Doctrine of the Will

by Asa Mahan

IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT.

The doctrine of the Will is a cardinal doctrine of theology, as well as of mental philosophy. This doctrine, to say the least, is one of the great central points, from which the various different and conflicting systems of theological, mental, and moral science, take their departure. To determine a man’s sentiments in respect to the Will, is to determine his position, in most important respects, as a theologian, and mental and moral philosopher. If we turn our thoughts inward, for the purpose of knowing what we are, what we ought to do, and to be, and what we shall become, as the result of being and doing what we ought or ought not, this doctrine presents itself at once, as one of the great pivots on which the resolution of all these questions turns.

If, on the other hand, we turn our thoughts from ourselves, to a study of the character of God, and of the nature and character of the government which He exercises over rational beings, all our apprehensions here, all our notions in respect to the nature and desert of sin and holiness, will, in many fundamental particulars, be determined by our notions in respect to the Will. In other words, our apprehensions of the nature and character of the Divine government, must be determined, in most important respects, by our conceptions of the nature and powers of the subjects of that government. I have no wish to conceal from the reader the true bearing of our present inquiries. I wish him distinctly to understand, that in fixing his notions in respect to the doctrine of the Will, he is determining a point of observation from which, and a medium through which, he shall contemplate his own character and deserts as a moral agent, and the nature and character of that Divine government, under which he must ever “live, and move, and have his being.”

[TRUE AND FALSE METHODS OF INQUIRY.]

Such being the bearing of our present inquiries, an important question arises, to wit: What should be the influence of such considerations upon our investigations in this department of mental science It should not surely induce us, as appears to be true in the case of many divines and philosophers even, first to form our system of theology, and then, in the light of that, to determine our theory of the Will. The true science of the Will, as well as that of all ether departments of mental philosophy, “does not come by observation,” but by internal reflection. Because our doctrine of the Will, whether true or false, will have a controlling influence in determining the character of our theology, and the meaning which we shall attach to large portions of the Bible, that doctrine does not, for that reason, lose its exclusively psychological character. Every legitimate question pertaining to it, still remains purely and exclusively a psychological question. The mind has but one eye by which it can see itself, and that is the eye of consciousness. This, then, is the organ of vision to be exclusively employed in all our inquiries in every department of mental science, and in none more exclusively than in that of the Will. We know very well, for example, that the science of optics has a fundamental bearing upon that of Astronomy. What if a philosopher, for that reason, should form his theory of optics by looking at the stars? This would be perfectly analogous to the conduct of a divine or philosopher who should determine his theory of the Will, not by psychological reflection, but by a system of theology formed without such reflection. Suppose again, that the science of Geometry had the same influence in theology, that that of the Will now has. This fact would not change at all the nature of that science, nor the mode proper in conducting our investigations in respect to it. It would still remain a science of demonstration, with all its principles and rules of investigation unchanged. So with the doctrine of the Will. Whatever its bearings upon other sciences may be, it still remains no less exclusively a psychological science. It has its own principles and laws of investigation, principles and laws as independent of systems of theology, as the principles and laws of the science of optics are of those of Astronomy. In pursuing our investigations in all other departments of mental science, we, for the time being, cease to be theologians. We become mental philosophers. Why should the study of the Will be an exception?

The question now returns—what should be the bearing of the fact, that our theory of the Will, whether right or wrong, will have an important influence in determining our system of theology? This surely should be its influence. It should induce in us great care and caution in our investigations in this department of mental science. We are laying the foundation of the most important edifice of which it ever entered into the heart of man to conceive—an edifice, all the parts, dimensions, and proportions of which, we are required most sedulously to conform to the “pattern shown us in the mount.” Under such circumstances, who should not be admonished, that he should “dig deep, and lay his foundation upon a rock?” I will therefore, in view of what has been said above, earnestly bespeak four things of the reader of the following treatise.

1. That he read it as an honest, earnest inquirer after truth.

2. That he give that degree of attention to the work, that is requisite to an understanding of it.

3. That when he dissents from any of its fundamental principles, he will distinctly state to his own mind the reason and ground of that dissent, and carefully investigate its validity. If these principles are wrong, such an investigation will render the truth more conspicuous to the mind, confirm the mind in the truth, and furnish it with means to overturn the opposite error.

4. That he pursue his investigations with implicit confidence in the distinct affirmations of his own consciousness in respect to this subject. Such a suggestion would appear truly singular, if made in respect to any other department of mental science but that of the Will. Here it is imperiously called for so long have philosophers and divines been accustomed to look without, to determine the characteristics of phenomena which appear exclusively within, and which are revealed to the eye of consciousness only. Having been so long under the influence of this pernicious habit, it will require somewhat of an effort for the mind to turn its organ of self-vision in upon itself, for the purpose of correctly reporting to itself, what is really passing in that inner sanctuary. Especially will it require an effort to do this, with a fixed determination to abandon all theories formed from external observation, and to follow implicitly the results of observations made internally. This method we must adopt, however, or there is at once an end of all real science, not only in respect to the Will, but to all other departments of the mind. Suppose an individual to commence a treatise on colors, for example, with a denial of the validity of all affirmations of the Intelligence through the eye, in respect to the phenomena about which he is to treat. What would be thought of such a treatise? The moment we deny the validity of the affirmations of any of our faculties, in respect to the appropriate objects of those faculties, all reasoning about those objects becomes the height of absurdity. So in respect to the mind. If we doubt or deny the validity of the affirmations of consciousness in respect to the nature and characteristics of all mental operations, mental philosophy becomes impossible, and all reasoning in respect to the mind perfectly absurd. Implicit confidence in the distinct affirmations of consciousness, is a fundamental law of all correct philosophizing in every department of mental science. Permit me most earnestly to bespeak this confidence, as we pursue our investigations in respect to the Will.

[COMMON FAULT.]

It may be important here to notice a common fault in the method frequently adopted by philosophers in their investigations in this department of mental science. In the most celebrated treatise that has ever appeared upon this subject, the writer does not recollect to have met with a single appeal to consciousness, the only adequate witness in the case. The whole treatise, almost, consists of a series of syllogisms, linked together with apparent perfectness, syllogisms pertaining to an abstract something called Will. Throughout the whole, the facts of consciousness are never appealed to. In fact, in instances not a few, among writers of the same school, the right to make such an appeal, on the ground of the total inadequacy of consciousness to give testimony in the case, has been formally denied. Would it be at all strange, if it should turn out that all the fundamental results of investigations conducted after such a method, should be wholly inapplicable to the Will, the phenomena of which lie under the eye of consciousness, or to stand in plain contradiction to the phenomena thus affirmed? What, from the method adopted, we see is very likely to take place, we find, from experience, to be actually true of the treatise above referred to. This is noticed by the distinguished author of The Natural History of Enthusiasm, in an Essay introductory to Edwards on the Will. “Even the reader,” he says, “who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science, will, if he follow our author attentively, be perpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, that some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions, although the linking of syllogisms seems perfect. This suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds, and will at length condense itself into the form of a protest against certain conclusions, notwithstanding their apparently necessary connection with the premises.” What should we expect from a treatise on mental science, from which the affirmations of consciousness should be formally excluded, as grounds of any important conclusions? Just what we find to be true, in fact, of the above named treatise on the Will; to wit: all its fundamental conclusions positively contradicted by such affirmations. What if the decisions of our courts of justice were based upon data from which the testimony of all material witnesses has been formally excluded? Who would look to such decisions as the exponents of truth and justice? Yet all the elements in those decisions may be the necessary logical consequents of the data actually assumed. Such decisions may be all wrong, however, from the fact that the data which ought to be assumed in the case, were excluded. The same will, almost of necessity, be true of all treatises, in every department of mental science, which are not based upon the facts of consciousness.

