“THE COMING SEA POWER.”
“Most well-informed people have a pretty clear general idea that the present is an era of unexampled naval activity throughout the civilized world; that great fleets are building everywhere; that the ships composing them are of new types, representing the highest development of naval architecture and the most exquisite refinement of the art of naval armament. Doubtless, a much smaller number of persons are aware that a new factor of imposing proportions has come into the general situation; that the newest member of the family of civilization is with rapid strides reaching a status of actual and potential sea power with which the older nations must henceforth reckon most seriously.
“It is, however, questionable whether any one not intimately conversant with the current history of modern ship-building, or not qualified to estimate properly the relative values of actual armaments, can adequately conceive the vast significance of the prodigious efforts which this youngest of civilized nations was then, and still is, successfully putting forth toward the quick and sure attainment of commanding power on the sea.
“In order to estimate accurately the significance of the current naval activity of Japan, it is requisite to trace briefly her prior development as a maritime power.
“The foundation of the Japanese navy was laid by the purchase of the Confederate ram ‘Stonewall,’ built in France in 1864, surrendered to the United States in 1865, and shortly afterward sold or given to Japan. This ship was soon followed by another of somewhat similar type, built at the Thames Iron Works in 1864-65, now borne on the Japanese navy list as the ‘Riojo,’ and used as a gunnery and training ship.
“From that time to the period of the Chinese War the naval growth of Japan was steady, and, considering her very recent adoption of Western methods, rapid.
“At the beginning of that war, Japan, though possessing a very respectable force of cruisers and gunboats, mostly of modern types and advanced design, had no armored ships worthy of the name. The old ‘Stonewall’ had been broken up, the ‘Fu-So,’ the ‘Riojo,’ the ‘Heiyei,’ and the ‘Kon-Go,’ built from 1865 to 1877, were obsolete, and the ‘Chiyoda,’ the only one of modern design and armament, was a small armored cruiser of 2450 tons, with a 4½-inch belt, and no guns larger than 4.7-inch caliber.
“The unarmored fleet, however, on which she had to rely, was for its total displacement equal to any in the world. It embraced three of the ‘Hoshidate’ class, 4277 tons and 5400 horse-power; two of the ‘Naniwa’ class, 3650 tons and 7000 horse-power, which had been considered by our Navy Department worth copying in the ‘Charleston;’ the ‘Yoshino,’ 4150 tons and 15,000 horse-power, and about fifteen serviceable gun-vessels from 615 to 1700 tons. All of the cruisers had been built in Europe, but most of the gun-vessels were of Japanese build, and represented the first efforts of the Japanese people in modern naval construction.
“Among the results of the war was the addition of several Chinese vessels to the Japanese navy, including the battleship ‘Chen Yuen,’ of 7400 tons and 6200 horse-power, and the ‘Ping Yuen,’ armored coast defence ship, which had been captured by the unarmored cruisers of the Mikado.
“At the end of the war Japan had forty-three sea-going vessels, displacing in the aggregate 79,000 tons, of which seven serviceable ships, with total displacement of 15,000 tons, were prizes.
“The navy of Japan in commission at that time (1897) embraced forty-eight sea-going ships, of 111,000 tons displacement, and twenty-six torpedo boats. The five sea-going vessels, of 32,000 tons total displacement, which had been added since the war, represented the most advanced types of modern naval architecture, and included two first-class battleships of 12,800 tons each, the ‘Fuji’ and ‘Yashima.’
“The ship-building programme then in progress of actual construction was calculated to produce by the year 1903 a total effective force of sixty-seven sea-going ships, twelve torpedo-catchers, and seventy-five torpedo boats, with an aggregate displacement of more than 200,000 tons.
“To the navy in commission or available for instant service, already described, Japan now adds, in plain sight under actual construction in various stages of forwardness, a new fleet vastly superior to it in power and efficiency.
“Here I desire to say that the word ‘progress,’ in its conventional sense, does not adequately indicate the naval activity of Japan. The word implies continuity, by more or less even pace, in one of two directions, or in both; one direction is an increase in tonnage, with but little or no improvement in efficiency; and the other is a marked advance of new ships in all the elements of offence, defence, staying power, and economy.
