Doctrine of the Will

by Asa Mahan

SECTION I.

We now come to a consideration of one of the great questions bearing upon our personal investigations—the proposition maintained by Necessitarians, as a chief pillar of their theory, that “the Will always is as the greatest apparent good.”

[PHRASE DEFINED.]

The first inquiry which naturally arises here is What is the proper meaning of this proposition?

In reply, I answer, that it must mean one of these three things.

1. That the Will is always, in all its determinations, conformed to the dictates of the Intelligence, choosing those things only which the Intelligence affirms to be best. Or,

2. That the determinations of the Will are always in conformity to the impulse of the Sensibility, that is, that its action is always in the direction of the strongest feeling. Or,

3. In conformity to the dictates of the Intelligence, and the impulse of the Sensibility combined, that is that the Will never acts at all, except when impelled by the Intelligence and Sensibility both in the same direction.

[MEANING OF THIS PHRASE ACCORDING TO EDWARDS.]

The following passage leaves no room for doubt in respect to the meaning which Edwards attaches to the phrase, “the greatest apparent good.” “I have chosen,” he says, “rather to express myself thus, that the Will always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable, than to say, that the Will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind’s preferring and choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct.” Here undeniably, the words, choosing, preferring, “appearing most agreeable or pleasing,” and “the greatest apparent good,” are defined as identical in their meaning. Hence in another place, he adds, “If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the mind’s volition and choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than by the preference or choice itself.” The reason is obvious. Appearing most agreeable or pleasing, and preference or choice, had been defined as synonymous in their meaning. To say, therefore, that preference or choice is determined by “what appears most agreeable or pleasing,” would be equivalent to the affirmation, that choice determines choice. “The act of volition itself,” he adds, “is always determined by that in or about the mind’s view of an object, which causes it to appear most agreeable,” or what is by definition the same thing, causes it to be chosen. The phrases, “the greatest apparent good,” and “appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind,” and the words, choosing, preferring, &c., are therefore, according to Edwards, identical in their meaning. The proposition, “the Will is always as the greatest apparent good,” really means nothing more nor less than this, that Will always chooses as it chooses. The famous argument based upon this proposition in favor of the doctrine of Necessity may be thus expressed. If the Will always is as the greatest apparent good, that is, if the Will always chooses as it chooses, it is governed by the law of Necessity. The Will is as the greatest apparent good, that is, it always chooses as it chooses. Therefore it is governed by this law. By this very syllogism, multitudes have supposed that the doctrine of Necessity has been established with all the distinctness and force of demonstration.

The question now returns, Is “the Will always as the greatest apparent good,” in either of the senses of the phrase as above defined?

[THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE DICTATES OF THE INTELLIGENCE.]

I. Is the Will then as the greatest apparent good in this sense, that all its determinations are in conformity to the dictates of the Intelligence. Does the Will never harmonize with the Sensibility in opposition to the Intelligence? Has no intelligent being, whether sinful or holy, ever done that which his Intellect affirmed at the time, that he ought not to do, and that it was best for him not to do? I answer,

1. Every man who has ever violated moral obligation knows, that he has followed the impulse of desire, in opposition to the dictates of his Intelligence. What individual that has ever perpetrated such deeds has not said, and cannot say with truth, “I know the good, and approve it; yet follow the bad?” Take a matter of fact. A Spanish nobleman during the early progress of the Reformation, became fully convinced, that the faith of the Reformers was true, and his own false, and that his salvation depended upon his embracing the one and rejecting the other. Yet martyrdom would be the result of such a change. While balancing this question, in the depths of his own mind, he trembled with the greatest agitation. His sovereign who was present, asked the cause. The reply was, “the martyr’s crown is before me, and I have not Christian fortitude enough to take it.” He died a few weeks subsequent, without confessing the truth. Did he obey his Intelligence, or Sensibility there? Was not the conflict between the two, and did not the latter prevail? In John 12: 42, 43, we have a fact revealed, in which men were convinced of the truth, and yet, because “they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God,” they did not confess, but denied the truth, a case therefore in which they followed the impulse of desire, in opposition to the dictates of the Intelligence. The Will then is not “always as the greatest apparent good,” in this sense, that its action is always in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence.