[PROPER METHOD OF REASONING FROM REVELATION TO THE SYSTEM OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY THEREIN PRE-SUPPOSED.]

By what has been said, the reader will not understand me as denying the propriety of comparing our conclusions in mental science with the Bible. Though no system of mental philosophy is directly revealed in the Bible, some one system is therein pre-supposed, and assuming, as we do, that the Scriptures are a revelation from God, we must suppose that the system of mental science assumed in the sacred writings, is the true system. If we could find the system pre-supposed in the Bible, we should have an infallible standard by which to test the validity of any conclusions to which we have arrived, as the results of psychological investigation. It is therefore a very legitimate, interesting, and profitable inquiry—what is the system of mental science assumed as true in the Bible? We may very properly turn our attention to the solution of such a question. In doing this, however, two things should be kept distinctly in mind.

1. In such inquiries, we leave the domain of mental philosophy entirely, and enter that of theology. In the latter we are to be guided by principles entirely distinct from those demanded in the former.

2. In reasoning from the Bible to the system of mental philosophy pre-supposed in the Scriptures, we are in danger of assuming wrong data as the basis of our conclusions that is, we are in danger of drawing our inferences from those truths of Scripture which have no legitimate bearing upon the subject, and of overlooking those which do have such a bearing. While there are truths of inspiration from which we may properly reason to the theory of the Will, pre-supposed in the Bible, there are other truths from which we cannot legitimately thus reason. Now suppose that we have drawn our conclusions from truths of inspiration which have no legitimate bearing upon the subject, truths which, if we do reason from them in the case, will lead us to wrong conclusions; suppose that in the light of such conclusions we have explained the facts of consciousness, assuming that such must be their true character, else we deny the Bible. Shall we not then have almost inextricably lost ourselves in the labyrinth of error?

The following principles may be laid down as universally binding, if we would reason correctly, as philosophers and theologians, on the subject under consideration.

1. In the domain of philosophy, we must confine ourselves strictly and exclusively to the laws of psychological investigation, without reference to any system of theology.

2. In the domain of theology, when we would reason from the truths of inspiration to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible, we should be exceedingly careful to reason from those truths only which have a direct and decisive bearing upon the subject, and not from those which have no such bearing.

3. We should carefully compare the conclusions to which we have arrived in each of these domains, assuming that if they do not harmonize, we have erred either as philosophers or theologians.

4. In case of disagreement, we should renew our independent investigations in each domain, for the purpose of detecting the error into which we have fallen.

In conducting an investigation upon such principles, we shall, with almost absolute certainty, find ourselves in each domain, following rays of light, which will converge together in the true theory of the Will.

[ERRORS OF METHOD.]

Two errors into which philosophers and divines of a certain class have fallen in their method of treating the department of our subject now under consideration, here demand a passing notice.

1. The two methods above referred to, the psychological and theological, which should at all times be kept entirely distinct and separate, have unhappily been mingled together. Thus the subject has failed to receive a proper investigation in the domain, either of theology or of philosophy.

2. In reasoning from the Scriptures to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in the same, the wrong truth has been adduced as the basis of such reasoning, to wit: the fact of the Divine foreknowledge. As all events yet future are foreknown to God, they are in themselves, it is said, alike certain. This certainty necessitates the adoption of a particular theory of the Will. Now before we can draw any such conclusion from the truth before us, the following things pertaining to it we need to know with absolute certainty, things which God has not revealed, and which we never can know, until He has revealed them, to wit: the mode, the nature, and the degree of the Divine foreknowledge. Suppose that God should impart to us apprehensions perfectly full and distinct, of the mode, nature and degree of His foreknowledge of human conduct. How do we know but that we should then see with the most perfect clearness, that this foreknowledge is just as consistent with the theory of the Will, denied by the philosophers and divines under consideration, as with that which they suppose necessarily to result from the Divine foreknowledge? This, then, is not the truth from which we should reason to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible.

There are truths of inspiration, however, which appear to me to have a direct and decisive bearing upon this subject, and upon which we may therefore safely base our conclusions. In the Scriptures, man is addressed as a moral agent, the subject of commands and prohibitions, of obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and punishment. Now when we have determined the powers which an agent must possess, to render him a proper subject of command and prohibition, of obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and punishment, we have determined the philosophy of the Will, really pre-supposed in the Scriptures. Beneath these truths, therefore, and not beneath that of the divine foreknowledge, that philosophy is to be sought for. This I argue—

1. Because the former has a direct, while the latter has only an indirect bearing upon the subject.

2. Of the former our ideas are perfectly clear and distinct, while of the mode, the degree, and the nature of the Divine foreknowledge we are profoundly ignorant. To all eternity, our ideas of the nature of commands and prohibitions, of obligations, of merit and demerit, and of reward and punishment grounded on moral desert, can never be more clear and distinct than they now are. From such truths, then, and not from those that we do not understand, and which at the utmost have only an indirect bearing upon the subject, we ought to reason, if we reason at all, to the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Scriptures. The reader is now put in possession of the method that will be pursued in the following treatise, and is consequently prepared to enter upon the investigation of the subject before us.

[CHAPTER II.]

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES.

Every individual who has reflected with any degree of interest upon the operations of his own mind, cannot have failed to notice three classes of mental phenomena, each of which is entirely distinct from either of the others. These phenomena, which comprehend the entire operations of the mind, and which may be expressed by the terms thinking, feeling, and willing, clearly indicate in the mind three faculties equally distinct from one another. These faculties are denominated the Intellect, the Sensibility or Sensitivity, and the Will. To the first, all intellectual operations, such as perceiving, thinking, judging, knowing, &c., are referred. To the second, we refer all sensitive states, all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires, &c. To the Will, or the active voluntary faculty, are referred all mental determinations, such as purposes, intentions, resolutions, choices and volitions.

[CLASSIFICATION VERIFIED.]

1. The classes of phenomena, by which this tri-unity of the mental powers is indicated, differ from one another, not in degree, but in kind. Thought, whether clear or obscure, in all degrees, remains equally distinct, in its nature, from feelings and determinations of every class. So of feelings. Sensations, emotions, desires, all the phenomena of the Sensibility, in all degrees and modifications, remain, in their nature and essential characteristics, equally distinct from thought on the one hand, and the action of the Will on the other. The same holds true of the phenomena of the Will. A resolution, for example, in one degree, is not a thought in another, a sensation, emotion, or desire and in another a choice, purpose, intention, or volition. In all degrees and modifications, the phenomena of the Will, in their nature and essential characteristics, remain equally distinct from the operations of the Intelligence on the one hand, and of the Sensibility on the other.

