A. PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS
“At 8 A.M. on Tuesday, the 8th December, a signal was received from the signal station on shore:—
“‘A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in sight from Sapper Hill, steering northwards.’
“At this time, the positions of the various ships of the squadron were as follows:—
“Macedonia: At anchor as look-out ship.
“Kent (guardship): At anchor in Port William.
“Invincible and Inflexible: In Port William.
“Carnarvon: In Port William.
“Cornwall: In Port William.
“Glasgow: In Port Stanley.
“Bristol: In Port Stanley.
“Macedonia: At anchor as look-out ship.
“Kent (guardship): At anchor in Port William.
“Invincible and Inflexible: In Port William.
“Carnarvon: In Port William.
“Cornwall: In Port William.
“Glasgow: In Port Stanley.
“Bristol: In Port Stanley.
“The Kent was at once ordered to weigh, and a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed.
“At 8:20 A.M. the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the southward, and at 8:45 A.M. the Kent passed down the harbour and took up a station at the entrance.
“The Canopus, Captain Heathcoat S. Grant, reported at 8:47 A.M. that the first two ships were eight miles off, and that the smoke reported at 8:20 A.M. appeared to be the smoke of two ships about twenty miles off.
“At 8:50 A.M. the signal station reported a further column of smoke in sight to the southward.
“The Macedonia was ordered to weigh anchor on the inner side of the other ships, and await orders.”
Here the signal, it will be observed, says “a four-funnel and two-funnel man of war.” The ships were probably end on when they were seen, and in the Nürnberg there was a considerable gap between the after-funnel and the two forward funnels. Seen from a point a little off the direct keel line, she would seem therefore to have two funnels only.
Port William and Port Stanley are two inlets with a tongue of land between them, and opposite this tongue of land is the channel to the sea. Port Stanley is in the more southerly division of the harbour, which is also the larger of the two. Canopus was anchored to the eastward of the town of Port Stanley, so that her guns could fire over the low-lying land between her and the sea. The land rises to the north as it creeps round towards the mouth of the harbour, and on this higher land there was an observation station where arrangements had been made by which the fire of Canopus could be directed out to sea at any squadron that threatened to attack. The reader is therefore to imagine the Macedonia lying in the outside mouth of the harbour; Kent anchored in the channel half way between Macedonia and where the harbour divides Port Stanley to the south and Port William to the north; with Inflexible, Invincible, and Carnarvon anchored in line in Port William; the Bristol and Glasgow in the southern bay, with Port Stanley behind them to the westward, and Canopus behind them to the east.
The Vice-Admiral wasted no time. As a fact, all his ships were then coaling. And the officers not engaged in this were making plans for a day’s shooting over the rough moors in the neighbourhood of the town—where hares and partridges were to be found—and were many of them in mufti, and most of them at breakfast when the startling and welcome news of the advent of the enemy came to them. Everything, of course, gave way to the necessity of getting out of harbour with the utmost speed. Colliers were cast off. The furnaces were fed, and all hands were started to clean first the ships and then themselves. At eight the first ships seemed to be probably twenty miles off. Twenty minutes later, a further detachment came into sight; half an hour later than that, the last of the Germans were seen upon the horizon.
Round about 9 o’clock Kent was outside the harbour, while Gneisenau and Nürnberg were approaching at about twenty knots.
3. “At 9:20 A.M. the two leading ships of the enemy (Gneisenau and Nürnberg), with guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the Canopus, who opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colours and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the Invincible at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William.
“A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the Kent at the entrance to the harbour, but about this time it seems that the Invincible and Inflexible were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts.
“The Glasgow weighed and proceeded at 9:40 A.M. with orders to join the Kent and observe the enemy’s movements.”
The Germans, as we have seen, expected possibly to find Canopus at the Falkland Islands, but not that she would be concealed from their fire behind the low-lying ground. Their astonishment then to find themselves under the fire of 12-inch guns at twenty minutes past nine was considerable. They therefore turned, not with the intention of running away but clearly to throw out the fire control that was directing the big guns at them, for it must have been about this time that they saw the county cruiser Kent in the offing, and their first thought was to go in and finish her off. But a very few moments after there opened up over the line of vision the tripod masts of the two battle-cruisers, and the Gneisenau and Nürnberg, that had been coming due north for the attack, now turned round to the east, and went full speed to join their approaching consorts, who were cutting off the corner made by the first two ships.
