VETO MESSAGES.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 26, 1890.
To the House of Representatives:
I return herewith without my approval the bill (H.R. 7170) "to authorize the city of Ogden, Utah, to assume an increased indebtedness,"
The purpose and effect of this bill is to relieve the city of Ogden from the limitation imposed by the act of July 30, 1886, upon all municipal corporations in the Territories as to the indebtedness which they may lawfully contract. The general law fixes the limit of 4 per cent upon the last assessment for taxation; this bill extends the limit as to the city of Ogden to 8 per cent. The purposes for which this legislation is asked are not peculiar or exceptional. They relate to schools, street improvements, and to sewerage, and are common to every prosperous and growing town and city. If the argument by which this measure is supported is adopted, the conclusion should be a repeal or modification of the general law; but in my opinion the limitation imposed by the act of 1886 is wise and wholesome and should not be relaxed.
The report of the governor of Utah for 1889 states the population of Ogden to be 15,000, the valuation for taxation $7,000,000, and the existing indebtedness $100,000. It will be noticed that under the existing limit the city has power to increase its indebtedness $180,000, which would seem to be enough to make a good beginning in the construction of sewers, while the cost of street improvements is usually met in large part by direct assessment upon the property benefited.
It is assumed in the report of the House committee that any city in the States similarly situated "would have the making of the needed improvements within its own power," while the fact is that almost all of our States have either by their constitutions or statutes limited the power of municipal corporations to incur indebtedness, and the limit is generally lower than that fixed by the act regulating this matter in the Territories. A large city debt retards growth and in the end defeats the purpose of those who think by mortgaging the future to attract population and property. I do not doubt that the citizens of Ogden will ultimately realize that the creation of a municipal debt of over half a million dollars by a city of 15,000 population—being $37 per capita—is unwise.
BENJ. HARRISON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 29, 1890.
To the House of Representatives:
I return without my approval the bill (H.R. 848) "to authorize the construction of an addition to the public building in Dallas, Tex."
The bill authorizes the construction of a wing or addition to the present public building at a cost of $200,000. I find that the bill as originally introduced by the member representing the Congressional district in which Dallas is situated fixed $100,000 as the limit of the proposed expenditure, and it was so reported from the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds after conferring with the Supervising Architect of the Treasury. A bill of the same tenor was introduced in the Senate by one of the Senators from that State, fixing the same limit of expenditure.
The public building at Dallas, for which a first appropriation of $75,000 was made in 1882, subsequently increased to $125,000, was only completed in 1889. It is probably inadequate now to the convenient transaction of business, chiefly in that part assigned to the Post-Office Department. The material and architectural style of any addition are fixed by the present building and its ground area by the available unoccupied space, as no provision is made for buying additional ground. The present building is 85 by 56 feet, and Mr. John S. Witwer, the postmaster and the custodian of the building, writing to the Supervising Architect, advises that to meet the present and prospective needs of the Government an addition at least two-thirds as large as the present building should be provided. It will be seen from the following extract from a letter of the Supervising Architect to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, dated February 17, 1890, that a building larger than that suggested can be erected within the limit of $100,000. He says:
From computations made in this office based upon data received it is found that an extension or wing about 40 by 85 feet in dimensions, three stories high, with basement, giving 3,400 square feet, in addition to the 4,760 square feet of the first-floor area of the building, of fireproof construction, can be erected on the present site within the limit of cost proposed by said bill, namely, $100,000.
It may be possible that an expenditure of $325,000 for a public building at Dallas, if the questions of site, material, and architecture were all undetermined, could be defended, but under existing conditions I do not see how an appropriation of $200,000 can be justified when one-half that sum is plainly adequate to such relief as the present site allows.
The legislation for the erection of public buildings has not proceeded, so far as I can trace it, upon any general rules. Neither population nor the extent of the public business transacted has always indicated the points where public buildings should first be built or the cost of the structures. It can not be expected that, in the absence of some general law, the committees of Congress having charge of such matters will proceed in their recommendations upon strict or equal lines. The bills are individual, and if comparisons are attempted the necessary element of probable future growth is made to cover all apparent inequalities. It will be admitted, I am sure, that only a public need should suggest the expenditure of the public money, and that if all such needs can not be at once supplied the most general and urgent should have the preference.
I am not unfriendly to a liberal annual expenditure for the erection of public buildings where the safe and convenient transaction of the public business demands it and the state of the revenues will permit. It would be wiser, in my opinion, to build more and less costly houses and to fix by general law the amount of the annual expenditure for this purpose and some order of preference between the cities asking for public buildings.
