debates. Indeed, “he sought the storms.” Otherwise he would not, could not, have participated in these many verbal contests. Throughout them all, his basic strategy—that of provocation—was determined by the very real fact that he had many more enemies than allies, among them, for instance, such formidable antagonists as Swift and Richard Bentley.[10] To survive he had to acquire a tough resilience, a skill in fending off attacks or turning them to his own advantage. Nevertheless, he remained a ready target all his life. Understandably so: his radicalism was stubborn and his opinions predictable. Such firmness may of course indicate his aversion to trimming. Or it may reveal a lack of intellectual growth; what he believed as a young man, he perpetuated as a mature adult. Whether our answer is drawn from either possibility or, more realistically, from both, the fact remains that he never camouflaged the two principles by which he lived and fought:
1. That universal liberty be established in respect to opinions and practises not prejudicial to the peace and welfare of society: by which establishment, truth must needs have the advantages over error and falsehood, the law of God over the will of man, and true Christianity tolerated; private judgment would be really exercised; and men would be allowed to have suffered to follow their consciences, over which God only is supreme:...
2. Secondly, that nothing but the law of nature, (the observance whereof is absolutely necessary to society) and what can be built thereon, should be enforced by the civil sanctions of the magistrate:...[11]