Two quite important questions arise at this point. Was it good policy on the part of Admiral Sturdee to allow Canopus to open fire and so drive the Germans away? If, indeed, it was Canopus that drove them off. He knew, of course, that it would take him at least half an hour to forty minutes before all his squadron could be clear of the harbour, and ready to begin the chase. Would it have been wiser if he had allowed the Germans to come right up and so to have made sure of having them within easy range when he did come out? The answer to this criticism is obvious. Gneisenau was a great deal more than a match for Kent, and no British ship could have got out to her assistance in time to prevent her destruction if Gneisenau had been allowed to close. The speed of Admiral Sturdee’s battle-cruisers was such—he had certainly a five, if not a six knot advantage over the armoured cruisers—that he knew he had it well within his power with the whole day before him, to give the Germans forty minutes’ start, and catch them and finish them off before evening. And it was his business to do this, if he could, with the smallest possible loss of life and the least possible damage to his ships. That is the first point. But next, it was quite within the possibilities of the case that Canopus’s guns would make a hit either on Gneisenau or Nürnberg. Indeed, so close did the fourth and fifth rounds go that it was thought on shore that there had been a hit; but this was afterwards proved to be a mistake. There was a good chance then of laming one of them and so making a quick capture certain. Finally, it was not altogether the fire of Canopus but the sight of the battle-cruisers’ masts that decided Von Spee, or rather the Captain of Gneisenau, to retreat.
It is more pertinent to ask whether it would not have been better policy on the part of the Germans to have got inside the range of Canopus—for obviously if she had fired over the hills she would not be able to use her guns at short range—and then bring the British squadron under an accurate bombardment just when they were coming out of harbour and unable to use their armament to effect. The same considerations that weighed with Admiral Sturdee in deciding to allow Canopus to open fire with the possible result of driving them off, should have weighed with the German captain and made him realize that once the battle-cruisers were out of harbour, there was no possible escape either for his ship or for the flagship. And it is undoubtedly certain that whether they could have succeeded in sinking and destroying any British ships before being destroyed themselves, they must have done vastly greater damage than they were, in fact, able to inflict in an action which, as we shall see, the British Admiral was able to fight on his own conditions from first to last. The main features of the final issue—that is, the destruction of the two armoured cruisers—could certainly not have been prevented, but had they closed the range, and fought the British ships as they came out, the complete escape of the light cruisers could have been assured, and it is certain that they could have done very great damage before being destroyed themselves.
4. “At 9:45 A.M. the squadron—less the Bristol—weighed, and proceeded out of harbour in the following order: Carnarvon, Inflexible, Invincible, and Cornwall. On passing Cape Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the southeast, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the northwest.”
At 9:45, when the squadron got clear of the harbour and was working up to full speed, the Germans, whose main squadron was about 8½ sea miles off at 9:30, while Gneisenau and Nürnberg were three miles closer in, were probably about twelve or thirteen miles off. There was then a gap of five or six miles to be made up before action range could be reached, and to make this good in three hours the British squadron would have to produce a speed greater by some two knots.
“At 10:20 A.M. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle-cruisers quickly passed ahead of the Carnarvon and overtook the Kent. The Glasgow was ordered to keep two miles from the Invincible, and the Inflexible was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to twenty knots at 11:15 A.M. to enable the other cruisers to get into station. At this time the enemy’s funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon.”
It will be observed that the British Admiral was carrying on his chase on a wide front and at full speed—probably twenty-four knots. Only Glasgow, Kent, and the two battle-cruisers could maintain this, which meant that Carnarvon and Cornwall were falling very much behind. The Admiral therefore, after an hour, dropped his speed to twenty knots to enable his two cruisers to catch up. Why did he do this?
In the first place, his burst at full speed had probably shown him that instead of having an advantage of only two knots in speed over his enemy, he could beat him by at least five knots when he chose. And he reasoned that if he drove at the five German ships with only four of his own, it was possible for the German ships to scatter and so for one or more of them to escape. It was of the essence of his tactics that the enemy should keep his fleet together as long as possible, and it was a vital matter that when the dispersion took place the pursuit of the light cruisers should be undertaken by his own light cruisers with the best possible prospects of bringing all of them to action. As we shall see by the next paragraph, this measure did not attain its desired end.
“The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided at 12:20 P.M. to attack with the two battle-cruisers and the Glasgow.
“At 12:47 P.M. the signal to ‘Open fire and engage the enemy’ was made.
“The Inflexible opened fire at 12:55 P.M. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the Invincible opened fire at the same ship.