“The first condition of progress is represented by the present activity of most nations who are sailing along evenly and with self-approval in fancied superiority. The second condition is represented by Japan, who suddenly appears as a cyclone in a smooth sea of commonplace progress.
“Japan is not only building more ships than any other power except England, but she is building better ships in English shipyards than England herself is constructing for her own navy. While other nations proceed by steps, Japan proceeds by leaps and bounds. What other nations are doing may be described as progress, but what Japan is doing must be termed a phenomenon. She is building:
“(1) Three 14,800-ton battleships, which are well advanced at the Armstrong Works, Thompson’s, and Thames Iron Works, respectively.
“(2) One battleship of about 10,000 tons, commencing at the Armstrong Works.
“(3) Four first-class armored cruisers of 9750 tons displacement and twenty knots speed at the Armstrong Works; one at the Vulcan Works, Stettin, Germany, and one in France.
“(4) Two 5000-ton protected cruisers of about twenty-three knots speed; one at San Francisco and one at Philadelphia.
“(5) One protected cruiser of 4300 tons and about twenty-three knots speed, at the Armstrong Works.
“(6) Four thirty-knot torpedo-boat destroyers at Yarrow’s.
“(7) Four more of similar type at Thompson’s.
“(8) Eight 90-ton torpedo boats at the Schichau Works, Elbing, Germany.
“(9) Four more of similar type at the Normand Works, France.
“(10) Three 3000-ton protected cruisers of twenty knots, three torpedo gunboats and a despatch vessel, at the Imperial Dock-yard, Yokosuka, Japan.
“(11) The programme for the current year embraces a fifth armored cruiser of the type previously described (9600 tons and twenty knots), to be built also at Yokosuka.
“This is Japan’s naval increase actually in sight. Excepting the ships building at Yokosuka, the whole programme has come under my personal observation.
“Comparison with the current progress of other powers discloses the fact that Japan is second only to England in naval activity, being ahead of France, much in advance of Germany, and vastly in the lead of Russia and the United States. It must also be borne in mind that the new Japanese fleet comprises throughout the very latest and highest types of naval architecture in every respect of force, economy, and efficiency.
“The spectacle of Japan surpassing France and closely following England herself in naval activity is startling. Considering the shortness of the time which has elapsed since Japan entered the family of nations or aspired to any rank whatever as a power, it is little short of miraculous. Yet it is a fact, and to my mind it is the most significant single fact of our time. Nations do not display such energy or undertake such expenditure without a purpose.
“It can hardly be maintained that Japan aims her vast preparations at the United States; at least, not primarily. The pending Hawaiian affair has given rise to some irritation, but its importance has been systematically exaggerated by the English press. It cannot, in any event, go beyond the stage of diplomatic exchanges. Japan will, doubtless, receive from the United States sufficient assurance that the rights of her subjects in Hawaii will be protected in case of annexation, and thus far she has asked no more than that. She is certainly entitled to no less.
“The object of the English in encouraging Japan to make a bold front against the United States was and is, like all their objects, purely commercial. They hoped to stir up in the Japanese mind an ill-feeling that would prevent the award of any more contracts to American shipyards, and even this characteristic stratagem is not likely to have more than a temporary effect. Thus I think it may be assumed that Japan’s immense naval preparation is not made with the United States in hostile view; certainly not mainly.
“Assuming these conditions to be beyond dispute, and considering that the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway will at once make Russia a great Pacific power, politically and commercially, her naval situation in those seas must become a matter of prime importance; perhaps not of equal importance with that of the United States now, but at once sufficient to challenge the best efforts of her statesmen.
“Having all these facts in view, and being in a position to judge with some accuracy of the significance and value of preparations which came under my own observation during a recent tour of Europe in my professional capacity, I could not help remarking the vast difference between the naval activity of Japan and that of the other two first-rate pacific powers, Russia and the United States. The existing situation in Russia and the United States, relatively speaking, can hardly be called more than the merest perfunctory progress, whereas the activity of Japan is really marvellous. If she were simply meditating another attack on China alone or unsupported, no such fleet as Japan is now building would be needed; certainly not the enormous battleships and the great armored cruisers. It must therefore be assumed that Japan’s purpose is the general one of predominant sea power in the Orient.
