FOOTNOTES:
[34] "Yunnan," by Major H. R. Davies.
[35] Ibid., p. 21.
[36] Sir A. P. Phayre, "History of Burma," p. 13.
[37] He was grinding wheat or paddy in a hand-mill.
[38] General Sir Edward Stedman, G.C.B.
[39] Sir Herbert White, K.C.I.E., late Lieut. Governor of Burma.
CHAPTER XVI
THE SHAN STATES (continued)
The narrative in the last chapter took the history down to the end of June, 1887, when comparative peace had been established in the Southern States.
The Northern States up to this time had not come under the influence of the Superintendent at Fort Stedman. The Chief Commissioner had decided that no expedition should be sent into those States until after the rains of 1887, unless it became absolutely necessary for the support of the friendly Sawbwa of Hsipaw. The chief had been able, as has been explained (p. 147), with the alliance of San Ton Hon to hold his own and to defeat their opponents headed by Naw Möng and the Chaunggwa Prince. If he had stopped at that point much misery and destruction would have been saved. But Hkun Saing's vanity had been inflated by the reception he had received at Mandalay when ten years' revenue had been remitted to him and the States of Möngtung, Manglön, and Hsumhsai made over to him, and he cherished visions of further aggrandisement. San Ton Hon was very much of the same mind.
After defeating the Prince they turned their forces southward and made an attack on Hsenwi Alelet, where comparative peace had been maintained by the Pa-ôk-Chok at Möngyai. San Ton Hon led his troops down by the east while Hsipaw's men, under the Sawbwa's father-in-law, went by the west. Mr. Hildebrand had heard of their designs and sent them orders to desist. The allies persisted, however, alleging that they were acting under instructions from Mandalay. Möngyai was occupied. The Pa-ôk-Chok and Naw Möng, who was with him, escaped to Möngnawng and sent messengers to Fort Stedman praying for redress. They were ordered to remain quiet until the Superintendent should come to Hsenwi. San Ton Hon remained in Möngyai making arrangements for administering the district. He then left for the town of Hsenwi in obedience to a further order from Mr. Hildebrand. By the end of August, 1887, peace had been restored, that is to say, active fighting had ceased in the Northern States, and the contending parties awaited the coming of the Superintendent to settle their claims. Little harm would have resulted from the turbulence of Hsipaw and San Ton Hon if they had restrained their followers from ravaging the country. These bandits, San Ton Hon's Kachins at the head of them, had burnt and destroyed everything. Thus the autumn of 1887 saw the cessation of bloodshed in both the Northern and Southern States. All were beginning to look to the British representative at Fort Stedman as the final arbitrator of disputes, and trade began to revive.
Meanwhile the objects to be aimed at and the measures to be taken in the ensuing open season of 1887-8 were occupying the Chief Commissioner. Mr. Hildebrand was invited to Mandalay, and the subject was fully discussed and settled in consultation with him. The main lines of the policy to be followed in relation to the States were defined. The conditions upon which the chiefs were to hold their States under the British Government were determined and embodied in a patent, or sanad, to use the Indian term, for the greater chiefs, and in a letter of appointment for the lesser. By the sanad the recipient was recognized as a feudatory chief and empowered to govern his territories in all matters whether criminal, civil, or revenue, and was authorized to nominate for the approval of the Government a fit person according to Shan usage to be his successor. These privileges were made subject to certain conditions, one of which was the payment of a tribute, settled for five years at the amount previously paid to the King, and liable to revision thereafter. The forests and royalties on all minerals and precious stones were reserved to the Government. Order was to be maintained by the chief, the rights and customs of the people were to be respected, and trade protected. All disputes arising between one State and another were to be referred to the Superintendent, at whose headquarters the chief was to maintain an agent or representative. The order of appointment given to the lesser men bound them to pay the revenue assessed by the Superintendent, and in all matters connected with the administration of their districts to conform to the instructions and orders issued by the Chief Commissioner or the Superintendent.
It was decided that each chief or ruler, whether known by the title of Sawbwa or some lesser designation, should be required to appear in person, to make a declaration of allegiance, and to subscribe to the terms of his sanad. Where there were rival claimants, weight was to be given to the fait accompli, and to considerations of expediency rather than to those of abstract right or justice. It was not held incumbent on the British Government to go behind existing facts or to inquire how the man in possession came by his power, provided he appeared to be a person capable of maintaining order.
Some matters of importance hitherto unsettled were decided by the Chief Commissioner at this time. The important State of Lawksawk had been left in temporary charge of a Burman Myoôk (vide page 154). There was a man named Hkun Nu who had been the (hereditary) Myoza of a small State called Tabet by the Burmans, Tamhpak by the Shans. He had been deposed about 1892 by the Burman Government because he could not raise the revenue demanded from the State. He lived in great poverty in Mandalay until the deposition of the King. His case coming to the Chief Commissioner's notice, a small allowance, enough to keep him alive, was made to him. Hkun Nu proved himself useful in giving information about the Shan country and in taking letters, not without some personal risk, to various potentates. He accompanied the expedition to the Shan States early in 1887, and was found by Mr. Hildebrand to be both intelligent and trustworthy and to be a person of some influence in the Shan country. On Mr. Hildebrand's recommendation, and with the goodwill of many of the notables of Lawksawk, and of some of the principal Sawbwas such as Möngnai and Möngpawn, he was appointed by the Chief Commissioner to be Sawbwa of Lawksawk, a territory of 4,048 square miles and paying a gross revenue of Rs. 27,297. Thus from being the dismissed magistrate of a petty district, earning a small wage as a guide and messenger, Hkun Nu became the ruler of a considerable and wealthy State by a sudden turn of the wheel of fortune. It may be recorded here that the State prospered under him. On his death in 1900 he was succeeded by his son, who was summoned to Rangoon in 1906, and presented to their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales. He received the decoration of K.S.M. on the 1st of January, 1907, and has done much in the way of road-making and otherwise to improve his country.
Another matter that came up was the Sawbwa of Möngnai's claim to the adjacent State of Kengtawng, which had been made over by the Burmese Government to Twet Nga Lu. Orders were now passed confirming the Sawbwa's title to administer Kengtawng as a State subordinate to him.
Many important questions remained, which could not be settled until the Superintendent was able to visit each State with a sufficient military escort to mark his authority and to render opposition improbable. Hsenwi was in a disturbed and distracted condition and had to be pacified and arrangements made for its administration. The method in which the group of smaller States on the western edge of the plateau known as the Myélat was to be administered had also to be considered and decided. The nearness of these States to Mandalay had resulted in diminishing their independence. Their position was in fact not much different from that of a purely Burman district. Then there were the Trans-Salween States, with which communication had not as yet been established. Five of the smallest of these had been claimed by the Siamese. Another very difficult matter was the attitude of the Karennis, whose relations with the British Government it was necessary to define. In the case of every State, big or little, the amount paid as revenue during the King's time had to be ascertained, the tribute payable to the British Government to be determined, and engagements to be taken for its regular payment.
In Mr. Hildebrand's expedition in the beginning of 1887 only one force had been employed. Experience showed that the area to be dealt with was too large for one column. While the force was in the south, fighting and disturbances were going on in the north. The appearance of two expeditions, one starting from Mandalay and visiting the north, the other from Fort Stedman, taking the Southern States and then moving up to combine with the first, would make a greater impression than a single force of much larger strength. Rumour would magnify the numbers of each, and if opposition were contemplated by any of the chiefs, he would not know where to direct his attack. For these reasons it was decided to employ two columns. The larger, under command of Major Swetenham, 27th P.I., was composed of:—
| 2 | guns 1-1 Eastern Division, R.A. |
| 50 | rifles—West Surrey Regiment. |
| 150 | rifles—27th P.I. |
| 25 | British} |
| 25 | Native} Mounted Infantry |
| 20 | lances—1st Bombay Lancers. |
It assembled at Fort Stedman, and was called the Southern Shan Column.
The smaller column was commanded by Major Yates, 1-1 Eastern Division, R.A., and included the following troops:—
| 2 | guns 1-1 Eastern Division, R.A. |
| 50 | rifles—Royal Munster Fusiliers. |
| 100 | rifles—43 G.L.I. (Bombay Army). |
| 50 | rifles—Native} Mounted Infantry. |
| 25 | rifles—British} |
This column was designated the Northern Shan Column. Its starting-point was Maymyo (Pyinulwin), forty miles from Mandalay.
To Mr. Hildebrand, as Superintendent of the Shan States, was given the chief political charge, and, within certain limits laid down by the Chief Commissioner, the movements of the columns and the measures to be taken for the pacification of the country were left to his discretion. He was to accompany the Southern Column, and Mr. J. G. Scott was appointed to go with him as his Assistant. Lieutenant H. Daly was posted as civil officer with the Northern Column. In all political matters he was placed entirely under Mr. Hildebrand, and was told that he was to act, and only to act, under his instructions.
The relations of Mr. Hildebrand to the military officers in command of the columns were carefully defined. The primary object of the expeditions was to establish peace, decide disputes, and lay the foundations of orderly rule for the future. The need of warlike operations was not anticipated. The military officers commanding were instructed therefore to give to the civil officers every assistance in carrying out the wishes of Government that could be given with due regard to the safety and well-being of the troops. In the event of hostilities becoming necessary, then the civil officer was to stand aside while the soldiers became solely responsible for the planning and carrying out of the necessary operations. The maintenance of the strictest discipline was enjoined, and the most scrupulous exactitude in paying for labour and supplies. Troops and followers were made to understand that they were operating in a friendly country.
Instructions were given to Mr. Hildebrand as to the route to be taken by each column, the matters demanding his attention, and the principles by which he was to be guided. Mr. Daly with the Northern Column was to move through Hsipaw to Northern Hsenwi, then to Tawngpeng, the chief of which State was still recalcitrant; and thence returning to Hsipaw, he was to march to Möngyai in Central Hsenwi.
Mr. Hildebrand with the Southern Column was to go to Möngpai, thence to Mawkmai, thence to Möngpan, and then to Möngnai, which was a convenient centre for the settlement of many matters. After a halt there, which it was anticipated might extend to several weeks, the column was to turn northward and march through the intervening States to Möngyai, which it was to reach about the same time as the Northern Column. The idea was to bring the two columns together in Hsenwi, where the contending parties of San Ton Hon, Naw Hpa, Naw Möng and Nga Aw the Pa-ôk-Chok, whom San Ton Hon and the Hsipaw Sawbwa had expelled from Möngyai, were expected to give trouble. At Möngyai, the settlement of the large State of Hsenwi—the most difficult, perhaps, of the duties entrusted to Mr. Hildebrand—would have to be taken in hand.
The Southern Column started on the 22nd of November, 1887, on its five months' march through the States. Before it moved, the chiefs of the Myélat and the Sawbwas and Myozas of States in the neighbourhood of Fort Stedman, were called in; the revenue to be paid by each was fixed, and the drafts of their sanads and letters of appointment given to them. There was no difficulty with any of them except Saw Ôn, the Sawbwa of Yawnghwè, who owed his position to the support afforded to him by the British Government. He objected to the payment of revenue, and feigned illness to avoid appearing before the Superintendent. He made it almost impossible to get coolies or bullocks, except directly through him and at most exorbitant rates. He exhibited, in fact, a fine example of a swollen head. But it may be that he partly believed in the truth of some absurd stories respecting the withdrawal of the British from Burma, which he was found afterwards to have spread abroad.
The first halt was made at Kaung-i, the residence of the Möngpai Sawbwa. The settlement of the chronic feud between him and Pobye, the Karenni chief, was the main business here. Pobye appeared, and the Superintendent heard both parties. After vainly endeavouring to bring them to an agreement, Mr. Hildebrand induced them to pledge themselves to abide by the Chief Commissioner's decision, and meanwhile to keep the peace. At a later date, they submitted their case at Rangoon to the Chief Commissioner, who settled the dispute....