“The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1:20 she (the Leipzig) turned away, with the Nürnberg and Dresden, to the southwest. These light cruisers were at once followed by the Kent, Glasgow, and Cornwall, in accordance with my instructions.
“The action finally developed into three separate encounters besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing.”
It is plain from this that when the speed was limited by that of its slowest ship, that is, the Carnarvon, the squadron was unable to gain on the Germans at all. The time, therefore, had come to force the enemy to a decision, and full speed was once more ordered. The British squadron from now until the next decisive move was taken, must be pictured in this way—the two battle-cruisers and Glasgow racing along at twenty-six or twenty-seven knots; Cornwall and Kent following along at their best speed—probably a knot and a half or two knots less—and Carnarvon bringing up the rear. She must soon have been left considerably behind. For an hour then the two squadrons had probably been keeping about twenty-one knots at a distance of about 19,000 yards. Half an hour’s chase at twenty-five knots brought the range to 17,000 and twenty-five minutes later, to something less than 15,000.
The German squadron was now under fire and Von Spee made the signal, “I intend to fight the battle-cruisers as long as I can, the light cruisers are to scatter and to escape if possible.” The reader will of course realize that up to this moment Leipzig, Nürnberg, and Dresden had been limiting their speed by the speed of Scharnhorst. This was undoubtedly Von Spee’s second mistake, if we assume he was wrong in not attacking the British squadron as it issued from the harbour. By keeping his light cruisers with him until the British were within ten miles of him, he brought their chance of escape to a very low ebb indeed. It is clear that Admiral Sturdee’s drop in speed at 11:20 completely deceived him. He probably thought that none of the British cruisers could exceed the speed the Vice-Admiral then ordered.
We now have to treat of the rest of the day’s work as three separate actions, though it is really more correct to call it four, because the actions between Kent and Nürnberg, Cornwall and Glasgow with Leipzig had, after the first phase, no influence one upon the other. We will deal first, as the Vice-Admiral does, with the action with the armoured cruisers.
CHAPTER XIII
Battle of the Falkland Islands (II)
B. ACTION WITH THE ARMOURED CRUISERS
“The fire of the battle-cruisers was directed on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The effect of this was quickly seen, when at 1:25 P.M., with the Scharnhorst leading, they turned about seven points to port in succession into line ahead and opened fire at 1:30 P.M. Shortly afterwards speed was eased to twenty-four knots, and the battle-cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line ahead, with the Invincible leading.
“The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased until at 2 P.M. it had reached 16,450 yards.”
The moment Von Spee found himself under the effective fire of the battle-cruisers, he took the only course open to him. To delay the finish by sheer flight would do no good. It was his duty to inflict some reciprocal injury on his opponent. He was under the fire of at least eight if not twelve 12-inch guns, and he only had six 8-inch guns bearing on Admiral Sturdee. To do anything at all effective he had to turn broadside on. He therefore turned seven-eighths of a right angle to port, that is, to the left—his course now being almost at right angles to Admiral Sturdee’s—and six minutes afterwards, when both his ships were on a steady course, he opened fire. Three minutes after he began his turn, and therefore three minutes before he opened fire, Admiral Sturdee turned his ships to port also, but his turn was not quite so big as the enemy’s, and for about twelve minutes the range was steadily closing. The effect of these changes of course was to bring the battle-cruisers to within 11,000 or 12,000 yards of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The Germans took full advantage of this opportunity, and before they had been firing five minutes they had salvo after salvo straddling the battle-cruisers.
As we have seen, both in the stories of the Koenigsberg and of the Emden, there has been no feature of any gunnery action more regularly reproduced than the rapidity with which the Germans find the range at the beginning of an action, or the regularity with which the projectiles of every broadside fall together. It was strikingly exemplified in the present instance, so much so indeed that Admiral Sturdee thought it wise to make a further turn to port, thus increasing the range, and as he says in this despatch, by the time his total turn was completed, he brought the range out again to about 13,500 yards. At this distance the 12-inch guns would have a marked advantage over the 8.2’s. But for all that the German fire continued surprisingly accurate, and many hits were made on our ships. The British Admiral held to his new course and the German ships theirs. This involved the lengthening of the range. But Von Spee doubtless preferred this to the confusion of a changing rate. He held on then till he could reach the British ships no longer. The consequence was that in twenty minutes the range had increased by a further 2,500 yards, which was far beyond the capacity of 8.2’s, and a range at which the shooting of even the 12-inch guns might be irregular. Accordingly at about 2 o’clock the British squadron began a gradual turn towards the enemy, which in about seven minutes’ time brought them on a course at right angles to their previous course, and therefore a little less than right angles to the course which the Germans were steering.