2. If this is so, sin, in all instances, is a mere blunder, a necessary result of a necessary misjudgment of the Intelligence? Is it so? Can the Intelligence affirm that a state of moral impurity is better than a state of moral rectitude? How easy it would be, in every instance, to “convert a sinner from the error of his way,” if all that is requisite is to carry his Intellect in favor of truth and righteousness? Who does not know, that the great difficulty lies in the enslavement of the Will to a depraved Sensibility?

3. If the Will of all Intelligents is always in harmony with the Intellect, then I affirm that there is not, and never has been, any such thing as sin, or ill desert, in the universe. What more can be said of God, or of any being ever so pure, than that he has always done what his Intellect affirmed to be best? What if the devil, and all creatures called sinners, had always done the same thing? Where is the conceivable ground for the imputation of moral guilt to them?

4. If all acts of Will are always in perfect harmony with the Intelligence, and in this sense, “as the greatest apparent good,” then, when the Intellect affirms absolutely that there can be no ground of preference between two objects, there can be no choice between them. But we are, in fact, putting forth every day just such acts of Will, selecting one object in distinction from another, when the Intellect affirms their perfect equality, or affirms absolutely, that there is and can be no perceived ground of preference between them. I receive a letter, I will suppose, from a friend, informing me that he has just taken from a bank two notes, perfectly new and of the same value, that one now lies in the east and the other in the west corner of his drawer, that I may have one and only one of them, the one that I shall name by return of mail, and that I must designate one or the other, or have neither. Here are present to my Intelligence two objects absolutely equal. Their location is a matter of indifference, equally absolute. Now if as the proposition “the Will is always as the greatest apparent good,” affirms, I cannot select one object in distinction from another, without a perceived ground for such selection, I could not possibly, in the case supposed, say which bill I would have. Yet I make the selection without the least conceivable embarrassment. I might mention numberless cases, of daily occurrence, of a nature precisely similar. Every child that ever played at “odd or even,” knows perfectly the possibility of selecting between objects which are, to the Intelligence, absolutely equal.

I will now select a case about which there can possibly be no mistake. Space we know perfectly to be absolutely infinite. Space in itself is in all parts alike. So must it appear to the mind of God. Now when God determined to create the universe, he must have resolved to locate its centre in some one point of space in distinction from all others. At that moment, there was present to the Divine Intelligence an infinite number of points, all and each absolutely equally eligible. Neither point could have been selected, because it was better than any other: for all were equal. So they must have appeared to God. Now if the “Will is always as the greatest apparent good,” in the sense under consideration, God could not in this case make the selection, and consequently could not create the universe. He did make the selection, and did create. The Will, therefore, is not, in this sense, “always as the greatest apparent good.”

[THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE STRONGEST DESIRE.]

II. Is the “Will always as the greatest apparent good” in this sense, that it is always as the strongest desire, or as the strongest impulse of the Sensibility? Does the Will never harmonize with the Intelligence, in opposition to the Sensibility, as well as with the Sensibility in opposition to the Intelligence? If this is not so, then—

1. It would be difficult to define self-denial according to the ordinary acceptation of the term. What is self-denial but placing the Will with the Intelligence, in opposition to the Sensibility? How often in moral reformations do we find almost nothing else but this, an inflexible purpose placed directly before an almost crushing and overwhelming tide of feeling and desire?

2. When the Will is impelled in different directions, by conflicting feelings, it could not for a moment be in a state of indecision, unless we suppose these conflicting feelings to be absolutely equal in strength up to the moment of decision. Who believes that? Who believes that his feelings are in all instances in a state of perfect equilibrium up to the moment of fixed determination between two distinct and opposite courses? This must be the case, if the action of the Will is always as the strongest feeling, and in this sense as the “greatest apparent good.” How can Necessitarians meet this argument? Will they pretend that, in all instances, up to the moment of decisive action, the feelings impelling the Will in different directions are always absolutely equal in strength? This must be, if the Will is always as the strongest feeling.

3. When the feelings are in a state of perfect equilibrium, there can possibly, on this supposition, be no choice at all. The feelings often are, and must be, in this state, even when we are necessitated to act in some direction. The case of the bank notes above referred to, presents an example of this kind. As the objects are in the mind’s eye absolutely equal, to suppose that the feelings should, in such a case, impel the Will more strongly in the direction of the one than the other, is to suppose an event without a cause, inasmuch as the Sensibility is governed by the law of Necessity. If A and B are to the Intelligence, in all respects, absolutely equal, how can the Sensibility impel the Will towards A instead of B? What is an event without a cause, if this is not? Contemplate the case in respect to the location of the universe above supposed. Each point of space was equally present to God, and was in itself, and was perceived and affirmed to be, equally eligible with all the others. How could a stronger feeling arise in the direction of one point in distinction from others, unless we suppose that God’s Sensibility is not subject to the law of Necessity, a position which none will assume, or that here was an event without a cause? When, therefore, God did select this one point in distinction from all the others, that determination could not have been either in the direction of what the Intelligence affirmed to be best, nor of the strongest feeling. The proposition, therefore, that “the Will always is as the greatest apparent good,” is in both the senses above defined demonstrably false.