At Möngpai every effort was made without success to induce Sawlapaw, the powerful chief of Eastern Karenni, to come in and arrange a modus vivendi with the British authorities. He remained obstinately hostile, and had to be chastised later on.
A Jungle Camp in the Shan States.
At this halt, where several chiefs were assembled, the principle of succession ruling in the Shan States was discussed. It appeared that as a rule succession devolved on the eldest son of the chief wife: failing her male issue, on the eldest male issue of the next wife. Failing heirs in the direct line, the succession went to collaterals. This was shown to be the ancient custom not to be departed from except in the case of obvious unfitness of the heir for the duties of his position either from incapacity or from vice. In Loilong and Hsahtung some questions relating to minor chiefships were settled. It was found that on this south-western frontier of the Shan States the inhabitants were mostly Karens and kindred races split up into small tribes speaking different dialects, timid and shy people submitting to the tyranny of dacoits and outlaws who sought a refuge in their hills from the pursuit of the police and troops in the low country.
The column marched through the Mawkmai territory to Möngpan. No special matter had been marked for settlement in Mawkmai. But it was noted that the villagers in the south stood in great fear of Sawlapaw, and paid blackmail to him. Work in the forests of Southern and South-eastern Mawkmai had been stopped on account of the hostility of the Karenni chief. The adjacent country was practically deserted, and the complaints against Sawlapaw were loud. Mawkmai, however, at this time was the most wealthy and prosperous of the Shan States, and the Sawbwa seemed powerful enough to hold his own against any of his neighbours.
From Mawkmai the column went on to Möngpan. Here they met the Siamese Commissioners and Mr. Archer, His Majesty's Acting Vice-Consul at Chiengmai (Zimme), who had come to discuss the claim made by the Bangkok Government to some small States east of the Salween. Möngpan had been taken and burnt by the filibuster Twet Nga Lu, who had so far recognized British authority that after his expulsion from Kengtawng by Kun Kyi, the Möngnai Sawbwa, he came to Fort Stedman and laid his claim before the Superintendent. It was considered and rejected by the Chief Commissioner. Thereupon he collected a regiment of bravi, as numerous in the Shan States in 1887 as in Italy of the Middle Ages, and descending on Kengtawng burnt whatever had escaped former devastations. Compelled to retreat by the Sawbwa's men, he retired south on Möngpan, and captured it in December, 1887. Again driven out by the Möngnai troops, he fell back beyond the Salween, the Möngnai men following him. But as the pursuit led them into the territory of Möngtung and Möng Hang, which were claimed by the Siamese, they were ordered by the Superintendent to retire to the right bank of the Salween. Twet Nga Lu was left encamped close to Möngtung, where a small Siamese garrison was stationed, and he thus escaped for the time. He was proclaimed a rebel and dacoit and every chief in the Shan States was desired to treat him as an outlaw. This was the situation at Möngpan when the Southern Column met Mr. Archer and the Siamese Commissioners at that place.
The four States in dispute with Siam were Möngtung, Möng Hang, Möng Hta, and Möng Kyawt. They were claimed by the British Government as part of the undoubtedly Burman State Möngpan, but had been occupied secretly by the Siamese. A fifth, Möng Hsat, was also claimed by them, but no garrison had been placed in it. It was and always had been a dependency of Kengtung, with which the Siamese could not pretend to have any connection. The Siamese claim had its origin in the conduct of the local rulers (Phayas) of these little territories in the disturbed times following the overthrow of King Thebaw.
The Mawkmai Sawbwa made a successful attack on Möngpan in the cold season of 1886-7. Earlier in the same year the Siamese had moved up a large force from Chiengmai, ostensibly to assist the British in maintaining order: more probably in the hope of picking up some fragments for themselves when the Burman Government went to pieces. Under these circumstances the local rulers, threatened with burning and robbery by Mawkmai, with invasion and slavery by Siam, sought the protection of the more powerful Siamese and drank the water of allegiance to Chiengmai. This was the only foundation for the claim made by the Bangkok Government. Their assertion that the States had been under Siam for a century had nothing to support it. The population was admittedly Shan. A report of the facts was drawn up and sent to the Chief Commissioner. Meanwhile a modus vivendi was arranged by Mr. Hildebrand with the Siamese Commissioner on the basis of maintaining the status quo, preserving peace, and abstaining from working the forests in the States until the dispute was settled by the Governments of the two countries. It may be stated here that a decision in favour of the British claim was announced in 1888 and effect given to it. Four States were restored to Möngpan, and possession of the fifth, Möng Hsat, confirmed to Kengtung.
The State of Möngpan contains a broad area of good paddy land, and in former times exported large quantities of paddy. When Mr. Hildebrand visited it he found the lands devastated. With the one exception of Laikha it had suffered more than any other Shan State. The town had been repeatedly burnt by filibusters. The great bulk of the population had fled over the Salween and scattered through the smaller States, some even going as far as Chiengmai (Zimme) and Kengtung. Leaving Möngpan, the column reached Möngnai on the 7th of January, 1888, and halted there for some weeks. Möngnai had been the place of assemblage of the Cis-Salween chiefs in the King's time. All of them had been warned in advance to meet Mr. Hildebrand at Möngnai, and all except the Sawbwa of Laikha, the Myozas of Möng Kung and Kehsi Mansam, who had started too late, were present. The chiefs assembled at Möngnai were:—
The Möngnai Sawbwa.
The Möngpawn Sawbwa.
The Möngpan Sawbwa.
The Mawkmai Sawbwa.
The Wanyin Myoza.
The Nawng Wawn Myoza.
The Hsahtung Myoza.
The Möngsit Myoza.
The Möngnawng Myoza.
The Hopong Myoza.
The Keng Hkam Myoza.
The Nam Hkok Myoza.
Naw Möng, son of Naw Hpa, who was claimant of Hsenwi, and Kun Aw, who was Pa-ôk-Chok of Möngyai in Hsenwi Alelet, and had been ejected by San Ton Hon and Hkun Sa, the exiled chief of Möngtung, were also present.
The question of tribute was one in which all took a keen interest, and it was fully discussed. The right of the British Government to demand tribute was not contested. But the manner of it, whether it should be in the form of annual presents or of money to be raised from the people by a house tax, was the subject of dispute. The exemption for ten years which had been given to the Sawbwa of Hsipaw caused much heartburning and led to demands for a similar indulgence.
Eventually, however, all agreed to pay tribute, the amount for the next five years being that which had been paid yearly in King Mindon's time.
The Trans-Salween States from various causes did not appear at Möngnai. But a dispute between Mawkmai and Möngnai regarding the right to a small Trans-Salween State of Möng Pu was settled satisfactorily in favour of Möngnai. Mawkmai's claim had no strong foundation, and after the facts had been set forth, the Sawbwa accepted them and yielded in a peaceable and graceful fashion. It was evident that already the authority of the British Government had been acknowledged by all, and that its decisions would be obeyed.
On the 20th of January Mr. Hildebrand held a Durbar, which all the chiefs, and a very great number of the smaller folk, attended. The draft patents and letters of appointment were given to the chiefs, along with suitable presents, and the advantages of the peace which would follow the establishment of British authority were pointed out to them by the Superintendent in a speech. A march past and a sham-fight by the troops gave them an opportunity of comparing British disciplined and trained troops with their own disorderly and ill-equipped followers. Sports followed the Durbar, affording amusement to all and giving a common ground on which all could unite. The wisdom and the excellent results of holding these meetings cannot be denied.
On the 22nd of January, 1888, the column left Möngnai and started on its way to Möngyai, where it will be recollected (p. 166) it was to meet with the Northern Column and Mr. Daly. The route to be taken on this march had been left by the Chief Commissioner to Mr. Hildebrand's discretion. Is has been seen that the Laikha group of States were not represented at the Durbar. The Superintendent, therefore, instead of taking the route to the east through Möngnawng, which was reputed to be the shorter, took a western road leading through Laikha, Möng Kung, and Kehsi Mansam. It proved to be the easiest route that could have been followed, and showed the troops to as large a number of States as possible.
On the second march out the Sawbwa of Laikha and the Myoza of Möng Kung were met coming to meet the Superintendent. They turned and marched with the column. They said that difficulties in procuring supplies had delayed them, and the truth of this statement was proved by the appearance of the countryside when the next march brought the force into Laikha territory—a wide billowy plain not long ago closely cultivated and well peopled: now deserted and waste. "The face of the land," wrote the Superintendent, "was deserted and desolate as an American pampas or a Russian steppe. We marched along the main north road which had clearly been not long since a wide thoroughfare travelled over by many men and many cattle. Now it was narrowed to a mere path which encroaching bushes and rank grass threatened at no great distance of time altogether to obliterate. Marks of tigers were seen here and there on the clay trodden hard by the feet of many wayfarers now no more to be seen. The few householders who remained were gaunt with hunger, and had not energy enough left to pull up the bamboo spikes which had been placed in the ground during the fighting which was the primary cause of all this misery, emphasized by the famine which succeeded as a necessary result. The Hsen (local headman) spiked his foot coming out to meet the column."
The description of the town of Laikha is not less melancholy. It has been on the decline for years. "Civil wars and local disturbances have ruined it slowly but surely." It was one of the finest and wealthiest places in the State, and there were many splendid monasteries and elaborate pagodas. These were found deserted and falling to pieces, the shrines left to moulder away without a single pious offering, the jungle coming up to their very thresholds and creepers tearing the bricks asunder.
Leaving Laikha on the 30th of January, three marches brought the column to Möngkung, a State blessed with very fertile soil and good streams. But here also local dissension and Burman interference had brought ruin. On the death of the chief (designated Myoza), one Hkun Saing was able by bribery or intrigue to procure an order from Mandalay giving him the succession. The people, however, clung to the rightful heir, the son of the deceased Myoza, a boy of ten or twelve. Hkun Sang persuaded the neighbouring State of Möngnawng to take his part. Kehsi Mansam took the boy's side. Nearly every village in both States was burnt, and the able-bodied men were too absorbed in the fight to till the soil. Ruin and famine followed in the track of the fighting, which did not cease until our troops arrived on the Shan plateau. The only villages to which any prosperity remained were those in the hills inhabited by tribes of a Karen origin who held aloof from Shan politics. At Möngkung the minor chief of Möngsang and Mönghsu came to see the Superintendent. Here also news came that Mr. Daly with the Northern Column had reached Hsenwi and had received from San Ton Hon a promise that he would come to Möngyai. This hopeful information regarding San Ton Hon enabled the Superintendent to issue a proclamation in Shan to the monks, headmen, and elders of Hsenwi, assuring them that a settlement of their affairs would certainly be made and ordering them to attend at Möngyai.
From Möngkung to Kehsi Mansam was four marches through a country marked by the ravages of war. Nevertheless the Myoza, "an undersized, insignificant-looking creature, addicted to the use of opium," was not too depressed to come out fifteen miles to meet the column, which he played into the town with a band of local musicians and dancers leading the way.
Matters relating to some minor States were discussed at Kehsi Mansam, and the peaceful settlement of Hsenwi seemed not distant. But it was sanguine to expect that people who had been engaged in petty wars for years would take suddenly to the ways of peace. The lion does not all at once lie down with the lamb, nor it might be said more appropriately does the jackal make peace with the wild dog. Two days after the arrival of the column at Kehsi Mansam it was reported that an attack had been made on Möngyai and San Ton Hon's deputy driven out. The men who headed this adventure were nephews of the Pa-ôk-Chok and gave out that they were acting for that personage with the Superintendent's approval. As the Pa-ôk-Chok and Naw Möng had accompanied the force ever since it marched from Möngnai, it was feared that this story might seem probable to San Ton Hon and might prevent him from coming to Möngyai. Letters, therefore, were sent to reassure him and to explain that the expulsion of his man from Möngyai would not influence the decision of the Superintendent.
