CHAPTER IV.
Origin of the war continued—Proposed annexation of Texas to the United States by treaty—Efforts of several administrations to recover Texas after the Florida treaty—President Tyler's objects—Mexican opinions—British intrigue—British views relative to Texas—Defeat of the treaty in the senate—French opinions.
There is no doubt that although the government of the United States was anxious to preserve a strict neutrality between the belligerents in 1837, and, thus, to avoid assuming the war with Mexico by annexing an insurgent State, it, nevertheless, refused the proffered union with regret. From the earliest period, our statesmen contended that, by the Louisiana treaty, we acquired a title to Texas extending to the Rio Grande, and that we unwisely relinquished our title to Spain by the treaty of 1819 which substituted the Sabine for the Rio Grande as our western boundary.[39] But, divested as we were by solemn compact with Spain, of what may have been our territory under the treaty with France, it was idle to regard Texas as a proper subject for restoration to the Union whilst active hostilities were waged by Mexico. Nevertheless, such was the evident value of the province, and such the anxiety to regain our ancient limits that before the outbreak of the revolution, Mr. Clay, as secretary of state under the administration of Mr. Adams, in March of the years 1825 and 1827, directed Mr. Poinsett, our envoy in Mexico, to negotiate for the transfer of Texas. This direction was repeated by Mr. Van Buren to our minister in August, 1829; and was followed by similar instructions from Mr. Livingston on the 20th of March, 1833, and by Mr. Forsyth on the 2d of July, 1835. President Jackson, however, was not contented with negotiations for that province alone; but, looking forward, with statesmanlike forecast, to the growth and value of our commerce in the Pacific ocean as well as on the west coast of America, he required the secretary of state, in August, 1835, to seek from Mexico a cession of territory, whose boundary, beginning at the mouth of the Rio Grande, would run along the eastern bank of that river to the thirty-seventh degree of latitude, and continue thence, by that parallel, to the Pacific. This demand, if granted by Mexico, not only secured Texas, but would have included the largest and most valuable portion of California together with the noble bay of San Francisco, in which our navy and merchantmen might find a safe and commodious refuge.[40]
Our anxiety to reannex Texas by peaceable negotiation was not met, however, by a correspondent feeling upon the part of Mexico.
Mr. Poinsett, on his return from Mexico, informed Mr. Clay that he had forborne even to make an overture for the repurchase of Texas, because he knew that such a negotiation would be impracticable, and believed that any hint of our desire would aggravate the irritations already existing between the countries.[41] The events which subsequently transpired in Texas, during the period when emigration increased from the United States, to that of the actual outbreak of hostilities, prevented the formation, in Mexico, of any party favorable to such an enterprise; and, after the war began, all hope of negotiation between us was dispelled.
"A leading member of the Mexican cabinet once remarked to me," says Mr. Thompson, in his Recollections of Mexico,[42] "that he believed the tendency of things was towards the annexation of Texas to the United States, and that he greatly preferred such a result either to the independence of Texas or any connection or dependence of Texas upon England; that if it became an independent power, other departments of Mexico would unite with it either voluntarily or by conquest, and that if there was any connexion between Texas and England, English merchandize would be smuggled into Mexico through Texas to the utter ruin of Mexican manufactures and revenue.
"In one of my last interviews with Santa Anna," continues the American minister, "I mentioned this conversation. He replied with great vehemence that he would 'war forever for the reconquest of Texas, and that if he died in his senses his last words should be an exhortation to his countrymen never to abandon the effort to recover the province;' and, added he: 'you know, sir, very well, that to sign a treaty for the alienation of Texas would be the same thing as signing the death warrant of Mexico, for, by the same process, the United States would take one after another of the Mexican provinces, until they possessed them all.'"
Such were the feelings of Mexico in regard to annexation, and such the anxieties in cabinets of all parties in the United States to restore our ancient limits, when the presses of our country intimated, in the year 1844, that President Tyler was negotiating a treaty of union with Texas as an independent power. It was on the eve a presidential canvass; and whilst the incumbent of the executive chair sought very naturally to present himself to the people with the successful results of a popular and beneficial negotiation, there were other candidates who opposed the measure both on principle and policy, as well as on account of the mode in which it was to be effected.
