The Mormon Doctrine of Deity: The Roberts-Van Der Donckt Discussion / To which is added a discourse, Jesus Christ, the revelation of God; also a collection of authoritative Mormon utterances on the being and nature of God

by B. H. Roberts

CHAPTER III.

A REJOINDER TO REV. C. VAN DER DONCKT'S REPLY.

I have read with great interest and I trust with due care the Rev. C. Van Der Donckt's Reply to my discourse on "Mormon Doctrine of Deity." With regard to his Reply in general, I observe three things: first, the Reverend gentleman labors with some pains to demonstrate that "Mormon" views of Deity with respect to the form and nature of God are at variance with the Catholic and even the orthodox Protestant views on that subject; second, the "Mormon" views of Deity are in conflict with the accepted Christian philosophy; third, that "Mormon" doctrines stand in sharp contrast to both Catholic and Protestant ideas respecting the unity of God. All this is easily proved; and would have been conceded cheerfully without proofs. "Mormons" not only admit the variances but glory in them. The foregoing, however, is not the issue between Mr. Van Der Donckt and myself. After the variances referred to are admitted, these questions remain: Which is most in agreement with what God has revealed concerning his form and nature, "Mormon" or orthodox Christian doctrine? Which is most in harmony with sound reason and the scriptures, "Mormon" doctrine, or the commonly accepted Christian philosophy? Which in their teaching presents the true doctrine of God's unity, "Mormons" or orthodox Christians? These are the issues; and so far as the Reverend gentleman has maintained the orthodox Christian doctrine against the "Mormon" doctrine, I undertake to controvert his arguments.

I.
THE FORM OF GOD.

Following the order of my treatise, the gentleman first deals with the form of God. His first premise is that "God is a Spirit," quoting the words of the Savior (John 4:24;) and Paul's words, "The Lord is a spirit," (II Cor. 3:17.) He then argues that a spirit is different from a man, and quotes the remark of Jesus to his disciples, when he appeared to them after his resurrection: "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have" (Luke 24:37-39). Also the words of Jesus to Peter, "Flesh and blood hath not revealed it [that is, that Jesus is the Christ] unto thee, but my Father who is in heaven." (Matt. 16:17.) The gentleman in all this sees a striking contrast between men, flesh and blood, and the Father; which "conveys the sense that God hath not flesh and blood like man, but is a spirit."

That God is a spirit Mr. V. holds is proved also from his being called "invisible" in the Bible; and from this premise argues: "All material beings are visible. Absolutely invisible beings are immaterial, or bodiless:" and therefore, to help the gentleman out a little, not like man in form.

With reference to the passage—"Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father who is in heaven," and the Reverend gentleman's remarks thereon, I wish to say, in passing, that the antithesis between man and God in the passage extends merely to the fact that the source of Peter's revelation was God, not man; and is no attempt at defining a difference between the nature of God and the nature of man. Here also I may say that the Latter-day Saints do not hold that God is a personage of flesh and blood, but a personage of flesh and bone, inhabited by a spirit, just as Jesus was after his resurrection. Joseph Smith taught concerning the resurrection that "all [men] will be raised by the power of God, having spirit in their bodies, and not blood."^[A] Again, in speaking of the general assembly and church of the first born in heaven (Heb. 12:23), he said: "Flesh and blood cannot go there; but flesh and bones, quickened by the Spirit of God, can."^[B] So that it must be remembered throughout this discussion that the Latter-day Saints do not believe that God is a personage of flesh and blood; but a personage of flesh and bone and spirit, united.

[Footnote A: Discourse delivered at Nauvoo, March 20, 1842. Mill. Star, Vol. xix, p. 213.]

[Footnote B: Discourse delivered at Nauvoo, Oct. 9, 1843. Mill. Star, Vol. xxii, p. 231.]

I would remind the reader, also, that while Jesus said, "God is a spirit," and that a spirit "hath nor flesh and bone as ye see me have," he nowhere says that a spirit is immaterial or not substance. That is a conclusion drawn by the theologians from the false philosophy of the ancient pagans.

But let us examine these premises and arguments of Mr. Van Der Donckt, more in detail. The inspired apostle says: "Our God is a consuming fire" (Heb. 12:29). "Now," to use the words of Mr. V., "although we must believe whatever God reveals to us upon one single word of his, just as firmly as upon a thousand; nevertheless, I will add" that Moses, who solemnly received the word from God which he delivered unto Israel, also says, "The Lord thy God is a consuming fire" (Exod. 4:24). Is Mr. V. ready to believe on these solemn assertions of scripture—hence of the Lord—that God is a fire, and therefore that fire is God? Or would he insist upon interpreting these passages by others, and by reason? Would he not want to quote Moses again where he says, "Thy God is * * * as a consuming fire" (Ex. 9:3), and accept this as a reasonable interpretation of the passage stating so definitely that "God is a fire"?

Again, "God is light" (I John 1:5). Would Mr. V. from that definition of God believe and teach that God is light, mere cosmic light? Or would he find an interpretation, or explanation necessary? And still again, "God is love" (I John 4:7, 16). Love is an attribute of mind, of spirit; must one conclude then from this definition that God is a mere attribute of mind? These reflections will demonstrate that these definitions of God, so far as they are such, together with the one with which Mr. V. commences his argument, "God is a Spirit," need defining. He endeavors to anticipate the "Mormon" answer to this argument by saying:

I am well aware that the Latter-day Saints interpret those texts as meaning a spirit clothed with a body, but what nearly the whole of mankind, Christians, Jews, and Mohammedans, have believed for ages, cannot be upset by the gratuitous assertions of a religious innovator of this last century.

At this point I will not appeal to or quote the "gratuitous assertions of a religious innovator of this last century"—meaning Joseph Smith. There is no need of that. If I were an unbeliever in the true Deity of Christ, I might take up the gentleman's argument in this way: You say God is a spirit, and hence bodiless, immaterial? His answer must be, "Yes." But Jesus says, "a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have"—hence Jesus is not God, because he is a personage of flesh and bone, in the form of man—not bodiless or immaterial. This, of course, is not my point. I merely refer to it in the beaten way of good fellowship, and by way of caution to my Catholic friend, who, I am sure, in his way, is as anxious to maintain the true Deity of the Nazarene as I am; but his method of handling the text, "God is a spirit," might lead him into serious difficulty in upholding the truth that Jesus was and is true Deity, if in argument with an infidel.

But now for the "Mormon" exposition of the text. Is Jesus Christ God? Was he God as he stood there among his disciples in his glorious and, to use Mr. V.'s own word, "sacred," resurrected body? There is but one answer that the Reverend Catholic gentleman or any orthodox Protestant can give, and that is in the affirmative—"yes, Jesus is God."^[A] But "God is a spirit!" True, he is; but Jesus is a spirit inside a body—inside an immortal, indestructible body of flesh and bone; therefore, if Jesus is God, and God is a spirit, he is an embodied spirit, just as the Latter-day Saints teach.

[Footnote A: "His acts proved his Deity; Jesus is Jehovah, and therefore we sing unto him as the Lord." "Treasury of David" (Spurgeon). Vol. iv, p. 371.]

Now let it be understood that Latter-day Saints are not so foolish as to believe that so much phosphate, lime, carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen as may compose the body of a perfected man, is God. They recognize the fact that the body without the spirit is dead, being alone; but the spirit having through natural processes gathered to itself a body, and that body having been purified by the power of God—who has promised in holy scripture that he will "change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself" (Phil. 3:20, 21)—when this is done, even the body takes upon it some of the divine nature. It indeed becomes "sacred," and something more than "sacred"—it becomes incorporated with and forever united to, a spirit that is divine, and henceforth becomes an integral part of God. Of which process, of a divine spirit taking on a body of flesh and bone, Jesus Christ is the most perfect example.

At this point, I shall pass for the present a few items that stand next in order in Mr. Van Der Donckt's argument, that I may consider some statements and arguments of his made further on in the "Reply," because they are immediately related to what has just been said. Mr. V. holds that it is proved by Holy Writ that "angels as well as God are bodiless beings." After quoting passages of scripture in support of this statement, he then adds: "Could plainer words be found to teach that angels, both good and bad, are spirits, devoid of bodies? Now, the Creator is certainly more perfect than his creatures, and pure minds are more perfect than minds united to bodies^[A] (men)." In support of which he quotes the following: "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind" (Wisdom 9:15)^[B]; and Paul's saying, "who shall deliver me from this body of death?"^[C] (Rom. 6:24). Therefore the Creator is a pure spirit.

[Footnote A: Italics are mine.]

[Footnote B: This is a book received by the Catholic Church on alleged apostolical tradition, but not found in the Hebrew Bible nor Protestant versions of the Bible.]

[Footnote C: Quoted thus by Mr. V. In both Catholic and Protestant Bibles it stands: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?">[

I fear Mr. V. in these statements has run into more difficulty. Let us see. According to his doctrine, "Angels as well as God are bodiless beings." "Angels, both good and bad, are spirits, devoid of bodies. The Creator is more perfect than his creatures, and pure minds [minds separated from bodies] are more perfect than minds united to bodies. * * * Therefore the Creator is a pure spirit." But where does this leave Jesus?

Was and is Jesus God—true Deity?

Yes.

But Jesus is a spirit and body united into one glorious personage. His mind was and is now united to and dwelling in a body. Our Catholic friend says, "pure minds [i. e. minds not united to bodies] are more perfect than minds united to bodies." He also says, "Angels, both good and bad, are spirits (i. e. minds) devoid of bodies." Therefore, it must follow from his premises and argument that angels are superior to Jesus since his spirit is united to a body, while they are minds not united to bodies! I will not press the point, that the same conclusions could be drawn from his premises and argument with reference even to bad spirits, whom he says are bodiless, and hence, upon his theory, superior to minds or spirits united to bodies, for that would be ungenerous upon my part, and would lay upon his faulty argument the imputation of awful blasphemy, which I am sure was not intended and would be as revolting to him as it would be to myself. Mr. V., I am sure, would contend as earnestly as I would that Jesus is superior to the angels, though it is perfectly clear that he is a spirit united to a body. "When he had by himself purged our sins, [Jesus] sat down on the right hand of the majesty on high; being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they. * * * And again, when he bringeth in the first begotten into the world, he saith, and let all the angels of God worship him. And of the angels he saith, who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire. But unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever" (Heb. 1:3-8). In this passage the superiority of Jesus over the angels is manifested in four ways: first, by the direct affirmation of God, that he was made "better" than the angels; second, that by inheritance he obtained a more exalted name; third, that the angels are commanded to worship him; fourth, God, the Father, addressing Jesus, said, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever." In this passage the Father directly addresses Jesus by the title "God." And as God is exalted above all angels, Jesus must be superior to angels, for he is "God," if we may believe the words of the Father—whom to disbelieve would be blasphemy.

Mr. Van Der Donckt admits in his argument,'of course, that Jesus is God; and also admits the persistence of him in the physical condition in which he left the earth with his resurrected body. For in explaining the scripture passage about seeing God "face to face," he remarks:

The first and chief element of the happiness of heaven will consist in the beatific vision; that is, in seeing God face to face, unveiled, as he really is. The "face to face," however, is literally true only of our blessed Savior, who ascended into heaven with his sacred body. Otherwise, as God is a spirit, he has no body, and, consequently, no face.

From this it is clear that, in the mind of the Reverend gentleman, Jesus not only ascended into heaven with his "sacred body," but now dwells there spirit and body united; and the blessed, who shall inherit heaven will see him there literally "face to face."^[A] Otherwise than this "face to face" view of Jesus—according to Mr. V.—we shall only see God, since he is a spirit, "with the spiritual eye; with the soul's intellectual perception, elevated by a supernatural influx from God!" This admission with reference to Jesus and his existence as an immortal personage of flesh and bone, and our literal view of him in heaven "face to face," draws with it some consequences which my Catholic friend evidently overlooked. In the creed usually named after St. Athanasius, it is said: "Such as the Father is, such is the Son." I take it that this, in the view of those who accept the Athanasian creed, has reference to the "substance of the Father," as well as to other things pertaining to him; for, according to that creed, the "substance" of the Father and Son is one and undivided. "We worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity," says the creed; "neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance." It must be, therefore, according to Mr. V.'s creed, that all the "substance" of God there is, is in Jesus Christ, as well as the attributes of God. The terms of the creed forbid us believing that part of the "substance" of God was enclosed in the flesh and bone body of Jesus, and the remainder existed outside of that body; for that would be dividing the "substance" of God, a thing the Athanasian creed forbids: therefore, all the "substance" of God inhabits the body of Jesus Christ, and he is wholly God. In this view of the subject, there is no God except the Deity enclosed in the flesh and body of Jesus Christ. But that would place our Catholic friend—after all he has said about God being a spirit, and about the superiority of pure minds (i. e. spirits not united to bodies) over minds united to bodies—under the necessity of accepting as God, the Supreme, the Almighty, a personage that is a spirit and body united in one glorious personage, and in form like man—a thing most abhorrent to our friend's principles.