“Japan may, and probably does, meditate a renewal of her efforts to establish a footing on the Asiatic mainland. Possibly, she may have in view the ultimate acquisition of the Philippine Islands! (This was written the year before the Spanish War.) But, whatever may be her territorial ambitions for the future, it is as plain as an open book that she intends, before she moves again, to place herself in a position to disregard and defy any external interference. This may be the true meaning of Japan’s extreme activity in naval preparation at this time.
“I may say without violation of confidence that a Japanese gentleman of distinction, a civilian, not long ago remarked in conversation on this subject that ‘while Japan was forced by circumstances to yield much at Shimonoseki that she had fairly conquered, she still secured indemnity enough to build a navy that would enable her to do better next time!’
“In view of all these facts, the question at once arises: Are Russia and the United States prepared or are they preparing to meet such conditions, and to maintain their proper naval status as Pacific powers? My answer to that question, based on observations of Japan’s naval strength already in sight and on what I know of her intended programme for further increase in the immediate future, as compared with the relative conditions of Russia and this country, would be in the negative.
“Just now Russia is trying the experiment of reliance on her own Imperial dock-yards, including two semi-private shipyards under government control; while the United States has halted completely. The Russian dock-yards are efficient, as far as they go, and turn out good work, judging from such specimens as I have seen. But their capacity is not adequate to the task that is presented by the situation which I have delineated. No other nation relies wholly on its own public dock-yards for new naval constructions. England, with public dock-yards almost equal in capacity to those of the rest of the world combined, builds over 65 per cent. of her displacement and 97 per cent. of her horse-power by contract with private shipyards and machine-shops. France, with very great dock-yard facilities, builds a large proportion of her hulls and machinery by contract. The same is true of Germany, Italy, and the United States. But Russia has no great private ship-building facilities, and there are no visible signs of the immediate development of resources of that description.
“Japan, on the contrary, though she has some facilities of her own, is drawing upon the very best resources elsewhere to be found; she is drawing on the ship-building power at once of England, France, Germany, and the United States. Not only that, but more than that; the vessels Japan is building in the shipyards of England, France, and Germany are superior to any vessels those nations are building for themselves, class for class.
“Hence, viewing the situation from any point at will, the conclusion of any one qualified to judge must be that, in the race for naval supremacy in the Pacific, Japan is gaining, while Russia and the United States are losing ground.
“It requires little prescience to discern that the issue which is to settle that question of supremacy as between the powers may not be long deferred.
“Though Japan’s naval activity is primarily significant of a purpose to secure general predominance in Oriental seas, and though, as I have suggested, there is no immediate reason for, or prospect of, trouble between Japan and the United States involving naval armaments; yet, in the broad general sense of dignity on the sea, our country can by no means safely ignore or be inattentive to the progress of our Oriental neighbor toward the rank of a first-class sea power in the Pacific Ocean. The completion of her fleet now building will, inside of three years, give Japan that rank, and the future programme already laid out will accentuate it. The superior quality of Japan’s new navy is even more significant than its enormous quantity. She has no useless ships, none obsolete; all are up to date.
“Meantime, the attitude of the United States seems quite as supine as that of Russia. It is not necessary to go into minute detail on this point. Suffice it to say that, taking Russia, Japan, and the United States as the three maritime powers most directly concerned in the Pacific Ocean, and whose interests are most immediately affected by its command, Japan at her present rate of naval progress, viewed with relation to the lack of progress of the other two, must in three years be able to dominate the Pacific against either, and in less than ten years, against both.
“I have heard the question raised as to the character and quality of the Japanese personnel; I have heard the suggestion that, magnificent as their material may be, their officers and men are not up to the European or American standard. It is not my intention to discuss this phase of the matter. But it is worth while to observe that, if the Japanese officers with whom we are in daily contact as inspectors of work we are doing for their government are average samples, they have no odds to ask of the officers of any other navy whatsoever as to professional ability, practical application, and capacity to profit by experience. And it should also be borne in mind that they have had more and later experience in actual warfare than the officers of any other navy, or of all other navies. While all other navies have been wrestling with the theoretical problems of war colleges, or encountering the hypothetical conditions of squadron evolutions, fleet manœuvres, and sham battles, the Japanese have been sinking or taking the ships, bombarding the towns, and forcing the harbors of their enemy. I do not know how others may view this sort of disparity in experience, but in my opinion it is the most portentous fact in the whole situation, and because of it no navy that has not done any fighting at all has the slightest license to question in any respect the quality of the personnel of the Japanese navy that has done a good deal of extremely successful fighting.