From Kehsi Mansam, passing through the Alelet or Central Division of Hsenwi, the column reached Möngyai on the 15th of February, 1888. Mr. Daly, with the Northern Column, joined Mr. Hildebrand on the 1st of March. Kun San Ton Hon came with him. Meanwhile all the headmen of various denominations, uncouth to English ears, Myozas, Heins, Seins, Ta Möngs, and Kin Möngs, had collected in obedience to the Superintendent's summons, and were busy no doubt in discussing the situation and the best methods of settlement and comparing the present condition of the State broken up into petty divisions, none of them powerful enough for self-defence, with the comparative order which had prevailed when it was under its hereditary Sawbwas, who could show an unbroken succession for two hundred years.
On the 1st of March, when San Ton Hon arrived with Mr. Daly, all the Hsenwi claimants were assembled at Möngyai. Naw Möng—representing his father, Naw Hpa, who was a refugee with the Kachins in the north; Sang Aw, the Pa-ôk-Chok, who claimed the Central Division; and San Ton Hon, who claimed the whole State. Naw Hpa was pronounced on all sides to be too old and infirm to rule. Naw Möng claimed as his heir and representative the whole of Hsenwi, excepting some of the southern subdivisions, which had been given independence in the King's time. His attitude was most reasonable. He confessed his obligations to the British Government. Unless they had occupied Mandalay and removed Thebaw, he and his sister would have been lying still in hopeless imprisonment. He was ready to bow to the Superintendent's decision, whatever it might be. The Pa-ôk-Chok was even more accommodating. He was an old worn man whose only title to be considered in the matter was that he had preserved the peace in the Central Division at a critical time. He would be quite content if he were permitted to administer Möngyai. San Ton Hon, who had no rightful title to any part of Hsenwi, not unnaturally laid claim to all the country that was or had been known by that name. On reflection, however, he adopted an attitude of greater humility and declared his willingness to abide by the decision of the Superintendent.
The points to which the Superintendent's inquiry should be directed had been laid down by the Chief Commissioner in the instructions given him. Amongst other points, such as the history of the several claimants, their sources of influence and their ability and power to govern, the Chief Commissioner had laid stress on the real wishes of the people of Hsenwi as a whole or of such parts of it as should be separately considered. "You should then," he wrote, "pending a full reference to the Chief Commissioner, make such arrangements for the administration of Theinni [Hsenwi] as you deem most fitting, bearing in mind that the great object to be attained is peace in the country. You must not be guided either in your provisional arrangements or in your recommendations solely by considerations of abstract right or abstract justice. You must give great weight to considerations of expediency and keep prominently before your mind that Theinni [Hsenwi] must have strong permanent Government in order to ensure peace and prosperity; and that the chief or chiefs must be both friendly to the British Government and ready and able to give proof of friendship by prompt and powerful action should such be necessary." The question whether the policy should be to unite the country into one large State, or to recognize the divisions into which it had been broken up, was left to Mr. Hildebrand's discretion, but an inclination in favour of the large State was indicated.
It was decided to hold a conference of all the persons interested in this matter and to ascertain, so far as might be possible, the views and wishes of the people. A large (Mandat or) temporary hall was constructed by the Pa-ôk-Chok for the assemblage. On the date fixed, the 3rd of March, 1888, "about fifty headmen of circles, many superiors of monasteries, monks, sidesmen, almoners, and village elders were assembled, while outside gathered great numbers of the common people from all parts of the country. There were also present beside the claimants, representatives of all the chief Southern States and of Hsipaw." In fact, it was an assemblage of all the estates of the realm in the Shan country—the Lords Temporal, the Lords Spiritual, and the Commons. They had come together to assist in deciding by whom and how the Hsenwi territory should be governed. And they had come at the call of a Government which had taken a visible form in the Shan country only a year before, which only two years previously had displaced the King of Burma to whom the Shans had been subject for centuries, and which was still fighting in Burma proper against the adherents of the King. It was certainly an achievement not easily matched in the history of conquests or annexations, and showed the confidence in our power and our justice which a very short experience had been able to create.
It was not a mere show; the people had not assembled themselves to register a foregone decision. The Superintendent was making an honest attempt to ascertain the wishes of all classes. The machinery was rude. But it was quite as likely to succeed in its object as the elaborate devices of advanced democracies which give free play to the arts of false-tongued demagogues and afford them every opportunity of bamboozling electors, most of whom are more ignorant of the issues than the Shans who assembled at Möngyai.
The method adopted for taking the votes was to call upon each head of a circle to record his opinion, and then to take the opinion of the assembly. The first question put was whether Hsenwi should be reunited or whether it should remain divided, and if divided, into how many parts. The opinion against reunion into one State was manifested unmistakably. On the second point there was much discussion, but the result showed a balance, and a large balance, of opinion in favour of two States, North and South. The great majority, when the question of the rulers to be appointed was put, gave the North to San Ton Hon, and the South to Naw Möng. The Pa-ôk-Chok did not press his claim. "On the whole," the report says, "considerable intelligence and a shrewd appreciation of the novel idea of an open election were displayed, and a member of the outside crowd created some amusement by his vigorous championing of San Ton Hon. This unexpected interlude had a very good effect in putting most of the headmen at their ease and in persuading the entire assemblage that the election was a perfectly open matter, and that any one present might give his opinion and his reasons for holding it." The Shans were evidently a primitive people in election matters at least, and had to learn the art of breaking up meetings and silencing opponents.
After electing the Sawbwas of Northern and Southern Hsenwi, the boundary to be fixed between the two divisions was discussed and settled with the acquiescence of San Ton Hon and Naw Möng, but against the views of some of the latter's people, who thought that Southern Hsenwi was shorn of some territory which ought to belong to it.
Further disagreement between the Naw Möng and his people followed when on the second day of the Durbar the amount of revenue to be paid by the two divisions respectively came to be considered. The Naw Möng offered spontaneously to pay the sum formerly paid to the King by the Alelet Division, without making any deduction on account of the circles which the boundary now adopted had given to the Northern territory. This easy attitude of their newly appointed chief caused acute discontent, which afterwards manifested itself. San Ton Hon was a man of different stamp. The Naw Möng had offered a revenue of Rs. 15,000. San Ton Hon made a stand against paying more than Rs. 500. He agreed, after much talking, to pay Rs. 2,000. The Northern Division of Hsenwi was no doubt much poorer at the time than the South. Still the amount was considerably less than the State ought to have paid. The Superintendent, however, thought it wiser to accept it than to risk a rupture with San Ton Hon.
The unequal treatment was impolitic as well as unfair and bred trouble in Southern Hsenwi. A month after the column left Möngyai a rising against Naw Möng was organized by the discontented party, and he had to make his escape by flight. Mr. Daly, who was at Hsipaw, rode out at once with a small party and summoned all the heads of circles to Möngyai. An inquiry was held, the leaders of the revolt were arrested and tried by the Sawbwa of South Hsenwi, and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. New headmen were appointed in place of those condemned. Mr. Daly returned to Hsipaw, and the Naw Möng had no further trouble to contend with. The settlement of Hsenwi made at the Möngyai Durbar has stood the test of time and is a monument to the officers concerned in bringing it about.
Leaving Möngyai on the 7th of March, the column marched to Lashio by easy stages.
Nothing has been said hitherto as to the Northern Shan Column which accompanied Mr. Daly. Mr. Daly had preceded the force to Hsipaw and made arrangements for its progress. He had despatched letters to the Northern chiefs announcing his coming, and reassuring them as to the nature of the movement.
The route laid down for the Northern Shan Column by the Chief Commissioner was from Hsipaw to the northern part of Hsenwi; thence westward to Namhsan, the chief town in Tawngpeng; then back to Hsipaw and from Hsipaw on to Möngyai to meet the Southern Column. No independent powers were given to Mr. Daly, who was to place himself in all political matters under Mr. Hildebrand's orders. He was to act as the precursor of the Superintendent, summoning the chiefs and headmen and explaining to them the objects of Mr. Hildebrand's coming. He was also to collect information as to the state of affairs and the position of the various factions in Hsenwi. He was given authority, however, to insist on the cessation of fighting, and empowered, if the necessity should arise, to use force in maintaining peace. He was empowered also to take action in Tawngpeng for securing the submission of the Sawbwa, and to require him to pay tribute for the past year of such sum as he (Mr. Daly) might judge reasonable, explaining that this payment was exacted because the Sawbwa had harboured disaffected persons.
The Northern Column left Hsipaw on the 29th of December, 1887, and crossed into Tawngpeng territory. All the villages were deserted, and on the 30th of December the advance- and rear-guards were simultaneously fired into. Two mules were killed and a driver wounded. A few volleys into the bush dispersed the attacking party. The town of Namhsam was reached on the 31st. All the inhabitants had disappeared. Mr. Daly remained eight days, in the hope of inducing the Sawbwa to come in, but without success. He was able, however, to restore confidence. The townspeople returned to their houses, and on the march of the column to Hsenwi the villagers on the road watched the troops without concern. The attack on the column was afterwards explained. There was an old standing feud between Tawngpeng and Hsipaw, dating from a treacherous massacre of Tawngpeng officials by the grandfather of Hkun Saing, the Sawbwa of Hsipaw. Mr. Daly had been several weeks in Hsipaw, and a number of Hsipaw bullock-drivers were with the column. This aroused the suspicions of the Tawngpeng officials, and orders were given to oppose any armed men from Hsipaw. However this may have been, the misunderstanding was only for a time.
Mr. Daly then went on to the town of Hsenwi, or rather to the site of the town, for the town had been destroyed, to meet San Ton Hon, who after some hesitation came in to see him and arranged to attend the Conference at Möngyai. The Northern Column then marched east to the Kunlon Ferry on the Salween, to Mansi, where San Ton Hon joined Mr. Daly and accompanied him to Möngyai. Except that the submission of the Tawngpeng Sawbwa had not been obtained owing to his timidity or hostility, the task appointed to the Northern Column had been executed with complete success.
But to go back. After the Durbar was over at Möngyai, the Southern Column, according to its wont, gave a display for the popular delight. On the first day there was a sham-fight, which was viewed with much interest by chiefs and followers; and on the second, garrison sports, which it is related "proved a great attraction and tended in no small degree to bring the troops and the people together and to produce good feeling on both sides."
All hope of meeting any of the great Trans-Salween chiefs was now past. Various causes had prevented them from coming in, amongst others a raid made across their track to Möngnai by the irrepressible Twet Nga Lu, and some mischievous lies spread by Saw Ôn of Yawnghwè regarding the withdrawal of the British forces. Trans-Salween affairs had therefore to be laid aside for a more convenient season. But much useful information was gathered and recorded by the Superintendent and Mr. Scott.
From Lashio the column moved to Panglon, a village on the eastern borders of Tawngpeng territory, to which place the chief had been summoned to meet the Superintendent and make his submission. He did not obey the summons, but sent excuses for his absence alleging age and infirmities, and saying that he wished his son to be accepted as Sawbwa in his room. Two days afterwards this son, entitled the Naw Möng, accompanied by most of the chief officials, came in, and with humble apologies for the attack made on the Northern Column, tendered his allegiance to the British Government. As it appeared that the old Sawbwa was nearly eighty years of age, it was decided to accept the Naw Möng, Hkun Kyan, as chief, and to draw out the sanad, or patent, in his name. This was done, and the amount of revenue to be paid by Tawngpeng was determined. It may be recorded here that Hkun Kyan administered the State for seven years until 1895, when he resigned on account of ill-health. A cousin succeeded him but proved incompetent, and in 1904 a Government officer was put in charge of Tawngpeng. At present, the Sawbwa is administering the State satisfactorily.