“The enemy then (2:10 P.M.) turned away about ten points to starboard and a second chase ensued, until, at 2:45 P.M., the battle-cruisers again opened fire; this caused the enemy, at 2:53 P.M., to turn into line ahead to port and open fire at 2:55 P.M.
“The Scharnhorst caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her fire slackened perceptibly; the Gneisenau was badly hit by the Inflexible.”
In the seven minutes of the beginning of Admiral Sturdee’s turn he reduced the range by considerably over 1,000 yards, and Von Spee perceiving the change of course of the British ships, turned about half a right angle to starboard, that is to the right, as if undecided whether to go right across the bows, and then a few minutes afterwards turned much more than a right angle to the right again. This brought the British squadron dead astern of him and showed that his only anxiety at this moment was to escape our fire as long as possible. It appears from various accounts that firing had ceased on both sides for some little time before Admiral Sturdee began his turn at 2 o’clock, and Von Spee wished to make the lull in the fighting as long as possible. There were doubtless many wounded to carry off, damages to be made good, and so forth. The whole of the first phase of the gunnery engagement, then, beginning just after half-past one on the German side, may be supposed to have ended round about ten minutes to two.
At ten minutes past two the enemy began his new flight, necessitating a reproduction by the British squadron of their tactics of two hours before. It was a chase, not on the direct track of the Germans, but on a course parallel to them and coming round on their port or left-hand side. Von Spee’s retreat had naturally increased the range, carried it out indeed considerably beyond 16,000 yards, but by a quarter to three it had been reduced once more to 15,000 yards, and when the British ships reopened fire, after less than ten minutes of it the enemy turned to bring his broadside into action, just as he had done at 1:25.
“At 3:30 P.M. the Scharnhorst led round about ten points to starboard; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the Scharnhorst became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam; at times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4:4 P.M. the Scharnhorst, whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was a doomed ship; for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4:17 P.M. she disappeared.”
There was this difference between the enemy’s manœuvres on this occasion and that of an hour and a half before. At 1:25 he simply turned sufficiently to bring his broadside to bear. This time he turned not less but much more than a right angle, and Admiral Sturdee was considerably behind him when he opened fire at a quarter to three. Had the British squadron not turned shortly afterwards, the Germans could have closed the range to collision point. As a matter of fact, immediately after the Germans turned, Admiral Sturdee turned too, but not so large an angle, and the consequence was that at 3 o’clock the range had been reduced to 12,000 yards, and at one time it had shortened down to about 9,000. It was apparently Von Spee’s intention at this stage to shorten the range to an extent that would give his guns the opportunity of doing some real damage to our ships. This is of course the proper policy to adopt if a squadron has inferior gun-power and is unable to escape by flight.
But it will be observed that Von Spee did not persist in this manœuvre, and it is obvious that he adopted it too late. He missed his first opportunity of inflicting serious and possibly decisive injury, when he failed to engage the British ships as they were coming out of harbour. He missed the second when, on Admiral Sturdee turning away from him at 1:45, he held on his course and allowed the range to be increased. He missed it again when at 2:10, instead of holding on his course and going across Admiral Sturdee’s bows, he began his second and necessarily futile flight. When the fourth chance came it was probably too late. Both ships had been hit and Scharnhorst seriously. But for about twenty minutes the German Admiral did now close the range and come in almost direct pursuit of the British. So much so that shortly after a quarter past three Admiral Sturdee turned away from him, and describing a kind of circle with his ships from left to right, brought his squadron round so as to be directly behind the German ships. He had two reasons for making this turn. His course was straight up wind, so that gunnery conditions were bad, and the turn brought him to the most favourable possible position for concentrating fire upon the enemy, while they had only a minimum number of guns bearing. This position Von Spee found intolerable. Both his ships were suffering, and one of the Scharnhorst’s funnels was carried away. It must have been evident to him that the end was not far off when he turned at half past three. Never since the first twenty minutes had the enemy’s fire been really good, and now the thing was assuming the dimensions of a military execution. The second phase of gunfire between a quarter to three and half past had been decisive as far as the Scharnhorst was concerned.
