INTRENCHED LINES.
Besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred to above, there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, and is in a measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it is intended to protect a part of the frontiers.
As a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge for an army, be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the system of intrenched lines absurd. I do not now refer to lines of small extent closing a narrow gorge, like Fussen and Scharnitz, for they may be regarded as forts; but I speak of extended lines many leagues in length and intended to wholly close a part of the frontiers. For instance, those of Wissembourg, which, covered by the Lauter flowing in front, supported by the Rhine on the right and the Vosges on the left, seemed to fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they were forced on every occasion when they were assailed.
The lines of Stollhofen, which on the right of the Rhine played the same part as those of Wissembourg on the left, were equally unfortunate; and those of the Queich and the Kinzig had the same fate.
The lines of Turin, (1706,) and those of Mayence, (1795,) although intended as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to the lines in question in their extent and in the fate which befell them. However well they may be supported by natural obstacles, their great extent paralyzes their defenders, and they are almost always susceptible of being turned. To bury an army in intrenchments, where it may be outflanked and surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is manifest folly; and it is to be hoped that we shall never see another instance of it. Nevertheless, in our chapter on Tactics we will treat of their attack and defense.
It may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these extended lines, it would be equally foolish to neglect the advantages to be derived from detached works in increasing the strength of a besieging force, the safety of a position, or the defense of a defile.
FOOTNOTES:
The memorable campaign of 1829 is evidence of the value of such a system. If the Porte had possessed masonry forts in the defiles of the Balkan and a good fortress toward Faki, the Russians would not have reached Adrianople, and the affair would not have been so simple.
Still, Napoleon was right in taking the offensive in the Frioul, since the Austrians were expecting a reinforcement from the Rhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly important to beat the Archduke Charles before this force joined him. In view of the circumstances of the case, Napoleon's conduct was in accordance with the principles of war.