APPENDIX

"MOROCCO NEWS"

"A lie is not worth the lying, nor is truth worth repeating."

Moorish Proverb.

So unanimous have been the uninformed reiteration of the Press in contravention of much that has been stated in the foregoing pages, that it will not be out of place to quote a few extracts from men on the spot who do know the facts. The first three are from leaders in Al-moghreb Al-aksa, the present English paper in Morocco, which accurately voices the opinion of the British Colony in that country, opinions shared by most disinterested residents of other nationalities.

"However we look upon the situation as it stands to-day, and wherever our sympathies may lie, it is impossible to over-estimate the danger attending the unfortunate Anglo-French Agreement. We have always—as our readers will acknowledge—advocated the simple doctrine of the status quo, and in this have received the support of every disinterested person in and out of Morocco. Our policy has at times thrown us into antagonism with the exponents of the French colonial schemes; but we at least have the satisfaction of knowing that, however we may have fallen short of our duty, it[page 382] has been one which we have persevered in, prompted by earnest conviction, by love of the country and its people, and by admiration for its Sultan. The simplicity of our aim has helped us in our uphill fight, and will, no doubt, continue to do so in the future.

"Needless to say we look forward with no little anxiety to the result of the conference. This needs no explanation. In the discussion of such a question it is absolutely imperative that the individual members of the conference should be selected from those who know their Morocco, and who are acquainted with the causes which led up to the present dead-lock. Only the keenest, shrewdest men should be selected, for it must be borne in mind that France will spare no pains to uphold the recent Anglo-French Convention. Her most astute diplomats will figure largely, for her dignity is at stake. Indeed, her very position, diplomatic and political, is in effect challenged. Taking this into consideration, it is more than necessary to see that the representatives of Great Britain are not chosen for their family influence or for the perfection they may have attained in the French language.

"The task is hard and perilous. England is waking to the fact that she has blundered, and, as usual, she is unwilling to admit the fact. Circumstances, however, will sooner or later force her to modify her terms. Germany, Spain, the United States, and other nations, to say nothing of Morocco, must point out the absurdity of the situation. If the agreement is inoperative with regard to Morocco, it may as well be openly admitted to be useless. This is not all. Should English statesmanship direct that this injudicious arrangement be adhered to, France and Great Britain will stand as self-confessed violators of the Convention of Madrid.

[page 383]

"Fortunately the Moorish cause has some excellent champions. For many years she has been dumb. Now, however, that she is assailed, we find a small but influential band of writers coming forward with their pens to do battle for her.

"This is the great consolation we have. Moorish interests will no longer be the sport of European political expediency. These men will, no doubt, protest against the land-grabbing propensities of the French colonial party, and they may find time to point out that after a thousand years of not ignoble independence, the Moorish race deserves a little more consideration than has hitherto been granted.

"Even those people who are responsible for this deplorable state of affairs must now stand more or less amazed at their handiwork. No diplomatic subterfuge can efface the humiliation that underlies the situation; and no one can possibly exaggerate the danger that lies ahead of us."



"Two centuries ago Great Britain abandoned Tangier, and it is only the present generation that has realized the huge mistake. A maudlin sentimentalism, to avoid displeasing the French King, prevented us from handing the city back to Portugal; an act which would have been wise, either strategically, commercially, or with a view to the suppression of the famous Salee rovers, who were for long a scourge to ships entering the Straits. A Commission of experts was appointed to consider the question of the abandonment, one of them being Mr. Pepys....

"Whatever the opinion may have been of the experts consulted by the Government on the present agreement with France, we are strongly disposed to believe that if they have been endowed with greater sense than those of 1683, there is probably more, as we must hope there is, in favour of British[page 384] interests, than appears to the public eye. Time alone will tell what reservation, mental or otherwise, may be locked up in the British Foreign Office. It is difficult to believe that any British statesman would wantonly give away any national interest, but too lofty a policy has often been wanting in practical sense which, had that policy descended from principles to facts, would have saved the nation thousands of lives, millions of money, and sacrifices of its best interests."



