JULY 2ND.
The Army of the Elbe moved forward to Chotetitz, Lhota and Hochweseley, with an advanced-guard at Smidar.
The Guard Landwehr Division advanced to Kopidlno, a few miles west of Hochweseley.
The Austrians remained in the positions of the preceding day, but sent their train to the left bank of the Elbe.
Incredible as it seems, the Prussians were ignorant of the withdrawal of the Austrians from the plateau of Dubenetz, and did not, in fact, even know that Von Benedek had occupied that position. The Austrians were supposed to be behind the Elbe, between Josephstadt and Königgrätz. On the other hand, Von Benedek seems to have been completely in the dark in regard to the movements of the Prussians. The Prussian Staff History acknowledges that “the outposts of both armies faced each other on this day within a distance of four and one-half miles, without either army suspecting the near and concentrated presence of the other one.” Each commander ignorant of the presence, almost within cannon shot, of an enormous hostile army! Such a blunder during our Civil War would, probably, have furnished European military critics with a text for a sermon on the mob-like character of American armies.
Supposing the Austrians to be between Josephstadt and Königgrätz, two plans were open to Von Moltke’s choice. First: To attack the Austrian position in front with the First Army and the Army of the Elbe, and on its right with the Second Army. This would have necessitated forcing the passage of a river in the face of a formidable enemy; but this passage would have been facilitated by the flank attack of the Crown Prince, whose entire army (except the Ist Corps) was across the river. It would have been a repetition of Magenta on a gigantic scale, with the Crown Prince playing the part of McMahon, and Frederick Charles enacting the rôle of the French Emperor. Second: To maneuver the enemy out of his position by moving upon Pardubitz; the occupation of which place would be a serious menace to his communications. The latter movement would necessitate the transfer of the Second Army to the right bank of the Elbe, and then the execution of a flank march in dangerous proximity to the enemy; but its successful execution might have produced decisive results. This movement by the right would have been strikingly similar to Von Moltke’s movement by the left, across the Moselle, four years later. The resulting battle might have been an antedated Gravelotte, and Von Benedek might have found a Metz in Königgrätz or Josephstadt. At the very least, the Austrians would, probably, have been maneuvered out of their position behind the Elbe.
Before determining upon a plan of operations, it was decided to reconnoiter the Elbe and the Aupa. The Army of the Elbe was directed to watch the country towards Prague, and to seize the passages of the river at Pardubitz. The First Army was ordered to take up the line Neu Bidsow-Horzitz and to send a detachment from its left wing to Sadowa, to reconnoiter the line of the Elbe between Königgrätz and Josephstadt. The Ist Corps was to observe the latter fortress, and to cover the flank march of the Second Army, if the movement in question should be decided upon. The remaining corps of the Second Army were, for the present, to remain in their positions, merely reconnoitering towards the Aupa and the Metau.
These orders were destined to be speedily countermanded.
Colonel Von Zychlinsky, who commanded an outpost at the castle of Cerakwitz, reported an Austrian encampment near Lipa, and scouting parties, which were then sent out, returned, after a vigorous pursuit by the Austrian cavalry, and reported the presence of the Austrian army in force, behind the Bistritz, extending from Problus to the village of Benatek. These reports, received after 6 o’clock P. M., entirely changed the aspect of matters.
Under the influence of his war experience, Frederick Charles was rapidly developing the qualities of a great commander; his self-confidence was increasing; and his actions now displayed the vigor and military perspicacity of Mars-la-Tour, rather than the hesitation of Münchengrätz.[11] He believed that Von Benedek, with at least four corps, was about to attack him; but he unhesitatingly decided to preserve the advantages of the initiative, by himself attacking the Austrians in front, in the early morning, while the Army of the Elbe should attack their left. The co-operation of the Crown Prince was counted upon to turn the Austrian right, and thus secure victory.
With these objects in view, the following movements were promptly ordered:
The 8th Division to be in position at Milowitz at 2 A. M.;
The 7th Division to take post at Cerakwitz by 2 A. M.;
The 5th and 6th Divisions to start at 1:30 A. M., and take post as reserves south of Horzitz, the 5th west, and the 6th east, of the Königgrätz road;
The 3d Division to Psanek, and the 4th to Bristan; both to be in position by 2 A. M.;
The Cavalry Corps to be saddled by daybreak, and await orders;
The reserve Artillery to Horzitz;
General Herwarth Von Bittenfeld, with all available troops of the Army of the Elbe, to Nechanitz, as soon as possible.
Lieutenant Von Normand was sent to the Crown Prince with a request that he take post with one or two corps in front of Josephstadt, and march with another to Gross Burglitz.