[Footnote A: In an article for the Improvement Era, on the Doctrines and Claims of the Catholic Church, Bishop Scanlan, of Salt Lake City, also said of the Divinity of Christ; "The Catholic Church teaches that Jesus Christ is not a mere elect child or special creation of God, or in any sense or manner a creature, but that he is the eternal and only Son of God, God of God, Light of Light; the expression of the Eternal Father, with whom he is one in nature and substance, and to whom he is equal in all divine attributes, power and glory."—Improvement Era, vol. i, p. 14.]

On the other hand, if it be contended that besides the Son of God, Jesus, a personage of flesh and bone and spirit, there exists God, a spirit, then there is likely to arise again the conception of the "substance" being divided, and the existence of two individual Gods instead of one. The one a spirit unembodied, and the other a spirit enclosed in a body of flesh and bone—the glorified, exalted Man, Christ. This danger is also increased by the part of the creed now being considered, viz., "Such as the Father is, such is the Son;" for it must follow, if this be true that such as the Son is, such is the Father also. And this, must hold with reference to God, wholly; to his substance, essence, personality, form, as well as to all attributes possessed, or else it is not true at all. And if true, since we know that Jesus is an immortal being of flesh and bone and spirit united into one glorious personage (and Mr. V. admits that, and also that the blessed in heaven shall see him as such a personage, literally "face to face"), then God the Father must be the same, a personage of flesh and bone and spirit united—a thing most abhorrent to Mr. V.'s principles.

At this point, I must complain of the gentleman's argument a little. However able and fair his article may be considered on the whole, I think, on the question of the "form of God," I am justified in charging that he has not dealt at all with my strong scripture proofs relative to that matter. He makes but the very slightest reference to the passage:

And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. * * * So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them (Genesis 1:26, 27).

And he considered nowhere the very definite passage:

God * * hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son. * * * who, being the brightness of his glory and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he hath by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high (Heb. 1:3).

"Now," to use the solemn words of the Reverend gentleman himself, "we must believe whatever God reveals to us upon one single word of his, just as firmly as upon a thousand"—I shall hold that it was incumbent upon Mr. V. to deal with these passages, and set forth in what way they are to be understood, if not to be understood as they read.^[A] I can think of no language that could express the truth more forcibly, that man was created in the form of God and, therefore, that God in form is like man, than the language of these two passages. When the word of God says: "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him;" and then again, in speaking of Jesus, who certainly bore all the semblance, figure and stature of a man—who was a man—when the divine Spirit, I say, in speaking of him, says that he was the express image of God's person—I shall despair of human language expressing any fact whatsoever, if this language does not say that in form God and man are alike. And what the word of God in plainness teaches—so plain that he who "runs may read," so plain that "wayfaring men though fools need not err therein"—"is not to be set aside by the gratuitous assertions" of "religious innovators" of early Christian centuries who corrupted the plain meaning of God's word by their vain philosophies, and oppositions of science, falsely so called. Mr. Van Der Donckt makes no reference to this plain passage in Hebrews 1:3; and I am under the necessity of thinking that in respect of this passage and the one in Genesis, he had no means at his command by which he could satisfactorily explain away their force. They stand, therefore, with their strength unimpaired, in proof of the doctrines taught in the discourse at which Mr V. leveled his Reply.

[Footnote A: The meaning of this language from the 26th verse of the first chapter of Genesis is made perfectly clear when compared with the third verse of the 5th chapter of Genesis where it is written: "And Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image; and called his name Seth." What do these words imply but that Seth was like his father in features and also doubtless in intellectual and moral qualities? And if when it is said Adam begat a son in his "own likeness, after his image," it simply means that Seth in form and features and intellectual and moral qualities was like his father—then there can be no other conclusion formed upon the passage that says God created man in his own image and likeness than that man, in a general way, in form and feature and intellectual and moral qualities was like God.]

Of God Being Invisible.

Mr. Van Der Donckt thinks he sees further proof of God's being a "Spirit," and therefore immaterial or bodiless, in the fact that he is spoken of in the Bible as being "invisible." Moses "was strong as seeing him that is invisible," (Heb. 11:27;) "No man hath seen God at any time" (I John 4:12;) "The King of kings—whom no man hath seen nor can see," (I Tim. 6:16); are the passages he relies upon for the proof of his contention.

Of course, Mr. V. is aware of the fact—for he mentions it—that these passages are confronted with the explicit statement of scripture that God has been seen by men. Moses saw him. At one stage of his experience, the great Hebrew prophet was told that he could not see God's face; "for," said the Lord, "there shall no man see me and live." But even at that time, Moses was placed in a cleft of the rock, "and thou shalt see my back parts," said the Lord to him; "but my face shall not be seen" (Exodus 23:18-23). On another occasion, Moses, Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, saw God.

And they saw the God of Israel; and there was under his feet as it were a paved work of sapphire stone, and as it were the body of heaven in his clearness. And upon the nobles of the children of Israel he laid not his hand: also they saw God, and did eat and drink (Ex. 24:9-11).

Isaiah saw him: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple." At the same time the seraphims proclaimed his holiness, saying, "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory." Then said Isaiah: "Woe is me! for lam undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts" (Isaiah 6:1-5).

To harmonize these apparitions of God to men with his theory of the invisibility of God, Mr. V. appeals to the writings of some of the Christian fathers, and Cardinal Newman, from whose teachings he concludes that God the Father is called "invisible" because "he never appeared to bodily eyes; whereas the Son manifested himself as an angel, and as a man after his incarnation. * * * Whenever the Eternal Son of God, or angels at God's behest, showed themselves to man, they became visible only through a body, or a material garb assumed for the occasion!"

Surely Tertullian, Ambrose, Augustine, the great English Cardinal of the Roman church, and Mr. V. are in sore straits when they must needs take refuge in the belief of such jugglery with matter as this, in order to reconcile apparently conflicting scriptures. And what a shuffling off and on of material garbs there must have been, as from time to time hosts of angels and spirits appeared unto men!

It is but the materialization of the spiritualist mediums on a little larger scale. But there is a better way of harmonizing the seeming contradictions; and better authority for the conclusion to be reached than the Christian fathers and Cardinal Newman. I mean the scriptures themselves.

Take this expression of the scripture, "No man hath seen God at any time" (I John 4:12). Standing alone, it seems emphatic and conclusive. And in the same connection this also, from the testimony of John: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him" (St. John 1:18). But consider these texts in connection with what the Master himself said on the same subject: "It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. Every man, therefore, that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me. Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father" (St. John 6:45, 46). Now we have the key to the matter. "No man hath seen God at any time, save [except] he which is of God, he hath seen the Father." If any one shall contend that this "he which is of God" has reference to Jesus only, the complete answer to that will be found in the account of the Martyr Stephen's glorious view of the Father and the Son together and at one time: "But he [Stephen] being full of the Holy Ghost, looked up steadfastly into heaven, and saw the glory or God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God, and said, "Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the ton of Man standing on the right hand of God." (Acts 7:55-6). Undoubtedly, for reasons that are wise, God the Father has been "invisible" to men except under very special conditions; for the most part the "Only Begotten hath declared him," and stood as his representative; and in the absence of those special conditions, no man hath seen God the Father; no man in the absence of these conditions can see his face and live. He must be "of God," as Stephen was, then he may see God, even the Father, as that martyr evidently did. Here, too, may be cited a passage from one of the revelations of the Lord to Joseph the Prophet, which throws more light upon the subject. Speaking of the Higher or Melchizedek Priesthood, the Lord says:

This greater Priesthood administereth the gospel and holdeth the key of the mysteries of the kingdom, even the knowledge of God; therefore, in the ordinances thereof, the power of godliness is manifest; and without the ordinances thereof, and the authority of the Priesthood, the power of godliness is not manifest unto men in the flesh; for without this no man can see the face of God, even the Father, and live (Doc. and Cov. sec. 84:19-22).

God, then, in the Bible, is called "invisible," not because he is absolutely so by reason of his nature, because he is "immaterial or bodiless," but because he is not to be seen by men except under very special conditions. The special conditions complied with, however, certain holy men have seen God; the Father, and have borne witness of the fact. Of course, it follows that the "invisibility" of God as here set forth does not carry with it the idea that God is immaterial or bodiless; nor would it follow that God is immaterial, even if absolutely invisible to human eyes in our present existence. Mr. V. advances a strange doctrine when he says that "All material beings are visible. Absolutely invisible beings are immaterial or bodiless." I take it that his assertion is equivalent to saying that all material things are visible; and that absolutely invisible things, like "invisible beings," are immaterial or bodiless. Is that true? Is the atmosphere visible? No. But it is material. "It is composed of atoms of matter whose weight is such that the pressure upon every square inch amounts to fifteen pounds; and upon the body of an ordinary-sized man some fourteen tons; but notwithstanding this, man could not construct a microscope sufficiently powerful to render these atoms visible."^[A] What of the ether extending throughout the universe, in which millions of suns and their attendant planets move as motes in a sunbeam; is that visible? No; but it is material nevertheless. So with many things that, notwithstanding they are absolutely invisible, are material for all that, and have some of the qualities in common with grosser matter. We know but little of substances, as yet; less of their essence; but since there are many material substances absolutely invisible to us, is it unreasonable to believe that there are also beings consisting of substances more refined, pure and glorious than the material that is visible to our limited and imperfect vision?—beings invisible to us, unless our eyes be quickened by the power of God, yet material, and having form, and limitations and relations to other beings and things; and also possessed of many other qualities common to matter. In view of these facts, is not Mr. Van Der Donckt a little reckless, and too dogmatic, in stating the datum from which he argues for the absolute invisibility of God, and hence also his supposed immateriality, or bodiless state?

[Footnote A: Samuel Kinns' "Harmony of the Bible and Science," p. 338.]

Mr. Van Der Donckt argues that angels and spirits are also bodiless or immaterial. Was it a bodiless or immaterial angel that wrestled with Jacob until the breaking of the day; and who, when he could not prevail against the patriarch, touched the sinew of his thigh that it forthwith shrank? (Gen. 32:23-32). Were they immaterial or bodiless angels who called at the tent-home of the patriarch Abraham, on the plains of Mamre, for whom Sarah baked cakes, and Abraham's servant prepared a roast of veal; and, when all things were made ready, the patriarch stood by, and the three heavenly personages—one of them is called "the Lord"—"did eat" (Gen. 18)—were they immaterial or bodiless? Perhaps the Reverend gentleman will say, however, that these cases, and a score of others of similar nature that might be quoted, are answered by his statement—made on the authority of some Christian fathers and Cardinal Newman—that when angels "showed themselves to man they became visible [hence materialized, according to my friend's theory of visible and invisible beings] only through a body, or material garb assumed for the occasion!" For which theory, as whimsical as it is nonsensical, I venture to tell the Reverend gentleman there is no warrant of divine authority; nothing but the assumptions and speculations of churchmen seeking to harmonize Christian doctrine with the vain speculations of old pagan philosophers. I know nothing that equals this theory for absurdity, except it be the idea of Epicurus, who, after affirming that the gods were of human form, explained—"Yet that form is not body (i. e. material), but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but something like blood!"^[A] Or may I say that Mr. Van Der Donckt's absurdity is really equalled by that of Heracleitus, who taught that the sun was extinguished every evening and made new every morning?

[Footnote A: Tuscul. Dispt. Cicero, p. 227 (Younge's translation).]

As for the rest of Mr. V.'s theory of immateriality and invisibility of angels and spirits, I shall trust to what I have said on these subjects in dealing with the invisibility of God, to be a sufficient answer.

Of Anthropomorphism and understanding the Bible Literally.

I must say a word upon Mr. V.'s remarks respecting the plain anthropomorphism of the Bible, and the matter of understanding that sacred book literally. With reference to the first he says:

All men after the example of the inspired writings, make frequent use of the figure called anthropomorphism, attributing to the Deity a human body, human members, human passions, etc., and that is done, not to imply that God is possessed of form, limbs, etc., but simply to make spiritual things or certain truths more intelligible to man.

I would like to know upon what authority Mr. V. adjudges the "inspired writings" not to imply that God is really possessed of form, limbs, passions, etc., after attributing them to him in the clearest manner. The "inspired writings" plainly and most forcibly attribute to Deity a form like man's, with limbs, organs, etc., but the Bible does not teach that this ascription of form, limbs, organs and passions to God, is unreal, and "simply to make spiritual things or certain truths more intelligible to man." On the contrary, the Bible emphasizes the doctrine of anthropomorphism by declaring in its very first chapter that man was created in the image of God: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." The explanation is offered that it was necessary to attribute human form, members and passions, to God, in order to make spiritual things intelligible to man; but what is the reason for ascribing the divine form to man, as in the passage just quoted? Was that done to make human beings or certain truths more intelligible to God? Or was it placed in the word of God because it is simply true?