Having settled this matter, the column marched into Hsipaw. It is worth noting that Hkun Saing, the chief of Hsipaw, had obtained greater favour from the British Government than any other of the Shan chiefs. The more prominent of them bitterly resented the concessions made to Hkun Saing, namely: the remission of his revenue for ten years and the conferment on him of the three States of Möngtung, Mönglong, and Hsumhsai, to which he had no right. His services to the British Government consisted in this, that he came down to meet the Chief Commissioner at Mandalay and was the first to make his submission to the Queen-Empress. It might have been expected, therefore, that he would have made some show of providing shelter and supplies for the troops. He did nothing. The extraordinary favours which he had received led him to think that he must be necessary to the Government, and he made no effort to prove his gratitude. The gift of Möngtung to Hkun Saing was resented by the inhabitants of that State, who claimed independence and wished to be ruled by their hereditary chief, who had been dismissed by the Sawbwa of Hsipaw. Similar were the feelings of the people of Mönglong, whose hereditary ruler, Nga Maung, gave great trouble to our administration. Mr. Hildebrand worked hard to arrive at some settlement by which peace might be assured. He was unsuccessful, and Möngtung as well as Mönglong was torn by dissension for some years. At length in 1893, owing to this and other administrative failures, a British officer was appointed to advise and guide the Sawbwa Hkun Saing, and by this means peace and order were restored.
On the 9th of April, after a tour of four months and nineteen days, the Southern Shan Column, under Colonel Swetenham, accompanied by Mr. Hildebrand and Mr. Scott, marched into Mandalay. The expedition had done its work well. Every chief, big and little, in the Cis-Salween States had been met and his formal recognition of British supremacy obtained. Long-existing feuds had been set at rest, and claims the subject of prolonged fighting peaceably adjudicated. The revenue payable by each State had been ascertained, and with one or two exceptions definitely fixed. The Southern Column had marched upwards of seven hundred miles, and had passed through the territory of every important chief. The few minor States untraversed by it had been visited either by Captain Jackson, R.E., of the Government of India Survey, or by Lieutenant Stanton, D.S.O., of the Intelligence Department, accompanied in each case by small parties of troops; and by their labours a map had been constructed on which the position of every important place in the Cis-Salween States was scientifically fixed. Moreover, a mass of information regarding the Shan country, its main features and products, and the character and politics of the people, was collected, invaluable to those engaged in administering this wide country.
Pagodas at Mang Kao—Shan States.
If the Shans generally on the west of the Salween have accepted British rule and learned to trust our good faith and moderation, the credit must be given to the work done by the two columns. Although that work was in the main of a civil character, and the military force was there as an escort and a protection in case of need, yet the soldiers deserve quite as great a share of the blessing promised to the peacemaker as the civilians. In building the Indian Empire, soldiers and civilians have always worked hand in hand. In Burma and the Shan States the old tradition was not belied.
The civil officers with the columns recorded their gratitude to Colonel Swetenham and his officers for their unwearying efforts to assist the Superintendent in his communications with the chiefs and the people. But more than that: "It remains to be noted," writes Mr. Scott, "that this desire to aid the Superintendent in his duties was no less conspicuous among the native officers, and the men, alike of the 2nd Queen's, the Battery, and the 27th Punjab Infantry. The native officers in particular took a most intelligent and evidently real interest in the objects of the expedition. They not only succeeded in suppressing all crime and ill-treatment of the people by the sepoys and followers, but they were foremost in showing the example of friendly and social intercourse with the people. Nearly every one in the regiment had picked up during their two years' stay in Burma a certain amount of Burmese; to this was added a few words of Shan; and these used freely on all occasions, whether apposite or not, never failed to break down the nervousness and awe with which the population was at first disposed to regard us. Whenever we halted for any time, friendships were struck up between the troops and the people, and that the goodwill and esteem thus created was not merely superficial or assumed was more than once proved in the most satisfactory manner. Followers were lost or strayed away from the camp. In every case these animals or men were taken care of, fed, and in some cases clothed and physicked and eventually sent on to join the column." A further proof of the friendliness of the people was the immunity of the mails from detention or pillage. Although sent without guards by native runners, they were invariably delivered after passing sometimes through many States and many hands. "If, therefore," concludes Mr. Scott, "as there can be no doubt is the case, the Cis-Salween States have definitely and thankfully accepted our suzerainty, no small share of the credit of our success is due to the exertions of the officers of the Shan Column."
In dealing with semi-savage and ignorant races, the power of rumour and misrepresentation can hardly be overestimated. When the Shans saw that the Southern Column left no detachment behind it at Möngnai, and instead of returning from Hsenwi to Fort Stedman marched down to Mandalay, rumour began to be busy and the ignorant imagination of the people to seek reasons for this movement. Ready at hand to supply food for fancy was Saw Ôn, the Yawnghwè Sawbwa. An intriguer and gossip by nature, he sat down to write letters to all the greater chiefs, informing them that the garrison at Fort Stedman had been reduced to forty men. This advanced person had already begun to take in some of the Rangoon papers and to read the telegrams, which he could not understand but from which he contrived to extract the notion that there was going to be a European war and that the British were withdrawing their troops from Burma, to which the notices in the papers of troops leaving in the course of the ordinary reliefs seemed to point. These letters reached men even more ignorant than himself. The impression gained ground that the British power was passing, and the disappointed claimants, the adventurers, and the men with a grievance saw an opportunity for action.
It will be remembered that the chief of Eastern Karenni had not met Mr. Hildebrand at Möngnai. The country of the Karenni, or Red Karens, has an area of nearly five thousand square miles, much of which is hill and forest. On the east it is bounded by Siamese territory; on the north by the Shan States; on the south by Lower Burma; and on the west by a hill tract which separates it from the level country of Burma proper. It is divided into Eastern Karenni and Western Karenni. We are concerned at present with the former, which consists of one single State, Gantarawadi. The ruler of this State was Sawlapaw. He resided at the chief place, Saw Lon, and he is aptly described by Mr. Scott as a stubborn man from his youth, who had grown old in the belief that his country was impregnable and his people in their hills invincible. He was confirmed in this unfounded belief by the extraordinary timidity and cowardice of the Shans, who habitually submitted to be raided and robbed, and to see their people carried away into slavery by this overbearing savage and his men.
Now Sawlapaw had a long-standing grievance with the adjoining Shan State of Mawkmai. The cause, or the alleged cause, was the seizure by the Sawbwa of Mawkmai, twenty-two years before, of a number of elephants and timber in Karenni forests. He had endeavoured to get redress from the Burmese Government twice, but without success. The Burmese Government had disappeared, and now he had seen a British force come and go, he was told for good and all. He thought his opportunity had come, and advanced on Mawkmai. The Sawbwa of that State, by name Hkun Hmon, had a bad conscience. His father, Ne Nwe, the man whom Sawlapaw accused of robbing him of his elephants, had died some time back. According to Shan custom Hkun Hmon ought to have buried his father and divided the personality amongst certain relations who were entitled to it. Shan custom demanded that the burial should precede the payment of the legacies. Hkun Hmon disliking the idea of parting with the property, put off the burial indefinitely, making, it may be hoped, some sort of decent, if temporary, shelter for his father's body, by placing it, for example, in a coffin of teak with a generous covering of honey.
Now the principal legatees were in Möngnai, and were connections of the Möngnai Sawbwa. Hence the "Smock-faced" Hkun Hmon, as Mr. Scott dubs him, when he heard of the Karenni force advancing upon him, knowing that Möngnai and the Karenni chief were allies, became conscience-stricken; and, imagining that a combined attack would be made on him, fled without raising a finger to defend himself. The Karenni entered Mawkmai on the 2nd of March without let or hindrance. They proceeded to burn the town and ravage the country. They destroyed everything. Even the monasteries and bridges were burnt. The Mawkmai Valley, which up to that time had escaped devastation and was the only part of the Shan States that had been spared, was completely ruined. Sawlapaw then appointed a man of his own to be Sawbwa of Mawkmai, and declared the State to be annexed to Karenni. Hitherto Eastern Karenni had been treated with much forbearance by the Chief Commissioner—more, perhaps, because it was inconvenient to move against it just then than from a desire to spare Sawlapaw.
Mr. Scott, after returning to Mandalay with the Southern Shan Column (see p. 180), had hurried back by the Natteik Pass to Fort Stedman. Late in April the Chief Commissioner sent him orders to clear the Karenni out of Mawkmai and restore the rightful Sawbwa, Hkun Hmon. He left Fort Stedman on the 2nd of May, with a party under Colonel Sartorius of the Beleuchi Regiment, to execute these orders.
The same influences which had led Sawlapaw to go on the warpath, at this moment had operated on the energetic mind of Twet Nga Lu. Since his expulsion from Kengtawng by the Möngnai troops (vide p. 168) he had remained on the east of the Salween, and had collected a number of his ruffianly followers who had been able to get arms and powder from Chiengmai. Crossing the river he took the town of Möngpan on the 4th of March, the day after the Karenni's seizure of Mawkmai.
The news of these disturbances had reached Mr. Hildebrand at Hsipaw. He had sent orders to the Möngnai Sawbwa to collect men to expel Twet Nga Lu and to reinstate Hkun Hmon in Mawkmai. Hkun Kyi raised what men he could and attacked Twet Nga Lu's position, but he was defeated, followed up by the bandit, and had to seek safety in flight. This happened on the evening of the 3rd of May.
On the 6th of May fugitives from Möngnai brought the news of this catastrophe to Mr. Scott, who was en route to Mawkmai with Colonel Sartorius. There was no hesitation. The direction of the march was at once changed to Möngnai. Mr. Scott saw at once the lucky chance offered to him of making an end of Twet Nga Lu. On the 9th of May a halt was made at Kanglu, nine miles west of Möngnai. The morning of the 10th of May was very wet, which rendered a surprise of the enemy more possible. Mr. Scott had studied the ground when he was with the Southern Column, and felt able to guide a mounted party in the hope of capturing the noted filibuster. There was no Mounted Infantry with the column. All the officers' ponies were requisitioned. Six men of the Rifle Brigade and one man of the Beleuchi Regiment were thus mounted; and under the command of Lieutenant Fowler of the Beleuchis, and led by Mr. Scott, the little party started on the adventure.
Following bypaths over the hills, they escaped notice, and the heavy rain falling kept most of the peasants under shelter. The town was entered by the south. Mr. Scott, knowing the ground, led them straight to the Sawbwa's haw—palace is too grand a name—a teak and bamboo structure with a stockade round it. Evidently the brigand felt quite secure. Hardly any one was about, and Twet Nga Lu himself was in bed in the verandah. He was seized and secured before he quite knew what had happened. This could not be done, however, without some noise, which brought in an armed crowd of his chief retainers. Mr. Scott ordered them peremptorily to sit down, which is the Burmese equivalent of "Hands up!" They hesitated. A straight blow between the eyes dropped the foremost. The rest sat down at once, and before they had time to count their opponents or take stock of the situation, the riflemen had collected their arms. An anxious and rather bad time followed until firing was heard, and the gallant little advance party knew that their supports had come into action. Colonel Sartorius entered the town from the north, and after a slight engagement, in which four of the ruffians were killed, the town was cleared of the armed rabble which had held it.
Along with Twet Nga Lu were taken six notable captains, the chief of whom was Hkun Sang Möng Cheng, his most trusted bravo, for years a terror to the hillside for his cruelty. He and Twet Nga Lu were famous for their powers of tattooing and charming, and all of them were universally believed to be proof against bullet or steel. Mr. Scott decided to let the Möngnai Sawbwa try them, all except Twet Nga Lu, according to Shan custom. The Sawbwa sentenced them to death, and after the Superintendent had considered and confirmed the sentence, they were shot on a crowded market-day in Möngnai, by a firing-party of Beleuchi Rifles. The executions were carried out in the presence of British officers and with every regard to humanity and decency. No greater scoundrels have ever met with a more deserved punishment. "All these malefactors," records the Superintendent, "were charmed against bullet and sword wound, and news of their death spread like wildfire throughout the States, and has done much to reform previously incorrigible murderers."