But in view of the pending legislation looking to a very large reduction of our revenues and of the urgency and necessity of a large increase in our expenditures in certain directions, I am of the opinion that appropriations for the erection of public buildings and all kindred expenditures should be kept at the minimum until the effect of other probable legislation can be accurately measured.
The erection of a public building is largely a matter of local interest and convenience, while expenditures for enlarged relief and recognition to the soldiers and sailors of the war for the preservation of the Union, for necessary coast defenses, and for the extension of our commerce with other American States are of universal interest and involve considerations, not of convenience, but of justice, honor, safety, and general prosperity.
BENJ. HARRISON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 4, 1890.
To the Senate of the United States:
I return without my approval the bill (S. 1306) "for the erection of a public building at Hudson, N.Y." Hudson, from the best information attainable, is a city of only a little more than 10,000 population. If the postal receipts are a fair indication of the growth of the city, it has not been rapid, as they only increased about $4,000 in ten years. The gross postal receipts for the year 1888 were but $14,809, and the office force consists of three clerks and five carriers. There are no other Government officers at Hudson entitled under the law to offices or to an allowance for rent, unless it be a deputy collector of internal revenue.
It appears from the bill and the correspondence with the Supervising Architect that it is proposed to erect a two-story building, with fireproof vaults, heating and ventilating apparatus, and elevators, 40 by 80 feet in dimensions. The ground-floor area of 3,200 feet, to be devoted to the post-office, would give 400 square feet to each of the present employees. The second story and the basement, each having the same area, will be absolutely tenantless, unless authority is given by law to the custodian to rent the rooms to unofficial tenants. It seems to me to be very clear that the public needs do not suggest or justify such an expenditure as is contemplated by this bill.
BENJ. HARRISON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 12, 1890.
To the House of Representatives:
I return without my approval the bill (H.R. 7175) to provide for the purchase of a site and the erection of a public building thereon at Tuscaloosa, in the State of Alabama.
Judged by its postal revenues and by the force employed in the office, the post-office at Tuscaloosa is not an important one. It has one clerk, at a salary of $450, and no carriers. The report of the Postmaster-General shows that the gross receipts for the year 1888 were $6,379 and the net revenue less than $4,000. The annual receipts have only increased about $3,000 in ten years. The rent now paid for a building affording 2,200 square feet of floor space is $275.
A general proposition to erect public buildings at this scale of expense in cities of the size of Tuscaloosa would not, I am sure, receive the sanction of Congress. It would involve the expenditure for buildings of ten times the present net revenues of such offices, and in the case under consideration would involve an increased cost for fuel, lights, and care greater than the rent now paid for the use of a room of ample size. I would not insist that it must always be shown that a proposed public building would yield an interest upon the investment, but in the present uncertain state of the public revenues and expenditures, resulting from pending and probable legislation, there is, in my opinion, an absolute necessity that expenditures for public buildings should be limited to cases where the public needs are very evident and very imperative. It is clear that this is not such a case.
BENJ. HARRISON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 17, 1890.
To the Senate of the United States:
I return without my approval the bill (S. 1762) "to change the boundaries of the Uncompahgre Reservation."
This bill proposes to separate from the Ute Indian Reservation in Utah and restore to the public domain two ranges of townships along the east side of the reservation and bordering the Colorado State line. It is said that these lands are wholly worthless to the Indians for cultivation or for grazing purposes, and it must follow, I think, that they are equally worthless for such purposes to white men.
The object, then, of this legislation is to be sought not in any public demand for these lands for the use of settlers—for if they are susceptible of that use the Indians have a clear equity to take allotments upon them—but in that part of the bill which confirms the mineral entries, or entries for mineral uses, which have been unlawfully made "or attempted to be made on said lands." It is evidently a private and not a public end that is to be promoted. It does not follow, of course, that this private end may not be wholly meritorious and the relief sought on behalf of these persons altogether just and proper. The facts, as I am advised, are that upon these lands there are veins or beds of asphaltum or gilsonite supposed to be of very great value.
Entries have been made in that vicinity, but upon public lands, which lands have been resold for very large amounts. It is not important, perhaps, that the United States should in parting with these lands realize their value, but it is essential, I think, that favoritism should have no part in connection with the sales. The bill confirms all attempted entries of these mineral lands at the price of $20 per acre (a price that is suggestive of something unusual) without requiring evidence of the expenditure of any money upon the claim, or even proof that the claimant was the discoverer of the deposits.