2. This distinction is recognized by universal consciousness. When, for example, one speaks of thinking of any particular object, then of desiring it, and subsequently of determining to obtain the object, for the purpose of gratifying that desire, all mankind most clearly recognize his meaning in each of the above-named affirmations, and understand him as speaking of three entirely distinct classes of mental operations. No person, under such circumstances, ever confounds one of these states with either of the others. So clearly marked and distinguished is the three-fold classification of mental phenomena under consideration, in the spontaneous affirmations of universal consciousness.

3. In all languages, also, there are distinct terms appropriated to the expression of these three classes of phenomena, and of the mental power indicated by the same. In the English language, for example, we have the terms thinking, feeling, and willing, each of which is applied to one particular class of these mental phenomena, and never to either of the others. We have also the terms Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, appropriated, in a similar manner, to designate the mental powers indicated by these phenomena. In all other languages, especially among nations of any considerable advancement in mental culture, we find terms of precisely similar designation. What do such facts indicate? They clearly show, that in the development of the universal Intelligence, the different classes of phenomena under consideration have been distinctly marked, and distinguished from one another, together with the three-fold division of the mental powers indicated by the same phenomena.

4. The clearness and particularity with which the universal intelligence has marked the distinction under consideration, is strikingly indicated by the fact, that there are qualifying terms in common use which are applied to each of these classes of phenomena, and never to either of the others. It is true that there are such terms which are promiscuously applied to all classes of mental phenomena. There are terms, however, which are never applied to but one class. Thus we speak of clear thoughts, but never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of irrepressible feelings and desires, but never of irrepressible thoughts or resolutions. We also speak of inflexible determinations, but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With what perfect distinctness, then, must universal consciousness have marked thoughts, feelings, and determinations of the Will, as phenomena entirely distinct from one another—phenomena differing not in degree, but in kind, and as most clearly indicating the three-fold division of the mental powers under consideration.

5. So familiar are mankind with this distinction, so distinctly marked is it in their minds, that in familiar intercourse, when no particular theory of the mental powers is in contemplation, they are accustomed to speak of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, and of their respective phenomena, as entirely distinct from one another. Take a single example from Scripture. “What I shall choose, I wot not—having a desire to depart.” Here the Apostle evidently speaks of desire and choice as phenomena differing in kind, and not in degree. “If you engage his heart” [his feelings], says Lord Chesterfield, speaking of a foreign minister, “you have a fair chance of imposing upon his understanding, and determining his Will.” “His Will,” says another writer, speaking of the insane, “is no longer restrained by his Judgment, but driven madly on by his passions.”

“When wit is overruled by Will,

And Will is led by fond Desire,

Then Reason may as well be still,

As speaking, kindle greater fire.”^[1]

In all the above extracts the tri-unity of the mental powers, as consisting of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, is distinctly recognized. Yet the writers had, at the time, no particular theory of mental philosophy in contemplation. They speak of a distinction of the mental faculties which all understand and recognize as real, as soon as suggested to their minds.

The above considerations are abundantly sufficient to verify the three-fold distinction above made, of mental phenomena and powers. Two suggestions arise here which demand special attention.

1. To confound either of these distinct powers of the mind with either of the others, as has been done by several philosophers of eminence, in respect to the Will and Sensibility, is a capital error in mental science. If one faculty is confounded with another, the fundamental characteristics of the former will of course be confounded with the same characteristics of the latter. Thus the worst forms of error will be introduced not only into philosophy, but theology, too, as far as the latter science is influenced by the former. What would be thought of a treatise on mental science, in which the Will should be confounded with the Intelligence, and in which thinking and willing would be consequently represented as phenomena identical in kind? This would be an error no more capital, no more glaring, no more distinctly contradicted by fundamental phenomena, than the confounding of the Will with the Sensibility.

2. We are now prepared to contemplate one of the great errors of Edwards in his immortal work on the Will—an error which we meet with in the commencement of that work, and which lays a broad foundation for the false conclusions subsequently found in it. He has confounded the Will with the Sensibility. Of course, we should expect to find that he has subsequently confounded the fundamental characteristics of the phenomena of the former faculty, with the same characteristics of the latter.

“God has endowed the soul,” he says, “with two faculties: One is that by which it is capable of perception and speculation, or by which it discerns, and views, and judges of things; which is called the understanding. The other faculty is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and view things, but is some way inclined to them, or is disinclined and averse from them; or is the faculty by which the soul does not behold things as an indifferent, unaffected spectator; but either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting. This faculty, as it has respect to the actions that are determined by it, is called the Will.”

From his work on the Affections, I cite the following to the same import:

“The Affections of the soul,” he observes, “are not properly distinguished from the Will, as though they were two faculties of the soul. All acts of the Affections of the soul are, in some sense, acts of the Will, and all acts of the Will are acts of the affections. All exercises of the Will are, in some degree or other, exercises of the soul’s appetition or aversion; or which is the same thing, of its love or hatred. The soul wills one thing rather than another, or chooses one thing rather than another, no otherwise than as it loves one thing more than another.” “The Affections are only certain modes of the exercise of the Will.” “The Affections are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul.”

Whether he has or has not subsequently confounded the fundamental characteristics of the phenomena of the Will with those of the phenomena of the Sensibility will be seen in the progress of the present treatise.

[CHAPTER III.]

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

We come now to consider the great and fundamental characteristic of the Will, that by which it is, in a special sense, distinguished from each of the other mental faculties, to wit: that of Liberty.

[SEC. I. TERMS DEFINED.]

Our first inquiry respects the meaning of the term Liberty as distinguished from that of Necessity. These terms do not differ, as expressing genus and species; that is, Liberty does not designate a species of which Necessity expresses the genus. On the other hand, they differ by way of opposition. All correct definitions of terms thus related, will possess these two characteristics. 1. They will mutually exclude each other that is, what is affirmed of one, will, in reality, be denied of the other. 2. They will be so defined as to be universal in their application. The terms right and wrong, for example, thus differ from each other. In the light of all correct definitions of these terms, it will be seen with perfect distinctness, 1st, that to affirm of an action that it is right, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is not wrong; and to affirm that it is wrong, is to affirm that it is not right; 2d, that all moral actions, actual and conceivable, must be either right or wrong. So of all other terms thus related.

The meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as distinguished the one from the other, may be designated by a reference to two relations perfectly distinct and opposite, which may be supposed to exist between an antecedent and its consequent.

1. The antecedent being given, one, and only one, consequent can possibly arise, and that consequent must arise. This relation we designate by the term Necessity. I place my finger, for example, constituted as my physical system now is, in the flame of a burning candle, and hold it there for a given time. The two substances in contact is the antecedent. The feeling of intense pain which succeeds is the consequent. Now such is universally believed to be the correlation between the nature of these substances, that under the circumstances supposed, but one consequent can possibly arise, and that consequent must arise; to wit—the feeling of pain referred to. The relation between such an antecedent and its consequent, therefore, we, in all instances, designate by the term Necessity. When the relation of Necessity is pre-supposed, in the presence of a new consequent, we affirm absolutely that of a new antecedent.