Twet Nga Lu himself was sent into Fort Stedman, presumably as being too noted a personage to be dealt with by a Sawbwa. The Shan States, on the annexation of Upper Burma, had been swept into the net and were constituted a part of British India before accurate information had been gained of their political conditions and their relations to the King's Government. On this account there were technical difficulties in the way of a trial by the Superintendent. The Chief Commissioner's orders to the Assistant Superintendent were in these words: "As to the prisoners, including Twet Nga Lu, send such as are Siamese subjects or natives of doubtful States in custody to Fort Stedman; make over natives of British Shan States to Möngnai Sawbwa for trial and punishment according to Shan custom—but do not allow any cruel or barbarous punishments. Take care that Twet Nga Lu does not effect his escape. If the Möngnai Sawbwa sentences any prisoner to death for an offence other than murder, suspend execution until you get orders on this point." Mr. Hildebrand was instructed therefore to send Twet Nga Lu back to Möngnai to be tried by the Sawbwa. On the way he attempted to escape, and was shot by the Beleuchi guard escorting him. The men returned to Fort Stedman and reported what had happened, saying that they had buried him on the spot.
It was desired to verify this statement, as there might have been trouble if the brigand had escaped, or even if the Shans had not believed him to have been killed. Unfortunately Mr. Scott, who was at Möngnai, was too unwell to go to the place, and did not visit it for some time. When he was able to go he found the marks of a very shallow hole, but no human remains of any kind except a long lock of hair, which might have been Twet Nga Lu's. The Shans, however, all believed that Twet Nga Lu was dead, and there was no reason to discredit the report of the Beleuchi sepoys.
All doubt on this point was removed afterwards. The scene of the brigand's death was in the wooded hills which border Möngpawn. The day after he was shot a party of Shans from Möngpawn disinterred, or rather lifted, the corpse from its shallow grave, and shook off the loose earth. The head was cut off, shaved, and sent to Möngnai, and exhibited there at the north, south, east, and west gates of the town during the absence of the Assistant Superintendent at Fort Stedman. The various talismans were removed from the trunk and limbs. Such charms are generally small coins or pieces of metal, which are inserted under the skin. These would be doubly prized as having been enshrined in the flesh of so noted a leader, and no doubt were eagerly bought up. The body was then boiled down, and a concoction known to the Shans as Mahè Si was obtained, which is an unfailing charm against all kinds of wounds. So valuable a "medicine" did not long remain in the hands of the poor, and soon found its way into some princely medicine-chest. The value attached to the fat of the tiger, and the demand for it by men of greater culture than the Shans could or can boast, are known to all Indian sportsmen. Such was the end of Twet Nga Lu. It was certainly, so far as the body is concerned, most complete.
CHAPTER XVII
THE KARENNIS, OR RED KARENS, AND SAWLAPAW
It has been told how Mr. Scott was on his way to Mawkmai, when Twet Nga Lu's enterprise caused him to turn his course to Möngnai. He now returned to the original object of his expedition, namely, the expulsion of the Karennis from Mawkmai and the restoration of the Sawbwa Hkun Hmon, whom they had expelled. He reached Mawkmai with the force under Colonel Sartorius on the 16th of May, 1888, and found that the Karennis had not awaited his coming. Mawkmai was occupied, and Sawbwa Hkun Hmon reinstated. Colonel Sartorius returned to Fort Stedman with the main portion of his command, leaving, in accordance with the instructions given to him, a hundred and fifty rifles, under Lieutenant Fowler, at Mawkmai, which was considered to be the most fitting post for the civil officer and his escort.
Mawkmai being only a long march of twenty-five miles from Möngnai, a detachment of twenty-five rifles was thought enough to support the Sawbwa, and in June, Hkun Hmon reported that the Karennis had quitted his country. All seemed to have settled down. The Superintendent did not hesitate, therefore, to call Mr. Scott to Fort Stedman for various business matters. Mr. Scott reached Fort Stedman on the 28th of June, and reported that all was well. Lieutenant Fowler was at that time in Mawkmai. On the 1st of July he moved his headquarters to Möngnai, leaving the detachment of twenty-five rifles to garrison Mawkmai. The Karennis, it may be presumed, were watching his movements, for on the 3rd of July, in the evening, a body of Karennis attempted to rush the town. They were repulsed, but kept up a fire on the defenders until long after dark. The twenty-five Beleuchis, seconded by the Sawbwa and his armed rabble, returned the fire and inflicted some loss on the enemy, who had withdrawn to a short distance. Considering it unsafe, after this experience, to leave Mawkmai with so small a detachment, Lieutenant Fowler moved his headquarters back to that place.
The monsoon was now in full force. With roads of the most primitive kind and swollen rivers, rapid travelling was difficult. Mr. Scott left Fort Stedman as soon as the news of what had happened reached him. Leaving his baggage to make what speed it could, he rode on and arrived at Mawkmai half-starved and dressed in some Shan garments which he had borrowed on the way to replace his dripping clothes, only to find that the fighting was over. Lieutenant Fowler, learning that the enemy had taken up a position within a day's march of Mawkmai, went straight for them, carried their entrenchments at the point of the bayonet, and drove them out with a loss to them of sixty men. This experience ought to have diminished the arrogance of Sawlapaw. He was very little moved by it. He wrote on the 13th of July in the most royal style, requesting the withdrawal of British troops from Mawkmai lest they should be "accidentally harmed" by his men when he attacked Hkun Hmon. This letter was returned to Sawlapaw's messengers by the Chief Commissioner's orders. A letter written in August, in which he explained his claims against Mawkmai, and asserted that he did not know the relations of that State to the British Government, was dealt with in the same way. Both these letters were written in a style that was inconsistent with the position of the Karenni chief, and they meant defiance.
In July, 1888, the matter was referred to the Government of India, and their sanction was received in August to demand from Sawlapaw compensation for the damage done to Mawkmai and securities for his future good behaviour, and to enforce these demands if they were not complied with.
In September, as the Karenni chief showed no signs of yielding, or willingness to meet Mr. Hildebrand, the Chief Commissioner prepared and placed in the Superintendent's hands an ultimatum in the following terms: Sawlapaw was required firstly to come in to Fort Stedman, and there make in person his submission as a chief subordinate to the Queen-Empress. Secondly, to pay an indemnity of two lakhs of rupees to cover the damage done to Mawkmai and the cost of the expedition sent to relieve that State; thirdly, to surrender five hundred serviceable muskets; lastly, to covenant to pay annually a tribute of five thousand rupees to the British Government. This ultimatum was placed in the Superintendent's (Mr. Hildebrand's) hands, but he was instructed to withhold it until November, and meanwhile to endeavour by all possible means to persuade Sawlapaw to come to terms.
In October it seemed as if the Karenni chief was beginning to have some misgivings. He adopted a tone of humility and apology, which led Mr. Hildebrand to hope for a peaceful ending. To make it easier for him, a reduction of the indemnity and of the number of the guns to be surrendered was allowed to Sawlapaw if he made his personal submission without delay. Later on, at Mr. Hildebrand's request, the Chief Commissioner allowed Mawkmai to be substituted for Fort Stedman as the place to which the chief should come, so that he should have a very short distance to travel beyond his own borders. On November 16th, as the obstinate chief showed no signs of yielding, the ultimatum was despatched. On the 17th a letter was received by the Superintendent bearing the date of November 5th. This letter, which had been written in a much more friendly tone, had been delayed en route. In it Sawlapaw proposed that Mr. Hildebrand should meet him at Loikaw on December 14th, accompanied "by a small escort," so that the people "should not be alarmed." "The reason," he added, "why I propose Loikaw is that at present I am like a mother with her child in her arms; she has to be with it always in order to prevent it crying; my people will feel my absence if I go to Fort Stedman." Mr. Hildebrand was permitted to accede to this request, provided Sawlapaw brought with him the two lakhs of rupees and the five hundred muskets required by the ultimatum. As an alternative the chief was told that if before the 14th of December he sent in the money and arms to Fort Stedman, to prove his good faith, the date for his personal submission at Loikaw would be postponed to the 1st of January, 1889. These concessions, which were made in the hope of avoiding a conflict, led to nothing except, perhaps, the hardening of Sawlapaw's heart. To leave the shelter of his own territory, and present himself before a foreign potentate whom he is conscious of having offended, was a hard thing to ask of a half-civilized ruler. But there was no evidence that Sawlapaw had any honest intention of submitting. He was said on all sides to be preparing to resist us. It is just possible that if the Superintendent had been allowed further latitude he might have persuaded the Karenni to make some sort of apology. To the Chief Commissioner it appeared absolutely necessary, as an example, to insist on open and unmistakable personal submission.
Group of Red Karens.
During all these negotiations, preparations for the expedition had been going on. It was expected that the main strength of Sawlapaw's resistance would be on his northern boundary. He would in all likelihood raid the districts of Lower Burma on his south; or, if he were hard pressed, he might try to escape in that direction, or he might cross into his own territory on the east of the Salween. It was settled, therefore, that there should be two columns. The main force, which was to make the real attack and to occupy Sawlôn, the capital of Eastern Karenni, was to concentrate at Saga, thirty-six miles south of Fort Stedman, on the 27th of December. The other was to travel up by the Salween viâ Papun, and march on Bawlaké in Western Karenni. Its duty was to cover the districts of Lower Burma, and at the same time to distract the attention of the enemy and also prevent his retreat southward. The command of this force was given to Colonel Harvey. To meet any attempt on Sawlapaw's part to escape eastward, a suggestion made by the British representative at Bangkok that the Siamese might be asked to co-operate had been accepted in August, and no further measure in this direction was thought necessary.
With Colonel Harvey were one hundred rifles of the Cheshire Regiment and one hundred and fifty rifles of the 8th Madras Infantry. Fifty rifles of the latter regiment had been advanced to Papun early in November, and the frontier posts of that district, which were held by Gurkha and Karen (Lower Burma) police, were reinforced. At the same time, in order to bring pressure to bear upon Sawlapaw and the Karennis, who depend to a large extent on imported food, a blockade was established and all exports from British territories stopped.
On the 7th of December Mr. Hildebrand reported that the Mawkmai Sawbwa had received letters from Sawlapaw announcing his intention to fight. On the 10th of December he telegraphed from Mobye that there was no hope of a peaceful solution. Lest an advance from the south should endanger a settlement, Colonel Harvey had been held back by the Chief Commissioner's orders. On the receipt of Mr. Hildebrand's telegram from Mobye, he was ordered to cover the frontier of the Salween district, arranging to reach Bawlaké on the date on which the Northern Column hoped to occupy Sawlôn. Colonel Harvey arrived at Papun on the 19th of December. Two days previously Kyaukhnyat, a village on the Salween River north-east of Papun, was attacked by a considerable number of Karennis. The village was burnt and the bazaar plundered under the eyes of the police, who were content to defend their own post. The delay, intended to avoid bloodshed, resulted, as often happens, in encouraging the enemy to strike the first blow. Another post was also attacked about the same time. As a precaution Colonel Harvey was strengthened by the addition of fifty British and one hundred Madras Rifles, and moved from Papun to Bawlaké on the 26th of December. Pazaung, a stockade held by Karennis, was taken without difficulty, and as that place offered a favourable position for covering the frontier of Lower Burma, Colonel Harvey remained there until he heard of the occupation of Sawlôn. The bulk of his column then returned to their quarters, leaving some Madras Rifles to strengthen the police outposts for a time.
The Northern Column was commanded by Brigadier-General H. Collett, C.B. It was composed of the following troops:—
2 guns, No. 1 Mountain Battery, Bengal.
100 rifles, 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade.
250 rifles, 1st Beluchi Light Infantry.
4 signallers and 40 Mounted Infantry, Rifle Brigade.