"The events that have been fully before the eyes of British subjects in Morocco in the abnormal condition of the country during the past two years, seem to have been ignored by our Foreign Office. In short, it fully appears that our Foreign Office policy has been designed to lead the Sultan to political destruction, and to sacrifice every British interest.

"About two years ago our Foreign Office began well in starting the Sultan on the path of progress: in carrying out its aims it has done nothing but blunders. Had it but acted with a little firmness, the opening up of this country would have already begun, and there would have been no 'Declaration' which will assuredly give future Foreign Secretaries matter for some anxiety. The declaration is only a display of political fireworks that will dazzle the eyes of the British public for a while, delighting our Little Englanders, but only making the future hazy and possibly more dangerous to deal with. It seems only a way of putting off the real settlement, which may not wait for thirty years to be dealt with, on the points still at issue, and for which a splendid opportunity has been thrown away at Downing Street, and could have been availed of to maintain British interests, prestige, and influence in this country. Briefly, we fear that the attainment[page 385] of the end in view may yet cost millions to the British nation.

"That Morocco will progress under French guidance there can be no question, and France may be congratulated on her superior diplomacy and the working of her Foreign Office system."

With regard to the Moorish position, a contributor observes in a later issue—

"The attitude of the Sultan and his Cabinet may be summed up in a few words. 'You nations have made your agreements about our country without consulting us. We owe you nothing that we are unable to pay on the conditions arranged between us. We did not ask your subjects to reside and trade on Moorish soil. In fact, we have invariably discouraged their so doing. Troubles exist in Morocco, it is true, but we are far greater sufferers than you—our unbidden guests. And but for the wholesale smuggling of repeating rifles by your people, our tribes would not be able to cause the disorders of which you complain. As to your intention to intervene in our affairs, we agree to no interference. If you are resolved to try force, we believe that the Faith of the Prophet will conquer. We still believe there is a God stronger than man. And should the fight go against us, we believe that it is better to earn Paradise in a holy war for the defence of our soil, than to submit tamely to Christian rule.'

"The position, however lamentable, is intelligible; but on the other hand it is incredible that France—her mind made up long ago that she is to inherit the Promised Land of Sunset—will sit down meekly and allow herself to be flouted by the monarch and people of a crumbling power like Morocco. And this is what she has to face. Not[page 386] indeed a nation, as we understand the term, but a gathering of units differing widely in character and race—Arabs, Berbers, mulattoes, and negroes—unable to agree together on any subject under the sun but one, and that one the defence of Islám from foreign intervention. Under the standard of the invincible Prophet they will join shoulder to shoulder. And hopeless and pathetic as it may seem, they will defy the disciplined ranks and magazine guns of Europe. Thus, wherever our sympathies may lie, the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the Morocco question appear to be dwindling day by day. The anarchy paramount in three-quarters of the sultanate is not only an ever-increasing peril to European lives and property, but a direct encouragement to intervention. Of one thing we in Morocco have no kind of doubt. The landing of foreign troops, even for protective service, in any one part of the coast would infallibly be the signal for a general rising in every part of the Empire. No sea-port would be safe for foreigners or for friendly natives until protected by a strong European force. And, once begun, the task of 'pacifying' the interior must entail an expenditure of lives and treasure which will amply satisfy French demands for colonial extension for many a year to come."

One more quotation from an editorial—

"And so it would appear, that, with the smiling approval of the world's Press, the wolf is to take over the affairs of the lamb. We use the phrase advisedly. We have never hesitated to criticize the action, and to condemn the errors, of the Makhzen where such a course has been needful in the public interest. We can, therefore, with all the more justice, call attention to the real issues of the compact[page 387] embodied in the Morocco clauses of the Anglo-French Agreement of April, 1904. How long the leading journals of England may continue to ignore the facts of the case it is impossible to say; but that there will come a startling awakening seems inevitable. Every merely casual observer on this side of the Mediterranean knows only too well that the most trifling pretext may be at any hour seized for the next move in the development of French intervention. Evidence is piling up to show that the forward party in France, and still more in Algeria, is burning to strike while yet the frantic enthusiasm of the Entente lasts, and while they can rely upon the support—we had almost written, the moral support—of Great Britain. Can we shut our eyes to the deliberate provocations they are giving the Makhzen in almost every part of the sultanate?