2. The second relation is this. The antecedent being given, either of two or more consequents is equally possible, and therefore, when one consequent does arise, we affirm that either of the others might have arisen in its stead. When this relation is pre-supposed, from the appearance of a new consequent, we do not necessarily affirm the presence of a new antecedent. This relation we designate by the term Liberty.

[CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ABOVE DEFINITIONS.]

On the above definitions I remark:

1. That they mutually exclude each other. To predicate Liberty of any phenomenon is to affirm that it is not necessary. To predicate Necessity of it, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is not free.

2. They are strictly and absolutely universal in their application. All antecedents and consequents, whatever the nature of the subjects thus connected may be, must fall under one or the other of these relations. As the terms right and wrong, when correctly defined, will express the nature of all moral actions, actual and conceivable, so the terms Liberty and Necessity, as above defined, clearly indicate the nature of the relation between all antecedents and consequents, real and supposable. Take any antecedent and consequent we please, real or conceivable, and we know absolutely, that they must sustain to each other one or the other of these relations. Either in connection with this antecedent, but this one consequent is possible, and this must arise, or in connection with the same antecedent, either this, or one or more different consequents are possible, and consequently equally so: for possibility has, in reality, no degrees.

3. All the phenomena of the Will, sustaining, as they do, the relation of consequents to motives considered as antecedents, must fall under one or the other of these relations. If we say, that the relation between motives and acts of Will is that of certainty, still this certainty must arise from a necessary relation between the antecedent and its consequent, or it must be of such a nature as consists with the relation of Liberty, in the sense of the term Liberty as above defined.

4. The above definitions have this great advantage in our present investigations. They at once free the subject from the obscurity and perplexity in which it is often involved by the definitions of philosophers. They are accustomed, in many instances, to speak of moral necessity and physical necessity, as if these are in reality different kinds of necessity: whereas the terms moral and physical, in such connections, express the nature of the subjects sustaining to each other the relations of antecedents and consequents, and not at all that of the relation existing between them. This is exclusively expressed by the term Necessity—a term which designates a relation which is always one and the same, whatever the nature of the subjects thus related may be. An individual in a treatise on natural science, might, if he should choose, in speaking of the relations of antecedents and consequents among solid, fluid, and aeriform substances, use the words, solid necessity, fluid necessity, and aeriform necessity. He might use as many qualifying terms as there are different subjects sustaining to each other the relation under consideration. In all such instances no error will arise, if these qualifying terms are distinctly understood to designate, not the nature of the relation of antecedent and consequent in any given case (as if there were as many different kinds of necessity as there are qualifying terms used), but to designate the nature of the subjects sustaining this relation. If, on the other hand, the impression should be made, that each of these qualifying terms designates a necessity of a peculiar kind, and if, as a consequence, the belief should be induced, that there are in reality so many different kinds of necessity, errors of the gravest character would arise—errors no more important, however, than actually do arise from the impression often induced, that moral necessity differs in kind from physical necessity.

5. I mention another very decisive advantage which the above definitions have in our present investigations. In the light of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as above defined, the two great schools in philosophy and theology are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in difference between them, without the possibility on the part of either, of escaping under a fog of definitions about moral necessity, physical necessity, moral certainty, &c., and then claiming a victory over their opponents. These terms, as above defined, stand out with perfect clearness and distinctness to all reflecting minds. Every one must see, that the phenomena of the Will cannot but fall under the one or the other of the relations designated by these terms inasmuch as no third relation differing in kind from both of these, is conceivable. The question therefore may be fairly put to every individual, without the possibility of misapprehension or evasion—Do you believe, whenever a man puts forth an act of Will, that in those circumstances, this one act only is possible, and that this act cannot but arise? In all prohibited acts, for example, do you believe that an individual, by the resistless providence of God, is placed in circumstances in which this one act only is possible, and this cannot but result, that in these identical circumstances, another and a different act is required of him, and that for not putting forth this last act, he is justly held as infinitely guilty in the sight of God, and of the moral universe? To these questions every one must give an affirmative or negative answer. If he gives the former, he holds the doctrine of Necessity, and must take that doctrine with all its consequences. If he gives the latter, he holds the doctrine of Liberty in the sense of the term as above defined. He must hold, that in the identical circumstances in which a given act of Will is put forth, another and different act might have been put forth; and that for this reason, in all prohibited acts, a moral agent is held justly responsible for different and opposite acts. Much is gained to the cause of truth, when, as in the present instance, the different schools are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in difference between them, and that without the possibility of misapprehension or evasion in respect to the nature of that question.

[MOTIVE DEFINED.]

Having settled the meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as designating two distinct and opposite relations, the only relations conceivable between an antecedent and its consequent, one other term which may not unfrequently be used in the following treatise, remains to be defined; to wit—motive—a term which designates that which sustains to the phenomena of the Will, the relation of antecedent. Volition, choice, preference, intention, all the phenomena of the Will, are considered as the consequent. Whatever within the mind itself may be supposed to influence its determinations, whether called susceptibilities, biases, or anything else; and all influences acting upon it as incentives from without, are regarded as the antecedent. I use the term motive as synonymous with antecedent as above defined. It designates all the circumstances and influences from within or without the mind, which operate upon it to produce any given act of Will.

The term antecedent in the case before us, in strictness of speech, has this difference of meaning from that of motive as above defined: The former includes all that is designated by the latter, together with the Will itself. No difficulty or obscurity, however, will result from the use of these terms as synonymous, in the sense explained.

[SEC. II. LIBERTY, AS OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE WILL.]

We are now prepared to meet the question, To which of the relations above defined shall we refer the phenomena of the Will? If these phenomena are subject to the law of necessity, then, whenever a particular antecedent (motive) is given, but one consequent (act of Will) is possible, and that consequent must arise. It cannot possibly but take place. If, on the other hand, these phenomena fall under the relation of Liberty, whenever any particular motive is present, either of two or more acts of Will is equally possible; and when any particular consequent (act of Will) does arise, either of the other consequents might have arisen in its stead.

Before proceeding directly to argue the question before us, one consideration of a general nature demands a passing notice. It is this. The simple statement of the question, in the light of the above relations, settles it, and must settle it, in the judgment of all candid, uncommitted inquirers after the truth. Let any individual contemplate the action of his voluntary powers in the light of the relations of Liberty and Necessity as above defined, and he will spontaneously affirm the fact, that he is a free and not a necessary agent, and affirm it as absolutely as he affirms his own existence. Wherever he is, while he retains the consciousness of rational being, this conviction will and must be to him an omnipresent reality. To escape it, he must transcend the bounds of conscious existence.

[OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.]

Such is the importance of the subject, however, that a more extended and particular consideration of it is demanded. In the further prosecution of the argument upon the subject, we will—

I. In the first place, contemplate the position, that the phenomena of the Will are subject to the laws of Necessity. In taking this position we are at once met with the following palpable and insuperable difficulties.

