The Dardanelles.
Mr. Churchill asked if the War Council attached importance to the proposed Dardanelles operations, which undoubtedly involved risks.
Lord Fisher said that he had understood that this question was not to be raised at this meeting. The Prime Minister knew his (Lord Fisher’s) views on the subject.
The Prime Minister said that, in view of what had already been done, the question could not be left in abeyance.
(Note.—Thereupon Lord Fisher left the Council table. He was followed by Lord Kitchener, who asked him what he intended to do. Lord Fisher replied to Lord Kitchener that he would not return to the Council table, and would resign his office as First Sea Lord. Lord Kitchener then pointed out to Lord Fisher that he (Lord Fisher) was the only dissentient, and that the Dardanelles operations had been decided upon by the Prime Minister; and he urged on Lord Fisher that his duty to his country was to go on carrying out the duties of First Sea Lord. After further talk Lord Fisher reluctantly gave in to Lord Kitchener and went back to the Council table.[9])
The First Sea Lord. By William Nicholson.
Mr. Churchill stated that the ultimate object of the Navy was to obtain access to the Baltic. There were, he said, three Naval phases:—
1st phase.—The clearing of the outer seas (this had been accomplished).
2nd phase.—The clearing of the North Sea.
3rd phase.—The clearing of the Baltic.
Mr. Churchill laid stress on the importance of the third phase and said this latter operation was of great importance, as Germany always had been, and still was, very nervous of an attack from the Baltic. For this purpose special vessels were required, and the First Sea Lord (Lord Fisher) had designed cruisers, &c., &c.[10] The meeting was adjourned to 6.30 the same evening.
10th Meeting of War Council (same day), January 28th, 1915, at 6.30 p.m.
The plan of a naval attack on Zeebrugge was abandoned and the Dardanelles operations were decided upon.
11th Meeting of War Council, February 9th, 1915.
Mr. Churchill reported that the Naval attack on the Dardanelles would take place on February 15th. (This was afterwards postponed until February 19th.)
12th Meeting of War Council, February 16th, 1915.
Agreed that the 29th Division should be sent to the Dardanelles and other arrangements made to support the Naval attack on the Dardanelles.
The Admiralty were authorised and pressed to build or obtain special craft for landing 50,000 men wherever a landing might be required.
13th Meeting of War Council, February 19th, 1915.
Transports ordered to be got ready:—
1. To convey troops from Egypt to the Dardanelles;
2. To convey the 29th Division from England to the Dardanelles,
but no final decision to be taken as to 29th Division.
14th Meeting of War Council, February 24th, 1915.
General Birdwood selected to join Admiral Carden before the Dardanelles.
The decision as to sending 29th Division postponed.
15th Meeting of War Council, February 26th, 1915.
Mr. Churchill said he could not offer any assurance of success in the Dardanelles attack.
16th Meeting of War Council, March 3rd, 1915.
The future of Constantinople was discussed, and what should be the next step after the Dardanelles. Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law, besides Mr. Balfour, were present.
17th Meeting of War Council, March 10th, 1915.
The War Office was directed to prepare a memorandum on the strategical advantages of Alexandretta.
18th Meeting of War Council, March 19th, 1915.
The sinking of the battleships “Irresistible,” “Ocean,” and “Bouvet,” the running ashore of “Gaulois” and the disablement of “Inflexible,” were discussed.
The continuance of naval operations against Dardanelles was authorised if the Admiral at the Dardanelles agreed.
Lord Fisher said that it was impossible to explain away the sinking of four battleships. He had always said that a loss of 12 battleships must be expected before the Dardanelles could be forced by the Navy alone. He still adhered to this view.
Note.—There was no meeting of the War Council from March 19th to May 14th.
19th Meeting of War Council, May 14th, 1915.