"These things are not reported to Europe, naturally. In spite of all our comfortable cant about justice to less powerful races, who in England cares about justice to Morocco and her Sultan? We owe it to Germany that the thing was not rushed through a few months ago. Who has heard, who wants to hear, the Moorish side of the question? Morocco is mute. The Sultan pulls no journalistic wires. He has no advocate in the Press, or in Parliament, or in Society. Hardly a public man opens his mouth in England to refer to Morocco, without talking absolute twaddle. The only member of either House of Parliament who has shown a real grasp of the tremendous issues of the question is Lord Rosebery, in the memorable words—

"'No more one-sided agreement was ever concluded between two Powers at peace with each other. I hope and trust, but I hope and trust rather than believe, that the Power which holds Gibraltar may never have cause to regret having handed Morocco over to a great military Power.'

[page 388]

"Had that true statesman, and true Englishman, been in power eighteen months ago, England would never have been pledged to sacrifice her commercial interests in Morocco, to abandon her wholesome, traditional policy in the Mediterranean, and to revoke her solemn engagement to uphold the integrity of the Sultan's dominions."

An excellent idea of the discrepancies between the alarmist reports with which the Press is from time to time deluged, and the facts as known on the spot, is afforded by the following extracts from Al-moghreb Al-aksa of January 7, 1905, when the London papers had been almost daily victimized by their correspondents regarding Morocco:—

"The dismissal of the military attachés at the Moorish Court threatened to raise a terrible conflagration in Europe, and great indignation among foreign residents in this country—according to certain Press reports. This fiery disposition of some offered a remarkable contrast with the coolness of the others. For instance, the British took almost no interest in the matter, for the simple reason that there has never been any British official military mission in the Moorish Court. It is true there are a few British subjects in Moorish military service, but they are privately employed by the Sultan's Government, and their service is simply voluntary. Even personally, they actually show no great concern in remaining here or not.

"The Italian military mission is composed of very few persons. The chief, Col. Ferrara, is on leave in Italy, and the Mission is now represented by Captain Campini, who lives at Fez with his family. They report having received all kind attentions from the Sultan quite recently, and that they[page 389] know nothing about the dismissal which has so noisily sounded in Europe. According to the same Press reports, great fears were entertained of a general rising against the foreign residents in Fez and other places in the interior, and while it is reported that the military attachés, consular officers and residents of all nations were notified to leave Fez and come to Tangier or the coast ports as a matter of precaution, we find that nobody moves from the Court, because, they say, they have seen nothing to induce them to leave that residence. And what has Mulai Abd El Azîz replied to French complaints and demands respecting the now historical dismissal of the military attachés? A very simple thing—that H.S.M. did not think that the dismissal could resent any of the civilized nations, because it was decided as an economic measure, there being no money to pay even other more pressing liabilities. However, the Sultan, wishing to be on friendly terms with France and all other nations, immediately withdrew the dismissal and promised to pay the attachés as long as it is possible to do so. The missions, consuls, etc., have now no need to leave Fez, and everything remains stationary as before. The only thing steadily progressing is the insecurity of life and property in the outskirts and district of Tangier, where murders and robberies proceed unabated, and this state of affairs has caused the British and German residents in this town to send petitions to their respective Governments, through their legations, soliciting that some measure may be adopted to do away with the present state of insecurity which has already paralysed all overland traffic between this city and the neighbouring towns.

"The contrasts of the situation are as remarkable as they are comic, and while the whole country is perfectly quiet, those places more in contact with[page 390] the civilized world, like Tangier and the Algerian frontier, are the only spots which are seriously troubled with disturbances."

