REGULATION
By the twentieth century, however, the hypnotic spell of the private enterprise creed over at least the middle and lower economic classes was beginning to weaken. The American public was developing a sullen and by no means silent antipathy—in some sections seemingly congenital—to the great national corporations. The storm had burst first upon the railroads; and when in 1906 the Hepburn Act gave the Interstate Commerce Commission definitely increased powers over the railroads, with commendable logic the express companies were coupled with the railroads in the scope of the law. All express tariffs had to be filed with the Commission. No change could be made in a tariff except after thirty days' notice. A uniform system of accounts could be and soon was ordered by the Commission. The Commission was given access to all the books and records of the companies. And, of especial significance, upon complaint express rates could be fixed by the Commission, subject to review by Federal courts.
The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 went even further. Among its other provisions, the burden of proof on rates was shifted to the express companies and the Commission was given power to initiate, of its own volition, express rate rulings which not much later became subject to review only by the Supreme Court of the United States. Power over the classification of express traffic was also specifically given to the Commission. The Commission immediately utilized its new powers to inaugurate a searching investigation of every aspect of the express business, with the result that on February 1, 1914, there went into effect a reduction in rates amounting to an average decrease of about 16%, together with a new system for calculating such rates, the country being divided for that purpose into five zones. The newly prescribed rates were stated and arranged after a fashion simple enough to be readily understood by any tyro. All direct and indirect rebates were abolished. Articles of food were to go at three-fourths the new rates. The classification of merchandise was radically simplified. (Already in 1913, a further act of Congress had made discrimination against shippers a criminal offense punishable by fine or imprisonment.)