The truth that God in form is like man is further emphasized by the fact that Jesus is declared to have been in "the express image" of the Father's person (Heb. 1:3); and until Mr. V. or some other person of his school of thought, can prove very clearly that the word of God supports his theory of the unreality of the Bible's description of form, organs, proportions, passions and feelings, to God and other heavenly beings, the truth that God in form is like man will stand secure on the foundation of the revelations it has pleased God to give of his own being and nature.^[A]

[Footnote A: Dean Mansel administers a scathing reproof to the German philosophers Kant and Fichte (and also to Professor Jowett in his note xxii in Lecture 1.) for what he calls "that morbid terror of what they are pleased to call anthropomorphism, which poisons the speculation of so many modern philosophers, when they attempt to be wise above what is written, and seek for a metaphysical exposition of God's nature and attributes." These philosophers, while holding in abhorrence the idea that God has a form such as man's—or any form whatsoever—parts, organs, affections, sympathies, passions or any attributes seen in man's spirit, are, nevertheless, under the necessity of representing God as conscious, as knowing, as determining; all of which, as pointed out by Dean Mansel in the passage which follows, are, after all, qualities of the human mind as well as attributes of Deity; and hence the philosophers, after all their labor, have not escaped from anthropomorphism, but have merely represented Deity to our consciousness, shorn of some of the higher qualities of the human mind, which God is represented in the scriptures as possessing in their perfection—such as love, mercy, justice. As orthodox Christian ministers, both Catholic and Protestant alike, including Mr. V., are afflicted with the same madness, I see no reason why the Dean's reproof should not be made to apply to them, and hence quote the passage in extenso: "They may not forsooth, think of the unchangeable God as if he were their fellow man, influenced by human motives, and moved by human supplications. They want a truer, juster idea of the Deity as he is, than that under which he has been pleased to reveal himself; and they call on their reason to furnish it. Fools, to dream that man can escape from himself, that human reason can draw aught but a human portrait of God. They do but substitute a marred and mutilated humanity for one exalted and entire: they add nothing to their conception of God as he is, but only take away a part of their conception of man. Sympathy, and love, and fatherly kindness, and forgiving mercy, have evaporated in the crucible of their philosophy; and what is the caput mortuum that remains, but only the sterner features of humanity exhibited in repulsive nakedness? The God who listens to prayer, we are told, appears in the likeness of human mutability. Be it so. What is the God who does not listen, but the likeness of human obstinacy? Do we ascribe to him a fixed purpose? Our conception of a purpose is human. Do we speak of him as continuing unchanged? Our conception of continuance is human. Do we conceive him as knowing and determining? What are knowledge and determination but modes of human consciousness? and what know we of consciousness itself, but as the contrast between successive mental states? But our rational philosopher stops short in his reasoning. He strips off from humanity just so much as suits his purpose; 'and the residue thereof he maketh a God less pious in his idolatry than the carver of the graven image, in that he does not fall down unto it and pray unto it, but is content to stand off and reason concerning it. And why does he retain any conception of God at all, but that he retains some portions of an imperfect humanity? Man is still the residue that is left; deprived indeed of all that is amiable in humanity, but in the darker features which remain, still man. Man in his purposes; man in his inflexibility; man in that relation to time from which no philosophy, whatever its pretensions, can wholly free itself; pursuing with indomitable resolutions a preconceived design; deaf to the yearning instincts which compel his creatures to call upon him. Yet this, forsooth, is a philosophical conception of the Deity, more worthy of an enlightened reason than the human imagery of the Psalmist: 'The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous, and his ears are open unto their prayers.' Surely downright idolatry is better than this rational worship of a fragment of humanity. Better is the superstition which sees the image of God in the wonderful whole which God has fashioned, than the philosophy which would carve for itself a Deity out of the remnant which man has mutilated. Better to realize the satire of the eleatic philosopher, (Xenophanes) to make God in the likeness of man, even as the ox or the horse might conceive gods in the form of oxen or horses, than to adorn some half-hewn Hermes, the head of a man joined to a misshapen block. Better to fall down before that marvelous compound of human consciousness whose elements God has joined together, and no man can put asunder, than to strip reason of those cognate elements which together furnish all that we can conceive or imagine of conscious or personal existence, and to deify the emptiest of all abstractions, a something or nothing, with just enough of its human original left to form a theme for the disputation of philosophy, but not enough to furnish a single ground of appeal to the human feelings of love, of reverence, and of fear. Unmixed idolatry is more religious than this. Undisguised atheism is more logical." (Limits of Religious Thought, Mansel, pp. 56-58).

Notwithstanding this passage, however, it should be remarked that Dean Mansel holds on the very next page of this treatise that there is a principle of truth of which this philosophy is the perversion. "Surely," he remarks, "there is a sense in which we may not think of God as though he were a man; as there is also a sense in which we cannot help so thinking of him. * * * * * We feel that there is a true foundation for the system which denies human attributes to God; though the superstructure, which has been raised upon it, logically involves the denial of his very existence." The position of the Dean, as is well known, is that such are the limitations of the human mind—such the limitations of religious thought, that man may not hope to understand the divine nature, but as an act of faith must accept what is revealed concerning that nature.]

But the strangest part of the Reverend gentleman's contention on the matter now in hand is that the Latter-day Saints understand the anthropomorphic expressions in the scriptures as he explains them; and cites our catechisms (chapter 5, question 9) in proof of it!^[A] I quote the reference given:

[Footnote A: This is a thing so astonishing for Mr. Van Der Donckt to say, that lest the reader should think I had misunderstood him. I place before him in this note Mr. Van Der Donckt's statement at length. "It is a well known fact that all men after the example of the inspired writings, make frequent use of the figure called anthropomorphism, attributing to the Deity a human body, human members, human passions, etc.; and that is done, not to imply that God is possessed of form, limbs, etc., but simply to make spiritual things or certain truths more intelligible to man, who, while he tarries in this world, can perceive things and even ideas only through his senses, or through bodily organs.

"That even the Latter-day Saints thus understand such expressions is evident from their catechism (chapter 5: question 9), etc., etc.">[

9. Q. If God is a person, how can he be everywhere present? A. His person cannot be in more than one place at the same time, but he is everywhere present by his Holy Spirit.

This is preceded by the following passages from the same book and chapter:

1. Q. What kind of a being is God?

A. He is in the form of a man.

2. Q. How do you learn this?

A. The scriptures declare that man was made in the image of God. * * *

3. Q. Have you any further proof of God's being in the form of a man?

A. Yes, Jesus Christ was in the form of a man, and was at the same time in the image of God's person. * * *

4. Q. Is it not said that God is a spirit?

A. Yes; the scriptures say so. (John 4:24.) * * *

5. Q. How, then, can God be like man?

A. Man has a spirit, though clothed with a body, and God is similarly constituted.

6. Q. Has God a body then?

A. Yes; like unto man's body in figure.

7. Q. Is the person of God very glorious?

A. Yes; infinitely glorious.

8. Q. Is God everywhere present?

A. Yes; He is in all parts of the universe.

Then follows, of course, question nine and its answer, quoted above and by Mr. V.; and yet the gentleman, in the very face of these explicit statements concerning the reality of God's form in our faith, would have it believed that the Latter-day Saints understand the expressions of scripture ascribing human forms, limbs and organs to God as he explains them—not to imply that God is possessed of form, limbs, etc., but simply to make spiritual things more intelligible to man! This is a splendid illustration of Mr. V.'s ability to misunderstand.

Mr. V. next takes up the subject of understanding the language of the Bible literally. He says it is from anthropomorphic passages of the Bible that the Latter-day Saints conclude that God has a body—such passages as speak of the face, hands feet and other limbs and organs of God. He holds these passages to be figurative. "I contend," he remarks, "that if we must understand the Bible literally in those passages ('God created man in his own image') from which they attempt to prove that God has a body, we must interpret it literally in other similar passages."^[A] I assent to that. It is well known that the language of the Bible is highly figurative, almost extravagantly so in places, and much allowance must be made for the inclination to imagery of prophetic natures, which, like poetic temperaments, are given to imagery; and hyperbole is the vice of oriental speech. But Mr. V. is not true to this canon of interpretation he lays down, viz., the same rule of interpretation must be applied to passages that are similar in character. After laying down this principle of interpretation, he proceeds to depart from it by placing for comparison very dissimilar passages. What similarity is there, for example, in the plain, matter of fact statement, "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him;" and the passage he quotes from Psalms: "If I take my wings early in the morning, and dwell in the uttermost part of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me"? And this also: "Whither shall I flee from thy face. If I ascend into heaven, thou art there; If I descend into hell thou art there?" Has not the Reverend gentleman placed for comparison here the most dissimilar passages that perhaps could be found in the whole Bible? Yet he insists that the prosy passage from Genesis must be regarded as equally figurative with David's poetry, and insists that if "Mormons" believe literally that God made man in his own image and likeness, or that Moses and seventy elders saw the God of Israel, as plainly declared by Moses, then "They must believe that God had such a very long hand as to extend to the uttermost parts of the sea;" and "such an extremely long face, reaching from heaven to hell;" and "conclude that David had wings!" Further remarks on this head are not necessary. One is under no obligation to seriously discuss nonsense.

[Footnote A: Italics are mine—R.]

Of the Incarnation or the Son or God.

Another case of misapprehension of "Mormon" ideas will be found in what Mr. Van Der Donckt says with reference to the Latter-day Saints' sacred books not teaching the Christian truth of the incarnation of Deity in the person of Jesus Christ. The sacred books of the Latter-day Saints may not contain the verbiage of so-called Christian literature on the subject; but if full recognition of the fact that Jesus was in the beginning with the Father—was the "Word," and, moreover, the "Word" that "was God," and afterwards was made flesh and dwelt among men—is to believe in the incarnation of the Son of God, then the sacred books of the Latter-day Saints teach this doctrine, for over and over again in our sacred books will passages to that effect be found (especially section 93 of the Doctrine and Covenants). Moreover, the Reverend gentleman should remember that "Mormons" include among their sacred books the Holy Bible, and all the doctrine of incarnation taught in that book is our doctrine. I think the main difference between the Latter-day Saints and "Christians" on the subject of incarnation, is that the Latter-day Saints believe that incarnation does not stop with the Lord Jesus Christ. Our sacred books teach that not only was Jesus Christ in the beginning with God, but that the spirits of all men were also with him in the beginning, and that these sons of God, as well as the Lord Jesus Christ, became incarnated in bodies of flesh and bone (Doctrine and Covenants, section 93). But Mr. V. thinks he discovers in this doctrine of incarnation a proof that "God has not a body and therefore is not an exalted man," "It is plain," says he, "that the Son of God became flesh only at the time of his sojourn on earth. Now had he been flesh or man before, as the 'Mormons' hold, how could he become what he was already from all eternity?" This is another instance of Mr. V.'s misapprehension of what "Mormons" teach. We nowhere teach that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, was flesh and bone from all eternity.

When seeking to make "Mormonism" appear inconsistent with itself, the Reverend gentleman is in duty bound to keep in mind our whole doctrine on any particular subject he is treating. He should remember that our theology holds that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are distinct and separate personages, in the sense that they are three distinct individuals; and that the Father is a personage of flesh and bone, as Jesus now is; but previous to Messiah's birth into the world, he was a spirit, the First Born of the hosts of the spirits in heaven, and was with the Father in the beginning of the creation of our earth and its heavens. Indeed, under the direction of the Father, he was the creator of them (Heb. 1:3; Col. 15:17; John 1:3); but he came to the earth to receive a tabernacle, that in all things he might become as his Father is—a divine spirit inseparably united to a sacred and glorified body—one glorious spiritual personage. As much of Mr. V.'s argument on this head is built on a misapprehension of our doctrine, it will not be necessary for me to follow him through the interminable windings of his argument with reference to it. "There is never a proper ending to reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation" (Cicero).