Mr. Churchill reported that one, or perhaps two, German submarines had arrived in the Eastern Mediterranean, and that the attack on the Dardanelles had now become primarily a military rather than a naval operation. It had been decided to recall the “Queen Elizabeth.” Mr. Churchill stated that if it had been known three months ago that an army of from 80,000 to 100,000 men would now be available for the attack on the Dardanelles the naval attack would never have been undertaken.
Lord Fisher reminded the War Council that he had been no party to the Dardanelles operations. When the matter was first under consideration he had stated his opinion to the Prime Minister at a private interview.
Conclusion.—Lord Kitchener to send a telegram to Sir Ian Hamilton asking what military force he would require in order to ensure success at the Dardanelles.
Note.—On the evening of this day Mr. Churchill drafted orders for further naval reinforcements for the Dardanelles, a course to which Lord Fisher could not assent.
(This led to Lord Fisher leaving the Admiralty.)
A Note on the Dardanelles Operations.
Major-General Sir Chas. Caldwell, K.C.B., was Director of Military Operations at the War Office during the whole period of the inception, incubation and execution of the Dardanelles adventure, and in an article in the “Nineteenth Century” for March, 1919, he completely disposes of the criticisms of Mr. G. A. Schreiner in his book “From Berlin to Bagdad,” and of those of Mr. H. Morgenthau, the late United States Ambassador at Constantinople, in his recent book, “The Secrets of the Bosphorus.” Both these works convey the impression that the general attack by the Fleet upon the Defences of the Narrows on March 18th, 1915, very nearly succeeded. This verdict is not justified by the facts as certified by Sir C. Caldwell. He proves incontestably that, even in the very unlikely case of indirect bombardment really effecting its object in putting the batteries out of action, there would still be the movable armament of the Turks left to worry and defeat the mine-sweepers, and there would still be the drifting mines and possibly the torpedoes fired from the shore to imperil the battleships. When peace did come it occupied the British Admiral a very long time to sweep up the mines. The damaging effect of Naval Bombardment was over-estimated—the extent to which the enemy’s movable armament would interfere with mine-sweeping was not realised, and the extent and efficiency of the minefields were unknown and unheeded. Sir Charles Caldwell says:
“The whole thing was a mistake, quite apart from the disastrous influence which the premature and unsuccessful operation exerted over the subsequent land campaign.”
It is also most true what Sir C. Caldwell says that “the idea at the back of the sailors’ minds (who so reluctantly assented to the political desire of getting possession of the Straits) was that it was an experiment which could always be instantly stopped if the undertaking were to be found too difficult.” But alas! “the view of the War Council came to be that they could not now abandon the adventure.”
* * * * *
Marshal Liman von Sanders, who had charge of the defence of the Dardanelles, said:
“The attack on the Straits by the Navy alone I don’t think could ever have succeeded. I proposed to flood the Straits broadcast with mines, and it was my view that these were the main defences of the Dardanelles, and that the function of the guns of the forts was simply to protect the minefields from interference.”
The evidence given by Captain (now Rear-Admiral Sir) William Reginald Hall, R.N., Director of Naval Intelligence, at the Dardanelles Inquiry, conflicts with the facts as afterwards made known to us; and no doubt this led to such official speeches as were made of our being so near victory at the Dardanelles—speeches which caused the further great sacrifice of life which took place after General Sir Charles Munro, the present Commander-in-Chief in India, had definitely and without any equivocation officially reported that the Evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula should immediately take place.
Field Marshal Lord Nicholson asked Captain Hall, R.N., how far the Gallipoli Peninsula was under German control; and his answer was that it was known that the defences had been inspected by a German and that many Germans were arriving there, whereas it is a matter of fact stated by General Liman von Sanders and confirmed from other sources that the Germans were in complete control; and it took the British Admiral many weeks after the Armistice, helped by the Turks, to clear a way through the mines for his Flagship to take him to Constantinople. At question 4930 Captain Hall stated his spies made him convinced that he could have pushed through with only the loss of one or more ships and got to Constantinople on March 18th.