4. Of the truth of this every one is aware when he appeals to his own Consciousness. In the amputation of a limb, for example, who does not know that if an individual, at the moment when the operation commences, should yield to the strongest feeling, he would refuse to endure it? He can pass through the scene, only by placing an inflexible purpose directly across the current of feeling. How often do we hear individuals affirm, “If I should follow my feelings, I should do this; if I should follow my judgment, I should do that.” In all such instances, we have the direct testimony of consciousness, that the action of the Will is not always in the direction of the strongest feeling: because its action is sometimes consciously in the direction of the Intelligence, in opposition to such feelings; and at others, in the conscious presence of such feelings, the Will remains, for periods longer or shorter, undecided in respect to the particular course which shall be pursued.

[THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY COMBINED.]

III. Is not the Will always as the greatest apparent good in this sense, that its determinations are always as the affirmations of the Intelligence and the impulse of the Sensibility combined? That it is not, I argue for two reasons.

1. If this was the case, when the Intelligence and Sensibility are opposed to each other—a fact of very frequent occurrence,—there could be no acts of Will in either direction. The Will must remain in a state of absolute inaction, till these belligerent powers settle their differences, and unite in impelling the Will in some particular direction. But we know that the Will can, and often does, act in the direction of the Intelligence or Sensibility, when the affirmations of one and the impulses of the other are in direct opposition to each other.

2. When both the Intellect and Sensibility, as in the cases above cited, are alike indifferent, there can be, on the present hypothesis, no acts of Will whatever. Under these identical circumstances, however, the Will does act. The hypothesis, therefore, falls to the ground.

I conclude, then, that the proposition, “the Will is always as the greatest apparent good,” is either a mere truism, having no bearing at all upon our present inquiries, or that it is false.

In the discussion of the above propositions, the doctrine of Liberty has received a full and distinct illustration. The action of the Will is sometimes in the direction of the Intelligence, in opposition to the Sensibility, and sometimes in the direction of the Sensibility, in opposition to the Intelligence, and never in the direction of either, because it must be. Sometimes it acts where the Sensibility and Intelligence both harmonize, or are alike indifferent. When also the Will acts in the direction of the Intelligence or Sensibility, it is not necessitated to follow, in all instances, the highest affirmation, nor the strongest desire.

SEC. II—MISCLLANEOUS TOPICS.

[NECESSITARIAN ARGUMENT.]

I. We are now prepared to appreciate the Necessitarian argument, based upon the assumption, that “the Will always is as the greatest apparent good.” This assumption is the great pillar on which that doctrine rests. Yet the whole argument based upon it is a perpetual reasoning in a circle. Ask the Necessitarian to give the grand argument in favor of his doctrine. His answer is, because “the Will always is as the greatest apparent good.” Cite now such facts as those stated above in contradiction of his assumption, and his answer is ready. There must be, in all such cases, some perceived or felt ground of preference, or there could be no act of Will in the case. There must have been, for example, some point in space more eligible than any other for the location of the universe, and this must have been the reason why God selected the one he did. Ask him why he makes this declaration? His reply is, because “the Will is always as the greatest apparent good.” Thus this assumption becomes premise or conclusion, just as the exigence of the theory based upon it demands. Nothing is so convenient and serviceable as such an assumption, when one has a very difficult and false position to sustain. But who does not see, that it is a most vicious reasoning in a circle? To assume the proposition, “the Will always is as the greatest apparent good,” in the first instance, as the basis of a universal theory, and then to assume the truth of that proposition as the basis of the explanation of particular facts, which contradict that theory, what is reasoning in a circle if this is not? No one has a right to assume this proposition as true at all, until he has first shown that it is affirmed by all the phenomena of the Will. On its authority he has no right to explain a solitary phenomenon. To do it is not only to reason in a circle, but to beg the question at issue.

[MOTIVES CAUSE ACTS OF WILL, IN WHAT SENSE.]