Mr. V. next brings as proof against God's being an exalted man, what he calls the direct statement of the Bible, that God is not man: "God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should be changed" (Numbers 23:19). "I am God and not man" (Psalm). These passages simply present the contrast between man as he is now, and with all his imperfections on his head, and God. The Latter-day Saints do not teach that man in his present state and condition is God; on the contrary, they hold that there is a very, very wide difference between them, all the difference indicated by the Bible: but they do believe that through the eternities that will pass over man's head, and with God for guide and teacher, he may become as his Father in heaven is, and that such is his destiny.^[A] It follows that when man shall attain to that destiny, the contrast now so striking between man and God will not exist. The contrast noted in the scriptures by Mr. V. is not between perfected men and God, but between very imperfect men—men who lie, and are changeable—and God; and since the Latter-day Saints do not hold that man while imperfect is God, or like God, or God like him, the argument of the gentleman, based on the passages quoted, is of no force. It could be said of some grandly developed, noble, high-minded man, such as a Gladstone, a Bismarck, or a Washington: He is not a child that he should halt in reason, or falter in action, or be frightened by phantoms of the dark. But such a contrast does not include the idea that the child may not change his status, and finally become all that the great man is with whom he is now contrasted. Clearly, the contrast is one of conditions, more than of natures, and at its very highest value is the contrast between a perfected nature and one not yet perfected.

[Footnote A: In a discourse in which much of the "Mormon" doctrine concerning the Deity is unfolded by the Prophet Joseph Smith—the King Follett discourse (see chapter 5)—in a passage dealing with the time in which man may attain to some of the contemplated exaltations in the future, he remarks: "When you climb up a ladder, you must begin at the bottom and ascend step by step, until you arrive at the top; and so it is with the principles of the Gospel—you must begin with the first, and go on until you learn all the principles of exaltation. But it will be a great while after you have passed through the vail [of death] before you will have learned them. It is not all to be comprehended in this world: it will be a great work to learn our salvation and exaltation, even beyond the grave.">[

The same answer applies to the Reverend gentleman's contention based on the passage, "Thou art always the selfsame;" "I am the Lord and change not;" "The Father of lights, with whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration." These passages teach what the Reverend gentleman calls the "immutability of God," which he holds to preclude the idea that God rose from a state of imperfection to that of perfection—since he is always the "selfsame." Before answering at length, I couple with this Mr. Van Der Donckt's final argument on this division of the subject—the scriptural evidences and arguments on the form and nature of God—namely, "The Latter day Saints' theory of the Man-God supposes a past and present with God. The Bible excludes that succession of time," says the Reverend gentleman, "and speaks of God as the everlasting present; 'I Am Who am,' 'From eternity to eternity thou art God.'" Against this argument, based upon God's reputed unchangeableness, and being always as he now is, from all eternity to eternity, I wish to say, first, that the God-nature is doubtless always the same, without reference to those who may attain unto it; and speaking of the God-nature, it is always the "Selfsame," from eternity to eternity; but after that statement, against the Reverend gentleman's argument bottomed on God's immutability and eternity—and, in fact, against all his arguments, from first to last, respecting the form and nature of God, I place Jesus of Nazareth, the Messiah, the revelation of God to man, I place him as my premises, and my argument against all the reverend gentleman has said, or can say, on this division of the subject. I call attention to the fact that neither in my discourse which brought forth Mr. Van Der Donckt's Reply nor in this Rejoinder, have I turned to those numerous passages of the Bible that speak of the face, limbs or organs of God. Not that I mistrust the force of those passages as evidence, but because I have thought it unnecessary to appeal to them, so long as I had in Jesus, the Messiah, a full length and complete representation of God, not only as to the reality of his being, but as to the kind of being God is. And now I ask, as I did in my discourse, is Jesus God? Is he a manifestation of God—a revelation of him? If so, there must be in him an end of controversy; for whatever Jesus Christ was and is God must be, or Jesus Christ is no manifestation, no revelation of God. Is Jesus Christ in form like man? Is he possessed of a body of flesh and bone which is eternally united to him—and now an integral part of him? Does he possess body, parts and passions? There can be but one answer to all these questions, and that is, "Yes; he possessed and now possesses all these things." Then God also possesses them; for even according to both Catholic and orthodox Protestant Christian doctrine, Jesus Christ was and is God, and the complete manifestation and revelation of God the Father.

Also the specific points of argument based upon God's unchangeability, and there being no succession of time with God—that, too, is answered in the person and experience of Jesus Christ. According to Catholic teaching, Jesus was a spirit, identical with God the Father in substance, before he became man; but at a certain time he became man, was not that a change? By it, he became something he was not before. His humanity, according to their teaching, was added to the Son of God when he received his tabernacle of flesh and bone; and he was certainly changed from an unembodied state to an embodied one; and there was a "before and after"—in reference to this great event, in the God Jesus' experience. Is it thinkable that this change was a deterioration? Was the Son of God's divinity debased to the human, or was so much of humanity as he took on raised to the divine nature, and henceforth made an integral part of it?

The orthodox doctrine of Christianity is—Catholic and Protestant alike—that Jesus Christ is God; that he always was and is God, according to both orthodox theology and Christian philosophy. Yet it is said of this Jesus that he "increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man" (Luke 2:52). Here is certainly a change in condition; here is succession of time with God—a before and after; here is being and becoming; for whereas, he was a spirit, he became man; and in becoming man, he passed through all the phases in life from infancy to manhood. It is significant also that it was not until Jesus had arisen from the tomb and stood in the presence of his disciples, a glorified personage, body and spirit united, that he exclaimed, "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth." If "given," there must have been a time when he did not possess all power in heaven and in earth; and hence, a change from possessing some power to the condition of possessing "all power," a fullness of power—"for it pleased the Father that in him should all fullness dwell" (Col. 1:19). But more of this when I come to deal with Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical proofs on the subject, I shall close this part of my rejoinder with the following summary of the facts maintained thus far in my argument:

First:—While the scriptures declare that God is a spirit, it does not follow that he is necessarily an unembodied spirit; on the contrary, it is clear that he is an embodied spirit; for Jesus Christ is God, and he, we know, is a spirit and body united; and he is said to be the express image of his Father's person; therefore, the Father of Jesus Christ, or God the Father, must be just what Jesus is—a spirit embodied in a tabernacle of flesh and bone.

Second:—Although the Bible says that God is a spirit, and speaks of angels as spirits also, and points out some differences between the nature of men and spirits, it does not follow that spirits are immaterial beings, and therefore without form. On the contrary, the evidence of scripture is to the effect that angels are very substantial personages. One wrestled bodily with Jacob and lamed him; while three others "did eat" of the substantial meal provided by Abraham; and there are many other proofs of angels being substantial, material personages.

Third:—It is an assumption absolutely unwarranted by authority of the word of God to say that when spirits, or angels, or Jesus—before his incarnation—showed themselves to men, they merely assumed the material garb for the occasion.

Fourth:—Although the Bible in sundry passages speaks of God the Father as "invisible," it does not follow that he is absolutely so, nor invisible from the nature of his being; on the contrary, it is clear from what has been set forth that under certain special conditions, God the Father as well as Jesus—before his incarnation—and certain angels, have been seen; and hence, the invisibility of God the Father, arises from his being invisible to men in their normal condition, unquickened by, and unclothed with, the power of God.

Fifth:—The doctrine that all absolutely invisible beings are immaterial is simply untrue, being contradicted by the fact that a number of absolutely invisible things are known to be material, and yet possess some of the properties of grosser matter; and it is reasonable to believe that the same truth holds as to spiritual beings.

Sixth:—The Bible distinctly ascribes to God and angels the form, limbs, organs, feelings and passions of men; and the Bible nowhere leads us to believe that this ascription of bodily form and organs and passions to God is simply to "make spiritual things, or certain truths more intelligible to man;" nor does it follow because some passages of the Bible are figurative, and hence not to be taken literally, that all the passages ascribing human form, organs and feelings to God are figurative, and hence not to be taken literally. It is only when anthropomorphic passages and expressions are similarly used as other clearly figurative passages and expressions are, that they are to be adjudged as figurative and not to be taken literally.

Seventh:—And lastly, beside all premises and arguments to the effect that God is an unembodied spirit, without form, without limbs, organs, features, human feelings, or passions, such as love, compassion, pity, etc., etc,—beside all this, I place the Lord Jesus, the Image of God the Father's person, the full length representation and revelation of God to men, as an all sufficient answer, and say that whatsoever Jesus Christ was and is, so, too, has been and is God, the Father; for such is the teaching of holy scripture.

II.
MR. VAN DER DONCKT'S "PHILOSOPHICAL PROOFS" OF THE FORM AND NATURE OF GOD.

Mr. Van Der Donckt, at the beginning of his argument under his "philosophical proofs of God's simplicity or spirituality," again exhibits the fact that he misapprehends the doctrines of the Latter-day Saints. He says: "The Latter-day Saints believe that God created the souls of men long before their conception." That is not the belief of the Latter-day Saints; and his misapprehension of what their doctrine is relative to man and God leads the gentleman to make statements, and indulge in lines of argumentation he would not have followed had he apprehended aright the teachings of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Since his philosophical argument has proceeded from a wrong basis, it becomes necessary to state what the "Mormon" doctrine is relative to the subject in hand, and then consider so much of his argument as may apply to the facts.

Latter-day Saints believe that the "soul of man" consists of both his spirit and his body united. "The spirit and the body is the soul of man; and the resurrection from the dead is the redemption of the soul" (Doc. and Cov. sec. 88:15, 16). This, I am aware, is not the usually accepted sense of the word "soul;" for it generally stands for what is regarded as the incorporeal nature of man, or the principle of mental and spiritual life of him. It is used variously in the scriptures. In one place, the Savior uses it in contrast with the body: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. 10:28). But the word as used in the passage above quoted from the Doctrine and Covenants also has warrant of scriptural authority: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7). Here body and "breath of life," the spirit, constitute the soul of man.

Of course, Mr. Van Der Donckt uses the phrase "souls of men" as we perhaps would use the phrase "spirits of men," and evidently makes reference to our doctrine of the pre-existence of spirits, that is, the doctrine of the actual existence of the spirits of men long ages before they tabernacled in the flesh, when he says: "The Latter-day Saints believe that God creates the souls of men long before their conception." But again explanation is necessary, as that statement does not quite meet our belief. Our doctrine is that "Intelligences are begotten spirits," which spirits are in form like men, and are really, substance, that is, matter, but of a more subtle and finer nature than the matter composing man's tabernacle of flesh and bone.^[A] Christians believe that "the Word," that is, Jesus Christ, was in the beginning with God; and not only that "the Word" was with God, but also that "the Word was God" (John 1:1, 2), Latter-day Saints not only believe Jesus was in the beginning with God, but it is their doctrine that man was "also in the beginning with the Father, that which is spirit" (Doc. and Cov. sec. 93:23). And again: "Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelligence, or the light of truth was not created or made, neither indeed can be. * * * * Every man whose spirit receiveth not the light is under condemnation for man is spirit. The elements are eternal, and spirit and element, inseparably connected, receive a fullness of joy; and when separated, man cannot receive a fullness of joy. The elements are the tabernacle of God; yea man is the tabernacle of God, even temples" (Doc and Cov. sec. 93:29, 32-35). The point to be observed is that intelligences—whence the spirits of men—are not created or made, nor indeed can they be, for they are eternal—eternal as God the Father, and God the Son are. "The mind of man—the immortal spirit—where did it come from?" asks the Prophet Joseph Smith, in a discourse delivered at Nauvoo;^[B] and then answers:

[Footnote A: The Prophet Joseph teaches that "all spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure [than the gross matter tangible to our senses] and can only be discerned by purer eyes. We cannot see it, but when our bodies are purified, we shall see that it is all matter." (Doc. and Cov. sec 137.)]

[Footnote B: April 7th, 1844, Mill. Star, vol. xxiii p. 245, et seq.]

All learned men, and doctors of divinity, say that God created it in the beginning; but it is not so; the very idea lessens man in my estimation. I do not believe the doctrine. I know better. Hear it, all ye ends of the world, for God has told me so. If you don't believe me it will not make the truth without effect. * * * * We say that God himself is a self-existent being. Who told you so? It is correct enough, but who told you that man did not exist in like manner upon the same principle? God made a tabernacle and put his [man's] spirit into it, and it became a living soul. How does it read in Hebrew? It does not say in Hebrew that God created the spirit of man. It says, "God made man out of earth and put in him Adam's spirit, and so became a living body." The mind, or the intelligence which man possesses is co-eternal with God himself. * * * * * I am dwelling on the immortality of the spirit of man. Is it logical to say that the intelligence of spirits is immortal, and yet that it had a beginning? The intelligence of spirits had no beginning, neither will it have an end. That is good logic. That which has a beginning may have an end. There never was a time when there were not spirits, for they are co-eternal with our Father in heaven. I want to reason more on the spirit of man; for I am dwelling on the body and spirit of man—on the subject of the dead. I take my ring from my finger and liken it unto the mind of man—the immortal part, because it has no beginning. Suppose you cut it in two; then it has a beginning and an end; but join it again, and it continues one eternal round. So with the spirit of man. As the Lord liveth, if it has a beginning it will have an end. All the fools and learned and wise men from the beginning of creation, who say that the spirit of man had a beginning, prove that it must have an end: and if that doctrine is true, then the doctrine of annihilation would be true. But if I am right, I might with boldness proclaim from the house tops that God never had the power to create the spirit of man at all, God himself could not create himself. Intelligence is eternal, and exists upon a self-existent principle. It is a spirit from age to age, and there is no creation about it. * * * * The spirit of man is not a created being; it existed from eternity, and will exist to eternity. Anything created cannot be eternal: and earth, water, etc., had their existence in an elementary state, from eternity.