“On the whole, the attitude of Japan among the powers is in the last degree admirable. Her aspirations are exaltedly patriotic, and her movements to realize them are planned with a consummate wisdom, and executed with a systematic skill, which nations far older in the arts of Western civilization would do well to emulate.”
In this paper, it need hardly be said, Mr. Cramp hewed to the line. He did not flatter the Russians nor did he omit to advise them of the full extent and unquestionable consequences of their procrastination and supineness. When the paper was prepared and had been finally revised, Mr. Cramp still hesitated about publishing it in that form. “The Russians,” he said, “are extremely sensitive; they know their weakness, or the best minds among them know it quite as well as I have pointed it out in this paper. Of course, I intend it as an appeal to their patriotism and to their sense of their country’s needs; but I am afraid that it will hurt the sensibilities of some of them.” However, after further consideration, Mr. Cramp determined to print the paper as it stood, and it was done. Probably no article appearing in an American magazine in many years, if ever, received as widespread or as earnest attention in Europe as did Mr. Cramp’s paper on “The Coming Sea Power.” As soon as the North American Review arrived in Europe, the paper was translated and printed in Russian and German and a copious synopsis of it in French, in the naval periodicals of the respective countries. It was also extensively discussed and criticised in the English press, both in the service papers and in the regular daily journals. In St. Petersburg, besides being translated and printed in the principal Russian magazine and discussed in the newspapers, it was made the basis of an address by one of the most eminent Admirals in the Russian navy. Mr. Cramp’s cautious apprehension, already referred to, that it might touch the susceptibilities of Russian officers proved groundless; and it has been openly admitted by high officials of the Russian Ministry of Marine that the arguments and considerations so vigorously advanced by Mr. Cramp had an effect of no little potency in turning the scale of Russian policy, which a few months later found expression in the great naval programme of 1898.
Early in the following spring Mr. Cramp received advices from St. Petersburg that the Ministry of Marine would be glad to entertain plans and proposals from him for the construction of at least two first-class battleships, two first-class protected cruisers of the highest speed, and thirty torpedo boats, under the new programme which had then, February, 1898, been finally authorized by the Ministry and approved by the Emperor Nicholas II.
Upon receipt of this information or suggestion, Mr. Cramp lost no time in preparing for the voyage. Although the time of year, early in March, was the most inclement season for a visit to the great northern capital, he cheerfully accepted the situation. So far as the general scheme and outline plans were concerned, he had substantially worked them out in anticipation, and not much delay was caused on that account. Early in March, 1898, Mr. Cramp sailed on the American Line steamship “St. Paul,” bound for St. Petersburg by the way of Southampton. Upon his arrival at the Russian capital, he was immediately turned over to the tender mercies of what is known as the Technical Board. This in Russian naval administration is a Board composed of officers representing all the branches of the service,—Line, Construction, Engineering and Ordnance, or the Artillery Branch, as they call it. The membership of this Board is considerable in number. For several weeks they subjected Mr. Cramp to a species of inquisition which might well have appalled a man of less resources, less determination, or less confidence in his own ultimate mastery of the situation. It is not worth while, even did our limits of space admit, to go into detail of Mr. Cramp’s discussion of his proposed designs and plans with the members of the Technical Board. Suffice to say, that after some weeks of consideration, taking the widest possible range, a general agreement was reached, leaving but few questions open for subsequent determination, none of which were of vital importance. The sequel of the whole transaction was that on the 23d of April, 1898, contracts were signed by Mr. Cramp on behalf of the Company, and by Vice-Admiral V. Verhovskoy, Chief of the Department of Construction and Supply, on behalf of the Emperor, for the construction of two vessels, one first-class battleship, now known as the “Retvizan,” and one first-class protected cruiser of the highest practicable speed, known as the “Variag.”