70 Mounted Infantry, 1st Beluchi Light Infantry.
25 Queen's Own, sappers and miners, with medical and commissariat staff.
On the 19th of December final orders were communicated to Mr. Hildebrand by wire. They prescribed the course to be followed in each of the possible cases that might arise, while at the same time allowing him a wide discretion in arranging the details. The main points on which the Chief Commissioner insisted were that the East Karenni chief should make his submission in an unmistakable fashion, and give substantial guarantees for his future good conduct. Accordingly, whether Sawlapaw met Mr. Hildebrand at Loikaw or not, the Superintendent, with the column, was to proceed to Sawlôn, and there arrange the conditions on which he was to retain his position as a feudatory chief, of which open personal submission was the most essential.
The instructions then proceeded as follows: "If your march is opposed by armed force, the nature of the measures to be taken will be a military question, to be decided by the officer commanding; except on purely military grounds of urgent necessity, the Chief Commissioner does not wish villages to be burnt; in no case must villages be sacked. Your object should be to show the people that our quarrel is not with them, but with Sawlapaw. Loikaw should not be destroyed, unless the officer commanding thinks it necessary on military grounds. You should remain at Sawlôn till the future administration is settled. If you are forced to turn out Sawlapaw, it will be necessary for you to stay there till you receive the Chief Commissioner's orders on your recommendations; this may involve delay, but it cannot be avoided. It is desirable to humble Sawlapaw, and ensure his peaceful behaviour in future; but very undesirable to cause him to fly and leave the country in confusion. The object is to keep him in a friendly, subordinate alliance. You have liberty, if he submits, to mitigate the terms to such extent as you may think necessary to secure his future friendship, and to let him see that we have no desire to harm him. If he does not submit, it will be necessary to punish him."
The terms and tenor of these orders will suffice to show that although the Chief Commissioner had little expectation of the peaceful settlement still hoped for by Mr. Hildebrand, he was anxious to avoid a conflict. It appeared to him that further delays and concessions could only result in encouraging Karenni arrogance, and would be misunderstood by others. There were military reasons, moreover, for finishing the business quickly and letting the troops return from the field.
General Collett, having assembled his force at Saga, left that place on the 29th for Sawlôn, Sawlapaw's capital. His route lay by Loikaw. As far as Nga Kaing, a village one march from that place, a good road had been cleared and bridged by the Sawbwa of Yawnghwè, the Myoza of Saga, and in that portion of it which passed through Sawlapaw's territory by Karennis acting under the instructions of the Mobye Sawbwa. On the part of the peasantry there was no enmity towards us.
The road for some way before reaching Nga Kaing passed through scrub jungle, which gave an enemy every chance of annoying the troops. Nothing, however, occurred, and on the 1st of January, 1889, the force debouched into the wide open paddy plain of Karenni without being molested. While the camp was being pitched, the Beleuchi Scouts, who were exploring some wooded ground near the village, were fired upon. They were immediately joined by the Beleuchi Mounted Infantry, under Lieutenant Tighe. The enemy, driven through the wood and compelled to break cover, attempted to make for the high ground; but, our men getting between them and the hills, forced them into the plain. They numbered two or three hundred, most of them Shans under two of Sawlapaw's officials, and were not without courage. Several times they turned and stood to face their pursuers; but, ill-armed and without discipline, they had not a chance. The threescore of Mounted Infantry broke them up, rode them down, and drove them almost up to Loikaw, eight miles distant, inflicting heavy loss. Some of them, seeing escape to be hopeless, turned fiercely on their enemies, and the Beleuchis lost four killed and seven wounded in the pursuit.
There was little chance for a combatant soldier to gain distinction against such a foe. Captain Crimmin, of the Indian Medical Service (Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel John Crimmin, V.C., C.I.E.), was awarded a Victoria Cross for gallantry in this action.
General Collett pressed on at once with a portion of his force, in order to complete the rout. He reached Loikaw after dark, and found it deserted.
Loikaw consisted of two parts, inhabited by two separate communities, the one of Shans, the other of Karens. The latter was quite deserted. But the Shans sent out a mission with green leaves, the equivalent of a flag of truce, to welcome our people, and did what they could to make the bivouac on the ground north of the village comfortable for them. Thus the night of New Year's Day saw General Collett with Mr. Hildebrand and a part of the force occupying Loikaw, while the remainder of the troops and the baggage were in the rear at Nga Kaing. On the next day, the 2nd of January, General Collett halted, to allow the rest of the column and the baggage to come up. The difficulty of moving even five hundred men in this country, destitute as it was of supplies for British and Indian soldiers, and equally destitute of roads, was great. The transport bullocks numbered thirteen hundred; there were ponies and elephants and camp followers innumerable. The 3rd of January was taken up in getting the column ferried across a stream named the Balu, which runs below Loikaw, and is eighty yards wide and unfordable.
While the soldiers were thus occupied the Superintendent used the delay to distribute a proclamation issued by the Chief Commissioner, explaining why the force had entered the Karenni country, and promising that the peaceful inhabitants should suffer no harm. The result of this was that some of the elders came in to ask for flags or other tokens which they might use to show that their villages were not hostile. The peasants generally had left their homes, they said, and fled to the hills, and would not return unless they had some assurance of safety. Mr. Hildebrand, therefore, having found in the baggage some red cloth, made flags and gave them to the elders for distribution. Before the evening of the 3rd people were returning in numbers to their homes, and applications for red flags came in from all sides. When the force continued its march flags were found placed on the paths leading up to villages from the main track.
Sawlôn was found to be four marches from Loikaw. On the 4th General Collett began to move, and encamped at Kawpiti, where trees had been felled and thrown across the road, and the advance-guard of Mounted Infantry was fired on. Our men replied, and the enemy, having suffered some loss, retreated. Some villagers came up with a red flag to warn our men that the jungle on either side of the road had been spiked, as Sawlapaw had taken measures to oppose us. The warning was useful, and only one pony was injured.
On the 5th the ferry on the Pon Chaung River, at a place called Tilanga, was reached. There had been no opposition hitherto, but directly the scouts appeared on the river bank fire was opened on them from the other side, a distance of one hundred and fifty yards. There was a village on the far bank from which the shots came. Our men returned the fire, but, as it seemed, with no effect. The guns were brought up, and two shells were dropped into the village, and set it on fire. All resistance then ended; but the river had to be crossed. Empty rum casks had been brought with the force, and the sappers began to make rafts. The river, however, was deep and rapid, and the attempt to cross the force on rafts had to be given up. The enemy had removed and concealed their boats. A close search was made for them, and six or seven were discovered. A ford at some little distance was found practicable for elephants, and amongst the Shans who followed the force sufficient skilled boatmen were found to man the boats. On the next day, the 6th of January, General Collett began to cross his men, and by the evening the whole force was on the other side of the Pon Chaung. The elephants and boatmen were exhausted, and could do no more that day, while all the commissariat bullocks and their loads still remained to be brought across the stream.
On the 7th, leaving a guard for the bullocks and baggage which had not crossed, the main force pushed on. The road now became very difficult. It narrowed down to a steep path, on the east side of which rose abruptly a range of rocky hills, on the west side ran the Pon Chaung, with its tangled jungle, affording the best of cover to an enemy. The ascent was sometimes severe. Small parties of the enemy were concealed on the slopes of the hills at short distances, and occasional shots were fired from the opposite bank of the river. An enemy with more knowledge or better arms might have made the advance very difficult. As it was, the hillsides on our left had to be searched and cleared before the main body could pass. It was dusk before Sakangyi, about six miles from the last bivouac, was reached. The casualties were one man in the Rifle Brigade killed and one wounded; two Beleuchis severely wounded; and Surgeon Manders shot through the thigh.
During the night the baggage came slowly in. The last bullock was not in camp until several hours after sunrise. The enemy made no attempt to annoy the baggage or the rear-guard. Leaving on the 8th, as soon as the men had breakfasted and the rear-guard was in camp, the force worked its way on in the same manner as on the day before. Firing went on incessantly, but the flanking parties of Beleuchis did their work perfectly. The woods within range were thoroughly beaten and cleared of the enemy, and the force passed through the defile (capturing two guns, both mounted on carriages, on the hilltop) and entered the more open country without a casualty.
Sawlôn was now in view. The Beleuchis, under Colonel Sartorius (Colonel George Conrad, C.B.), were sent forward at once to occupy the town, which stands on a plateau some three hundred feet above the river. It was found to be quite deserted. The rest of the column encamped on the bank of the river below.
It may be well here to give some account of Sawlôn, the capital of the Red Karen country, as it was in January, 1889. It stands on some high ground about a mile to the east of the Pon Chaung. The hills at this point rise by three steps, the first and second of which open out into two small plateaux. The town is on the first step. To those looking at it as the force left the defile, it appeared to consist of a few huts. On ascending the hill, however, it was found to be well laid out, and to contain some really fine houses. Three broad streets ran through the town parallel to each other, and were crossed at right angles by connecting roads of lesser width. There was an excellent water-supply. A stream from the plateau above the town had been led down the face of an almost perpendicular rock, and formed a very picturesque waterfall. On reaching the level it flowed through the town from east to west. The channel which carried the main supply was substantially bridged in each of the main streets. On both sides of every street in the town were smaller channels, fed from the parent stream. The watercourses were all carefully lined with teak to prevent erosion. Posts with glass lamps stood before the houses of the better class. Here and there in the main street a perambulator was seen standing, where it had been left when the people fled. A box in Sawlapaw's storehouse was found full of babies' bottles, together with a very large stock of arrowroot. Evidently the younger generation of the Karennis inclined towards the luxuries of the West.
The chief, however, was said to stand on the ancient ways, rarely quitting his house, except to climb to his paddy-fields above the town, which he worked with his own hands like an ordinary peasant. His haw, or palace, however, gave some signs of his rank—a large old rambling house of teak, inside a teak palisade, with a smaller house for his wife in the same enclosure; a stable close by, with loose-boxes for four ponies, well built of teak, with iron-barred windows, and raised about three feet above the ground. Teak timber, which formed the wealth of the State, was lying about everywhere. The road leading up from the river to the town was littered with fine logs. It seemed that there would be little difficulty in recovering the indemnity demanded from Sawlapaw. Near the palace was an immense timber-yard with four sheds; in each shed were four saws. The yard was full of timber sawn and in the rough. The converted timber was methodically stacked in wooden frames round the yard, each frame containing the same cubic measurement of timber, so that there was no need to count the pieces. The palace was by no means the finest house in the town; that of Sawlawi, the Kya Maing, or heir-apparent, was especially good. A monastery and a rest-house, of great solidity and excellent workmanship, with very good carving, stood a little way off.
With the occupation of Sawlôn the active military operations ended. The work of Mr. Hildebrand was only now beginning, and it was difficult and perplexing. Sawlapaw had disappeared, and if the people knew his whereabouts, none would tell. Little was known of the inner politics of the Karenni State. If the old chief chose to hide himself and let the case go against him by default, who was to be appointed in his room? It will be remembered that in the instructions given to Mr. Hildebrand, the possibility of having to supersede Sawlapaw was contemplated, and Mr. Hildebrand was definitely told that he was to remain in Sawlôn until the future administration had been settled and the Chief Commissioner's orders received. In a private letter the Chief Commissioner wrote: "In the alternative of Sawlapaw running away and leaving the country without a governor, you must find some one to take his place. I do not want Karenni left on my own hands. You have had so much practice in king-making that I need say no more."
Mr. Hildebrand's difficulties were much increased by the announcement of the General in command, that the column must leave Sawlôn on the 23rd of January, to return to Fort Stedman, as the rations were insufficient for a longer stay. The task before him was no easy one in any case. That he should be able to effect a settlement of Karenni affairs in a fortnight was too much to hope. There was a risk that the object of the expedition might be frustrated, and that the work would have to be done over again. General Collett consented to send for a supply of rations to meet the column at Mobye, to enable him to remain at Sawlôn until the 30th of January. It is not known on whom the responsibility rested for arrangements which might easily have made the expedition fruitless.
