THE QUESTION OF MONTENEGRO’S INDEPENDENCE

Same speech delivered in the Chamber, 21st June 1921.

Hon. Mussolini. What is going to be our line of policy in view of the vast field for disagreement which has been left by the peace treaty, or rather peace treaties, all over the world?

I shall not touch upon the quarrel between Greece and Turkey, although inconceivable complications may result if it is true, as is said, that Lenin is an ally of Kemal Pasha and has already despatched the advance guard of the Red army to Asia Minor. Neither shall I speak of Upper Silesia, as I have not yet succeeded in defining the attitude of the Government on this question. Egypt, again, I shall leave untouched. But I cannot hold my peace about the fate prepared for Montenegro.

How is it that Montenegro has lost her independence? In theory she has not lost it, but actually she lost it in October 1918. And yet Count Sforza said that the independence of Montenegro was completely guaranteed, first by the Treaty of London of 1915, which presupposed her aggrandisement at the expense of Austria and the restitution of Scutari; secondly, by the conditions laid down by Wilson for the Allies, which safeguarded her existence with that of Belgium and Serbia; and thirdly, by the decision of the Supreme Council of the Conference of January 1919, in which the right of Montenegro to be represented by a Delegate at the Paris Peace Conference was recognised. Not only this, but when Franchet d’Esperey entered Montenegro with Serb and French elements, he gave out that he was governing in the name of King Nicholas.

When, however, King Nicholas, the Court and the Government wished to return to Cettinge, France, in whose interest it was to create a powerful Yugoslavia to counterbalance Italy in the Adriatic, informed the Montenegrin Government that she would have broken off all diplomatic relations had they done so.

What attitude did Italy adopt in this difficult situation? The Hon. Federzoni spoke yesterday of a Convention that became a scrap of paper; and it was this Convention of 30th April 1919. In it the relations between Italy and Montenegro are clearly established. And this is what it says: “Following upon the agreement made between the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Government of Montenegro” (so there was a Government still in 1919), “represented by their Consul General at Rome, Commander Ramanadovich, the Montenegrin Government will form a nucleus of officers and troops, drawn from the Montenegrin refugees, and will receive from the Italian Government the necessary funds in money for the payment of the allowances of the officers and men.” Other conditions follow, the last being: “The present Convention cannot be altered without the common consent of both the Italian and Montenegrin Governments.”

Now this Convention was destroyed after the death of King Nicholas. Signs of disaffection were noticed among the Montenegrin troops, and the commander asked for military aid from our Government, in order to proceed to the work of elimination. A Commission was appointed, presided over by Colonel Vigevano. This commission, which was to save the Montenegrin army, was the chief cause of its disbandment. And not only this—on 27th May the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs told the Montenegrin Government that the troops must be disbanded or no more funds would be forthcoming from Italy. And in this way the Convention of 30th April 1919 was violated, because in it it had been said that no alteration was to be made without the common consent of the two Governments, and this decision had never been accepted by the consul general at Rome, who represented the Montenegrin Government. The fact is that the Italian Minister had made use of the presence of the Montenegrin army in Italy for political purposes, thinking thereby to obtain better terms with Yugoslavia. This expectation not being realised, the Montenegrin army, at a given moment, was cast aside like a worn-out coat. The fact of the election of the Constituent does not justify the tragic state of abandonment in which Italy left Montenegro, because only twenty per cent. of the electors voted, and of those only nine per cent. in favour of annexation by Serbia. The Serbian authorities have introduced a real reign of terror in Montenegro and have prevented the presentation of lists which might contain the names of candidates favourable to the independence of the country.

But I hope Count Sforza will not think that the question of Montenegro is a thing of the past. First, as he knows, the Montenegrin people are still in arms against the Serbs, and secondly, the Italian people are unanimous as regards this question. Even the Socialists, and I say it to their honour, have several times declared in their papers that the independence of Montenegro is sacred. The Universities of Padua and Bologna have pronounced in favour of her independence, while the Fascisti have presented a motion to this effect.

The shameful page which signs the death warrant of the Montenegrin people must be redeemed by the adoption of our motion, because if you bring the question once more before the Great Powers, so that another plebiscite be summoned, I am certain that, under conditions of liberty, anti-Serbian results will be returned.