In his operations at St. Petersburg leading up to these important contracts, which aggregated nearly seven millions of dollars, including extra work ordered during construction, Mr. Cramp encountered powerful and persistent opposition from three widely diverse sources. First, there was an element strongly intrenched in the Ministry of Marine, who opposed the award of contracts to foreign builders other than the French. This element of opposition was powerfully represented on the Technical Board, and its influences were shown particularly in the Ordnance installation and in the Engineering section, who wanted everything done in Russia. It proved factious and troublesome, though not otherwise formidable, because the decision to have some of the ships in the programme of 1898 built abroad had already been reached in higher quarters. In fact, though not definitely so announced by the Russian government, it was known by the middle of March, 1898, at least by those intending to bid, that the Ministry of Marine had decided to award contracts for the construction of two first-class battle-ships, one armored cruiser, and three first-class protected cruisers of the highest speed in foreign shipyards, and a large number of torpedo boats.
The French and German shipyards were represented not only by their own agents and experts, but they were backed, and their claims to consideration urged, with all the power and influence their respective Embassies and banking houses could command at the Court of St. Petersburg.
However, this situation was not at all unforeseen or unexpected by Mr. Cramp. To encounter opposition from the agents of the foreign banking houses and diplomats was a normal condition of this kind of business. Fortunately for Mr. Cramp, or, rather, fortunately for American industrial interests at large, we also had an ambassador at St. Petersburg in 1898. He was not of the common run of American diplomatic representatives “near” foreign Courts. He was different. Almost from the foundation of our government, a rule—amounting to unwritten law—had prevailed which forbade American diplomatic representatives abroad to do or say anything in aid or furtherance of commercial or industrial enterprises of American citizens in the country to which they were accredited.
Object lessons were before them. During Polk’s Administration, James Buchanan, then Secretary of State, had removed, or rather transferred to another post, a United States Minister to one of the South American Republics on the Pacific slope. This Minister had committed the, in United States “diplomacy,” unpardonable offence of indorsing the drafts of certain whale-ship captains upon their owners in New Bedford and Nantucket. The ships of these captains were in distress, having been dismasted in tempestuous passages around Cape Horn, and they had made their voyage to Valparaiso under jury-masts. Arrived there, they needed money to repair and refit their battered and storm-beaten ships. Our Minister to Chile used his good offices to help them get their drafts cashed so they could repair their vessels and pursue their voyages. This, from the view-point of primitive United States “diplomacy,” was of course a crime, and the Minister was made to suffer for it! Ultimately this unwritten law or tacit doctrine found expression on the floor of the Senate, in a debate on the Consular and Diplomatic Appropriation, from the lips of Thomas F. Bayard:
“The purity and dignity of our foreign representation,” he said, “must be preserved! The law now recognized, though unwritten, should be made statutory! If an American Minister abroad should use any of the influence or employ any of the prestige or credit which he may derive from his status as a representative of this country to aid or further or promote any scheme or project of American citizens in that country, having private gain in view, he should be held answerable for official misdemeanor!”
Buchanan and Bayard have already found their proper levels in American history, and need not be discussed here, even if their memories were worth discussion. But the theory they applied to our diplomatic representation was for many years the rule. The result was that our “diplomatic service” (so-called) down to, we may say, the end of Cleveland’s last Administration, had become little else than a hospital for political cripples, or a sanitarium for over-worked old lawyers and nervously prostrated college professors. It was the laughing-stock of foreigners and the object of cynical, albeit good-natured, contempt on the part of our own people. It had become a symposium of urbane uselessness and solemn stupidity.
All this was changed in our representation at St. Petersburg in 1898. Our Ambassador there was the Hon. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, of Missouri. He was neither a political cripple, nor an overworked old lawyer, nor a college president needing a gilt-edged vacation.