1. The conviction above referred to—a conviction which remains proof against all apparent demonstrations to the contrary. We may pile demonstration upon demonstration in favor of the doctrine of Necessity, still, as the mind falls back upon the spontaneous affirmations of its own Intelligence, it finds, in the depths of its inner being, a higher demonstration of the fact, that that doctrine is and must be false—that man is not the agent which that doctrine affirms him to be. In the passage already cited, and which I will take occasion here to repeat, the writer has, with singular correctness, mapped out the unvarying experience of the readers of Edwards on the Will. “Even the reader,” he says, “who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science, will, if he follow our author attentively, be perpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, that some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions, although the linking of syllogisms seems perfect. This suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds, and will at length condense itself into the form of a protest against certain conclusions, notwithstanding their apparently necessary connection with the premises.” What higher evidence can we have that that treatise gives a false interpretation of the facts of universal consciousness pertaining to the Will, than is here presented? Any theory which gives a distinct and true explanation of the facts of consciousness, will be met by the Intelligence with the response, “That’s true; I have found it.” Any theory apparently supported by adequate evidence, but which still gives a false interpretation of such facts, will induce the internal conflict above described—a conflict which, as the force of apparent demonstration increases, will, in the very centre of the Intelligence, “condense itself into the form of a protest against the conclusions presented, notwithstanding their apparently necessary connection with the premises.” The falsity of the doctrine of Necessity is a first truth of the universal Intelligence.

2. If this doctrine is true, it is demonstrably evident, that in no instance, real or supposable, have men any power whatever to will or to act differently from what they do. The connection between the determinations of the Will, and their consequents, external and internal, is absolutely necessary. Constituted as I now am, if I will, for example, a particular motion of my hand or arm, no other movement, in these circumstances, was possible, and this movement could not but take place. The same holds true of all consequents, external and internal, of all acts of Will. Let us now suppose that these acts themselves are the necessary consequents of the circumstances in which they originate. In what conceivable sense have men, in the circumstances in which Providence places them, power either to will or to act differently from what they do? The doctrine of ability to will or to do differently from what we do is, in every sense, false, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. Men, when they transgress the moral law, always sin, without the possibility of doing right. From this position the Necessitarian cannot escape.

3. On this theory, God only is responsible for all human volitions together with their effects. The relation between all antecedents and their consequents was established by him. If that relation be in all instances a necessary one, his Will surely is the sole responsible antecedent of all consequents.

4. The idea of obligation, of merit and demerit, and of the consequent propriety of reward and punishment, are chimeras. To conceive of a being deserving praise or blame, for volitions or actions which occurred under circumstances in which none others were possible, and in which these could not possibly but happen, is an absolute impossibility. To conceive him under obligation to have given existence, under such circumstances, to different consequents, is equally impossible. It is to suppose an agent under obligation to perform that to which Omnipotence is inadequate. For Omnipotence cannot perform impossibilities. It cannot reverse the law of Necessity. Let any individual conceive of creatures placed by Divine Providence in circumstances in which but one act, or series of acts of Will, can arise, and these cannot but arise—let him, then, attempt to conceive of these creatures as under obligation, in these same circumstances, to give existence to different and opposite acts, and as deserving of punishment for not doing so. He will find it as impossible to pass such a judgment as to conceive of the annihilation of space, or of an event without a cause. To conceive of necessity and obligation as fundamental elements of the same act, is an absolute impossibility. The human Intelligence is incapable of affirming such contradictions.

5. As an additional consideration, to show the absolute incompatibility of the idea of moral obligation with the doctrine of Necessity, permit me to direct the attention of the reader to this striking fact. While no man, holding the doctrine of Liberty as above defined, was ever known to deny moral obligation, such denial has, without exception, in every age and nation, been avowedly based upon the assumption of the truth of the doctrine of Necessity. In every age and nation, in every solitary mind in which the idea of obligation has been denied, this doctrine has been the great maelstrom in which this idea has been swallowed up and lost. How can the Necessitarian account for such facts in consistency with his theory?

6. The commands of God addressed to men as sinners and requiring them in all cases of transgression of the moral law, to choose and to act differently from what they do, are, if this doctrine is true, the perfection of tyranny. In all such cases men are required—

(1.) To perform absolute impossibilities; to reverse the law of necessity.

(2.) To do that to which Omnipotence is inadequate. For Omnipotence, as we have seen, cannot reverse the law of necessity. Not only so, but—

(3.) Men in all such instances are required, as a matter of fact, to resist and overcome Omnipotence. To require us to reverse the relation established by Omnipotence, between antecedents and consequents, is certainly to require us to resist and overcome Omnipotence, and that in the absence of all power, even to attempt the accomplishment of that which we are required to accomplish.

7. If this doctrine is true, at the final Judgment the conscience and intelligence of the universe will and must be on the side of the condemned. Suppose that when the conduct of the wicked shall be revealed at that Day, another fact shall stand out with equal conspicuousness, to wit, that God himself had placed these beings where but one course of conduct was possible to them, and that course they could not but pursue, to wit, the course which they did pursue, and that for having pursued this course, the only one possible, they are now to be “punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of God and the glory of his power,” must not the intelligence of the universe pronounce such a sentence unjust? All this must be true, or the doctrine of Necessity is false. Who can believe, that the pillars of God’s eternal government rest upon such a doctrine?

8. On this supposition, probation is an infinite absurdity. We might with the same propriety represent the specimens in the laboratory of the chemist, as on probation, as men, if their actions are the necessary result of the circumstances in which Omnipotence has placed them. What must intelligent beings think of probation for a state of eternal retribution, probation based on such a principle?

9. The doctrine of Necessity is, in all essential particulars, identical with Fatalism in its worst form. All that Fatalism ever has maintained, or now maintains, is, that men, by a power which they cannot control nor resist, are placed in circumstances in which they cannot but pursue the course of conduct which they actually are pursuing. This doctrine has never affirmed, that, in the Necessitarian sense, men cannot “do as they please.” All that it maintains is, that they cannot but please to do as they do. Thus this doctrine differs not one “jot or tittle,” from Necessity. No man can show the want of perfect identity between them. Fatalists and Necessitarians may differ in regard to the origin of this Necessity. In regard to its nature, the only thing material, as far as present inquiries are concerned, they do not differ at all.

10. In maintaining the Necessity of all acts of the Will of man, we must maintain, that the Will of God is subject to the same law. This is universally admitted by Necessitarians themselves. Now in maintaining the necessity of all acts of the Divine Will, the following conclusions force themselves upon us:

(1.) Motives which necessitate the determinations of the Divine Will, are the sole originating and efficient causes in existence. God is not the first cause of anything.

(2.) To motives, which of course exist independently of the Divine Will, we must ascribe the origin of all created existences. The glory of originating “all things visible and invisible,” belongs not to Him, but to motives.

(3.) In all cases in which creatures are required to act differently from what they do, as in all acts of sin, they are in reality required not only to resist and overcome the omnipotent determinations of the Divine Will, but also the motives by which the action of God’s Will is necessitated. We ask Necessitarians to look these consequences in the face, and then say, whether they are prepared to deny, or to meet them.