Mr. Van Der Donckt will recognize quite a difference between the doctrine here stated as to the spirits of men, and the one he states for us when he says, "Latter-day Saints believe that God creates the souls of men long before their conception." There is that in man, according to our doctrine, which is not created at all; there is in him an "ego"—a "spirit" uncreated, never made, a self-existent entity, eternal as God himself; and of the same kind of substance or essence with him, and, indeed, part of him, when God is conceived of in the generic sense.

With the doctrine of "Mormonism" relative to man and God thus stated, the question is, what part of Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical argument touches it?

Mr. Van Der Donckt, it must be remembered, bases his philosophical argument upon the absolute "simplicity or spirituality" of God. "I Am Who Am," is the definition of God about which circle all his arguments. God is "the Necessary Being," is his contention; infinite, illimitable; not limited by his own essence, by another, or by himself. From which I understand him to mean, after the philosophers of his school, that God, the very essence of him, is pure being-"Actual being or existence" are his own words. (Page 53).

This his premise; and the part of his argument which affects our doctrine is the following:

If God were an aggregation of parts, these parts would be either necessary beings or contingent (that do not necessarily exist), or some would be necessary and some contingent. None of these suppositions are tenable, therefore God is not an aggregate of parts. * * * * If the parts of God were necessary beings, there would be several independent beings, which the infinity of God precludes. God would not be infinite, if there were even one other being independent of him, as his power, etc., would not reach that being.

The infinite being is most simple, or not compound. Were he compound, his parts would be either all finite, or all infinite, or one infinite and the others finite. None of these suppositions are possible, therefore he is not compound.

Several finite things cannot produce an infinite or an illimitable, as there would always be a first and last.

Many infinite beings are inconceivable, for, if there were several they would have to differ from each other by some perfection. Now, from the moment one would have a perfection the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite. Therefore, God cannot be a compound of infinite parts.

If one is infinite, nothing can be added to it. Finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God.

Therefore, the infinite Being is not composite, but simple or spiritual. Therefore he is not, nor ever was, a man, who is a composite being.

Of Mr. Van Der Donckt's Premise.

I have to do first of all with Mr. Van Der Donckt's premise—"the simplicity or spirituality" of God.

So far as it is possible to make language do it, the gentleman teaches that God is "pure being," "most [therefore absolutely] simple—not compound." He is not only infinite, then, but infinity. It follows that he is without quality, other than being—mere existence—"I Am Who Am;" without attributes; not susceptible of division, or of relation; for if he possessed quality or attribute or was susceptible of division or of relation, his absolute simplicity—that tremulously precarious thing on which, according to Mr. V.'s philosophy, his very existence and all his excellence depends—would be destroyed. It was doubtless these considerations that led the Church of England—which, by the way, is at one with the Roman Catholic Church in the doctrine of God—to say of the "one true and living God," that he is without body, parts or passions.^[A] With which also the Westminster Confession of Faith agrees, by saying: "There is but one only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts or passions, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible," etc.^[B]

[Footnote A: Bk. Com. Prayer, Articles of Religion, Art. 1.]

[Footnote B: Westminster Confession, Art. 2, Sec. 1.]

The German school of philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which ends in inevitable agnosticism, went but one step further than these creeds; a step made inevitable by the creeds themselves. The creeds postulate God as "pure being"—"existence" "the one who could not not exist," Mr. V.'s interpretation of "I Am Who Am." But "existence," says Fichte, "implies origin," and "God is beyond origin"—i. e. beyond "being," "existence." Schelling reached substantially the same conclusion when, by a pathway but little divergent from that followed by Fichte, he was led to regard God as neither "real or ideal;" "neither thought nor being." While Hegel, by similar subtleties, established the identity of "Being and Non-Being." This German philosophy, which but extends the philosophy of the orthodox creeds to its legitimate conclusion, leaves us with the paradox on our hands of regarding God at once as the most real existence, and as the most absolute non-existence. The conclusions from the premise are just; and Mr. V.'s "most simple," "infinite being," he who is "pure existence itself," vanishes amid the metaphysical subtleties of the learned Germans.^[A]

[Footnote A: "Existence itself, that so-called highest category of thought, is only conceivable in the form of existence modified in some particular manner. Strip off its modification, and the apparent paradox of the German philosopher becomes literally true;—pure being is pure nothing. We have no conception of existence which is not existence in some particular manner; and if we abstract from the manner, we have nothing left to constitute the existence. Those who, in their horror of what they call anthropomorphism, or anthropopathy, refuse to represent the Deity under symbols borrowed from the limitations of human consciousness, are bound in consistency, to deny that God exists; for the conception of existence is as human and as limited as any other" (Limits of Religious Thought, Mansel, pp. 95, 96).]

Let us examine the effect of this Deity-destroying postulate in England. Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Infinite being," "most simple or not compound," is identical with the "absolute," the "unconditioned;" the "first cause," hence the "uncaused." These terms, it is well known, Mr. Herbert Spencer seized upon, in his volume on "First Principles," and ran them down to logical absurdity, showing them to be "unthinkable," and that ultimate religious ideas (arising from the postulates of orthodox creeds) lead to the "Unknown!" In reaching this conclusion he was wonderfully helped by Henry L. Mansel, some time Dean of St. Paul's, who in his celebrated Bampton Lecture arrives at substantially the same conclusion—with an exception to be noted later.^[A] Indeed, so nearly at one are the churchman and the philosopher, in their methods of thought, in their deductions, that the latter reaches his conclusions from the data and reasoning of the former, whom he quotes with approval and at great length. I select from these writers a few typical passages tending to show the absurdity of God's "simplicity," or "spirituality," as held by Mr. Van Der Donckt, reminding the reader that Mr. V.'s "Infinite Being," "most simple or not compound," is identical with the "absolute," "unconditioned," the "first cause," the "uncaused" of both Mr. Mansel and Mr. Spencer.

[Footnote A: Page 109.]

Mr. Spencer, after showing that the First Cause cannot be finite, nor dependent, reaches the conclusion that it must be infinite and independent; and then proceeds:

But to think of the First Cause as totally independent is to think of it as that which existed in the absence of all other existence; seeing that if the presence of any other existence is necessary, it must be partially dependent on that other existence, and so cannot be the First Cause. Not only, however, must the First Cause be a form of being which has no necessary relation to any other form of being, but it can have no necessary relation within itself. There can be nothing in it which determines change, and yet nothing which prevents change. For if it contains something which imposes such necessities or restraints, this something must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd. Thus the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total; including within itself all power, and transcending all law. Or to use the established word, it must be absolute.^[A]

[Footnote A: First Principles (Spencer) pp. 29, 30; 1896 edition, D. Appleton & Co., N. Y.]

Thus far the philosopher; and even Mr. Van Der Donckt, I think, could not complain that he has not stated the "simplicity" of the First Cause most clearly. But at this point the philosopher, Mr. Spencer, introduces the churchman, Dean Mansel, to abolish the structure of the "First Cause," the "simple" or "spiritual being," or "God," as held by Mr. V. and all orthodox Christians. I quote Mr. Mansel:

But these three conceptions—the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite—all equally indispensable, do they not imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, as such, be absolute: the Absolute cannot as such be a cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction by introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the infinite. How can the infinite become that which it was not from the first? If Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits. * * Supposing the Absolute to be a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power: and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary, and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But consciousness again is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the object is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by itself as the absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded, by distinguishing between the absolute as related to another and the absolute as related to itself. The absolute, it may be said, may possibly be conscious provided it is only conscious of itself. But this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive than the other. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of the subject's existence or not, is either created in and by the act of consciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In the former case the object depends upon the subject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends upon the object, and the object alone is the true absolute. Or, if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each exists independently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only a pair of relatives; for coexistence, whether in consciousness or not, is itself a relation.

The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to anything else, but it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within itself; as a whole, for instance composed of parts, or as a substance consisting of attributes, or as a conscious subject in antithesis to an object. For, if there is in the absolute any principle of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation of parts or attributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If, on the other hand, there is no such principle, then there is no absolute at all, but only a plurality of relatives. The almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason also, as far as reason has any voice in the matter. But this absolute unity, as indifferent and containing no attributes, can neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in their multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference: it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible.

Let us, however, suppose, for an instance, that these difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative—the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the Absolute, whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection; and, therefore, was not originally perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection. There remains only the supposition that the two states are equal, and the act of creation one of complete indifference. But this supposition annihilates the unity of the absolute, or it annihilates itself. If the act of creation is real, and yet indifferent, we must admit the possibility of two conceptions of the absolute—the one as productive, the other as non-productive. If the act is not real, the supposition itself vanishes. * * *

Again, how can the relative be conceived as coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. But to conceive an object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction; for that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; but, if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it as already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates itself. * * *

To sum up briefly this portion of my argument:

The conception of the absolute and the infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions.

There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist.

There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many.

There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal.

It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active, nor, without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive.

It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of that sum.^[A]

[Footnote A: First Principles (Spencer) pp. 40-44. Limits of Religions Thoughts, lecture II, first American edition, 1875.]

After thus running to absurdity the prevalent conceptions of the "Infinite," the "Absolute," the "Uncaused," Mr. V.'s "Most simple or not compound" "Being," the churchman does what all orthodox Christians do, he commits a violence against all human understanding and good sense—he arbitrarily declares, in the face of his own inexorable logic and its inevitable deductions, that, "it is our duty to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite;" that is, it is our duty to think of the infinite as at once limited and unlimited; as finite and infinite—"which," to use a phrase dear to Mr. Van Der Donckt, "is absurd," and therefore not to be entertained. At this point, the philosopher and the churchman reach the parting of the ways, and this is the exception, in the conclusion of the two, noted a few pages back.^[A]

[Footnote A: Page 105.]

Some do indeed allege [says Mr. Spencer] that though the Ultimate Cause of things cannot really be thought of by us as having specified attributes, it is yet incumbent upon us to assert these attributes. Though the forms of our consciousness are such that the Absolute cannot, in any manner or degree, be brought within them, we are nevertheless told that we must represent the Absolute to ourselves under these forms! * * * That this is not the conclusion here adopted, needs hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the foregoing arguments, duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality. Our duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to the established limits of our intelligence, and not perversely to rebel against them. Let those who can, believe there is eternal war between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations. I, for one, admit no such radical vice in the constitution of things.^[A]

[Footnote A: First Principles, p. 110.]

Yet Mr. Mansel, in the inconsistent and illogical course he pursues, is not more inconsistent, illogical, and unphilosophical than all orthodox Christians. The postulates of their creeds concerning the nature of God leads them to affirm what they call his "Spirituality," "Infinite Being," "Simplicity," etc. (which are but the equivalents of the philosopher's "absolute," "infinite," and the "uncaused"); and yet the necessities of their faith in revelation make it imperative that they regard him as existing in some relation to the universe and to man, which destroys his alleged "simplicity." To ascribe to him attributes is to destroy that simplicity^[A] which orthodox creeds affirm, and for which Mr. Van Der Donckt so stoutly argues. Nor does it help matters when it is said that these attributes are existences—the attitude of Mr. V., for he says: "Every perfection [goodness, mercy, justice, etc.—attributes of God] is some existence, something that is." If this be granted, then it follows that God must be the sum of all these existences, therefore a compound, not "simple." And not only does orthodox belief in revelation compel those who follow it to concede the existence of attributes in God, but personality also. But if God be conceived as a personality, his "simplicity" or "spirituality," as held by Mr. V., vanishes, because, when recognized as personality, God is no longer "being"—but a being.

[Footnote A: "The rational conception of God is that he is, nothing more. To give him an attribute is to make him a relative God. * * * We cannot attribute to him any quality, for qualities are inconceivable apart from matter." "Origin and Development of Religious Beliefs—Christianity."—(S. Baring-Gould, p. 112.) It was held by well nigh the whole medieval school of theologians that God was unknowable because "the absolute simplicity of the divine essence was incompatible with the existence of distinctions therein." (See art. "Theism," Ency. Brit., and the references there given.)]