He was a great and successful manufacturer, a man of broad and keen business instincts, and he thought that any scheme calculated to disburse about seven million dollars among the workingmen and steel mills of the United States was well worthy the earnest attention and the best officers of the most dignified Ambassador. Imbued with such ideas, Mr. Hitchcock helped Mr. Cramp all he could. He may not have been as noisy about it as the German Ambassador or as strenuously in evidence as the French Ambassador, but he was none the less active or effective in his efforts to subserve and promote the interests of his country and her citizens. The maw-worm doctrine of Buchanan and the raven-like croaking of Bayard were lost upon such a man. Taking the situation altogether, it is safe to say, so far as diplomatic representation was concerned, the commercial and industrial interests of the United States and of American citizens in the Russian Empire were quite as well guarded in 1898 as were those of France and Germany.
The third element of opposition which Mr. Cramp had to encounter and overcome was of a purely technical or mechanical character. His plans involved installation of water-tube boilers of the Niclausse type. But up to that moment, ever since the adoption of the water-tube system by the Russian navy, the Belleville type of boiler had held undisputed sway there. The enormous wealth of the Belleville people, their straightway, open-handed mode of doing business with naval officials, not only in Russia but in England as well, and their aptness in placing valuable things where they would do the most good, were all notorious. They had for some time admitted that the Niclausse system was their most formidable rival, and naturally they were ready to exhaust their resources to prevent its introduction into the Russian navy, where their monopoly, up to that time, had been perfect and invulnerable. This discussion was, of course, carried on wholly between Mr. Cramp and the Russian technical authorities. It was a subject that could not be touched by diplomacy or by personal influence; a contest to be fought out wholly on the mechanical merits of the respective systems and decided entirely by skilled judgment. In this kind of contest Mr. Cramp was at home, and he won. His staple argument was that for any naval power to surrender itself to a single type of proprietary boiler, thereby creating a monopoly against itself, could not be else than unwise; that the era of water-tube boilers was still in the experimental stage, that perfection was yet to be developed, and was doubtless a long way off. Exhaustive trials already made had demonstrated a wide range of efficiency and consequent merit in the Niclausse system, and while it was no part of his contention to decry or depreciate the rival type, comparative performances of official record beyond dispute argued that sound marine engineering policy would forbid the exclusion of the Niclausse system. By the weight of these arguments Mr. Cramp carried all his points. The ultimate result of a six weeks’ campaign was the award of contracts for construction of six vessels in foreign shipyards: one first-class battleship and one armored cruiser to the Forges et Chantiers, of France; one first-class battleship and one large protected cruiser of the highest attainable speed to Mr. Cramp, and two protected cruisers of type similar to the last-named to Germany yards, the “Germania” of Kiel and the “Vulcan” of Stettin.
Upon these awards, Mr. Cramp came home and began construction at once. Indeed, while still in St. Petersburg, he had placed orders for important parts of the material required, and had contracted for the necessary armor. At the outset some delay occurred, due to the extreme deliberation observed by the Russian Inspectors in approving detail plans and specifications, and to some changes made in the character and quality of material for protective decks after the contract was signed. But notwithstanding these delays, Mr. Cramp completed and delivered both his ships long in advance of either the French or German builders, and such time penalties as had accrued by reason of the initial delays already referred to were remitted by direction of the Emperor Nicholas II himself.
The trial conditions imposed upon these ships were the most drastic and crucial ever known; they being required to develop their maximum speed for twelve hours continuously, as against four-hour or measured mile trials in other navies.
Upon the completion and delivery of these ships, Mr. Cramp had achieved the distinction of having done the greatest volume and highest value of ship-building for foreign accounts ever performed in an American shipyard. On their arrival at St. Petersburg, both ships were personally inspected by the Emperor, who was so pleased with the “Variag” that he ordered her detailed as escort to the Imperial yacht in a trip to Cherbourg.
It is worthy of remark that in the fall of 1898 our Navy Department advertised for proposals to construct three battleships, now known as the “Maine” class. The plan put forth by the Department was a modified and slightly enlarged “Alabama,” with a speed requirement of seventeen knots as against sixteen in the original type. Mr. Cramp offered to build an eighteen-knot ship within the statutory limit prescribed for one of seventeen knots, and used his Russian battleship as a basis of design. His proposition was accepted, and the other bidders—Newport News and the Union Iron Works, to each of whom one ship was awarded—were required to adopt Mr. Cramp’s conditions of dimension and performance. In this manner the American navy as well as the Russian profited by Mr. Cramp’s interesting and remarkable “Campaign of 1898.”