11. Finally, if the doctrine under consideration is true, in all instances of the transgression of the moral law, men are, in reality, required to produce an event which, when it does exist, shall exist without a cause. In circumstances where but one event is possible, and that cannot but arise, if a different event should arise, it would undeniably be an event without a cause. To require such an event under such circumstances, is to require an event without a cause, the most palpable contradiction conceivable. Now just such a requirement as this is laid upon men, in all cases of disobedience of the moral law, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. In all such cases, according to this doctrine men are placed in circumstances in which but one act is possible, and that must arise, to wit: the act of disobedience which is put forth. If, in these circumstances, an act of obedience should be put forth, it would be an event without a cause, and in opposition also to the action of a necessary cause. In these identical circumstances, the act of obedience is required, that is, an act is required of creatures, which, if it should be put forth, would be an event without a cause. Has a God of truth and justice ever laid upon men such a requisition as that? How, I ask, can the doctrine of Necessity be extricated from such a difficulty?

[DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY—DIRECT ARGUMENT.]

II. We will now, as a second general argument, consider the position, that the Will is subject in its determinations to the relation of Liberty, in opposition to that of Necessity. Here I would remark, that as the phenomena of the Will must fall under one or the other of these relations, and as it has been shown, that they cannot fall under that of Necessity, but one supposition remains. They must fall under that of Liberty, as opposed to Necessity. The intrinsic absurdity of supposing that a being, all of whose actions are necessary, is still accountable for such actions, is sufficient to overthrow the doctrine of Necessity for ever. A few additional considerations are deemed requisite, in order to present the evidence in favor of the Liberty of the Will.

1. The first that I present is this. As soon as the doctrine of Liberty, as above defined, is distinctly apprehended, it is spontaneously recognized by every mind, as the true, and only true exposition of the facts of its own consciousness pertaining to the phenomena of the Will. This doctrine is simply an announcement of the spontaneous affirmations of the universal Intelligence. This is the highest possible evidence of the truth of the doctrine.

2. The universal conviction of mankind, that their former course of conduct might have been different from what it was. I will venture to affirm, that there is not a person on earth, who has not this conviction resting upon his mind in respect to his own past life. It is important to analyze this conviction, in order to mark distinctly its bearing upon our present inquiries. This conviction is not the belief, that if our circumstances had been different, we might have acted differently from what we did. A man, for example, says to himself—“At such a time, and in such circumstances, I determined upon a particular course of conduct. I might have determined upon a different and opposite course. Why did I not?” These affirmations are not based upon the conviction, that, in different circumstances, we might have done differently. In all such affirmations we take into account nothing but the particular circumstances in which our determinations were formed. It is in view of these circumstances exclusively, that we affirm that our determinations might have been different from what they were. Let the appeal be made to any individual whatever, whose mind is not at the time under the influence of any particular theory of the Will. You say, that at such a time, and under such circumstances, you determined upon a particular course, that you might then have resolved upon a different and opposite course, and that you blame yourself for not having done so. Is not this your real meaning? “If my circumstances had been different, I might have resolved upon a different course.” No, he would reply. That is not my meaning. I was not thinking at all of a change of circumstances, when I made this affirmation. What I mean is, that in the circumstances in which I was, I might have done differently from what I did. This is the reason why I blame myself for not having done so. The same conviction, to wit: that without any change of circumstances our past course of life might have been different from what it was, rests upon every mind on earth in which the remembrance of the past dwells. Now this universal conviction is totally false, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The doctrine of the Liberty of the Will must be true, or the universal Intelligence is a perpetual falsehood.

3. In favor of the doctrine of Liberty, I next appeal to the direct, deliberate, and universal testimony of consciousness. This testimony is given in three ways.

(1.) In the general conviction above referred to, that without any change of circumstances, our course of conduct might have been the opposite of what it was. Nothing but a universal consciousness of the Liberty of the Will, can account for this conviction.

(2.) Whenever any object of choice is submitted to the mind, consciousness affirms, directly and positively, that, under these identical circumstances, either of two or more acts of Will is equally possible. Every man in such circumstances is as conscious of such power as he is of his own existence. In confirmation of these affirmations, let any one make the appeal to his own consciousness, when about to put forth any act of Will. He will be just as conscious that either of two or more different determinations is, in the same circumstances, equally possible, as he is of any mental state whatever.

(3.) In reference to all deliberate determinations of Will in time past, the remembrance of them is attended with a consciousness the most positive, that, in the same identical circumstances, determinations precisely opposite might have been originated. Let any one recall any such determination, and the consciousness of a power to have determined differently will be just as distinctly recalled as the act itself. He cannot be more sure that he acted at all, than he will be, that he might have acted [determined] differently. All these affirmations of consciousness are false, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true.

4. A fundamental distinction which all mankind make between the phenomena of the Will, and those of the other faculties, the Sensibility for example, is a full confirmation of the doctrine of Liberty, as a truth of universal consciousness. A man is taken out of a burning furnace, with his physical system greatly injured by the fire. As a consequence, he subsequently experiences much suffering and inconvenience. For the injury done him by the fire, and for the pain subsequently experienced, he never blames or reproaches himself. With self-reproach he never says, Why, instead of being thus injured, did I not come out of the furnace as the three worthies did from that of Nebuchadnezzar? Why do I not now experience pleasure instead of pain, as a consequence of that injury? Suppose, now, that his fall into the furnace was the result of a determination formed for the purpose of self-murder. For that determination, and for not having, in the same circumstances, determined differently, he will ever after reproach himself, as most guilty in the sight of God and man. How shall we account for the absence of self-reproach in the former instance, and for its presence in the latter? If the appeal should be made to the subject, his answer would be ready. In respect to the injury and pain, in the circumstances supposed, they could not but be experienced. Such phenomena, therefore, can never be the occasion of self-reproach. In the condition in which the determination referred to was formed, a different and opposite resolution might have been originated. That particular determination, therefore, is the occasion of self-reproach. How shall we account for this distinction, which all mankind agree in making, between the phenomena of the Sensibility on the one hand, and of the Will on the other? But one supposition accounts for this fact, the universal consciousness, that the former are necessary, and the latter free that in the circumstances of their occurrence the former may not, and the latter may, be different from what they are.

5. On any other theory than that of Liberty, the words, obligation, merit and demerit, &c., are words without meaning. A man is, we will suppose, by Divine Providence, placed in circumstances in which he cannot possibly but pursue one given course, or, which is the same thing, put forth given determinations. When it is said that, in these identical circumstances, he ought to pursue a different and opposite course, or to put forth different and opposite determinations, what conceivable meaning can we attach to the word ought, here? There is nothing, in the circumstances supposed, which the word, ought, or obligation, can represent. If we predicate merit or demerit of an individual thus circumstanced, we use words equally without meaning. Obligation and moral desert, in such a case, rest upon “airy nothing,” without a “local habitation or a name.”

On the other hand, if we suppose that the right and the wrong are at all times equally possible to an individual; that when he chooses the one, he might, in the same identical circumstances, choose the other; infinite meaning attaches to the words, ought, obligation, merit and demerit, when it is said that an individual thus circumstanced ought to do the right and avoid the wrong, and that he merits reward or punishment, when he does the one, or does not do the other. The ideas of obligation, merit and demerit, reward and punishment, and probation with reference to a state of moral retribution, are all chimeras, on any other supposition than that of the Liberty of the Will. With this doctrine, they all perfectly harmonize.

6. All moral government, all laws, human and Divine, have their basis in the doctrine of Liberty; and are the perfection of tyranny, on any other supposition. To place creatures in circumstances which necessitate a given course of conduct, and render every other course impossible, and then to require of them, under the heaviest sanctions, a different and opposite course—what can be tyranny if this is not?

