Formation and Employment of Infantry.
Infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service, since it forms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the attack and defense of positions. If we must admit that, next to the genius of the general, the infantry arm is the most valuable instrument in gaining a victory, it is no less true that most important aid is given by the cavalry and artillery, and that without their assistance the infantry might at times be very seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partial success.
We shall not here introduce those old discussions about the shallow and the deep formations, although the question, which was supposed decided, is far from being settled absolutely. The war in Spain and the battle of Waterloo have again given rise to disputes as to the relative advantages of fire and the shallow order, and of columns of attack and the deep order. I will give my own opinion farther on.
There must, however, be no misconception on this subject. The question now is not whether Lloyd was right in wishing to add a fourth rank, armed with pikes, to the infantry formation, with the expectation of producing more effect by the shock when attacking, or opposing a greater resistance when attacked. Every officer of experience knows the difficulty of moving in an orderly manner several deployed battalions in three ranks at close order, and that a fourth rank would increase the disorder without adding any advantage. It is astonishing that Lloyd, who had seen service, should have insisted so much upon the material advantage to be gained by thus increasing the mass of a battalion; for it very rarely happens that such a collision between opposing troops takes place that mere weight decides the contest. If three ranks turn their backs to the enemy, the fourth will not check them. This increase in the number of ranks diminishes the front and the number of men firing upon the defensive, whilst in the offensive there is not near so much mobility as in the ordinary column of attack. It is much more difficult to move eight hundred men in line of battle in four ranks than in three: although in the former case the extent of front is less, the ranks cannot be kept properly closed.
Lloyd's proposal for remedying this diminution of front is so absurd that it is wonderful how a man of talents could have imagined it. He wishes to deploy twenty battalions, and leave between them one hundred and fifty yards, or an interval equal to their front. We may well ask what would befall those battalions thus separated. The cavalry may penetrate the intervals and scatter them like dust before the whirlwind.
But the real question now is, shall the line of battle consist of deployed battalions depending chiefly upon their fire, or of columns of attack, each battalion being formed in column on the central division and depending on its force and impetuosity?
I will now proceed to sum up the particulars bearing upon a decision of the question in hand.
There are, in fact, only five methods of forming troops to attack an enemy:—l, as skirmishers; 2, in deployed lines, either continuous or checkerwise; 3, in lines of battalions formed in column on the central divisions; 4, in deep masses; 5, in small squares.
The skirmishing-order is an accessory; for the duties of skirmishers are, not to form the line of battle, but to cover it by taking advantage of the ground, to protect the movements of columns, to fill up intervals, and to defend the skirts of a position.
These different manners of formation are, therefore, reducible to four: the shallow order, where the line is deployed in three ranks; the half-deep order, formed of a line of battalions in columns doubled on the center or in battalion squares; the mixed order, where regiments are partly in line and partly in column; finally, the deep order, composed of heavy columns of battalions deployed one behind the other.
FIG. 29. [[46]]
Deployed in order of two lines.
The formation into two deployed lines with a reserve was formerly used to a great extent: it is particularly suitable on the defensive. These deployed lines may either be continuous, ([Fig. 29],) or checkerwise, or in echelons.
Fig. 30.
Twelve battalions in columns of attack in two lines, with skirmishers in the intervals.
A more compact order is shown in [Fig. 30], where each battalion is formed into a column of attack, being by divisions upon the central division. It is really a line of small columns
In the three-rank formation, a battalion with four divisions[[47]] will have twelve ranks in such a column as shown above: there are in this way too many non-combatants, and the column presents too good a mark for the artillery. To remedy in part these inconveniences, it has been proposed, whenever infantry is employed in columns of attack, to form it in two ranks, to place only three divisions of a battalion one behind the other, and to spread out the fourth as skirmishers in the intervals of the battalions and upon the flanks: when the cavalry charges, these skirmishers may rally behind the other three divisions. ([See Fig. 31].) Each battalion would thus have two hundred more men to fire, besides those thrown into the two front ranks from the third. There would be, also, an increase of the whole front. By this arrangement, while having really a depth of but six men, there would be a front of one hundred men, and four hundred men who could discharge their fire-arms, for each battalion. Force and mobility would both be obtained.[[48]] A battalion of eight hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of four divisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which the first alone—and only two ranks of that—discharge their pieces. Bach battalion would deliver, therefore, one hundred and twenty shots at a volley, whilst formed in the manner shown in [Fig. 31] it would deliver four hundred.