So much for northern Morocco. The same issue contains the following report from its Mogador correspondent regarding the "disturbed state" of southern Morocco.

"It would puzzle even the trained imagination of certain journalists we wot of to evolve anything alarmist out of the condition of the great tribes between Mogador and the Atlas. During the recent tribal differences not one single highway robbery, even of a native, was, I believe, committed. The roads are open everywhere; the rival chieftains have, figuratively, exchanged the kiss of peace, and the tribes have confessed that it was a mistake to leave their farms and farm-work simply to please an ambitious and utterly thankless governor.

"As for Europeans, they have been rambling all over the country with their wonted freedom from interference. A Frenchman, travelling almost alone, has just returned from Imintanoot. Another has twice crossed the Atlas. Needless to say the route to Marrákesh is almost as devoid of other than pleasurable novelty as a stroll on the Embankment or down the shady side of Pall Mall. When, indeed, will folks at home grasp the fact that the Berber clans of southern Morocco belong to a race differing utterly in character and largely in customs from the ruffians infesting the northern half of the sultanate?

"'Nothing but the unpleasant prospect of being held up by brigands,' writes a friend, 'prevents me from revisiting your beautiful country.' How convince such people that brigandage is an art unknown south of the Oom Rabya? That the prayer of the[page 391] Shluh, when a Nazarene visits their land, is that nothing may happen to bring trouble on the clan? They may inwardly hate the Rûmi, or they may regard him merely as an uncouth blot on the scenery; but should actual unpleasantness arise, he will, in almost every case, have himself to thank for it. (London papers please copy!)"

This letter was dated two days after the Paris correspondent of the Times had telegraphed—

"Events would seem likely to be coming to a head in consequence of the anarchy prevailing in the Shereefian Empire. The Pretender is just now concentrating his troops in the plain of Angad, and is preparing to take an energetic offensive against Ujda. The camp of the Pretender is imposing in its warlike display. All the caids and the sons of Bu Amema surround Mulai Mahomed. The men are armed with French chassepots, and are well dressed in new uniforms supplied by an Oran firm. All the war material was embarked on board the French yacht Zut, which landed it last month on the shores of Rastenga between Cape Eau and Melilla under the direction of the Pretender's troops."

Towards Christmas, 1902, circumstantial reports began to appear in the newspapers of an overwhelming defeat of the imperial army by rebels who were marching on Fez, who had besieged it, and had cut off the aqueduct bringing its water, the Sultan retreating to the palace, Europeans being ordered to the coast, etc., etc. These statements I promptly and categorically denied in an interview for the London Echo; there was no real "pretender," only a religious fanatic supported by two disaffected[page 392] tribes, the imperial army had not been defeated, as only a small body had been despatched to quell the disturbance; the "rebels" were not besieging Fez, as they had no army, and only the guns captured by the clever midnight surprise of sleeping troops, of which the "battle"—really a panic—consisted; they had not cut the "aqueduct," as Fez is built on the banks of a river from which it drinks; the Sultan's palace was his normal abode; the Europeans had not fled, seeing no danger, but that on account of the alarming telegrams from Europe, their Ministers in Tangier had advised them to withdraw, much against their will.

So sweeping a contradiction of statements receiving daily confirmation from Tangier, heightened colour from Oran, and intensification from Madrid, must have been regarded as the ravings of a madman, for the interview was held over for a week for confirmation. Had not thirty-four correspondents descended on Tangier alone, each with expenses to meet? Something had to be said, though the correspondent nearest to the scene, in Fez, was two days' journey from it, and six from Tangier, the nearest telegraph station. It is true that some years ago an American boldly did the journey "From Fez to Fleet Street in Eight Days," by forgetting most of the journey to Tangier, but this was quite out-done now. Meanwhile every rumour was remodelled in Oran or Madrid, and served up afresh with confirmatory sauce piquante, à la française or à l'espagnol, as the case might be. It was not till Reuter had obtained an independent, common-sense report, that the interview was published, my statements having been all confirmed, but by that time[page 393] interest had flagged, and the British public still believes that a tremendous upheaval took place in Morocco just then.