II. We are also prepared to notice another assumption of President Edwards, which, if admitted in the sense in which he assumes it as true, necessitates the admission of the Necessitarian scheme, to wit: that the determination of the Will is always caused by the Motive present to the mind for putting forth that determination. “It is that motive,” he says, “which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest which determines the Will.” Again, “that every act of the Will has some cause, and consequently (by what has been already proved) has a necessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of Will, whatsoever, is excited by some motive.” “But if every act of the Will is excited by some motive, then that motive is the cause of that act of the Will.” “And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives.”

If we grant the principle here assumed, the conclusion follows of necessity. But let us inquire in what sense motive and volition sustain to each other the relation of cause and effect. The presence and action of one power causes the action of another, so far, and so far only, as it necessitates such action; and causes its action in a particular direction, so far only as it necessitates its action in that direction, in opposition to every other. Now the action of one power may cause the action of another, in one or both these ways.

1. It may necessitate its action, and necessitate it in one direction in opposition to any and every other. In this sense, fire causes the sensation of pain. It necessitates the action of the Sensibility, and in that one direction. Or,

2. One power may necessitate the action of another power, but not necessitate its action in one direction in opposition to any or all others. We have seen, in a former chapter, that the Motive causes the action of the Will in this sense only, that it necessitates the Will to act in some direction, but not in one direction in distinction from another. Now the error of President Edwards lies in confounding these two senses of the word cause. He assumes that when one power causes the action of another in any sense, it must in every sense. It is readily admitted, that in one sense the Motive causes the action of the Will. But when we ask for the reason or cause of any one particular choice in distinction from another, we find it, not in the motive, but in the power of willing itself.

[OBJECTION—PARTICULAR VOLITION, HOW ACCOUNTED FOR.]

III. We are also prepared to notice the great objection of Necessitarians to the doctrine of Liberty as here maintained. How, it is asked, shall we account, on this theory, for particular volitions? The power to will only accounts for acts of Will in some direction, but not for one act in distinction from another. This distinction must be accounted for, or we have an event without a cause. To this argument I reply,

1. It assumes the position in debate, to wit: that there cannot be consequents which are not necessarily connected with particular antecedents, which antecedents necessitate these particular consequents in distinction from all others.

2. To account for any effect, all that can properly be required is, to assign the existence and operation of a cause adequate to the production of such effects. Free-agency itself is such a cause in the case now under consideration. We have here given the existence and operation of a cause which must produce one of two effects, and is equally capable, under the circumstances, of producing either. Such a cause accounts for the existence of such an effect, just as much as the assignment of an antecedent necessarily producing certain consequents, accounts for those consequents.

3. If, as this objection affirms, an act of Will, when there is no perceived or felt reason for that act in distinction from every other, is equivalent to an event without a cause; then it would be as impossible for us to conceive of the former as of the latter. We cannot even conceive of an event without a cause. But we can conceive of an act of Will when no reason, but the power of willing, exists for that particular act in distinction from others. We cannot conceive of an event without a cause. But we can conceive of the mind’s selecting odd, for example, instead of even, without the Intellect or Sensibility impelling the Will to that act in distinction from others. Such act, therefore, is not equivalent to an event without a cause. The objection under consideration is consequently wholly baseless.

[FACTS LIKE THE ABOVE WRONGLY ACCOUNTED FOR.]

IV. The manner in which Necessitarians sometimes endeavor to account for acts of Will in which a selection is made between objects perceived and felt to be perfectly equal, requires attention. Suppose that A and B are before the mind. One or the other is to be selected, or no selection at all is to be made. These objects are present to the mind as perfectly equal. The Intelligence and Sensibility are in a state of entire equilibrium between them. Now when one of these objects is selected in distinction from the other, this act of Will is to be accounted for, it is said, by referring back to the determination to make the selection instead of not making it. The Will does not choose between A and B, at all. The choice is between choosing and not choosing. But mark: To determine to select A or B is one thing. To select one in distinction from the other, is quite another. The former act does not determine the Will towards either in distinction from the other. This last act remains to be accounted for. When we attempt to account for it, we cannot do it, by referring to the Intelligence or Sensibility for these are in a state of perfect equilibrium between the objects. We can account for it only by falling back upon the power of willing itself, and admitting that the Will is free, and not subject to the law of Necessity.

[CHOOSING BETWEEN OBJECTS KNOWN TO BE EQUAL—HOW TREATED BY NECESSITARIANS.]