Mr. Van Der Donckt himself says: "Something is limited, not because it is [i. e. exists]: but because it is this or that; for instance, a stone, a plant, a man"—or a person, I suggest. For if God has personality, he is a person, a some-thing, and hence limited, according to Mr. V.'s philosophy; if limited, as he must be when conceived of as this or that, as a person, for instance, then of course not infinite being; and thus my friend's doctrine of God's "simplicity" is destroyed the moment he ascribes personality to Deity. Nor does the difficulties of Mr. Van Der Donckt and all orthodox Christians end here. Not only does revelation as they view it demand belief in the personality of God, but it demands the belief that in God are three persons—the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. This further complicates the matter, and removes orthodox Christians still further from the postulate of "simplicity" they affirm of God; for if there are three persons in God, by no intellectual contortions whatsoever can this conception of "three" be harmonized with the orthodox Christian postulate of God's "simplicity." For the Son, if he exists at all, must exist in virtue of some distinction from the Father; so also the Holy Ghost must exist in virtue of some distinction from both the Father and the Son. Each must have something distinct from the other; must be what the other is not, in some particular;* and if each one has something the other has not, and each lacks something which the other has, how can it be said that each of these persons is God, and each infinite as he must be in order to be God, under Mr. V.'s doctrine?

[Footnote A: "Distinction is necessarily limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some form which the other has." Dean Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thoughts.">[

If the three be conceived as one God—yet each with that about him which distinguishes him from the other—how can God be regarded as "simple," "not compound?" The orthodox creeds of Christendom, moreover, require us to believe that while the Father is a person, the Son a person, and the Holy Ghost a person, yet there are not three persons, but one person. So with each being eternal and almighty. So with each being God: "The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God: and yet there are not three Gods but one God"^[A] No wonder the whole conception is given up as "incomprehensible." "Their mode of subsistence [i. e., the subsistence of the three persons] in the one substance," says the Commentary on the Confession of Faith, "must ever continue to us a profound mystery, as it transcends all analogy."^[B] So the Douay Catechism (Catholic), ch. i:

[Footnote A: See the creed of St. Athanasius, a copy is published in the History of the Church, vol. I, Introduction, p. 87.]

[Footnote B: This Commentary is by Rev. A. A. Hodges, D.D., LL.D., p. 58.]

Q. In what do faith and law of Christ consist? A. In two principal mysteries, namely, the Unity and Trinity of God, and the incarnation and death of our Savior.

"To think that God is, as we think him to be, is blasphemy," is the lofty assertion behind which some of the orthodox hide when hard pressed with the inconsistency of their creed; and if I mistake not, "A God understood is a God dethroned," has long been an aphorism of the Church of which Mr. Van Der Donckt is a priest.

But what is the sum of my argument thus far on Mr. Van Der Donckt's premise of God's absolute "simplicity" or "spirituality?" Only this:

First, his premise is proven to be unphilosophical and untenable, when coupled with his creed, which ascribes qualities, attributes and personality to God. Either the gentleman must cease to think of God as "infinite being," "most simple," "not compound," or he must surrender the God of his creed, who is represented by it to be three persons in one substance; and, moreover, persons possessed of attributes and qualities which bring God into relations with men and the universe, a mode of being which destroys "simplicity." Either one or the other of these beliefs must be given up; they cannot consistently be held simultaneously, as they destroy each other. If Mr. V. holds to the God of his creed, what becomes of all his "philosophy?" If he holds to his "philosophy," what becomes of the God of his creed.

Second, as affecting this discussion, the matter at this point stands thus: Since the gentleman's premise of God's absolute simplicity is proved to be illogical and unphilosophical, it affords no sound basis of argument against the Latter-day Saints' views of Deity, wherein they hold him to be something different from absolute "being"—more than a mere, and, I may say, bare and barren "existence," a metaphysical abstraction. Mr. V.'s premise of absolute simplicity affords no consistent basis of argument against our view that God is a person in the sense of being an individual, in form like man, and possessed of attributes which bring him within the nearest and dearest relations to men that it is possible to conceive.

Of the Doctrine of God's "Simplicity" Being of Pagan Rather than of Christian Origin.

The next step in my argument is to prove that this doctrine of God being "most simple," "not compound," "pure being"—without body (i. e., not material), parts or passions—hence, without attributes, is not a doctrine of the Christian scriptures, but comes from the old Pagan philosophies.

Clearly the data for this doctrine of God's absolute "simplicity" did not come from the Old Testament, for that teaches the plainest anthropomorphic ideas respecting God. It ascribes to him a human form, and many qualities and attributes possessed by man, which, in the minds of philosophers of Mr. V.'s school, limit him who must be, to their thinking, without any limit whatsoever; and ascribes relativity to him who must not be relative but absolute.

The data for the doctrine of God's absolute "simplicity"—contended for by Mr. V.—does not come from the New Testament, for the writers of that volume of scripture accept the doctrine of the Old Testament respecting God, and even emphasize its anthropomorphic ideas, by representing that the man Christ Jesus was in the "express image" of God, the Father's, person; was, in fact, God manifest in the flesh (I Tim. 3:16); "the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:5); "God, the Word, who was made flesh, and dwelt among men, who beheld his glory" (St. John 1:1-14). Hence Mr. Van Der Donckt's doctrine of God's "simplicity" cannot claim the warrant of New Testament authority.

Plato, in his Timaeus, (Jowett's translation, page 530,) incidentally referring to God, in connection with the creation of the universe, says:

We say indeed that "he was," "he is," "he will be;" but the truth is that "he is" alone truly expresses him, and that "was" and "will be" are only to be spoken of generation in time.

Here, then, is Mr. V.'s "pure being," "most simple," "not compound." Again:

We must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself giving out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the sight is granted to intelligence only (Ibid. p. 454).

Here Mr. V. may find his God, "who cannot change with regard to his existence, nor with regard to his mode of existence." Also his God who can only be seen with the "soul's intellectual perception, elevated by a supernatural influx from God." Dr. Mosheim, in his account of Plato's idea of God, says: "He considered the Deity, to whom he gave the supreme governance of the universe, as a being of the highest wisdom and power, and totally unconnected with any material substance."^[A]

[Footnote A: Mosheim's "Historical Commentaries on the State of Christianity, During the First Three Hundred Years", vol. 1. p. 37.]

To the same effect, also, Justin Martyr (second Christian century) generalizes and accepts as doctrine what may be gathered from the sixth book of Plato's "Republic," with reference to God. To the Jew, Trypho, Justin remarks:

The Deity, father, is not to be viewed by the organs of sight, like other creatures, but he is to be comprehended by the mind alone, as Plato declares, and I believe him. * * * * Plato tells us that the eye of the mind is of such a nature, and was given Us to such an end, as to enable us to see with it by itself, when pure, that Being who is the source of whatever is an object of the mind itself, who has neither color, nor shape, nor size, nor anything which the eye can see, but who is above all essence, who is ineffable, and undefinable, who is alone beautiful and good, and who is at once implanted into those souls who are naturally well born, through their relationship to and desire of seeing him.

Athanasius (third Christian century) quotes the same definition (Contra Gentes, ch. 2), almost verbatim. Turning again to the Timaeus of Plato, this question is asked:

What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and has never any being? That which is apprehended by reflection and reason [God] always is; and is the same; that on the other hand which is conceived by opinion, with the help of sensation without reason [the material universe], is in a process of becoming and perishing but never really is. * * * Was the world [universe], always in existence and without beginning? or created and having a beginning? Created, I reply.

In this, the orthodox Christians and Mr. V. may find their God of pure "being," that never is "becoming," but always is; also the creation of the universe out of nothing. The fact is that orthodox Christian views of God are Pagan rather than Christian.

In his great work on the "History of Christian Doctrine," Mr. William G. T. Shedd says:^[A] "The early Fathers, in their defenses of Christianity against their pagan opponents, contend that the better pagan writers themselves agree with the new religion in teaching that their is one Supreme Being. Lactantius (Institutiones, 1, 5), after quoting the Orphic poets, Hesiod, Virgil, and Ovid, in proof that the heathen poets taught the unity of the supreme deity, affirms that the better pagan philosophers agree with them in this. 'Aristotle,' he says, 'although he disagrees with himself, and says many things that are self-contradictory, yet testifies that one supreme mind rules over the world. Plato, who is regarded as the wisest philosopher of them all, plainly and openly defends the doctrine of a divine monarchy, and denominates the supreme being, not ether, nor reason, nor nature, but as he is, God; and asserts that by him this perfect and admirable world was made. And Cicero follows Plato, frequently confessing the deity, and calls him the supreme being, in his Treatise on the Laws.'"

[Footnote A: Vol 1, p 56.]

It is conceded by Christian writers that the Christian doctrine of God is not expressed in New Testament terms, but in the terms of Greek and Roman metaphysics, as witness the following from the very able article in the Encyclopedia Britannica on Theism, by the Rev. Dr. Flint, Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh: "The proposition constitutive of the dogma of the Trinity—the propositions in the symbols of Nice, Constantinople and Toledo, relative to the immanent distinctions and relations in the Godhead—were not drawn directly from the New Testament, and could not be expressed in New Testament terms. They were the product of reason speculating on a revelation to faith—the New Testament representation of God as a Father, a Redeemer and a Sanctifier—with a view to conserve and vindicate, explain and comprehend it. They were only formed through centuries of effort, only elaborated by the aid of the conceptions, and formulated in the terms of Greek and Roman metaphysics." The same authority says: "The massive defense of theism, erected by the Cambridge school of philosophy, against atheism, fatalism, and the denial of moral distinctions, was avowedly built on a Platonic foundation."

In method of thought also, no less than in conclusions, the most influential of the Christian fathers on these subjects followed the Greek philosophers rather than the writers of the New Testament.^[A] "Platonism, and Aristotelianism," says the author of the History of Christian Doctrine, "exerted more influence upon the intellectual methods of men, taking in the whole time since their appearance, than all other systems combined. They certainly influenced the Greek mind, and Grecian culture, more than all the other philosophical systems. They re-appear in Roman philosophy—so far as Rome had any philosophy. We shall see that Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, exerted more influence than all other philosophical minds united, upon the greatest of the Christian Fathers: upon the greatest of the Schoolmen; and upon the theologians of the Reformation, Calvin and Melanchthon. And if we look at European philosophy as it has been unfolded in England, Germany and France, we shall perceive that all the modern theistic schools have discussed the standing problems of human reason, in very much the same manner in which the reason of Plato and Aristotle discussed them twenty-two centuries ago. Bacon, Des Cartes, Leibniz, and Kant, so far as the first principles of intellectual and moral philosophy are concerned, agree with their Grecian predecessors. A student who has mastered the two systems of the Academy and Lyceum will find in modern philosophy (with the exception of the department of natural science) very little that is true, that may not be, found for substance, and germinally, in the Greek theism."^[B]

[Footnote A: Especially compare Plato's methods of arising from the conception of the finite and variable, to the infinite and unchangeable; from the relatively beautiful and good, to the absolutely beautiful and good, in the sixth and seventh books of the "Republic," with St. Augustine's manner of arriving at the conception of "That which is"—God.—Confessions St. Augustine, book seven.]

[Footnote B: History of Christian Doctrine, by William G. T. Shedd; Vol. I, p. 52.]

It is hoped that enough is said here to establish the fact that the conception of God as "pure being," "immaterial," "without form," "or parts or passions," as held by orthodox Christianity, has its origin in Pagan philosophy, not in Jewish nor Christian revelation.

Of Jesus Christ Being Both Premise and Argument against Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Philosophical Argument."

And now as to the whole question of God being "existence," "pure being," "most simple," "not compound;" also his "immutability," as set forth in Mr. Van Der Donckt's "philosophical argument." What of it? This of it: Whatever "simplicity," "immutability," or other quality that is ascribed to God, must be in harmony with what Jesus Christ is: I meet Mr. V.'s "philosophical argument" as I meet his scriptural argument. I appeal to the being and nature of Jesus Christ, as a refutation of his philosophical conclusions. Is Jesus Christ God? "Yes," must be my friend's answer. Very well, this is my premise. Jesus is God in his own right and person, and he is a revelation of what God the Father is. He is not only a revelation of the being of God, but of the kind of being God is. And now I test Mr. V.'s argument by the revelation of what God is, as revealed in the person and nature of the Son of God. While I am doing so, let it be remembered that Jesus is now and will ever be what he was at the time of his glorious ascension from the midst of his disciples on Mount Olivet—God, possessed of all power in heaven and in earth, a glorious personage of flesh and bone and spirit. And now, is Jesus Christ without form? No; he is in form like man. Is Jesus Christ illimitable? Not as to his glorious body; that has limitations, dimensions, proportions. Is Jesus Christ without parts? Not as to his person; his body is made up of limbs, trunk, head; and parenthetically I may remark, a whole without parts is inconceivable. Then it follows that God's "infinity," so far as it is spoken of in scripture, does not refer to his person, but evidently to the attributes of his mind—to his intelligence, wisdom, power, patience, mercy, and whatsoever other qualities of mind or spirit he may possess. If it is argued that it is illogical and unphilosophical to regard God in his person as finite, but infinite in faculties, that is finite in one respect and infinite in another, my answer is that it is a conception of God made necessary by what the divine wisdom has revealed concerning himself, and it is becoming in man to accept with humility what God has been pleased to reveal concerning his own nature, being assured that in God's infinite knowledge he knows himself, and that which he reveals concerning himself is to be trusted far beyond man's philosophical conception of him.