The bill requires "good faith," but it will be next to impossible for the officers of the Interior Department to show actual knowledge on the part of the claimant of the lines of the reservation. The case will practically be as to this matter in the hands of the claimant. But why should good faith at the moment of attempting the entry, without any requirement of expenditure, and followed, it may be, within twenty-four hours by actual notice that he was upon a reservation, give an advantage in the sale of these lands that may represent a very large sum of money?
In the second place, I do not think it wise, without notice even to the Indians, to segregate these lands from their reservation. It is true, I think, that they hold these lands by an Executive order, with a contract right to take allotments upon them, and that the lands in question are not likely to be sought as an allotment by any Indian. But the Indians have been placed on this reservation and its boundaries explained to them, and to take these lands in this manner is calculated to excite their distrust and fears, and possibly to create serious trouble.
BENJ. HARRISON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 20, 1890.
To the House of Representatives:
I return without my approval the bill (H.R. 3934) "to authorize the board of supervisors of Maricopa County, Ariz., to issue certain bonds in aid of the construction of a certain railroad."
This bill proposes to confer authority upon the supervisors of the county of Maricopa to issue county bonds at the rate of $4,000 per mile in aid of a railroad to be constructed from Phoenix northwardly to the county line, a distance estimated at 50 miles, but probably somewhat longer. The bill seems to have passed the House of Representatives under an entire misapprehension of its true scope and effect. In the brief report submitted by the Committee on Territories it is said that "by the terms of the bill the county receives bonds in payment of the money proposed to be advanced," and in the course of the debate the Delegate from Arizona mistakenly stated in response to a request for information that the bill proposed a loan by the county, in exchange for which it was to receive the bonds of the railroad company. In fact, the bill does not provide for a loan to be secured by bonds, but for a subscription of stock. How far this mistake may have affected the passage of the bill can not of course be known.
The bill does not submit the question of granting this aid to a vote of the people of the county, but confers direct authority upon the supervisors to issue the bonds. It is said, however, that in April, 1889, an election was held to obtain the views of the people upon the question. It does not appear from any papers submitted to me who were the managers of this so-called election; what notice, if any, was given; what qualifications on the part of voters were insisted upon, if any, or in what form the question was presented. There was no law providing for such an election. Being wholly voluntary, the election was, of course, under the management of those who favored the subsidy, and was conducted without any legal restraints as to the voting or certification. I have asked for a statement of the vote by precincts, and have been given what purports to be the vote at twelve points. The total affirmative vote given was 1,975 and the negative 134. But of the affirmative vote 1,543 were given at Phoenix and 188 at Tempe, a town very near to Phoenix. If there were no other objections to this bill, I should deem this alone sufficient, that no provision is made for submitting to a vote of the people at an election, after due notice and under the sanction of law, the question whether this subscription shall be made.
But again, the bill proposes to suspend for this case two provisions of the act of Congress of July 30, 1886—first, that provision which forbids municipal corporations from subscribing to the stock of other corporations or loaning their credit to such corporations, and, second, that provision which forbids any municipal corporation from creating a debt in excess of 4 per cent of its taxable property as fixed by the last assessment. The condition of things then existing in Arizona had not a little to do with the enactment by Congress of this law, intended to give to the people of the Territories that protection against oppressive municipal debts which was secured to the people of most of the States by constitutional limitations. The wisdom of this legislation is not contested by the friends of this bill, but they claim that the circumstances here are so peculiar as to justify this exception. I do not think so. In the States the limitation upon municipal indebtedness is usually placed in the constitution, in order that it may be inflexible. If a showing of need, gain, or advantage is to overcome the barrier, then it is scarcely worth while to declare a limitation. Only a belief that the limit is inflexible will promote care and economy in administration. If this bill becomes a law, how can Congress refuse to any county in any of the Territories the right to subscribe to the stock of a railroad company, especially where the subscription would not exceed the debt limit, upon a showing of the advantages of better and cheaper communications?
Maricopa County is one of great extent. Its northern boundary is 95 miles long, its southern boundary 66, its eastern 45, and its western 102. This great area is to be taxed to construct a road which can, in the nature of things, be of advantage to but a fraction of it. There is no unity of interest or equality of advantage. It may very well be that a section of these lands along the line of the road, and especially town lots in Phoenix, would have an added value much greater than the increased burden imposed, but it is equally clear that much property in the county will receive no appreciable benefit.