V. The manner in which Necessitarians treat facts of this kind, to wit, choosing between things perceived and felt to be equal, also demands a passing notice. Such facts are of very little importance, one way or the other, they say, in mental science. It is the height of folly to appeal to them to determine questions of such moment as the doctrine of Liberty and Necessity. I answer: Such facts are just as important in mental science, as the fall of a piece of gold and a feather, in an exhausted receiver, is in Natural Philosophy. The latter reveals with perfect clearness the great law of attraction in the material universe. The former reveals with equal conspicuousness the great law of Liberty in the realm of mind. The Necessitarian affirms, that no act of Will is possible, only in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence, or of the strongest impulse of the Sensibility. Facts are adduced in which, from the necessity of the case, both Faculties must be in a state of perfect equilibrium. Neither can impel the Will in one direction, in distinction from the other. In such circumstances, if the doctrine of Necessity is true, no acts of Will are possible. In precisely these circumstances acts of Will do arise. The doctrine of Necessity therefore is overthrown, and the truth of that Liberty is demonstrated. So important are those facts which Necessitarians affect to despise. True philosophy, it should be remembered, never looks contemptuously upon facts of any kind.

[PALPABLE MISTAKE.]

VI. We are prepared to notice a palpable mistake into which Necessitarians have fallen in respect to the use which the advocates of the doctrine of Liberty design to make of the fact, that the Will can and does select between objects perceived and felt to be equal.

“The reason why some metaphysical writers,” says President Day, “have laid so much stress upon this apparently insignificant point, is probably the inference which they propose to draw from the position which they assume. If it be conceded that the mind decides one way or the other indifferently, when the motives on each side are perfectly equal, they infer that this may be the fact, in all other cases, even though the motives to opposite choices may be ever so unequal. But on what ground is this conclusion warranted? If a man is entirely indifferent which of two barley-corns to take, does it follow that he will be indifferent whether to accept of a guinea or a farthing; whether to possess an estate or a trinket?” The advocates of the doctrine of Liberty design to make, and do make, no such use of the facts under consideration, as is here attributed to them. They never argue that, because the Will can select between A and B, when they are perceived and felt to be equal, therefore, when the Will acts in one direction, in distinction from another, it is always, up to the moment of such action, impelled in different directions by feelings and judgments equally strong. What they do argue from such facts is, that the Will is subject to the law of Liberty and not to that of Necessity. If the Will is subject to the latter, then, when impelled in different directions by Motives equally strong (as in the cases above cited), it could no more act in the direction of one in distinction from the other, than a heavy body can move east instead of west, when drawn in each direction by forces perfectly equal. If the Will is subject to the law of Necessity, then, in all instances of selection between objects known and felt to be equal, we have an event without a cause. Even the Necessitarians, many of them at least, dare not deny that, under these very circumstances, selection does take place. They must, therefore, abandon their theory, or admit the dogma, of events without causes.

[CHAPTER VI.]

CONNECTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY WITH THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.

The argument on which Necessitarians chiefly rely, against the doctrine of Liberty, and in support of that of Necessity, is based upon the Divine prescience of human conduct. The argument runs thus: all acts of the Will, however remote in the distant future, are foreknown to God. This fact necessitates the conclusion, that such acts are in themselves certain, and, consequently, not free, but necessary. Either God cannot foreknow acts of Will, or they are necessary. The reply to this argument has already been anticipated in the Introduction. The Divine prescience is not the truth to which the appeal should be made, to determine the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible. This I argue, for the obvious reason, that of the mode, nature, and degree, of the Divine prescience of human conduct we are profoundly ignorant. These we must know with perfect clearness, before we can affirm, with any certainty, whether this prescience is or is not consistent with the doctrine of Liberty. The Divine prescience is a truth of inspiration, and therefore a fact. The doctrine of Liberty is, as we have seen, a truth of inspiration, and therefore a fact. It is also a fact, as affirmed by the universal consciousness of man. How do we know that these two facts are not perfectly consistent with each other? How do we know but that, if we understood the mode, to say nothing of the nature and degree of the Divine prescience, we should not perceive with the utmost clearness, that this truth consists as perfectly with the doctrine of Liberty, as with that of Necessity.

If God foresees events, he foreknows them as they are, and not as they are not. If they are free and not necessary, as free and not necessary he foresees them. Having ascertained by consciousness that the acts of the Will are free, and having, from reason and revelation, determined, that God foreknows such acts, the great truth stands revealed to our mind, that God does and can foreknow human conduct, and yet man in such conduct be free; and that the mode, nature, and degree, of the former are such as most perfectly to consist with the latter.