A curious incident in this interval should be noted. Just as the firing began in this second phase, a full-rigged sailing ship was observed about four miles off to the southeast from the leading British ship. She is not identified in any of the reports of the action that I have seen, nor has any account appeared that I know of, of what those on board saw. But it must have been an astonishing experience for a peaceful trading sailing vessel, beating down quietly towards the Horn, to find herself suddenly in the middle of so grim a business as this. Those on board saw a thing at that time unprecedented in the history of the world. A sea battle in which ships as fast as the swiftest Atlantic liners were using an armament twice as powerful as that carried by any battleship that had ever been used in war before.
The last moments of Scharnhorst were curiously dramatic. Till now she had led Gneisenau throughout the fight. Just before she sank she turned a half circle past Gneisenau in the reverse direction, and before anybody in the British ships could guess whether this was an intentional manœuvre or purely involuntary, she turned over on her side, her bows plunged downwards, and after standing upright for a second or two with her screws whirring high in the air, vanished from sight. It is probable that coincident with one shot inflicting such injuries that she was flooded, another had smashed up her steering gear, and jammed her helm hard a-port.
“The Gneisenau passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle cruisers.
“At 5:8 P.M. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much.
“At 5:15 P.M. one of the Gneisenau’s shells struck the Invincible; this was her last effective effort.
“At 5:30 P.M. she turned towards the flagship with a heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes, and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal ‘Cease fire,’ but before it was hoisted the Gneisenau opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time with a single gun.
“At 5:40 P.M. the three ships closed in on the Gneisenau, and, at this time, the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying.
“At 5:50 P.M. ‘Cease fire’ was made.
“At 6 P.M. the Gneisenau heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before sinking.”
The Gneisenau, at 4:17, still had all her guns in action, and seemed indeed to have suffered very little. Had the fire of both battle-cruisers hitherto been concentrated chiefly on the flagship? If so, the effect was really rather unfortunate, for with one ship going strong, it was impossible for the Vice-Admiral to attempt the rescue of the people in Scharnhorst. Rain had set in. There were signs of mist and thick weather. At any moment the light might fail. The conditions of the morning had been ideal for the control of guns at long range. These conditions had long since vanished. No doubt it went greatly against the grain to leave the brave fellows of the Scharnhorst in their hopeless struggle, but the necessities of the situation gave no choice. For that matter, when the loss of life that took place in the Gneisenau is considered, it is highly probable that had the British ships stopped to look for people of the Scharnhorst they would have found none. For she turned over and sank, not as Gneisenau subsequently did, so slowly that the people on board were able to muster on deck and then clamber on to the ship’s sides as she heeled over, but with such fearful rapidity that it is said that a salvo which Carnarvon had fired at her when she was still afloat and showed no signs of immediate collapse, actually pitched in the water where she had sunk! If this story is true she must have turned over and vanished from sight in from ten to fifteen seconds. In this instance there can have been few if any survivors left swimming in the water, and those must have perished before help could reach them.
With the disappearance of Scharnhorst Admiral Sturdee made a double turn with his ships to bring them more or less into the wake of Gneisenau and adopted a new disposition. He followed Gneisenau on the starboard side himself, in Invincible, and sent Inflexible to take up a corresponding position on the port quarter. This brought both ships within a range of about 12,000 yards of the Gneisenau, who for the next forty minutes was subjected to a double attack, one on each side. At 5:15 she made her last effort. She hit Invincible amidships.
![[(LARGER)]](#7198634926806088604_i_199_large.jpg.id-4434702403719063377.wrap-0.html.html){kind=link}
Plan of the action between the British battle-cruisers and the German armoured cruisers
It is curious that after 5:30, when every gun but one was out of action and the ship had a heavy list, that she should still have been able to fire her last surviving piece. But such incidents are common to all naval actions. It is said that, at the battle of Tuschima, when Savaroff had not only been shot to pieces, but seemed to be red hot from stem to stern, one of the 6-inch casemates kept at work quite steadily throughout, the last shot being fired when the ship was on her beam ends, in the act of sinking, so that the shell must have been shot straight up into the air.
“The prisoners of war from the Gneisenau report that by the time the ammunition was expended, some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves with hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water.
“When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some two hundred unwounded survivors in the water, but owing to the shock of the cold water, many were drowned within sight of the boats and ship.
“Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships; life-buoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a proportion could be rescued. The Invincible alone rescued 108 men, fourteen of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board; these men were buried at sea the following day with full military honours.”
Some of the German prisoners believed that Gneisenau was not sunk by gun-fire at all, and said that the commander had had the Kingston valves opened as soon as the ammunition was exhausted and there was no possibility of carrying on the fight.