There was no possibility of laying the matter before the Chief Commissioner and obtaining his orders. Mr. Hildebrand, therefore, took the risk on himself and set to work at once to find Sawlapaw if possible; failing that, to select some one in his room. As a first step a proclamation was issued calling upon Sawlapaw to appear before the 18th of January, and stating that if he did not come in a successor would be appointed to take charge of his State pending the Chief Commissioner's orders. At the same time the people generally were invited to come to Sawlôn to confer with Mr. Hildebrand and advise him on the choice of the man to be appointed, in case Sawlapaw did not appear.
Meanwhile it was as well to acquire some knowledge of the feelings of the people. The Superintendent's camp was moved up to the (Pongyi Kyaung) monastery, and by constant intercourse with monks and people their confidence was won, and an idea of the causes that had led to Sawlapaw's flight was formed. The disaster suffered by his men at Nga Kaing village on the 1st of January had convinced Sawlapaw that further opposition to our advance was hopeless. But there was a war party in the State of which one Naw Maing of Loikaw was the head. The measures taken to resist the force were the work of this party. On the 5th of January the smoke of the Tilanga village on the Pon Chaung was seen at Sawlôn. The chief then made up his mind. He told those who wished to remain to do as they pleased. For himself he would leave Sawlôn and would never come back. He took his wife and a few followers, and, forbidding any one else to come after him, he went to the upper plateau above the town, where he had another house, and was not seen again in Sawlôn. No one would tell whither he went.
Thereupon the Shan villagers (there was a Shan community in Sawlôn) went to the Pongyi and moved him to head a deputation to the officers with the British force. On the morning of the 6th, with two red flags and the customary green boughs, the party set out to meet the British who were expected to arrive at Sawlôn that day. When they did not arrive, thinking the delay was on account of Sunday, the deputation returned to the town. On the evening of the 6th General Collett's force was encamped beside the Pon Chaung. A few Beleuchi Mounted Infantry Scouts were sent on to reconnoitre the road. At the entry of the defile they were fired on by some Karennis, and one of the ponies was killed. They retreated without stopping to recover the saddle. The Karennis, taking the saddle from the dead pony, went back to Sawlôn in triumph, displaying their spoil and declaring that the enemy were few in number and had retreated. This put new spirit into the war party, and the peace deputation dissolved. On the 7th, when it was reported that the British were advancing in force, every one left the town, and it was found deserted, as has been already told. In two or three days, however, most of the people, Shans and Karens, had returned to their homes.
There appeared to be little chance of inducing Sawlapaw to make his appearance. The day fixed for Sawlapaw's surrender was the 18th of January. On the 17th a deputation representing the chief men of three of the largest communities came to Mr. Hildebrand and begged for further days of grace and a written safe-conduct for Sawlapaw. Both requests were granted. Furthermore, a promise was given that if he would come in and fulfil the conditions of the ultimatum, he would be confirmed in his position as head of the Karenni State. The date for the appearance of Sawlapaw, or, failing this, the election of his successor, was postponed until the 25th.
Mr. Hildebrand was assured that the Kya Maing, or heir-apparent, who was a nephew of Sawlapaw, would appear as a candidate for election. The 25th, the 26th, and the 27th passed, but no Kya Maing. The long-suffering patience of the Superintendent was exhausted. Fate, in the form of commissariat supplies, demanded a settlement before the 30th. Just as arrangements were being made for an election, a note was brought in from the Kya Maing to the effect that he was on his way to Sawlôn from his hiding-place in the jungle, but had broken down, footsore and weary. He promised to appear on the next day. As the people earnestly besought that his prayer might be granted, and as it was evident to the Superintendent that this man, as heir to Sawlapaw and acceptable to the people, was the right man to take charge of the State, and as moreover one of the wealthiest men in the State gave security to the amount of Rs. 20,000 that he would produce the Kya Maing, the proceedings were postponed until the morrow.
The remaining time had now dwindled to twenty-four hours, and the 28th of January was a day of anxiety for Mr. Hildebrand. It was a relief when the arrival of the Kya Maing was put beyond doubt. He made his appearance at an early hour, a man (by name Sawlawi) of about thirty-eight years of age, intelligent-looking, and evidently popular in Karenni. The election was held at noon. There were twenty-nine electors, of whom six were Heins, or chiefs of divisions, four were the chiefs or representatives of the Western Karenni States subject to Sawlapaw, the rest were headmen of villages or groups of villages, and traders in timber and other goods, many of whom were men of wealth and influence. Each man gave his vote, with the result that Sawlawi was unanimously elected.
Fourteen of the wealthy electors entered into a joint bond to pay the compensation of two lakhs and the five hundred muskets specified in the ultimatum, and a further sum of one lakh as war indemnity; the money to be paid before the end of December into the Moulmein Treasury, and the muskets to be lodged in Fort Stedman before the end of the following March. The order of appointment given by Mr. Hildebrand to Sawlawi was as follows:—
"I, the Superintendent of the Shan States, hereby appoint you, Sawlawi, Kya Maing, to be Chief of the State of Eastern Karenni, on the following conditions:—
"1. That you shall govern your State in accordance with established custom, and as a tributary to the British Queen whom you acknowledge to be your Suzerain.
"2. That you shall enter into no negotiations, treaties, or agreements with any other State than that of England.
"3. That you shall pay as tribute the sum of Rs. 5,000 yearly.
"4. That you will in all matters obey the orders of the Superintendent of the Shan States.
"5. That in case of dispute with Siam about territory east of the Salween, you will refer the matter to the Superintendent of the Shan States for arbitration.
"6. That no Shan, or Burman, or British subjects of any race shall be detained in any part of Eastern Karenni against their will, but that they shall have free liberty to go where they please.
"Given under my hand and seal this 29th day of January, 1889.
"A. H. Hildebrand,
"Superintendent of Shan States."
Sawlaw:—Gantarawadi Sawbwa.
(Red Karens.)
The sixth clause was inserted to provide for the abolition of slavery. It will be noted that the terms of the order did not make the State of Eastern Karenni part of British India. Experience of the difficulties arising from the position of the Shan States as part of British India, and of the absence of such difficulties in the case of the feudatory States of the Central Provinces, induced the Chief Commissioner to leave the Eastern Karenni State in the position of a feudatory chiefship.
The fifth clause needs explanation. It has been told above (p. 191) that a suggestion made by the British Representative at Bangkok for inviting Siamese co-operation had been acted upon. At the time no hint had been given by the Siamese, so far as was known to the Administration of Burma, that they had ulterior views, or claims to advance. It was supposed, naïvely perhaps, that as a friendly nation, anxious on many grounds to ensure the protection of Great Britain, they had agreed to act partly to help the British Government, partly to protect their own border. It was not until the 10th of November, 1888, that Mr. Gould, H.M.'s Representative at Bangkok, intimated that in return for their co-operation the Siamese would probably wish to establish their territorial rights over the Karenni possessions lying east of the Salween. That was the first notice of the Siamese intentions which reached the Chief Commissioner, and he had dispatched his ultimatum to Sawlapaw before its receipt. Mr. Gould was informed that the ultimatum could not be altered to include the Siamese claims. At the same time Mr. Hildebrand was instructed to reserve those claims in his settlement with Sawlapaw. Hence the insertion of the fifth clause in the order of appointment given to Sawlawi.
As a matter of fact, the Siamese co-operation was purely nominal and valueless, too late to be of any use. On the 11th of December Bangkok was informed that the columns from the Shan States and Papun would reach Sawlôn about the 7th of January. On the 28th of December the Vice-Consul at Chiengmai was told of the attack by the Karennis on the police post at Kyaukhnyat, and was asked to move the Siamese to act. On the 10th of January the result of the fight near Loikaw was telegraphed to Bangkok and Chiengmai. On the 17th they were informed of the occupation of Sawlôn. While Mr. Hildebrand was arranging matters after the occupation, a detachment of troops went to reconnoitre Ywathit, a village on the right bank of the Salween, about thirty miles south of Sawlôn. From Ywathit a party went out to see the Salween, some three miles away. This was on the 20th of January. On the evening of that day the advance-guard of the Siamese force appeared on the east bank of the Salween, at the mouth of the Mèpai Chaung, and the officer commanding this party was visited by the Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Barnard, on the 21st of January. It was known from the Vice-Consul at Chiengmai that the Siamese had taken no action until the middle of January. This, however, is a digression.
On the day following the election, a Durbar was held in a large hall in the rest-house in the grounds of the monastery, near which the Superintendent had pitched his camp. The place was well fitted for the occasion and was more ornate than one would have expected to find in the wilds of Karenni. A spacious chamber "built of the best sawn teak with venetians and folding doors of good workmanship, and a floor which might have been made for a ball-room, the whole," writes the Superintendent, "both inside and out being very highly finished with panelling and carving and gilding." Here the notables, who had met for the election of the new chief, and all the townspeople assembled, and the Superintendent (as the Representative of the British Government), supported by the General commanding and all the officers of the force, opened the Durbar. A broad, sturdy figure of a man, with a face that bore the marks of work and climate, a determined man, patient and considerate, but nevertheless a man accustomed to be obeyed. There were no bright uniforms, no show of gold or scarlet. Civil and military were all in the working-dress of the field, soiled and stained with dust and sweat; for the last few marches through the wooded defile of the Pon Chaung had been very toilsome. Amongst the Shans and Karens assembled, some spots of gay colour might be seen, and smart white jackets here and there.
In a few words the causes which had led to the expedition were explained and the consequences, namely, the subordination of the Karenni chief to the British Government, and the payment by him of an indemnity. This might be unpleasant to some of them. On the other hand, to the Karenni people at large, it meant a better government, the cessation of raids and petty wars, the extension and protection of trade, and undisturbed peace. The order of appointment (provisional, as subject to the Chief Commissioner's approval), was then read and given to Sawlawi. Thus the Karenni territory, which had been hitherto independent and had been protected by us from the designs of Burma, became practically part of the Empire. It may be noted that Mr. Hildebrand acted as the Representative of the British Government on both occasions. On the first, when he secured the independence of Karenni by negotiation with the Burmese King; on the second, when he made Karenni subordinate to the Government of India.
What was the first use made of his new power by Sawlawi? His first thought was to rid his territory east of the Salween of the Siamese troops now occupying it. The Superintendent gave him letters to the Siamese commander, announcing the fall of Sawlapaw and the appointment of Kya Maing Sawlawi in his place; informing him that matters had been arranged with the Karennis, that the British force was withdrawing on the 30th of January, and that Siamese co-operation was no longer necessary. At the same time the Vice-Consul at Chiengmai was asked to use his influence to procure the immediate recall of the Siamese troops.
On the 30th of January the British troops left Karenni and marched back to Fort Stedman. Sawlawi was left to his own resources. Prophets of evil had foretold the immediate reappearance of Sawlapaw and the vengeance to be executed on his successor and his supporters. Excited journalists published tales in Rangoon of wholesale executions in Sawlôn under the old chief's orders. As a matter of fact, the ex-Sawbwa never attempted to disturb the Settlement, and the new Sawbwa, Sawlawi, carried out his engagements punctually. The indemnity was paid and the fire-arms surrendered. To the day of his death, in 1907, he governed his people in an upright and capable manner.
It must be confessed there was some risk in leaving the country the day after Sawlawi's instalment. The Chief Commissioner's instructions were clear that the Superintendent should remain in Sawlôn until he received orders on his proposals. Mr. Hildebrand, however, had no choice, and the risk had to be taken, because of the defective arrangements for feeding the troops, which made it impossible to stay. In taking the responsibility he did his duty well. The only difficulty in Eastern Karenni arose from the action of the Siamese Government in continuing to occupy the territory east of the Salween, which had been long held by the Karens, was vital to them, and had never been in the possession of the Siamese.