I might very properly in this historical sketch pass over the narrative of annexation, and, deal with the union, ultimately effected between Texas and the United States as the only important fact. Texas, bound to the North American confederacy by a solemn act of congress,—the indisputable constitutionality of which is implied in its passage,—is, indeed, the only subject which the historian is compelled to regard. Whatever results ensued, whether they were perceived and predicted by the statesmen of the time, or, were entirely latent until developed during the last two years, must be entirely attributed to the act of congress which consummated annexation and reposed in the hands of a president the executive power of solemnizing the union. Nevertheless, I believe it due to impartial history that I should state concisely the causes which seem to have provoked annexation, and, indeed, rendered it almost necessary at the time when it occurred.
We have seen that active hostilities by Mexico against the insurgents had either ceased for nearly seven years, or had been confined to such border forays as resembled predatory incursions rather than civilized hostilities. Statesmen, in all parties, regarded the war as ended; for Mexico, impoverished by the thriftless administrations that ruled and plundered her during the short intervals between her revolutions, was in no condition to carry it on with reasonable prospects of success. France, England, Belgium and the United States, had acknowledged Texan independence and established diplomatic relations with the republic. Emigrants settled the interior, and invited accessions. The constitution and laws of the nation were fixed upon a firm basis, while the government was conducted with ability. A lucrative commerce from foreign countries began to pour into the territory. New towns sprang up every where, and Texas exhibited to the world every evidence of an orderly, well regulated government, with infinitely greater strength and stability than the military republic from which she was divorced. Mexico, nevertheless, refused to recognize her independence notwithstanding her inability to make any effort for reconquest. The leading men of Texas anxiously desired that their national independence should continue, and the moral sense of the world, in contrasting the superior progress of the Anglo-American race with the anarchy and feebleness of Mexico, was naturally solicitous to behold the infant colony successful rather than to see it fall a prey to the passions of a people with whom it had no sympathy, and, in whose victory, they might witness the outpouring of a pent up wrath which would never cease in its vindictive persecutions until the province was entirely desolated.[43] This was not alone the common feeling in the United States, but it prevailed in Europe also. The British minister of foreign affairs, Lord Aberdeen, and that zealous partizan of liberty, Lord Brougham, took occasion in the house of peers in August, 1843, to express their solicitude as to the prospects of Texas. Lord Brougham characterized it as a country as large as France, possessing the greatest natural capabilities, but, at the same time he perceived in it an embryo state, (a large portion of whose soil was adapted to cultivation by white labor,) which might become a boundary and barrier against the slavery of the United States of America. If, by the good offices of England, Mexico could be induced to acknowledge Texan independence upon the condition of abolishing slavery, he suggested the hope that it would lead to the extinction of slavery in the southern States of our Union.
Lord Aberdeen replied to Lord Brougham, that England had not only acknowledged her independence, but had also negotiated with Texas a treaty of commerce as well as one for the abolition of the slave trade. He did not believe that there was any importation of slaves into Texas by sea, but, he alleged, there was a large influx of slaves from the United States to that country. As soon as negotiations were commenced with Texas, the utmost endeavors of England had been used to end the war which prevented the full recognition of the independence of Texas by Mexico; but all their endeavors had been met by difficulties, although he was happy to declare that an armistice had been established between the two powers which he hoped would lead to the absolute acknowledgment of her independence. In the existing state of negotiations between the parties, however, he thought it would not contribute to an useful end to express any opinion as to the state of those negotiations, nevertheless he assured his noble friend that the matter would be pressed by every means in the power of her majesty's ministers.
The answer of Lord Brougham to this conversational speech of the minister of foreign affairs, was brief but ominous. Nothing, he declared, could be more satisfactory to him, whilst the statement of his lordship "would be hailed with joy by all who were favorable to the object of anti-slavery societies."[44]
I do not design in this history to discuss either the slavery question or the British project of propagating seditious opinions upon negro servitude by means of diplomacy on this continent. But, when we remember the guaranties of our constitution and the preponderance of the black population in our southern States, it must be conceded that it requires no great degree of sensibility to alarm the white inhabitants of that section and to render them anxious to counteract the avowed machinations of Great Britain. The abstract question of the right of slavery is altogether distinct from slavery as it exists in this Union, and as the foundation of property, population, labor, and, even, existence in the south.