But to resume our inquiry: Is Jesus Christ immutable, unchangeable? Is he Plato's "that which always is and has no becoming?" or Mr. Van Der Donckt's "necessary Being * * * that cannot change with regard to his existence, nor can he change with regard to his mode of existence," and therefore could never be anything other than he was from eternity? It is inconceivable how any being can be a son and not have a beginning as such. Whatever of eternity may be ascribed to the existence of the Lord Jesus, he must have had a beginning as a son; that term implies a relation, let it be brought about how it may, and that relation must have had a beginning. While there may never have been a time when Jesus was not in respect of his existence as an Intelligence, there must have been a time when he was not as "Son." So that he doubtless became "Son," hence changed his relation from not Son to Son; hence changed in his relations, in his mode of existence. We know there was a time when he was not man, that is, not man of flesh and bone made of the materials of this world; and he became man; another change. There was a time when he was mortal man, by which I mean, man subject to death; and he became, and is now, immortal man; another change. There was a time when all power in heaven and in earth was "given" to him; (Matt. 28:18) hence, there must have been a time when he did not possess it; hence another change, a change from the condition of holding some power to that of possessing all power. These facts attested by Holy Writ are against Mr. V.'s doctrine of God's "immutability," so far at least as relates to the impossibility of changing his mode of existence. And if Mr. V.'s doctrine of the "immutability" of God means that God cannot change in his relations, then I put these facts in the career of the Lord Jesus against his argument, and say that not only did Jesus pass through these changes of conditions and relations, but that God the Father could, and very likely did, pass through similar relations and changes. Else of what significance are the following passages?

The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do; for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise (St. John 5:19).

The Prophet Joseph Smith quoting the substance of St. John 5:26, also says:

"As the Father hath power in himself, even so hath the Son power"—to do what? Why, what the Father did. The answer is obvious—in a manner to lay down his body and take it up again. "Jesus, what are you going to do?" "To lay down my body as my Father did, and take it up again." Do you believe it? If you do not believe it, you do not believe the Bible.^[A]

[Footnote A: Millennial Star, Vol. 23: p. 247.]

It is the accepted doctrine of the orthodox Christian creeds that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is as the Father is—(Creed of St. Athanasius) that is, of the same nature and essence. Very well, then; as God, the Father, begot Jesus, the Son, may not the Son in time also beget a son or sons? Or, after ascribing to the Son the same nature and the same power as is ascribed to the Father, will our orthodox friends insist upon limiting the Son by denying him productive virtue, and contend that Jesus must endure without the exercise of it? If the existence of the Son was essential to the perfection of God, the Father—and it cannot be thought of in any other light—may it not be, since the Son is of the same nature as the Father, that the fact of fatherhood is necessary to the perfection of the Son? To deny him the power of attaining it would be to limit his power, which may not be done even according to orthodox Christian doctrine. Is it not likely, nay, would it not be so? that the same cause or impulse, or necessity, or what influence or consideration soever it was that led God, the Father, to beget a Son, create a world, and provide for its redemption, would impel the Son, since he is of the same nature as the Father, to do these same things? And where was the beginning of such proceedings? and where will be the end of them?

But now, to resume again our measuring of Mr. V.'s philosophy by Jesus Christ as God.

Is Jesus Christ without passions? No; his deathless love for his friends, so beautifully manifested by word and deed throughout his mortal life, together with his love for mankind, which led him to give his life for the world, as also his explicitly declared hatred of that which is sin and evil, forbid us thinking of him as without passions.^[A] As in him dwelt "all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," so in him necessarily are gathered all these qualities, attributes and perfections that go to the making of God. Does possession of these qualities, together with Messiah's mode of existence in the form and person of Jesus Christ, come in conflict with the notion of God's "simplicity," "immutability," and "eternity," as conceived by philosophers? So much the worse, then, for the faulty and merely human conceptions of those qualities, as relating to God. Better mistrust the accuracy of metaphysical reasoning; better throw aside Plato and his philosophy as untrustworthy, than to be moved ever so slightly from the great truth of revelation that Jesus, the Messiah, is God; and that such as he is, God is, as to essence, attributes, existence, and the mode of existence. Jesus Christ, then, once accepted as God, and the manifestation of God to men, is a complete answer to Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical argument for the absolute "simplicity" or "spirituality" or "immutability" of God.

[Footnote A: God is angry with the wicked every day (Ps 7:11.)]

More of Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Philosophy."

I must not neglect Mr. Van Der Donckt's "philosophy" that forbids us believing that "several finite things" can "produce an infinite, or an illimitable, as there would always be a first and last." Also his "finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God." Also, his "many infinite beings are inconceivable; for, if there were several, they would have to differ from each other by some perfection." And his "from the moment one would have a perfection, the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite. Therefore, God cannot be a compound of infinite parts."

Can any one, can Mr. Van Der Donckt himself, be quite sure of all this? Who knows how the infinite is constituted? When men speak of the infinite, are they not treating of that which is beyond the comprehension of the mind of man, at least in his present state of limited intellectual powers; for whatever may be the heights to which the mind of man may rise, when freed from his present earth-bound conditions, here and now he must recognize his intellectual limitations: for, as in Christ's humiliation (i. e. in his earth-life) his judgement was taken away (Acts 8:33), that is, his divine, supreme, intellectual and spiritual powers were veiled—so with man, in this same world of trial and limitations. Whatever his power as an eternal Intelligence may have been, or what it may be hereafter, he is now compelled to admit that he sees but as through a glass darkly, and therefore imperfectly. Men, I hold, though they be philosophers, cannot comprehend the infinite, much less say how it is constituted. But let us reflect a little upon the several propositions Mr. V. submits to us:

1—"Several finite beings cannot produce the infinite."

So far as it is possible for the human intellect to conceive the infinite, the material universe is infinite, eternal, without beginning and without end. It is inconceivable that the universe could have had a beginning, could have been produced from nothing. "All the apparent proofs," remarks Herbert Spencer, "that something can come out of nothing, a wider knowledge has one by one cancelled. The comet that is suddenly discovered in the heavens and nightly waxes larger, is proved not to be a newly created body, but a body that was until lately beyond the range of vision. The cloud which in course of a few minutes forms in the sky, consists not of substance that has just begun to be, but of substance that previously existed in a more diffused and transparent form. And similarly with a crystal or precipitate in relation to the fluid depositing it" (First Prin., p. 177.) Mr. Spencer holds it "impossible to think of nothing becoming something," for the reason that "nothing" cannot become an object of consciousness (Ibid pp. 161-2.) In like manner, he holds that matter is indestructible, and hence, that the universe cannot be annihilated. "The doctrine that matter is indestructible has become a common-place," he remarks. "The seeming annihilations of matter turn out, on close observation, to be only changes of state. It is found that the evaporated water, though it has become invisible, may be brought by condensations to its original shape." The indestructibility of matter, Mr. Spencer holds to be a datum of consciousness, which he thus illustrates:

Conceive the space before you to be cleared of all bodies save one. Now imagine the remaining one not to be removed from its place, but to lapse into nothing while standing in that place. You fail. The place that was solid you cannot conceive becoming empty, save by the transfer of that which made it solid * * * However small the bulk to which we conceive a piece of matter reduced, it is impossible to conceive it reduced into nothing. While we can represent to ourselves the parts the matter as approximated, we cannot represent to ourselves the quantity of matter as made less. To do this would be to imagine some of the constituent parts compressed into nothing; which is no more possible than to imagine compression of the whole into nothing. Our inability to conceive matter becoming non-existent, is immediately consequent on the nature of thought. Thought consists in the establishment of relations. There can be no relation established, and therefore no thought framed, when one of the related terms is absent from consciousness. Hence, it is impossible to think of something becoming nothing, for the same reason that it is impossible to think of nothing becoming something. (First Prin., p. 181.)

The material universe, then, is eternal, it always existed, and how many changes soever it may pass through, it will never be annihilated. Not one atom can be added to the sum total of its substance, nor one blotted out of existence—it is everywhere existing, and, so far as the mind of man can conceive "infinity," it is infinite. Yet we know that this whole is made up of a great variety of substances and objects which are finite; and our philosophers, for the most part, hold that matter is divisible into ultimate atoms. Not that such a fact has been demonstrated or is demonstrable; but granted the existence of matter, its existence as an aggregation of such ultimate things as atoms seems to be a necessary truth. I say necessary truth, because the mind of man cannot conceive to the contrary, and hence, science assumes matter to be composed of atoms. But atoms are things—material things; and in the mind must necessarily be thought of as having dimensions—an upper and lower part, also a hither and thither side; or if spherical then a circumference and diameter; in other words, atoms are finite, material things, and in the aggregate constitute the material universe, which, so far as the wit of man can conceive, is infinite; and hence, we may say the infinite universe is composed of finite atoms; or, several finite things—Mr. V.'s philosophy to the contrary notwithstanding—produce the infinite.

2—"Many infinite beings are inconceivable; for if there were several, they would have to differ from each other by some perfection. Now, the moment one would have a perfection the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite."

That may be true in relation to absolute "infinity." But we have already seen that God cannot be considered as absolutely infinite, because we are taught by the facts of revelation that absolute infinity cannot hold as to God; as a person, God has limitations, and that which has limitations is not absolutely infinite. If God is conceived of as absolutely infinite, in his substance as in his attributes, then all idea of personality respecting him must be given up; for personality implies limitations. If the idea of personality in respect of God be retained, then the idea of absolute infinity regarding him must be abandoned. That "infinite" which does not include all things and all qualities is not absolutely infinite. The only persons who consistently hold to the absolute infinity of God are those who identify God with the universe—regarding God and the universe as one and the same. So long as orthodox Christians regard God as distinct from what they call the "material universe," that long they teach but a modified infinity respecting God. They really mean that God is only infinite "after his kind." One of Spinoza's definitions may help us here. He says a thing is finite after its kind "when it can be limited by another thing or the same nature," as one body is limited by another (Ethics Def. ii.) is not a thing infinite after its kind, then, when it is not limited by anything of the same nature? Is not this the necessary corollary of Spinoza's definition of the "finite after its kind?" and do not those who regard God as distinct from the universe, and at the same time ascribe infinity to him, mean only that he is infinite "after his kind?" There may be, then, many infinites after their kind; and this view is sustained by the fact that such infinites do exist. Duration or time is infinite after its kind, because not limited by anything of the same nature. Space is infinite after its kind, for the same reason; so, too, are force and matter. If there may be two or four things infinite after their kind, because not limited by anything of the same nature, are many infinites inconceivable? Moreover, when infinity is thus understood—and it can be understood when relating to God in no other way—the difficulty raised by the latter part of Mr. V.'s proposition, viz., that, if there were several infinite beings, they would differ from each other by some perfection, and when one would have a perfection that the other lacked, the latter would not be infinite, etc.—disappears; for when beings are infinite after their kind, they are only limited by things of a different nature, and therefore the perfections possessed by those beings of a different nature will constitute no limitation to their infinity.

3—"If one is infinite nothing can be added to it."

This maybe true of the absolutely infinite; for that which is absolutely infinite must be the sum total of all existence. To say, therefore, that something existed in addition to this sum total, and could be added to it, would be illogical. But infinity in this conception cannot be ascribed to God; for we have seen that God is only infinite in faculties and power, not in person, hence not absolutely infinite; therefore, this statement in the gentleman's philosophy can have no bearing on the controversy in which we are engaged.

4—"Finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God."

When the Son of God, Jesus, took on a human body of flesh and bone, was not that which is finite, his body, added to the infinite in Jesus Christ? Did the finite body, taken on by the spirit of Jesus, communicate its limitations to God? And is Jesus, now in his resurrected, immortal body of flesh and bones, less "infinite" than before his spirit was united to his body? If one accepts Mr. V.'s doctrine of the absolute infinity of God, then one must believe that Jesus "the Word," who "was in the beginning with God," who "was God"—was not "made flesh;" that is, did not take on a body of flesh and bone; for the body of Jesus was finite; it had, in fact, all the limitations of a man's body, and Mr. V.'s doctrine tells us that "if one is infinite, nothing can be added to it"—therefore the "Word," who "was God," could not have been made flesh. If, on the other hand, one accepts the fact, so well attested by holy scriptures, viz., that Jesus, "the Word," "who was God," was made flesh, did take on a body that was flesh and bones, even though that body was finite, then one must reject the philosophy of Mr. V., which says the infinite may not take on finite parts, for the reason that they would communicate their limitations to the infinite, and thus destroy its infinity.