I know with perfect distinctness, that I am now putting forth certain acts of Will. With equal distinctness I know, that such acts are not necessary, but free. My present knowledge is perfectly consistent with present freedom. How do I know but that God’s foreknowledge of future acts is equally consistent with the most perfect freedom of such acts.

Perhaps a better presentation of this whole subject cannot be found than in the following extract from Jouffroy’s “Introduction to Ethics.” The extract, though somewhat lengthy, will well repay a most attentive perusal.

[DANGER IN REASONING FROM THE MANNER IN WHICH WE FOREKNOW EVENTS TO THAT OF DIVINE PRESCIENCE.]

“To begin, then, with a very simple remark: if we conceive that foreknowledge in the Divine Being acts as it does in us, we run the risk of forming a most incorrect notion of it, and consequently, of seeing a contradiction between it and liberty, that would disappear altogether had we a truer notion. Let us consider that we have not the same faculty for foreseeing the future as we have of reviewing the past; and even in cases where we do anticipate it, it is by an induction from the past. This induction may amount either to certainty, or merely to probability. It will amount to certainty when we are perfectly acquainted with necessary causes, and their law of operation. The effects of such causes in given circumstances having been determined by experience, we can predict the return of similar effects under similar circumstances with entire certainty, so long at least as the present laws of nature remain in force. It is in this way that we foresee, in most cases, the physical occurrences, whose law of operation is known to us; and such foresight would extend much further, were it not for unexpected circumstances which come in to modify the result. This induction can never go beyond probability, however, when we consider the acts of free causes; and for the very reason that they are free, and that the effects which arise from such causes are not of necessary occurrence, and do not invariably follow the same antecedent circumstances. Where the question is, then, as to the acts of any free cause, we are never able to foresee it with certainty, and induction is limited to conjectures of probability.

Such is the operation, and such are the limits of human foresight. Our minds foresee the future by induction from the past; this foresight can never attain certainty except in the case of causes and effects connected by necessary dependence; when the effects of free causes are to be anticipated, as all such effects are contingent, our foresight must be merely conjecture.”

[MISTAKE RESPECTING THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.]

“If, now, we attempt to attribute to the Deity the same mode of foresight of which human beings are capable, it will follow, as a strict consequence, that, as God must know exactly and completely the laws to which all the necessary causes in nature are subject—laws which change only according to his will,—he can foresee with absolute certainty all events which will take place in future. The certain foresight of effects, therefore, which is to us possible only in particular cases, and which, even then, is always liable to the limitation that the actual laws of nature are not modified,—this foresight, which, even when most sure, is limited and contingent, must be complete and absolute certainty in God, supposing his foreknowledge to be of like kind with ours.

But it is evident that, according to this hypothesis, the Deity cannot foresee with certainty the volitions of free causes any more than we can; for, as his foresight is founded, as ours is, upon the knowledge of the laws which govern causes, and as the law of free causes is precisely this, that their volitions are not necessary, God cannot calculate, any more than a human being can, the influence of motives, which, in any given case, may act upon such causes. Even his intelligence can lead no further than to conjectures, more probable, indeed, than ours, but never amounting to certainty. According to this hypothesis, we must, therefore, say either that God can foresee, certainly, the future volitions of men, and that man, therefore, is not a free being, or that man is free, and that God, therefore, cannot, any more than we can, foresee his volitions with certainty; and thus Divine prescience and human free-will are brought into direct contradiction.

But, gentlemen, why must there be this contradiction? Merely because we suppose that God foresees the future in the same way in which we foresee it; that his foreknowledge operates like our own. Now, is this, I ask, such an idea as we ought to form of Divine prescience, or such an idea as even the partisans of this system, which I am opposing, form? Have we any reason for thus imposing upon the Deity the limitation of our own feebleness? I think not.

Unendowed as we are, with any faculty of foreseeing the future, it may be difficult for us to conceive of such a faculty in God. But yet can we not from analogy form such an idea? We have now two faculties of perception—of the past by memory, of the present by observation; can we not imagine a third to exist in God—the faculty of perceiving the future, as we perceive the past? What would be the consequence? This: that God, instead of conjecturing, by induction, the acts of human beings from the laws of the causes operating upon them, would see them simply as the results of the free determinations of the will. Such perception of future acts no more implies the necessity of those actions, than the perception of similar acts in the past. To see that effects arise from certain causes is not to force causes to produce them; neither is it to compel these effects to follow. It matters not whether such a perception refers to the past, present, or future; it is merely a perception; and, therefore, far from producing the effect perceived, it even presupposes this effect already produced.