For many years past the fanaticism of freedom has been warring against slavery, until it has created in our country a fanaticism of slavery which was quite as relentless in its obstinacy. It was therefore, natural that individuals who had refused our own congress the right to interfere with slavery, by denying the privilege of petition for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, should resist most ardently the jesuitical propagandism of a foreign power.
This was a question of grave importance to the south. It was an avowal of European policy that struck a death blow at American property; nor was it therefore at all surprising to see Mr. Calhoun, our secretary of state, who was a native and inhabitant of that part of the union, at once seize upon the project of prompt annexation as the only means of counteracting the evils of British diplomacy. If expressions, similar to those used by Lords Aberdeen and Brougham in the English parliament, had been casually uttered in the warm debates of our congress, perhaps but little attention would have been paid them by reflecting men; yet the most trifling observations of British statesmen always deserve notice, because they are well pondered and deliberately made. The opinions of Lord Brougham, assented to by the silence of Lord Aberdeen, had consequently an emphatic significance; and although the British minister of foreign affairs, as well as the envoy at Washington, subsequently disclaimed any attempt to interfere with the internal system of the United States, yet there can be no doubt that they wished to modify the condition and laws of a southern neighbor so as to effect indirectly what prudence taught them to avoid openly.[45] "Great Britain," said Lord Aberdeen, in a despatch to the Hon. Mr. Pakenham, on the 26th December, 1843, "does not desire to establish in Texas, whether partially dependent on Mexico or entirely independent, any dominant influence. She only wishes to share her influence equally with other nations. Her objects are purely commercial, and she has no thought or intention of seeking to act directly or indirectly, in a political sense, on the United States through Texas."
It cannot be expected—for it is not the nature or policy of governments—that statesmen should disclose to each other, with perfect frankness, all their international ambitions, projects or hopes. A wise diplomacy conceals these things whilst in progress. But all governments take means to obtain secretly, as far as they are able, an insight into the views of each other. The diplomacy of the United States, although generally very frank, is nevertheless employed sometimes in this way, and, I believe our records will show, that wherever it became necessary for our departments to get information upon projects touching the interests of our country, they have always found means to discover the truth.
It is fortunate for the history of this annexation question that the commercial designs alluded to by Lord Aberdeen have been revealed to us. Some of the statements are made anonymously, yet, from the very nature of such disclosures whilst negotiations were pending, it cannot be expected that the names of informants would be revealed. Their value and character must be vouched for alone by the officers who communicate them to the world, and deem them sufficient to authorize the action of government. The authorities, to which I allude, were communicated to congress by President Tyler in May, 1844, and were submitted to him by Mr. Calhoun, as secretary of state, on the 16th of that month.[46]
By a convention, concluded in London on the 14th of November, 1840, between Her Majesty's government and the republic of Texas, it was agreed that the queen should tender her good offices to Mexico as mediator between the belligerents. Mexico, however, saw fit to reject this offer. But Texas, still animated by a desire for peace, sought to obtain a triple mediation of the three great powers,—the United States, France and England,—with the hope that under their auspices a settlement might speedily be made. To this arrangement, the governments of France and the United States assented with alacrity; while the government of Great Britain, though expressing an ardent desire to do all in its power by private mediatorial efforts, inclined to the opinion that it would be better, on all accounts, for each party to act alone, though similarly in point of tone and argument, in urging the Mexican government to recognize the independence of Texas.
This suggestion was communicated through Lord Cowley the British ambassador in Paris, to the French government, by whom it was approved.[47]
By this act of the British cabinet, it preserved its independence of all others, and abstained from combined action which would, necessarily, have disclosed its motives as well as its conduct. The objects of the ministers in retaining their independence of all other cabinets will now become more manifest.