The chief-of-staff of the First Army, General Von Voigts-Rhetz, hastened to report the situation of matters to the King, who had assumed command of the armies on June 30th, and now had his headquarters at Gitschin. The measures taken by Frederick Charles were approved, and Von Moltke at once issued orders for the advance of the entire Second Army, as requested by that commander. These orders were sent at midnight, one copy being sent through Frederick Charles at Kamenitz; the other being carried by Count Finkenstein direct to the Crown Prince at Königinhof. The officer who had been sent by Frederick Charles to the Crown Prince was returning, with an answer that the orders from army headquarters made it impossible to support the First Army with more than the Ist Corps and the Reserve Cavalry. Fortunately, he met Finkenstein a short distance from Königinhof. Comparing notes, the two officers returned together to the Crown Prince, who at once issued orders for the movement of his entire army to the assistance of Frederick Charles.
In order to deliver his dispatches to the Crown Prince, Finkenstein had ridden twenty-two and one-half miles, over a strange road, on a dark, rainy night. Had he lost his way; had his horse suffered injury; had he encountered an Austrian patrol, the history of Germany might have been different. It is almost incredible that the Prussian general should have diverged so widely from the characteristic German prudence as to make success contingent upon the life of an aide-de-camp, or possibly the life of a horse. Even had the other courier, riding via Kamenitz, reached his destination safely, the time that must have elapsed between the Crown Prince’s declension of co-operation and his later promise to co-operate, would have been sufficient to derange, and perhaps destroy, the combinations of Von Moltke.
Let us now examine the Austrian position. Derrécagaix describes it as follows:
“In front of the position, on the west, ran the Bistritz, a little river difficult to cross in ordinary weather, and then very much swollen by the recent rains.
“On the north, between the Bistritz and the Trotina, was a space of about five kilometers, by which the columns of the assailant might advance. Between these two rivers and the Elbe the ground is broken with low hills, covered with villages and woods, which gave the defense advantageous points of support. In the center the hill of Chlum formed the key of the position, and commanded the road from Sadowa to Königgrätz. The heights of Horenowes covered the right on the north. The heights of Problus and Hradek constituted a solid support for the left. At the south the position of Liebau afforded protection on this side to the communications of the army.[12]
“The position selected had, then, considerable defensive value; but it had the defect of having at its back the Elbe and the defiles formed by the bridges.”
On this subject, however, Hozier says: “The Austrian commander took the precaution to throw bridges over the river. With plenty of bridges, a river in rear of a position became an advantage. After the retreating army had withdrawn across the stream, the bridges were broken, and the river became an obstacle to the pursuit. Special, as well as general, conditions also came into play.... The heavy guns of the fortress scoured the banks of the river, both up and down stream, and, with superior weight of metal and length of range, were able to cover the passage of the Austrians.”
In considering the Austrian retreat, we shall find that neither of these distinguished authorities is entirely right, or wholly wrong, in regard to the defects and advantages of the position described.
The following dispositions were ordered by Von Benedek:
The Saxons to occupy the heights of Popowitz, the left wing slightly refused, and covered by the Saxon Cavalry;
The 1st Light Cavalry Division, to the rear and left, at Problus and Prim;
The Xth Corps on the right of the Saxons;
The IIId Corps to occupy the heights of Lipa and Chlum, on the right of the Xth Corps;
The VIIIth Corps in reserve, in rear of the Saxons.
In case the attack should be confined to the left wing, the other corps were merely to hold themselves in readiness. If, however, the attack should extend to the center and right, the following dispositions were to be made:
The IVth Corps to move up on the right of the IIId to the heights of Chlum and Nedelist;
The IId Corps, on the right of the IVth, constituting the extreme right flank;
The 2d Light Cavalry Division, to the rear of Nedelist;
The VIth Corps to be massed on the heights of Wsestar;
The Ist Corps to be massed at Rosnitz;
The 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions to take position at Sweti;
The 2d Reserve Cavalry Division, at Briza;
The Reserve Artillery behind the Ist and VIth Corps.
The Ist and VIth Corps, the five cavalry divisions and the Reserve Artillery were to constitute the general reserve.
A slight attempt was made to strengthen the position by throwing up entrenchments. Six batteries were constructed on the right, as well as breastworks for about eight companies of supporting infantry. The infantry breastworks, as well as the batteries, were constructed by engineer soldiers, and were of strong profile, with traverses, and had a command of eight feet. There was not the slightest attempt to have the infantry shelter themselves with hasty entrenchments. Even the earthworks that were constructed were of no use; for a misunderstanding of orders caused the line of battle to be established far in advance of them. On the left but little was done to strengthen the position before the Prussian attack began.