I do not pretend that this vision of what is to be is an operation of which our minds easily conceive. It is difficult to form an image of what we have never experienced; but I do assert, that the power of seeing what no longer exists is full as remarkable as that of seeing what has as yet no being, and that the reason of our readily conceiving of the former is only the fact that we are endowed with such a power: to my reason, the mystery is the same.

But whatever may or may not be in reality the mode of Divine foreknowledge, or however exact may be the image which we attempt to form of it, it always, I say,—and this is the only point I am desirous of proving,—it always remains a matter of uncertainty, which cannot be removed, whether the Divine foreknowledge is of a kind like our own, or not; and as, in the one case, there would not be the same contradiction that there is in the other, between our belief in Divine foreknowledge and human freedom, it is proved true, I think, that no one has a right to assert the existence of such a contradiction, and the necessity that human reason should choose between them.”

[SINGULAR INCONSISTENCY OF NECESSITARIANS.]

There is no class of men who dwell with more frequency and apparent reverence, upon the truth, that “secret things belong to God,” and those and those only, “that are revealed to us;” that “none by searching can find out God;” that “as the heavens are high above the earth, so are His ways above our ways, and His thoughts above our thoughts;” and that it is the height of presumption in us, to pretend to understand God’s mode of knowing and acting. None are more ready to talk of mysteries in religion than they. Yet, strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless true, that their whole argument, drawn from the Divine foreknowledge, against the doctrine of Liberty, and in favor of that of Necessity, is based entirely upon the assumption that they have found out and fully understand the mode of the Divine prescience of human conduct; that they have so measured and determined the “ways and thoughts” of God, that they know that he cannot foresee any but necessary events; that among many events, all in themselves equally possible, and none of them necessary in distinction from others, he cannot foreknow which, in fact, will arise. We may properly ask the Necessitarian whence he obtained this knowledge, so vast and deep; whence he has thus “found out the Almighty to perfection?” To me, the pretension to such knowledge appears more like presumption than that deep self-distrust and humiliation which becomes the Finite in the presence of the Infinite. This knowledge has not been obtained from revelation. God has never told us that He can foresee none but necessary events. Whether He can or cannot foresee events free as well as necessary, is certainly one of the “secret things” which God has not revealed. If we admit ourselves ignorant of the mode of God’s fore-knowledge of future events (and who will dare deny the existence of such ignorance in his own case?), the entire argument of the Necessitarian, based upon that fore-knowledge, in favor of his doctrine, falls to the ground at once.

[NECESSITARIAN OBJECTION TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENT.]

To all that has been said above, the Necessitarian brings an objection which he deems perfectly unanswerable. It is this: If actions are free in the sense maintained in this treatise, then in themselves they are uncertain. If they are still certainly known to God, they are both certain and uncertain, at the same time. True, I answer, but not in the same sense. As far as the powers of the agent are concerned, the action may be uncertain, while God at the same time may know certainly how he will exert his powers. In reference merely to the powers of the agent, the event is uncertain. In reference to the mind of God, who knows instinctively how he will exert these powers, the event is certain.

[CHAPTER VII.]

BEARING OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY UPON THE PURPOSES AND AGENCY OF GOD, IN RESPECT TO HUMAN CONDUCT.

All truth is in harmony with itself. Every particular truth is, and must be, in harmony with every other truth. If the doctrine of Necessity be assumed as true, we must take one view of the relation of God’s purposes and agency in respect to the conduct of moral agents. If, on the other hand, we assume as true the doctrine of Liberty, quite another and a different view, in respect to this whole subject, must be taken. In the remarks which I have to make upon this subject, I shall assume the truth of the doctrine of Liberty, together with those of the perfect Divine Omniscience, Wisdom, and Benevolence. The question now arises, in the light of all these great truths, What relation do the Divine purposes and agency sustain to human action? In what sense does God purpose, preordain, and bring to pass, the voluntary conduct of moral agents? To this question but one answer can be given, in the light of the truths before us. God purposes human action in this sense only: He determines himself to act in a given manner, because it is wisest and best for him to act in that manner, and in that manner only. He determines this, knowing how intelligent beings will act under the influence brought to bear upon them by the Divine conduct. He purposes and brings about, or causes human action in this sense only, that in the counsels of eternity, He, in the exercise of infinite wisdom and goodness, preordains, and at the time appointed, gives existence to the motives and influences under which moral agents do act, and in the light of which they voluntarily determine their own character and conduct.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE.