If an abstract love of liberty is, indeed, the true cause why England seeks to abolish slavery throughout the world and has set the example of emancipation in her West India colonies, she may really deserve the high commendation of philanthropists. But it cannot be denied that whilst she diffuses a spirit of individual freedom, she does not regret to behold national dependence on herself established by interest and necessity. We find among the documents transmitted to congress by President Tyler, a number of private letters, in which it is alleged that the primary object of Great Britain's interference was to prevent absolute annexation to the United States. Indeed, Lord Aberdeen, in May, 1844, declared to Mr. Everett that he "shared with Lord Brougham the hope and belief that the treaty for annexation would not be ratified by our senate."[48]
If the independence of Texas could be secured on the only probable ground upon which Mexico would acknowledge it,—a pledge that she would not subsequently join the United States;—and if so desirable a result,—which appealed directly to the ambition and vanity of the leading men of Texas, could be effected by the secret negotiations of her ministers, England foresaw that she would obtain a decided advantage over us in future negotiations, without a positive treaty stipulation to that effect. Texas, with every element of prosperity in her people and territory, was war-worn, and suffering from pecuniary embarrassments in which her revolution plunged her. For an agricultural and commercial people, peace and stability, under almost any liberal government, are all that is requisite to insure progress. England, a free, maritime and manufacturing country, deeply interested in Mexico as a purchaser, and in the United States as a rival, was precisely the nation to secure these advantages for Texas, especially as that republic offered a point d'appui which she could not find elsewhere on this continent.
The "free trade" policy of Great Britain was consequently addressed to the cupidity of Texas as a bewitching allurement; and this was, perhaps, secretly coupled with pecuniary offers which would enable her to struggle against adverse fortune during the first years of independence.
This liberal system, while it attracted to England the cotton of Texas in British vessels, would necessarily raise the national duties of the republic to the highest standard on American produce and provisions, at the same time that it introduced the manufactures of England without imposts. The schemers who had achieved emancipation in the British West Indies[49] imagined that the same result might be produced in Texas by sufficient inducements, and that white labor or apprentices would supply the place of slaves, thus striking an indirect blow at slavery in the southern States of our Union. Besides this, England would find a market for her manufactures which might temptingly address itself to the cupidity of the United States and of Mexico as well as of Texas. For, with such an extent of frontier on all sides, and with wastes between us, inhabited by a sparse or reckless population, the greatest inducements would be offered to convert Texas into a smuggling ground not only for our Union but especially for Mexico, whence British fabrics are almost excluded by exorbitant tariffs. The policy of England would thus affect simultaneously our manufactures as well as our commerce. Instead of sending her merchandize to New York, she would find in Galveston a readier market to supply our southern States through the medium of contraband.[50] Her goods would naturally have been carried in British vessels, and thus the labor and commerce of the United States would be directly injured by England until we could afford to navigate and manufacture at cheaper rates.[51]
The impolicy of permitting our carrying trade and home market, in such a country, to pass out of our hands into those of a commercial rival, and the dangers of counteracting or creating a contraband system which would almost immediately ensue, commended this annexation promptly to the notice of President Tyler. He perceived in British supremacy in Texas a multitude of evils. Collisions would arise which must endanger our peace. The power and influence of England would be intruded, geographically, on territory lying between us and Mexico. A large increase of our military forces would be necessary, not only to protect the United States from daily disputes with Texans, but to guard the border inhabitants against hostile inroads from Indians. Texas, he was authoritatively told, would seek the friendship of other nations if denied the protection of ours; and, in a condition of almost hopeless abandonment, would naturally fall an easy prey to any power that would protect her, should we refuse our alliance.[52]
Such were some of the reasons that induced the president, in 1844, to direct Mr. Upshur, who was the secretary of state, to negotiate a treaty of annexation between the United States and Mexico, and thus, in his emphatic language,—"to break up and scatter to the winds the web of European intrigues."[53]
This treaty was transmitted to the senate on the 22nd of April, 1844, and immediately became the topic of discussion throughout the country. It was opposed and defended by some of the most distinguished men in the country. General Jackson pleaded that the golden moment might not be lost, and that we should not throw Texas into the arms of England.[54] Mr. Clay, whose nomination as a presidential candidate was expected to be shortly made, and Mr. Van Buren whose name was also speedily to come before a democratic convention assembled to select a candidate for the chief magistracy, both published long and argumentative letters against the project. The debate on the treaty in the senate was eager, and able. The northern abolitionists regarded it as a measure frought with danger to their cause, and as the basis of perpetual slavery, whilst the southern slave owners hailed annexation as a boon, which, at least for a season, would stay the aggressive arm that was raised against their rights and interests.
At length, the senate finally rejected the treaty; but President Tyler, by a message to the house of representatives, dated the 10th of June, transmitted the rejected document to the popular branch of the national legislature, so that, without suggesting the mode of annexation, the house of representatives might decide whether it should be accomplished in any shape.