[OBJECTION IN BAR OF AN APPEAL TO CONSCIOUSNESS.]

An objection which is brought by Necessitarians, in perpetual bar of an appeal to consciousness, to determine the fact whether the phenomena of the Will fall under the relation of Liberty or Necessity, here demands special attention. Consciousness, it is said, simply affirms, that, in given circumstances, we do, in fact, put forth certain acts of Will. But whether we can or cannot, in these circumstances, put forth other and opposite determinations, it does not and cannot make any affirmation at all. It does not, therefore, fall within the province of Consciousness to determine whether the phenomena of the Will are subject to the relation of Liberty or Necessity; and it is unphilosophical to appeal to that faculty to decide such a question. This objection, if valid, renders null and void much of what has been said upon this subject; and as it constitutes a stronghold of the Necessitarian, it becomes us to examine it with great care. In reply, I remark,

1. That if this objection holds in respect to the phenomena of the Will, it must hold equally in respect of those of the other faculties the Intelligence, for example. We will, therefore, bring the objection to a test, by applying it to certain intellectual phenomena. We will take, as an example, the universal and necessary affirmation, that “it is impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be.” Every one is conscious, in certain circumstances, of making this and other kindred affirmations. Now, if the objection under consideration is valid, all that we should be conscious of is the fact, that, under the circumstances supposed, we do, in reality, make particular affirmations; while, in reference to the question, whether, in the same circumstances, we can or cannot make different and opposite affirmations, we should have no consciousness at all. Now, I appeal to every man, whether, when he is conscious of making the affirmation, that it is impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be, he is not equally conscious of the fact, that it is impossible for him to make the opposite affirmation whether, when he affirms that three and two make five, he is not conscious that it is impossible for him to affirm that three and two are six? In other words, when we are conscious of making certain intellectual affirmations, are we not equally conscious of an impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations? Every man is just as conscious of the fact, that the phenomena of his Intelligence fall under the relation of Necessity, as he is of making any affirmations at all. If this is not so, we cannot know but that it is possible for us to affirm and believe perceived contradictions. All that we could say is, that, as a matter of fact, we do not do it. But whether we can or cannot do it, we can never know. Do we not know, however, as absolutely as we know anything, that we cannot affirm perceived contradictions? In other words, we do and can know absolutely, that our Intelligence is subject to the law of Necessity. We do know by consciousness, with absolute certainty, that the phenomena of the Intelligence, and I may add, of the Sensibility too, do fall under the relation of Necessity. Why may we not know, with equal certainty, whether the phenomena of the Will do or do not fall under the relation of Liberty? What then becomes of the objection under consideration?

2. But while we are conscious of the fact, that the Intellect is under the law of Necessity, we are equally conscious that Will is under that of Liberty. We make intellectual affirmations; such, for example, as the propositions, Things equal to the same things are equal to one another, There can be no event without a cause, &c., with a consciousness of an utter impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations. We put forth acts of Will with a consciousness equally distinct and absolute, of a possibility, in the same circumstances, of putting forth different and opposite determinations. Even Necessitarians admit and affirm the validity of the testimony of consciousness in the former instance. Why should we doubt or deny it in the latter?

3. The question, whether Consciousness can or cannot give us not only mental phenomena, but also the fundamental characteristics of such phenomena, cannot be determined by any pre-formed theory, in respect to what Consciousness can or cannot affirm. If we wish to know to what a witness is able to testify, we must not first determine what he can or cannot say, and then refuse to hear anything from him, except in conformity to such decisions. We must first give him a full and attentive hearing, and then judge of his capabilities. So in respect to Consciousness. If we wish to know what it does or does not, what it can or cannot affirm, we must let it give its full testimony, untrammelled by any pre-formed theories. Now, when the appeal is thus made, we find, that, in the circumstances in which we do originate given determinations, it affirms distinctly and absolutely, that, in the same identical circumstances, we might originate different and opposite determinations. From what Consciousness does affirm, we ought surely to determine the sphere of its legitimate affirmations.

4. The universal solicitude of Necessitarians to take the question under consideration from the bar of Consciousness is, in fact, a most decisive acknowledgment, on their part, that at that tribunal the cause will go against them. Let us suppose that all men were as conscious that their Will is subject to the law of Necessity, as they are that their Intelligence is. Can we conceive that Necessitarians would not be as solicitous to carry the question directly to the tribunal of Consciousness, as they now are to take it from that tribunal? When all men are as conscious that their Will is under the law of Liberty, as they are that their other faculties are under the relation of Necessity, no wonder that Necessitarians anticipate the ruin of their cause, when the question is to be submitted to the bar of Consciousness. No wonder that they so solemnly protest against an appeal to that tribunal. Let the reader remember, however, that the moment the validity of the affirmations of Consciousness is denied, in respect to any question in mental science, it becomes infinite folly in us to reason at all on the subject; a folly just as great as it would be for a natural philosopher to reason about colors, after denying the validity of all affirmations of the eye, in respect to the phenomena about which he is to reason.

[DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY ARGUED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN ALL MINDS.]

III. I will present a third general argument in favor of the doctrine of Liberty; an argument, which, to my mind, is perfectly conclusive, but which differs somewhat from either of the forms of argumentation above presented. I argue the Liberty of the Will from the existence of the idea of Liberty in the human mind, in the form in which it is there found.

If the Will is not free, the idea of Liberty is wholly inapplicable to any phenomenon in existence whatever. Yet this idea is in the mind. The action of the Will in conformity to it is just as conceivable as its action in conformity to the idea of Necessity. It remains with the Necessitarian to account for the existence of this idea in the human mind, in consistency with his own theory. Here the following considerations present themselves demanding special attention.

1. The idea of Liberty, like that of Necessity, is a simple, and not a complex idea. This all will admit.

2. It could not have come into the mind from observation or reflection because all phenomena, external and internal, all the objects of observation and reflection, are, according to the doctrine of Necessity, not free, but necessary.

3. It could not have originated, as necessary ideas do, as the logical antecedents of the truths given by observation and reflection. For example, the idea of space, time, substance, and cause, are given in the Intelligence, as the logical antecedents of the ideas of body, succession, phenomena, and events, all of which are truths derived from observation or reflection. Now the idea of Liberty, if the doctrine of Necessity is true, cannot have arisen in this way because all the objects of observation and reflection are, according to this doctrine, necessary, and therefore their logical antecedents must be. How shall we account, in consistency with this theory, for the existence of this idea in the mind? It came not from perception external, nor internal, nor as the logical antecedent or consequent of any truth thus perceived. Now if we admit the doctrine of Liberty as a truth of universal consciousness, we can give a philosophical account of the existence of the idea of Liberty in all minds. If we deny this doctrine, and consequently affirm that of Necessity, we may safely challenge any theologian or philosopher to give such an account of the existence of that idea in the mind. For all ideas, in the mind, do and must come from observation or reflection, or as the logical antecedents or consequents of ideas thus obtained. We have here an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Necessity is true.

