The Sexual Definition of Libido Must be Abandoned
The intensity of the libido is said to be diminished relatively to the early age. But we advanced just now several considerations to show why it seems doubtful if we can regard the vital functions of a child, sexuality excepted, as of less intensity than those of adults. We can really say that, sexuality excepted, the emotional phenomena, and, if nervous symptoms are present, then these likewise are quite as intense as those of adults. On the energic conception of the libido all these things are but manifestations of the libido. But it becomes rather difficult to conceive that the intensity of the libido can ever constitute the difference between a mature and an immature sexuality. The explanation of this difference seems rather to postulate a change in the localization of the libido (if the expression be allowed). In contradistinction to the medical definition the libido in children is occupied far more with certain side-functions of a mental and physiological nature than with local sexual functions. One is here already tempted to remove from the term libido the predicate “sexualis,” and thus to have done with the sexual definition of the term given in Freud’s “Three Contributions.” This necessity becomes imperative, when we put it in the form of a question: The child in the first years of its life is intensely living—suffering and enjoying—the question is, whether his striving, his suffering, his enjoyment are by reason of his libido sexualis? Freud has pronounced himself in favor of this supposition. There is no need to repeat the reasons through which I am compelled to accept the pre-sexual stage. The larva stage possesses a libido of nutrition, if I may so express it, but not yet the libido sexualis. It is thus we must put it, if we wish to keep the energic conception which the libido theory offers us. I think there is nothing for it but to abandon the sexual definition of libido, or we shall lose what there is valuable in the libido theory, that is, the energic conception. For a long time past the desire to extend the meaning of libido, and to remove it from its narrow and sexual limitations, has forced itself upon Freud’s school. One was never weary of insisting that sexuality in the psychological sense was not to be taken too literally, but in a broader connotation; but exactly how, that remained obscure, and thus too, sincere criticism remained unsatisfied.
I do not think I am going astray if I see the real value of the libido theory in the energic conception, and not in its sexual definition. Thanks to the former, we are in possession of a most valuable heuristic principle. We owe to the energic conception the possibility of dynamic ideas and relationships, which are of inestimable value for us in the chaos of the psychic world. The Freudians would be wrong not to listen to the voice of criticism, which reproaches our conception of libido with mysticism and inaccessibility. We deceived ourselves in believing that we could ever make the libido sexualis the bearer of the energic conception of the psychical life, and if many of Freud’s school still believe they possess a well-defined and almost complete conception of libido, they are not aware that this conception has been put to use far beyond the bounds of its sexual definition. The critics are right when they object to our theory of libido as explaining things which cannot belong to its sphere. It must be admitted that Freud’s school makes use of a conception of libido which passes beyond the bounds of its primary definition. Indeed, this must produce the impression that one is working with a mystical principle.