The existing bonded indebtedness of Maricopa County is $272,000; the tax assessment of the county is about $5,000,000, and the population is estimated, by multiplying the vote cast in 1888 by 6, at about 12,000. It will be seen that the bonded debt, to say nothing of a floating debt, which is said to be small, is already largely in excess of the legal limit, and it is proposed to increase it by a subscription that will certainly involve $200,000, and possibly $250,000. If the bill becomes a law, the bonded indebtedness will very closely approximate 10 per cent of the assessed valuation of the property of the county.
The condition of things in the county of Yavapai, lying immediately north of Maricopa, and through which this road is also to run, though not directly affected by this legislation, is very instructive in this connection.
By an act of the legislature of Arizona passed the year before the act of Congress to which I have referred Yavapai County was authorized to subscribe $4,000 per mile to this line of road. The total length of the road in the county was 147 miles, and 74 miles, to Prescott, have been constructed. The secretary of the Territory, in response to an inquiry, states the debt of Yavapai County at $563,000 and the assessment for taxation at "between six and seven millions." There are 73 miles of road yet to be built from the present terminus, Prescott, to the south line of the county, for which Yavapai County must make a further issue of bonds of $292,000, making a total county debt of $855,000, or above 13 per cent upon the taxable assessment (taking that at $6,500,000), and a per capita county debt of nearly $85, taking the population at about 10,600, as stated in the report of the Senate committee. Surely no one will insist that the true and permanent prosperity of these communities will be promoted by loading their energies and their industries with these great debts. I feel the force of the suggestion that the freight charges now imposed upon the farm and orchard products of Maricopa County by the railroads now in operation are oppressive. But this bill does not afford much relief even in that direction. There would be but one competing point, viz, Phoenix. At all other points on the proposed road the people would be subject to the exaction of just such rates as are demanded by the other lines. If this bill contained some effective provision to secure reasonable freight rates to the people who are to be taxed to build the road, it would go far to secure my favorable consideration for it.
I have carefully examined the reports of the committees and every argument that has been submitted to me by the friends of the bill, but I can not bring myself to believe that the permanent welfare of the communities affected by it will be promoted by its passage.
BENJ. HARRISON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, July 9, 1890.
To the House of Representatives:
I return herewith without my approval the bill (H.R. 5974) entitled "An act extending the time of payment to purchasers of land of the Omaha tribe of Indians in Nebraska, and for other purposes."
The United States holds the legal title of these lands, which have been sold for the benefit of the Omaha Indians to secure the unpaid purchase money, the time of payment of which it is proposed by this act to extend. There is no objection that I know of, either on the part of the United States or of the Indians, to the extension of the unpaid installments due from purchasers. This relief is probably due to the purchasers. The bill, however, contains the following provision:
That all the lands the payment for which is hereby extended shall be subject to taxation in all respects by and in the State of Nebraska as if fully paid for and patents issued.
Now, while it is entirely proper that the interest of the purchasers in these lands should share the burdens of the communities in which the lands are located, the title of the United States and the beneficial interest of the Indians in the lands should not be subjected to sale for the delinquency of the purchasers in paying tax assessments levied upon the lands. The effect of the provision which has been quoted would, in my opinion, give to the purchaser at a tax sale a title superior to the lien of the Government for purchase money. The bill should have contained a proviso that only the interest of the purchasers from the Government could be sold for taxes, and that the tax sale should be subject to the lien of the United States for unpaid purchase money.
BENJ. HARRISON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, September 30, 1890.
To the House of Representatives:
I return herewith without my approval the joint resolution (H. Res. No. 39) declaring the retirement of Captain Charles B. Stivers, of the United States Army, legal and valid, and that he is entitled as such officer to his pay.
Captain Stivers was dismissed the service summarily by order of the President on July 15, 1863. A subsequent examination into the causes leading to this action seems to have satisfied the President that an injustice had been done to the officer, and on the 11th day of August, 1863, an order was issued revoking the order of dismissal and restoring Captain Stivers to duty as an officer of the Army. On December 30, 1864, by a proper order from the War Department, after examination, Captain Stivers was placed upon the retired list of the Army.
The Supreme Court has decided in the case of The United States vs. Corson (114 U.S. Reports, 619):
First. That at the time of the issuance of the order of dismissal the President had authority under the law to summarily dismiss an officer, and that the effect of such an order was absolutely to separate the officer from the service.