At that moment, however, new elements of political commotion were introduced in the nomination of Mr. Clay and Mr. Polk by the respective party conventions held in Baltimore, and the project passed from the national legislature to the people for discussion during the presidential canvass.
Note.—The opinions and arguments adduced by the president in support of annexation have been singularly fortified by disclosures subsequent to the union between Texas and the United States. The British cabinet, mortified by defeat, has been silent upon the subject, but singular developments were made in debate in the French chambers. On the 12th and 20th of January, 1846, a discussion took place between Messieurs Guizot, Thiers, Berreyer and others, in which the Texas question, and the position of France, in the event of war between the United States and England, upon the Oregon question, was warmly debated. The minister, Guizot, alleged that in all the negotiations with Texas, France had sought commercial relations in consequence of the advantages offered of markets for French goods. He declared that it was his policy to interpose an independent State in the midst of the United States, and that he believed it to be advisable to multiply the number of secondary independent States on our continent, as the commercial and political interests of France would suffer materially by the foundation of a governmental unity in America. He watched our progress with a jealous eye, and he considered the policy of the United States in refusing to be the ally of any European power both right and wise in our view of the question.
M. Thiers, the former minister, replied to M. Guizot; and, after asserting that Texas had been annexed to our Union "to the great displeasure of England, and, as far as could be discovered, to the great displeasure of France," he declared that it was the true interest of his government to place Texas under the patronage of a powerful nation like ours rather than to abandon it to the influence of England. "You are aware," said he, "that Texas is of great importance to the United States, and that its possession was anxiously desired by that power: I will add that never was an annexation made in a more regular manner. For more than ten years Texas had been separated from Mexico, and all the powers, including France, had recognised it." He regarded the union of England and France in diplomacy between Mexico, Texas, and the United States, as adopted only to redeem the faults of the French cabinet during the last five years, and as a truckling peace-offering for its conduct on the question of the "right of search." But, of all the French orators and statesmen, none denounced the conduct of the cabinet with more zeal than the eloquent Berreyer. He proved by facts and documents that it was at the instance of England, and in subservience to her, that the French government interposed, (as will be seen in the following chapter,) to maintain the separate independence of Texas:—"We have not limited ourselves"—exclaimed he—"to a wish and a counsel that Texas should retain her freedom, but we have been led to take a part in that which I regret I am compelled to regard as nothing else than an intrigue, which, unfortunately for our national dignity has borne all the marks of an intrigue, and has met, at last, its humiliation."—Niles' Register, vol. 70, pp. 25, 26, 27, 28, and vol. 68, p. 290.
FOOTNOTES:
[39] See Mr. Clay's letter on the Texas question, Raleigh, N. C., April, 1844. I shall discuss the boundary elsewhere in this volume. When Texas offered herself in 1837 to the United States it was only two years after Mexico had overthrown the federal constitution, and not even one after the battle of San Jacinto. A great change however took place in the general aspect of affairs between that period and the final annexation.
[40] Executive document, No. 42, H. of R., 25th congress, 1st session, contains the letters referred to.
[41] Mr. Clay's letter on annexation, ut antea.
[42] Recollections of Mexico, p. 238.
[43] It was evidently the intention of Mr. Webster, whilst secretary of state, to adopt some prudent scheme for the settlement of the war between Texas and Mexico. In January, 1843, he addressed a despatch to Mr. Thompson, who was then our envoy in Mexico, in which he directs him to use his good offices with the Mexican secretary to mitigate the animosity of the government. "Mexico," says he, "has an undoubted right to resubjugate Texas, if she can, so far as other states are concerned, by the common and lawful means of war. But other States are interested,—especially the United States, a near neighbor of both parties, are interested,—not only in the restoration of peace between them, but also in the manner in which the war shall be conducted if it shall continue. These suggestions may suffice for what you are requested to say amicably and kindly to the Mexican secretary, at present; but I may add, for your information, that it is in the contemplation of this government to remonstrate, in a more formal manner, with Mexico, at a period not far distant, unless she shall consent to make peace with Texas, or shall show the disposition and ability to prosecute the war with respectable forces. Executive document, No. 271, H. of R., 28th cong., 1st sess., p. 69.
For the opinions of French statesmen on this question see the debate between Guizot, Thiers, Berreyer and others, reported in vol. 70, of Niles' Register, p. 25, 26.