4. All simple ideas, with the exception of that of Liberty, have realities within or around us, corresponding to them. If the doctrine of Necessity is true, we have one solitary idea of this character, that of Liberty, to which no reality corresponds. Whence this solitary intruder in the human mind?

The existence of this idea in the mind is proof demonstrative, that a reality corresponding to it does and must exist, and as this reality is found nowhere but in the Will, there it must be found. Almost all Necessitarians are, in philosophy, the disciples of Locke. With him, they maintain, that all ideas in the mind come from observation and reflection. Yet they maintain that there is in the mind one idea, that of Liberty, which never could thus have originated; because, according to their theory, no objects corresponding do or can exist, either as realities, or as the objects of observation or reflection. We have again an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true.

5. The relation of the ideas of Liberty and Necessity to those of obligation, merit and demerit, &c., next demand our attention. If the doctrine of Necessity is true, the idea of Liberty is, as we have seen, a chimera. With it the idea of obligation can have no connection or alliance; but must rest exclusively upon that of Necessity. Now, how happens it, that no man holding the doctrine of Liberty was ever known to deny that of obligation, or of merit and demerit? How happens it, that the validity of neither of these ideas has ever, in any age or nation, been denied, except on the avowed authority of the doctrine of Necessity? Sceptics of the class who deny moral obligation, are universally avowed Necessitarians. We may safely challenge the world to produce a single exception to this statement. We may challenge the world to produce an individual in ancient or modern times who holds the doctrine of Liberty, and denies moral obligation, or an individual who denies moral obligation on any other ground than that of Necessity. Now, how can this fact be accounted for, that the ideas of obligation, merit and demerit, &c., universally attach themselves to a chimera, the idea of Liberty, and stand in such irreconcilable hostility to the only idea by which, as Necessitarians will have it, their validity is affirmed?

6. Finally, If the doctrine of Necessity is true, the phenomena of the Intelligence, Sensibility, and the Will, are given in Consciousness as alike necessary. The idea of Liberty, then, if it does exist in the mind, would not be likely to attach itself to either of these classes of phenomena; and if to either, it would be just as likely to attach itself to one class as to another. Now, how shall we account for the fact, that this idea always attaches itself to one of these classes of phenomena, those of the Will, and never to either of the others? How is it that all men agree in holding, that, in the circumstances of their occurrence, the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility cannot but be what they are, while those of the Will may be otherwise than they are? Why, if this chimera, the idea of Liberty, attaches itself to either of these classes, does it not sometimes attach itself to the phenomena of the Intelligence or Sensibility, as well as to those of the Will? Here, once again, we have an event without a cause, a distinction without a difference, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The facts before us can be accounted for only on the supposition, that the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility are given in Consciousness as necessary, while those of the Will are given as free.

[THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE BIBLE.]

IV. We will now, in the fourth place, raise the inquiry, an inquiry very appropriate in its place, and having an important bearing upon our present investigations, whether the doctrine of the Will, above established, is the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible? The following considerations will enable us to give a decisive answer to this inquiry.

1. If the doctrine of the Will here maintained is not, and consequently that of Necessity is, the doctrine pre-supposed in the Scriptures, then we have two revelations from God, the external and internal, in palpable contradiction to each other. As the works of God (see Rom. 1: 19, 20) are as real a revelation from him as the Bible, so are the necessary affirmations of our Intelligence. Now, in our inner being, in the depths of our Intelligence, the fact is perpetually revealed and affirmed—a fact which we cannot disbelieve, if we would—that we are not necessary but free agents. Suppose that, in the external revelation, the Scriptures, the fact is revealed and affirmed that we are not free but necessary agents. Has not God himself affirmed in one revelation what he has denied in another? Of what use can the internal revelation be, but to render us necessarily sceptical in respect to the external? Has the Most High given two such revelations as this?

2. In the Scriptures, man is presented as the subject, and, of course, as possessing those powers which render him the proper subject of command and prohibition, of obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and punishment. Let us suppose that God has imparted to a being a certain constitution, and then placed him in a condition in which, in consequence of the necessary correlation between his constitution and circumstances, but one series of determinations are possible to him, and that series cannot but result. Can we conceive it proper in the Most High to prohibit that creature from pursuing the course which God himself has rendered it impossible for him not to pursue, and require him, under the heaviest sanctions, to pursue, under these identical circumstances, a different and opposite course—a course which the Creator has rendered it impossible for him to pursue? Is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the Bible? Does the Bible imply a system of mental philosophy which renders the terms, obligation, merit and demerit, void of all conceivable meaning, and which lays no other foundation for moral retributions but injustice and tyranny?

3. Let us now contemplate the doings of the Great Day revealed in the Scriptures, in the light of these two opposite theories. Let us suppose that, as the righteous and the wicked stand in distinct and separate masses before the Eternal One, the Most High says to the one class, “You, I myself placed in circumstances in which nothing but obedience was possible, and that you could not but render; and you, I placed in a condition in which nothing but disobedience was possible to you, and that you could not but perpetrate. In consequence of these distinct and opposite courses, each of which I myself rendered unavoidable, you deserve and shall receive my eternal smiles; and you as richly deserve and shall therefore endure my eternal frowns.” What would be the response of an assembled universe to a division based upon such a principle? Is this the principle on which the decisions of that Day are based? It must be so, if the doctrine of Liberty is not, and that of Necessity is, the doctrine of the Bible?

4. We will now contemplate another class of passages which have a bearing equally decisive upon our present inquiries. I refer to that class in which God expresses the deepest regret at the course which transgressors have pursued, and are still pursuing, and the most decisive unwillingness that they should pursue that course and perish. He takes a solemn oath, that he is not willing that they should take the course of disobedience and death, but that they should pursue a different and opposite course. God expresses no regret that they are in the circumstances in which they are, but that in those circumstances they should take the path of disobedience, and not that of obedience. Now, can we suppose, what must be true, if the doctrine of Necessity is the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible, that God places his creatures in circumstances in which obedience is to them an impossibility, and in which they cannot but disobey, and then takes a solemn oath that he is not willing that they should disobey and perish, “but that they should turn from their evil way and live?” What is the meaning of the exclamation, “O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandment,” if God himself had so conditioned the sinner as to render obedience an impossibility to him? Is this the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible? On the other hand, how perfectly in place are all the passages under consideration, on the supposition that the doctrine of Liberty is the doctrine therein pre-supposed, and that consequently the obedience which God affirms Himself desirous that sinners should render, and his regret that they do not render, is always possible to them! One of the seven pillars of the Gospel is this very doctrine. Take it from the Bible, and we have “another Gospel.”

5. One other class of passages claims special attention here. In the Scriptures, the Most High expresses the greatest astonishment that men should sin under the influences to which he has subjected them. He calls upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the conduct of men under those influences. “Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth,” he exclaims, “for the Lord hath spoken; I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against me.” Now, let us suppose, as the doctrine of Necessity affirms, that God has placed sinners under influences under which they cannot but sin. What must we think of his conduct in calling upon the universe to unite with him in astonishment, that under these influences they should sin—that is, take the only course possible to them, the course which they cannot but take? With the same propriety, he might place a mass of water on an inclined plane, and then call upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the downward flow of the fluid. Is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the Bible?