COUPS DE MAIN.
These are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for the capture of posts of different strength or importance.[[30]] They partake of the nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both these methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a successful issue. Although coups de main seem to be entirely tactical operations, their importance certainly depends on the relations of the captured posts to the strategic combinations in hand. It will become necessary, therefore, to say a few words with reference to coups de main in [Article XXXVI.], when speaking of detachments. However tiresome these repetitions may seem, I am obliged to state here the manner of executing such operations, as it is evidently a part of the subject of the attack of intrenchments.
I do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to these operations; for their name, coups de main, implies that ordinary rules are not applicable to them. I desire only to call attention to them, and refer my readers to the different works, either historical or didactic, where they are mentioned.
I have previously stated that important results may often follow from these enterprises. The capture of Sizeboli in 1828, the unsuccessful attack of General Petrasch upon Kehl in 1796, the remarkable surprises of Cremona in 1702, of Gibraltar in 1704, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1814, as well as the escalades of Port Mahon and Badajos, give an idea of the different kinds of coup de main. Some are effected by surprise, others by open force. Skill, stratagems, boldness, on the part of the assailant, and fear excited among the assailed, are some of the things which have an influence upon the successful issue of coups de main.
As war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is no longer of the same importance as formerly unless it has a direct influence upon the results of a great strategic operation.
The capture or destruction of a bridge defended by intrenchments, that of a large convoy, of a small fort closing important passes, like the two attacks which were made in 1799 upon the fort of Lucisteig in the Grisons; the capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally, the capture of a post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of provisions and munitions much needed by the enemy;—such are the enterprises which will justify the risks to which a detachment engaging in them may be exposed.
Posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes with fascines, sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been used for the same purpose. Ladders are generally necessary, and should always be prepared. Hooks have been used in the hands and attached to the shoes of soldiers, to help them in climbing rocky heights which commanded the intrenchment. An entrance was effected through the sewers at Cremona by Prince Eugene.
In reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but hints; for what has been done once may be done again.
FOOTNOTES:
The number of defenders at Dresden the first day (August 25) was twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and the third day, more than one hundred thousand.
The distinction between the importance and the strength of a post must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very little importance, and vice aversá.