It is not difficult to see that something is wrong with the philosophy of Mr. Van Der Donckt, which thus constantly brings us in conflict with the revelations of God in the scriptures, and especially in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

In what state do these considerations leave the argument? Mr. Van Der Donckt reaches the conclusion, from the premise that several finite things cannot produce the infinite, that God cannot be a compound of finite parts. Yet we have seen that what is called the material universe, so far as it is possible for the mind of man to apprehend infinity, answers to his conception of the infinite; and we know that the universe is made up of finite parts; and that in its last analysis, it is but the aggregation of finite atoms.

From the premise that many infinite beings are inconceivable, Mr. V. reaches the conclusion that God cannot be a compound of infinite parts. But upon principles of sound reason, we have seen that things are infinite after their kind when not limited by anything of the same nature; and his premise of a number of infinites being inconceivable is destroyed by the actual existence of a number of infinites after their kind, such as duration, space, matter, spirit, and hence the absolute infinite, if existing at all, must be composed of an aggregation of infinities after their kind.

From the premise that if one is infinite nothing can be added to it, the gentleman implies the conclusion that God is infinite and therefore nothing can be added to him. Still, since Jesus was the Word, and the Word was and is God, we have seen that something was added to whatever of infinity there was in God, the Word, viz., what orthodox Christians call his "humanity"—that is, the pre-existent, divine spirit of Jesus took on a tabernacle of flesh—something finite was added to the infinite of God, the Word, and that, too, let me say, without communicating any limitations to the infinity possessed of God.

On these several premises, Mr. Van Der Donckt bases his general conclusion:—

Therefore, the infinite Being is not composite, but simple or spiritual. Therefore, he is not, nor ever was, a man, who is a composite being.

But since the premises themselves have been shown to be utterly untenable, as relating to God, as revealed in the scriptures, and in the person and nature of Jesus Christ, the conclusions are wrong; and the facts established are that while God in mind, faculties and in power is doubtless infinite, in person he is finite; and as his spirit is united to a body, he is composite, not simple; and as Jesus Christ was God manifested in the flesh, the express image of God the Father's person, the counterpart of his nature, and yet at the same time was a man—it is neither unscriptural, nor unphilosophical to hold that God, even the Father, is also a perfected, exalted man.

III.
MR. VAN DER DONCKT'S CONTRASTS BETWEEN MAN AND GOD.

Of the Intellectual Powers of Man.

Mr. Van Der Donckt insists that man can never become a God, because he "is finite or limited in everything; ever changeable and changing, ever susceptible of improvement." Granting that man is ever susceptible of improvement, ought not the gentleman to proceed with some caution before dogmatically asserting that there are to be limitations to man's enlargement, to his progress, and to his attainments? Given the susceptibility to improve, never ending duration through which the processes of improvement shall continue, and God to direct such processes, who can dogmatize upon the limitations of the Intelligences now known as men? It is not enough to say in reply to this that the "finite can never become infinite;" nor to argue that if God were an exalted man he would possess contradictory attributes, such as being both finite and infinite, compound and simple. We have already seen that when one undertakes to treat of the infinite, he is dealing with the unknown, dealing with terms that stand for the names of things of which the mind can form no adequate or satisfactory conception. But so far as the Father and the Son are concerned—personages held out to us in the scriptures as Gods—we have seen that absolute infinity may not be predicted of them. In person, form and the general nature of their physical being, they have limitations; and whatever of infinity or simplicity is ascribed to them must be ascribed to mind and attributes, not to personality. Seeing then, that the revelation of God in the scriptures, and especially in the revelation of God in the person and character of Jesus Christ, forces upon us a conception of God that represents him as concrete rather than abstract, finite in some respects, and infinite in others; and as compound rather than simple—it follows that urging the apparent absurdity of such characteristics in Deity as these is of no avail against the facts in the revelations God has given of himself. And now, as the limitations found in man, as to his physical person, nature, etc.,—and which are supposed by Mr. V. to forever bar man from attaining divinity—are found also in God the Father and in God the Son, it is quite clear that these physical limitations may not be urged as insuperable obstacles to man attaining divinity. As for the spirit of man—the mind—who can say what its metes and bounds are, much less what they shall be? Who comprehends its powers? Who dare say that it is not potentially infinite? and shall be hereafter actually infinite after its kind? I have already called attention to the fact that it is said of Messiah that in his humiliation, his judgment was taken away, which doubtless means that in his earth-life his intellectual and spiritual powers were somewhat veiled; and with man doubtless it is the same; in his earth-life that intellectual excellence which he enjoyed as a spirit in the mansions of the Father is veiled; but veiled as it is, there is of its manifestations sufficient to inspire one with awe, and make him hesitate ere pronouncing dogmatically upon its nature or its limitations. To illustrate my thought: I am this moment sitting at my desk, and am enclosed by the four walls of my room—limited as to my personal presence to this spot. But by the mere act of my will, I find I have the power to project myself in thought to any part of the world. Instantly I can be in the crowded streets of the world's metropolis. I walk through its well remembered thoroughfares, I hear the rush and roar of its busy multitudes, the rumble of vehicles, the huckster's cries, the cab-man's calls, sharp exclamations and quick retorts in the jostling throngs, the beggar's piping cry, the sailor's song, fragments of conversation, broken strains of music, the blare of trumpets, the neighing of horses, ear-piercing whistles, ringing of bells, shouts, responses, rushing trains and all that mingled din and soul-stirring roar that rises in clamor above the great town's traffic.

At will, I leave all this and stand alone on mountain tops in Syria, India, or overlooking old Nile's valley, wrapped in the awful grandeur of solemn silence. Here I may bid fallen empires rise and pass in grand procession before my mental vision and live again their little lives: fight once more their battles; begin again each petty struggle for place, for power, for control of the world's affairs; revive their customs: live again their loves and hates, and preach once more their religions and their philosophies—all this the mind may do, and that as easily and as quickly as in thought it may leave this room, cross the street to a neighbor's home, and there take note of the familiar objects within his habitation. Nor does this begin to indicate all the power of the mind in these respects. Though the sun is ninety-two millions of miles away, on the instant, in thought, one may stand upon it within its resplendent atmosphere. In the same manner and with equal ease, one may project himself to the Pole Star, though it is so distant that it requires forty years for a ray of light to pass through the intervening space between that star and our earth, and still light travels at the rate of one hundred and eighty-six thousand miles per second! Nor is the end yet. In like manner and with equal ease one may instantly project himself in thought from within the four walls of his room to those more distant constellations of stars known to exist out in the depths of space, whence it would require a ray of light a million years to reach our earth; yet standing there in a world so distant from ours, one would find himself still centered in the universe, and out beyond him, in a straight line from the earth whence he has traveled, would extend other realms in splendor no less magnificent. From the vasty deep of these realms, he could call up other worlds, and people them with creatures of his thought, as one may call up empires to pass in mighty procession before him in the Nile or in the Ganges valley.

Distance, then, to the mind of man, is as nothing. The infinity of extension, and of duration also, is matched by the infiniteness of man's mind, though that mind has a local habitation and a name within a tabernacle of flesh and bone. This is but a glimpse at the infinite powers of the mind of man in one direction, and under circumstances that somewhat veil the splendor of his intellectual and spiritual glory; what those powers may be in all particulars when man shall be made free from the restricting and depressing environment of the present earth-life, no one may say; but enough may be seen from what is here pointed out to establish the firm belief that, as the intellectual powers in man rise to match the infinitudes of extension and duration, as indicated, so, too, in all other respects shall the mind of man, when free, rise to the harmony of all the infinities that make up the universe. And it is not inconceivable (in view of the great spiritual and intellectual powers even now discernible in him) that the time will come when man will not only be able to project himself in thought to any part of the universe, no matter how distant, but in his future immeasurably exalted state he may project both thought and consciousness equally to all points of the universe at once, steadfastly maintain them there, and thus be all-knowing, everywhere present in thought, in consciousness—in spirit in fact—as God now is; and if, as it is reasonable to believe will be the case, his power equals his knowledge; and his freedom of volition equals his knowledge and his power—then, indeed, will man be a spiritual and intellectual force immanent in the universe, both to will and to do, even as God.

Jesus prayed that his disciples might be one with each other even as he and the Father are one (St. John 17:11); that they all might be one; and as the Father was in Christ, and as Christ was in the Father, so also would Messiah have the disciples to be one in him and in the Father, that they might all be one with the Father and the Son, and with each other, even as the Father and the Son are one (St. John 17; 21,22.) But for the disciples to be "one" with the Father and the Son, in the complete sense in which the Messiah here prayed for that "oneness," necessarily means to be "like" the Father, and that "likeness" can rise to the full height of its perfection only when it reaches equality with those with whom the disciples are to be "one" or "like." If man may not rise to the height of divinity, how shall this prayer of the Christ be realized? Or must we believe that the divine wisdom in the Son of God exercised itself in praying for that which is unattainable, that which is not only absurd but impossible? It is unthinkable that the divine nature shall be brought down to be "one" with men; so that if the "oneness" which also involves "likeness," be realized, in fulfilment of Messiah's prayer, it must be by men rising to divinity, Mr. Van Der Donckt's "impossibilities" to the contrary notwithstanding.

"Behold the Man Has Become as One of Us."

To illustrate his contention that man can never rise to the quality of divinity, Mr. Van Der Donckt indulges in comparisons between man and God; and, to emphasize that contrast, challenges well-known men of science to the exercise of creative powers, contrasts the frequent collisions upon our railroads with the order, regularity, and safety of the movements among the planetary systems where never a collision occurs; and then indulges in such folly as this:

They (astronomers) can indeed predict transits and eclipses; but suppose astronomers from New Zealand, on their way to America to observe this fall's moon eclipse, meet with an accident in mid-ocean, would they at once send this wireless telegram to the United States' stargazers assembled say at Lick Observatory: "Belated by leak. Please retard eclipse two hours that we may not miss it." As well might all the telescope men in the world combined, attempt to fetch down the rings of Saturn for the construction of a royal race track, as pretend to control movements of the heavenly bodies.

The gentleman also points out how precarious are the powers of man:

The helpless babe of yesterday may indeed rival Mozart, Haydn, and Paderewski, but tomorrow he may rise with lame hands and pierced ear-drums; and millions of worshipers of the shattered idol are powerless to restore it to the musical world.

This part of the gentleman's argument sinks far below the general high level of his Reply, and is unworthy of his intelligence. I have already pointed out, that Latter-day Saints do not teach that man in his present state and condition is a God. On the contrary, they admit man's narrowness, weakness, imperfections and limitations; and also recognize the great gulf stretching between man in his present state and that dignity of divinity to which somewhere and sometime in the eternities it is within his province and power to attain. Mr. Van Der Donckt's comparisons, therefore, between God and man, in the latter's present condition, are not in point, for the reason that the Latter-day Saints do not claim that man is now a Deity, only as he may be thought potentially one. Taking the highest type of man to start with, consider him as raised from the dead and hence immortal; give him Gods for guides, teachers, and companions, with the universe for the field of his operations, then let Mr. V. or anyone else, say what man's attainments will be one thousand millions of years hence; and that period, let it be remembered, long as it may seem to man's petty methods of computing duration, is but as a moment in the existence of an immortal being. Let Mr. Van Der Donckt institute his comparisons from that point of man's career, instead of from the present point of man's weakness and mortality, and then say if ultimately divinity seems so unattainable as now. If he shall say he is unable to institute his comparisons at the point proposed, because what man will then be is unknown, I shall agree with him; but let him acknowledge, as perforce he must, that man will be immeasurably advanced beyond what he is now; also let him admit the injustice he does our doctrine by insisting upon making his comparisons between God and man as the latter now stands, under the effects of the fall, and in his humiliation and weakness.

After indulging in the aforesaid comparisons, Mr.V. further remarks:

I fear Mr. B. H. Roberts will be inclined to think God jealous because he gives man no show for comparison with him. This would certainly be a less blunder of the Utah man, ("I will not give my glory to another"—Isaiah 42:8) than his contention, which is a mere echo of Satan's promise in Paradise: "You shall be as Gods." (Genesis 3:5.)

To which I answer, not so; the contention of the "Utah man" is not the echo of Satan's promise, "ye shall be as Gods." On the contrary, the "Utah man's" contention is bottomed on the august and sure word of God, uttered in Eden, when he said of the man Adam—"Behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil" (Genesis 3:22)—a passage which the Reverend gentleman seems to have overlooked.