[GODS PURPOSES CONSISTENT WITH THE LIBERTY OF CREATURES.]

1. We perceive the perfect consistency of God’s purposes and agency with human liberty. If the motives and influences in view of which men do act, do not destroy their free agency,—a fact which must be true from the nature of the Will,—then God’s purposes to give existence, and his agency in giving existence, to these motives and influences, cannot in any sense destroy, or interfere with such agency. This is a self-evident truth.

[SENSES IN WHICH GOD PURPOSED MORAL GOOD AND EVIL.]

2. We also perceive the senses in which God purposed the existence of moral good and evil, in the universe. He purposed the existence of the motives, in view of which He knew that a part of His subjects would render themselves holy, and a part would render themselves sinful. But when we contemplate all the holiness and consequent happiness which do exist, we then perceive the reason why God gave existence to these motives. The sin consequent, in the sense above explained, constitutes no part of the reason for their existence, but was always, in the Divine Mind, a reason against their existence; which reason, however, was overpowered by infinitely more important reasons on the other side. The good which results from creation and providence is the great and exclusive object of creation and providence. The evil, God always regretted, and would have prevented, if possible, i. e. if compatible with the existence of the best possible system.

[DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE PREORDAINED BUT NOT WILLED.]

3. We also perceive the perfect consistency of those Scriptures which represent God as, on the whole, purposing the death of incorrigible transgressors, and yet as not willing it, but as willing the opposite. The purpose to destroy is based upon the foreseen incorrigibleness of the transgressor,—a purpose demanded by perfect wisdom and benevolence, in view of that foreseen incorrigibleness. The incorrigibleness itself, however, and the perdition consequent, are evils, the existence of which God never willed; but are the opposite of what he willed, are evils which a being of perfect wisdom and goodness never could, and never can will. It is with perfect consistency, therefore, that the Scriptures represent God, in view of incorrigibleness foreseen, as purposing the death of the transgressor, and at the same time, in view of the fact that such incorrigibleness is the opposite of what He wills the creature to do, as affirming, that He is not “willing that any should perish, but that all should come to a knowledge of the truth.”

[GOD NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE.]

4. We see, also, how it is, that, while God does that, and eternally purposed to do that, in view of which he eternally knew that certain of his creatures would for ever destroy themselves, none but themselves are in fault for such destruction. The reasons are these:

(1.) God never did anything in view of which men ought to act thus, nor which did not lay them under obligations infinite, to act differently, and which was not best adapted to secure that end.

(2.) Their destruction constituted no part of the object of God in creation and providence, the opposite of this being true.

(3.) The great object of God in creation and providence was and is, to produce the greatest possible amount of holiness and consequent happiness, and to prevent, in every possible way consistent with this end, the existence of sin, and consequently of misery.—Now if creatures perish under such an influence, they perish by their own fault.

[SIN A MYSTERY.]

5. I have a single remark to make upon those phenomena of the Will, in which evil is chosen instead of good, or sin instead of holiness. That all intelligent beings possess the power to make such a choice, is a fact affirmed by universal consciousness. But that any being, under any circumstances, should make such a choice, and that he should for ever refuse to return to the paths of virtue, notwithstanding his experience of the consequences of sin, is an abuse of human liberty, which must for ever remain an inexplicable mystery. When a being assigns the real reason in view of which right is chosen, we are always satisfied with such reason. But we are never satisfied with the reason for the opposite course.

[CONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE.]

One conclusion forces itself upon us, from that view of the Divine government which consists with the doctrine of Liberty. The aspect of that government which results from this view of the subject commends itself to the reason and conscience of the intelligent universe. Mysteries we do and must find in it; but absurdities and contradictions, never. Under such a Government, no being is condemned for what he cannot avoid, nor rewarded for what he could but do. While

“God sits on no precarious throne,

Nor borrows leave to be,”

the destiny of the creature turns upon his own deserts, his own choice of good or evil. The elucidation of the principles of such a government “commends itself to every man’s conscience in the sight of God.”

[CHAPTER VIII.]

OBLIGATION PREDICABLE ONLY OF THE WILL.