Second. That having been thus separated from the service he could not be restored except by nomination to the Senate and its advice and consent to the appointment.
Mr. Garland, as Attorney-General, gave an opinion to the Secretary of War in the case of Captain Stivers, based upon the decision of the Supreme Court to which I have referred, holding that Captain Stivers was not an officer on the retired list of the Army. The present Attorney-General, with whom I have conferred, takes the same view of the law. Indeed, the decision of the Supreme Court to which I have referred is so exactly in point that there can be no doubt as to the law of the case. It is undoubtedly competent for Congress by act or joint resolution to authorize the President, by and with the advice of the Senate, to appoint Captain Stivers to be a captain in the Army of the United States and to place him upon the retired list. It is also perfectly competent by suitable legislation for Congress to give to this officer the pay of his grade during the interval of time when he was improperly carried upon the army lists. But the joint resolution which I herewith return does not attempt to deal with the case in that way. It undertakes to declare that the retirement of Captain Stivers was legal and valid and that he always has been and is entitled to his pay as such officer. I do not think this is a competent method of giving the relief intended. The retirement under the law as it then existed was not legal and valid, as the highest judicial tribunal under the Constitution has declared, for the reason that Captain Stivers was not then an officer on the active list. That being so, it follows, of course, that he was not entitled to draw the pay of an office he did not hold.
The relief should have taken the form usual in such cases, which is to authorize the appointment of the officer to a place made for him on the retired list.
BENJ. HARRISON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, October 1, 1890.
To the Senate:
I return to the Senate without my approval the bill (S. 473) "for the relief of the Portland Company, of Portland, Me."
This bill confers upon the Court of Claims jurisdiction to inquire into and determine how much certain steam machinery built for the United States under contract, and to be used in the vessels Agawam and Pontoosuc, cost the contractors over and above the contract price and any allowances for extra work which have been made, and requires the court to enter judgment in favor of the claimant for the excess of cost above such contract price and allowances.
The bill differs from others which have been presented to me, and one of which I have approved, in that it does not make the further allowance to the contractors contingent upon the fact that the additional expense was the result of the acts of the Government through its officers' causing delays and increased cost in the construction of the work.
The bill in effect directs the court to ignore the contract entirely, except as payments under it are to be treated as credits, and to allow the contractors the cost of the work, and that without reference to their own negligence or want of skill in executing the work. There would seem to be no object in the Government's making a contract for work if the contract is only to be binding upon the parties in the event that the contractor realizes a profit.
I can not give my approval to the proposition applied here, which if allowed here should be given general application, that every contractor with the Government who during the early days of the war failed to realize, by reason of increase in the cost of labor and materials, a profit upon the contract shall now have access to the Court of Claims to recover upon the quantum meruit the cost of the work.
BENJ. HARRISON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, October 1, 1890.
To the Senate:
I return without my approval Senate bill No. 1857, "for the relief of Charles P. Chouteau, survivor of Chouteau, Harrison & Valle."
This claim has been once presented to the Court of Claims and fully heard. This bill authorizes a rehearing. I find upon examination that every fact connected with the case necessary to the determination of the question whether the claim should be appropriated for has already been found and stated by the Court of Claims in a published opinion. Judgment was given against the claimant upon the ground that a settlement had been made and a receipt given in full. If in the opinion of Congress this receipt, given under the circumstances which accompanied it, should not be held a bar to such further appropriation as is equitable, all the facts have been found that can be necessary to determine the question what further payment should be made to the contractors. There can be no reason, as it seems to me, for a retrial of the case in the Court of Claims in the absence of any showing of newly discovered evidence. The result would only differ from the result already obtained in that under the bill which I return the court would enter a judgment instead of a finding, and the judgment could only be paid after Congressional action.
The finding which has already been made, as I have said, is a complete basis for any such action as Congress may think should be taken in the premises.
BENJ. HARRISON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, October 7, 1890.
To the Senate:
I return without my approval the bill (S. 3830) "to prohibit bookmaking of any kind and pool selling in the District of Columbia for the purpose of gaming."
My objection to the bill is that it does not prohibit bookmaking and pool selling, but, on the contrary, expressly saves from the operation of its prohibitions and penalties the Washington Jockey Club "and any other regular organizations owning race tracks no less than 1 mile in length," etc.
If this form of gambling is to be prohibited, as I think it should be, the penalties should include all persons and all places.
BENJ. HARRISON.