[44] Debates in the British house of lords, Friday 18th August, 1843, reported in the London Morning Chronicle of the 19th; and see executive document, No. 271, H. of R., 28th congress, 1st session.
[45] Ex. Doc. No. 271, H. of R., 28 cong., 1st sess. p. 48, et seq:—In an interview between Lord Aberdeen and Mr. Everett, in November, 1843, the secretary of foreign affairs told him that England had long been pledged to encourage the abolition of the slave trade and of slavery, as far as her influence extended and in every proper way, but had no wish to interfere with the internal concerns of governments. In reference to Texas, he said that "the suggestion that England had made or intended to make the abolition of slavery the condition of any treaty arrangement with her was wholly without foundation."—id. page 38. The direct interference of England in the internal affairs of other governments has often been very distinctly manifested notwithstanding Lord Aberdeen's disavowal. There is scarcely a country in Europe which has been unvisited by her arms or her diplomacy, either when it became her interest to do so, or when she had the necessary force to make success unquestionable. Her policy is, perhaps, not so much one of ambition as of avarice or necessity. She must feed her multitudes at home; and an extension of her wide spread commerce, with co-extensive privileges in new countries, will open new sources of wealth to her people. Nations are not to be blamed for seeking such advantages; but the nearer neighbor should be equally blameless for grasping, if possible, the benefit for herself, so as to keep off a dangerous rival and secure the revenues which otherwise would flow into that rival's coffers.
The excursive philanthropy of England was admirably depicted by the Frenchman, who, according to the London Times remarked that: "Your Englishman knows all about Timbuctoo, or Hindoostan, or the frozen regions about the North Pole; but ask him about Ireland, the country lying next his own, and he is perfectly innocent of any information on the subject. Africa he investigates—Ireland he neglects. He weeps for the suffering of the negro, but allows his Irish fellow subject to live in ignorance and filth, and often to die of starvation."
[46] Ex. Doc. No. 271, H. of R., 28th cong., 1st sess. p. 101, et seq.
[47] Id.—p. 70. Letter of Mr. Van Zandt to Mr. Webster.
[48] Id.—p. 100. Washington, 24th January, 1843.
[49] See Lord Brougham's speech, ut antea.
[50] Any one who is familiar with the condition of our Canadian frontier will understand the ease with which smuggling in British fabrics is carried on between the countries. An extensive business has, doubtless, always been sustained; and it is not unusual even for the ladies of certain towns along the frontier, to shop in Canada, with the understanding that their purchases are to be delivered at the risk of the British vender, on the other side of the American line!
[51] Executive document, 271, H. of R., 28th cong., 1st sess. Letter of Mr. Allen to Hon. R. J. Walker, and other letters copied on pages 103 and 105 of the same document.
The government of the United States entertained such views of the grasping policy of England for reasons which are clearly set forth in an able despatch from Mr. Calhoun to Mr. King, our envoy at the court of France. "The question," says the secretary of state, "is, by what means can Great Britain regain and keep a superiority in tropical cultivation, commerce and influence? Or shall that be abandoned and other nations, suffered to acquire the supremacy even to the extent of supplying British markets to the destruction of the capital already vested in their production? These are the questions which now profoundly occupy the attention of her statesmen and have the greatest influence over her councils.
"In order to regain her superiority she not only seeks to revive and increase her own capacity to produce tropical productions, but to diminish and destroy the capacity of those who have so far outstripped her in consequence of her error. In pursuit of the former, she has cast her eyes to her East India possessions, to Central and Eastern Africa, with the view of establishing colonies there, and even to restore, substantially, the slave trade itself, under the specious name of transporting free laborers from Africa to her West India possessions, in order, if possible, to compete successfully with those who have refused to follow her suicidal policy. Her main reliance, however, is on the other alternative, to cripple or destroy the productions of her successful rivals. There is but one way by which it can be done, and that is by abolishing African slavery throughout this continent; and that she avows to be the constant object of her policy and exertions." Senate doc. No. 1, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 44.
[52] President Tyler's message to the senate. 22nd April, 1844.
[53] Letter of President Tyler to the Richmond Enquirer in 1847.
[54] President Jackson's letter 17th March, 1844, written in consequence of a private mission to him from President Houston of Texas.