Yet, notwithstanding the detailed accounts of battles and reverses—a collation of which shows the "Father of the She-ass" fighting in several places at once, captured or slain to-day and fighting to-morrow, and so on—the Government of Morocco was never in real danger from the "Rogi's" rising, and the ultimate issue was never in doubt. The late Sultan, El Hasan, more than once suffered in person at the hands of the same tribes, defeats more serious than those experienced by the inadequate forces sent by his son.

The moral of all this is that any news from Morocco, save that concerning Europeans or events on the coast, must be received with caution, and confirmation awaited. The most reliable accounts at present available are those of the Times correspondent at Tangier, while the Manchester Guardian is well informed from Mogador. Whatever emanates from Paris or Algeria, not referring directly to frontier events; or from Madrid, not referring to events near the Spanish "presidios," should be refused altogether, as at best it is second-hand, more often fabricated. How the London Press can seriously publish telegrams about Morocco from New York and Washington passes comprehension. The low ebb reached by American journals with one or two notable exceptions in their competitive sensationalism would of itself suffice to discredit much that appears, even were the countries in touch with each other.

The fact is that very few men in Morocco itself[page 394] are in a position to form adequate judgements on current affairs, or even to collect reliable news from all parts. So few have direct relations with the authorities, native and foreign; so many can only rely on and amplify rumour or information from interested sources. So many, too, of the latter must make money somehow! The soundest judgements are to be formed by those who, being well-informed as to the conditions and persons concerned, and Moorish affairs in general, are best acquainted with the origin of the reports collected by others, and can therefore rightly appraise them.

[page 395]

[A] | [B] | [C] | [D] | [E] | [F] | [G] | [H] | [I] | [J] | [K] | [L] | [M] | [O] | [P] | [R] | [S] | [T] | [V] | [W] | [X] | [Z]

[page 397]

[page 400]

THE END

PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES.

Transcriber's Note:
Page 6: Missing accent added to Seville (Sevílle).
Page 36: corrected mis-matched quotes.
Page 104: 'whch' corrected to 'which'.
Page 128: 'beats' changed to 'beasts', to fit context.
Page 130: 'flead' [sic]
Page 153: corrected mis-matched quotes. ("And when at home? ')
Page 185: 'Rabhah' is spelled 'Rabbah' in previous illustration.
Page 198: sic: carraway/caraway]
Page 263: changed comma for period at sentence end. (sighted, This)
Page 273: 'through' changed to 'though', to fit context.
Page 274: 'accetpance' changed to 'acceptance'.
Page 284: 'territoral' changed to 'territorial'.
Page 289: carcase/carcass, both are correct: Oxford Dictionary.
Page 299: sic: instal/install.
Page 346: added missing accent to III Seville (Sevílle), for conformity. (II Córdova is accented).
Page 349: added missing accent to Giralda (Girálda), for conformity.
Page 353: corrected 'architectual' to 'architectural'.
Page 372: comma corrected to period. (a Moorish cistern hard by.)
Page 296: colon corrected to semicolon. (Moorish worshippers in, 342; )
Page 296: added comma (Debts in Morocco, how settled, 30-34)
Page 377: added closing quote to "Castle of Ayûb.
Page 395: 'Bobadil' changed to 'Boabdil'.
Page 395: removed extraneous '378' reference for Charlemagne.
Page 397: removed extraneous entry (368) for 'kufic inscriptions'; changed '575' to '375'.
Pages 398, 399: Missing accent added to Seville (Sevílle).
Page 399: '198' changed to '199' for reference to 'Smeerah'.
Page 399: missing accent added to Cordova (Córdova).
Page 399: comma added after 'remains' (other Moorish towns, villages, castles, and remains, 366-379;).
Page 399: Changed '373' to '374' for reference to "Toledo'.
Page 400: comma added after 'occupations' (Women of Morocco, occupations, 58, 62, 77, 111, 134;).