CHAPTER XIV
Battle of the Falkland Islands (III)
C. ACTION WITH THE LIGHT CRUISERS
At about 1 P.M., when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau turned to port to engage the Invincible and Inflexible the enemy’s light cruisers turned to starboard to escape; the Dresden was leading and the Nürnberg and Leipzig followed on each quarter.
“In accordance with my instructions, the Glasgow, Kent, and Cornwall at once went in chase of these ships; the Carnarvon, whose speed was insufficient to overtake them, closed the battle-cruisers.
“The Glasgow drew well ahead of the Cornwall and Kent, and at 3 P.M. shots were exchanged with the Leipzig at 12,000 yards. The Glasgow’s object was to endeavour to outrange the Leipzig with her 6-inch guns and thus cause her to alter course and give the Cornwall and Kent a chance of coming into action.
“At 4:17 P.M. the Cornwall opened fire, also on the Leipzig.
“At 7:17 P.M. the Leipzig was on fire fore and aft, and the Cornwall and Glasgow ceased fire.
“The Leipzig turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 P.M. Seven officers and eleven men were saved.
“At 3:36 P.M. the Cornwall ordered the Kent to engage the Nürnberg, the nearest cruiser to her.
“Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine-room department, the Kent was able to get within range of the Nürnberg at 5 P.M. At 6:35 P.M. the Nürnberg was on fire forward and ceased firing. The Kent also ceased firing and closed to 3,300 yards; as the colours were still observed to be flying in the Nürnberg, the Kent opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later on the colours being hauled down, and every preparation was made to save life. The Nürnberg sank at 7:27 P.M. and as she sank a group of men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived.
“The Kent had four killed and twelve wounded mostly caused by one shell.
“During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the Nürnberg and Leipzig, the Dresden, who was beyond her consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed. The Glasgow was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed in engaging the Leipzig for over an hour before either the Cornwall or Kent could come up and get within range. During this time the Dresden was able to increase her distance and get out of sight.
“The weather changed after 4 P.M. and the visibility was much reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the Dresden to get away unobserved.”
Sir Doveton Sturdee’s account of the two actions between the two light cruisers is almost too syncopated to be intelligible. Fortunately, however, many other records of these two encounters are available, so it is possible to describe what happened in somewhat greater detail. From 1:20 until about quarter to four, Glasgow, Kent, and Cornwall were engaged in a plain stern chase with the three enemy cruisers. At that time the enemy began separating out, and the three British cruisers worked into a line abreast following suit. The Glasgow was at the right of the line between three and four miles from Cornwall and about a mile to a mile and a half ahead of her. Kent was to the left of Cornwall, about two and a half miles off and about abreast of her. Straight ahead of Cornwall was Leipzig, the centre ship of the enemy. She was about eight miles from Cornwall and between six and seven from Glasgow. To Leipzig’s right, and two or three miles ahead of her, was Dresden, and to her left and about the same distance off was Nürnberg. There had been a certain exchange of shots before this condition was reached, for Glasgow, very much the fastest of the British cruisers, had more than once drawn up towards Leipzig, and opened fire on her in hopes of turning her towards Cornwall and Kent. And each time her attack was met by resolute and accurate fire by the Germans. As the German ships began to separate, Glasgow headed off to the right towards Dresden, once more coming under the broadside fire of Leipzig. It must be remembered that Glasgow only had two 6-inch guns, only one of which—the bow gun—could be employed in these conditions, and that the Leipzig’s 4.2’s completely outranged her 4-inch. It appears to be a universal practice with the Germans to mount all their guns from the largest to the smallest, so that they can be used at extreme elevation. It will be remembered how the Koenigsberg showed the most perfect accuracy of fire at nearly 11,000 yards with guns of a calibre that in pre-war days few in the British Service would have thought it possible to employ at greater range than 7,000 or 8,000 yards. These efforts of Glasgow to manœuvre Leipzig into contact with Cornwall, gave Dresden a chance she was not slow to take. She was much the fastest of all the German craft, and managed, between four and five, to slip completely out of sight and escape.
This escape was made easier, and all the shooting throughout the two cruiser actions was made much more difficult by the sudden change in the weather that has already been noted as having begun shortly before 4 o’clock. A drizzling rain had set in, and not only had it become practically impossible to use rangefinders owing to the poor light, but it became extremely hard to detect the fall of shot and so correct the fire. In considering these two fights then, the extremely difficult conditions that prevailed must be taken into account. Let us deal first with the pursuit and destruction of Nürnberg.