This was a matter which threatened at any moment to disturb the peace and gave anxiety to those responsible for maintaining it. The first act of Sawlawi, as has been said, after his appointment was to ask the assistance of the Superintendent to procure the withdrawal of the Siamese from the territory east of the Salween. The British Vice-Consul at Chiengmai and the Siamese officer in command of their troops were notified that peace had been made and that the British troops were leaving the field; the withdrawal of the Siamese was therefore necessary. The Siamese claims had been reserved for settlement in the terms of Sawlawi's appointment. The Chief Commissioner prohibited the Karenni chief from attacking or making any forcible resistance to them. When month after month passed and they made no show of retiring, but on the contrary began to appropriate the timber and even the elephants of the Karenni traders, the local Government of Burma was placed in a very uncomfortable position. Sawlawi urged that he had accepted our terms, made his submission and acknowledged himself to be the subordinate of the Queen-Empress. He looked in return for the advantage of British protection; apparently he was not to have it. He knew well enough that it only needed a firm order and a small display of force to cause the retirement of the Siamese with more alacrity than they had displayed in their advance. Why was nothing done? If he began to doubt our good faith, it was no wonder.
As a matter of fact—a fact to him unknown, and unintelligible if it had been known—the Chief Commissioner could do nothing but put the case to the Government of India. This was done in as strong words as possible. The Government of India could do nothing except through the Secretary of State; the Secretary of State could not act except through the British Foreign Office; the Foreign Office was obliged to work through the Siamese Embassy in London and the British Resident in Bangkok; the King of Siam had to consult his local lieutenants at Chiengmai. The situation demanded patience, and much of it.
It has been said above that the territory occupied by the Siamese was vital to the Karennis. Their best and most extensive forests, the main source of their wealth, lay there. The only way of getting timber to the market from the forests was (and is) by floating it down the Salween, the mouth of which is in British territory opposite to Moulmein. The logs are stopped and collected at Kado, a short distance from the mouth of the river, and a duty levied by the Government of Burma. Every owner of timber has his stamp with which he marks his logs, and a register of these stamps is kept by the forest officer. The logs which had been seized by the Siamese were easily distinguished, and orders were given to the forest officer to detain them. By this means a check was put upon the rapacity of the Siamese, and the loss of the Karenni timber dealers restricted. In the course of time, the matter was arranged between the Siamese and the Foreign Office, and the Karennis were restored to possession (vide Chapter XVIII, p. 221).
The history of this matter shows the difficulties which the Government of India and their subordinates on the spot meet with in dealing with a boundary dispute, even of a simple kind, with a foreign country. The facts have to be gathered locally and placed before the Government of India, who then have to negotiate through the Foreign Office, with the risk of misunderstanding and the certainty of long delays. It is unavoidable. Fortunately, on the north-western frontier, where the delays and hesitation which caused inconvenience in the disputes with Siam might breed serious trouble, the action of the Government of India is less trammelled.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE TRANS-SALWEEN STATES
With the capture of Twet Nga Lu and the subjugation of the Red Karens all serious trouble in the Shan States west of Salween ended. Writing in July, 1890, the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States was able to say:—
"During the year under report, which extends from the beginning of June, 1889, the Shan States have been perfectly quiet. Nowhere have there been any revolts, nowhere any insubordination or sedition; hardly anywhere, except along the frontier with Burma, any dacoities or gang robberies." (Report on the Shan States for 1889-90 by Mr. (now Sir George) Scott.)
Pretenders had become convinced that they could not succeed against the chiefs who had been confirmed in possession by the Sovereign Power, and they settled down to make the best of things. The floating army of ruffians who had supplied the fighting material in past times had disappeared, and contrived to pick up a living in more peaceful ways.
"They make very good show-figures in a Sawbwa's processions, with their tattooing from ankle to throat and their chest and arms bossed all over with armlets and charms let in below the skin. They are also admirable letter-carriers to distant States. They know all roads, they are afraid of nobody, and they seem to be able to trudge from dawn to sunset for an indefinite number of days.... It is certain, however, that the States are infinitely quieter than they have been at any time since the death of King Mindon, and probably quieter than they have been at all." (Ibid.)
The year 1889 therefore offered a good opportunity for attending to Trans-Salween affairs.
Early in this year the question of the frontier line which was to limit our responsibilities eastward was anxiously considered. Some of the States west of the Salween which had already come under our protection held or claimed ground east of the river. There were others lying wholly east of the Salween which had been subject to the dominion of Burma although they had been loosely held. Of these the most important, Kengtung and Kang Hung, held, or claimed to hold, territory east of the Mekong.
It will be easily understood that the Government was not eager to lay hold of more territory than it was bound in honour to accept as the successor of the Burmese dynasty. We had already taken as much as we could administer or garrison with efficiency. Our authority was now definitely established up to the Salween. The country lying between that river and the Mekong was known to be mountainous, unhealthy, and unprofitable, destitute of roads, a succession of steep mountain ranges which made travelling most laborious. To maintain even a handful of troops in that region would be costly. Revenue, there would be none. It was asked where were our responsibilities to end? It was not easily answered. The problem had several sides—the military, the political, and the administrative. From the soldiers' point of view the arguments in favour of making the Salween our eastern boundary had considerable force. The river gave a clear and definite frontier drawn from north to south. The advance of a possible enemy through the country between the Mekong and the Salween could not, from the nature of the ground, be made without much difficulty; whereas the defence would have, in the wide plateau with its rolling prairies on the west of the Salween, an admirable position, with easy communications open to the Irrawaddy Valley.
Looking at the matter, moreover, from a broader point of view, it was doubtful whether the British dominion in India was not outgrowing its strength. In 1886 the annexation of Upper Burma added, roughly, 120,000 square miles to the area for which the Government of India was responsible. Of this, roughly speaking, 20,000 square miles lay across the Salween. Before Upper Burma was added to the Empire it had been argued by a great military authority that if we were seriously threatened by an enemy beyond the frontier of India, it would be necessary to recall the garrison of British Burma and to let that province go for the time. If there were any foundation for this opinion the difficulty in the event supposed would be very much increased by the addition of the new province. For no addition had been made to the army in India since the annexation. There were strong reasons, therefore, for not going a yard farther than was necessary. The advance beyond the Salween meant the inclusion of some 20,000 square miles of very difficult country and the possible neighbourhood of a troublesome power.
In support of the military arguments it was urged that the Salween was designed by nature for a boundary. It cut its way, in a line running almost due north and south, through steep mountains and rocks. It was not navigable in its upper reaches; the mouth and the navigable portion of the river were in our hands. But as a matter of fact, however adapted by its natural formation for such a purpose, the Salween has not been able to limit the spread of any race or power that has settled on its banks. On the north the Chinese hold both banks. The Shans have settled indiscriminately on either side. It proved no obstacle to the extension of the Burmese power to the eastward. In short, so far from having been "an uncompromising natural boundary," as it has been called, it has not been a boundary at all except for a short length of about sixty miles where it divides the Lower Burma Salween district from Siamese territory. Moreover, it is a timber-floating river. The teak cut on either bank must be rafted down to Moulmein; and hence disputes would be sure to arise. Rivers, as a rule, are held to be bad boundaries, and the Salween is no exception.
At first sight the strategical objections to crossing the Salween appeared to derive support from a consideration of the relations to foreign powers which might follow. It was not desired to take any step which might in the near future bring us into contact with France, and thus add a new factor to the frontier problems of our Indian Empire. The Government was even more anxious to avoid action which might give offence to Siam, or have the appearance of want of consideration in our dealings with that somewhat unreasonable power.
Further examination, however, led to a doubt as to the soundness of these views. Supposing that the British Government, influenced by these motives, decided to decline responsibility for these Trans-Salween States, what would become of them? Even Kengtung, the most powerful, could not stand alone. China and Siam might be invited to absorb them, and thus a belt of territory might be placed between our boundary and that of French dominion in Tonquin China. But China, it was believed, had no wish to increase her responsibilities in these regions, where her authority was very weak. Siam might be willing enough, but her rule would be feeble and unstable, and not welcome to the Shans. Both countries on this frontier were more likely to lose than to gain. If, with the view of avoiding the inconveniences that might arise from becoming conterminous with a great Western Power in these distant countries, we should invite Siam or China, or both, to relieve us of the charge of the Trans-Salween country, what security was there that either of these powers would retain the territory given to them? We might be creating the very conditions we wished to avert. The result of a cautious policy of this kind might be to make our dominion conterminous with that of France, not on or beyond the Mekong but on the Salween itself—an intolerable position.
Looking at the matter from an administrative and local point of view, the Chief Commissioner was against stopping short of the frontier claimed by the King of Burma. It was argued that our new subjects, whether in Burma proper or in the Shan States, would not understand such a policy, and that it would have a bad effect on their feelings towards us. We might dignify it by the names of prudence and forbearance; they would ascribe it to fear and weakness. To them we should seem to have lifted a burden too heavy for our strength. We were afraid of going into places which the King had held and prepared for us.
This, however, might be disputed, or treated as a question of sentiment. But the practical objections were evident and insuperable.
The Easternmost Point of the British-Indian Empire.
Reach of the Mé Khong where our boundary marches with French Indo-China.
Looking to the character of the country lying between the Salween and the Mekong, it was certain to be the refuge of all the discontent and outlawry of Burma. Unless it was ruled by a Government not only loyal and friendly to us, but thoroughly strong and efficient, this region would become a base for the operations of every brigand leader like Twet Nga Lu, or pretender such as Saw Yan Naing, where they might muster their followers and hatch their plots to raid British territory when opportunity offered. To those responsible for the peace and order of Burma such a prospect was not pleasant.
These arguments prevailed, and it was decided to accept without flinching the full burden of responsibility which fell on us as standing in the King of Burma's place.
The States east of the Salween which were under the King of Burma came under two categories: those which were governed directly by their own chiefs or Sawbwas, and those which were subordinate parts of certain Cis-Salween States. Kang Hung and Kengtung came in the first class, and were the most important of the Burmese possessions east of the Salween. Their position may be roughly judged by the tribute paid to the King and the contingent they were bound to supply to the royal army. The tribute consisted of gold blossoms and cups, candles, bales of silk, ponies, and embroidered pillows; and it was due not only to the King and the heir-apparent, but to the members of the Hlutdaw, or Cabinet. Kang Hung sent tribute every third year, while Kengtung sent nearly thrice the value every year. The former State furnished a contingent of 2,500 men, half musketeers and half spearmen, and maintained seven posts on the southern frontier of from 60 to 100 men. The latter's contingent was of the same strength; but seven guards, with garrisons of from 50 to 200 men, had to be maintained by Kengtung on the southern frontier.
Kang Hung was the largest in area of the Trans-Salween States connected with Burma. The greater and the richer part lay to the east of the Mekong, and was overlapped on the north-east and east by Chinese territory. It was divided into twelve "panna," or townships, six of which lay on the east and six on the west of the river. The six panna on the east were more under the influence of China than those on the west. Nevertheless, it is said that when Upper Burma was annexed there were no Chinese settlers in the eastern panna, and no interference of any kind by China with the administration of the country. Although in 1885 the King of Burma, in his secret treaty with the French, purported to cede Kang Hung to France, he had lost hold of Kang Hung altogether at that time, and he had no power then or previously to dispose of it without China's consent, although China did not meddle with the local Government.
Kengtung, which adjoins Kang Hung on the south, has had something of a history. About the middle of last century the Siamese invaded it. They were routed, and did not care to try a second venture. Later on it was the first State to revolt against Thebaw's exactions. The people, led by their chief, attacked the Burman Resident, and put him and his escort to the sword. The similar revolt at Möngnai about the same time gave King Thebaw as much as he could do, and Kengtung was left alone. It has been related in Chapter XV how the Shan chieftains met at Kengtung and formed a Confederacy under the Limbin Prince. The chief of Kengtung had intrigued previously with the Myingun Prince with the object of inducing him to be their chief. As he was unable to come, the Limbin Prince was invited to lead. It was not the Burmese dynasty, but the person of King Thebaw they wished to be quit of.
When the Limbin Confederacy dissolved and Möngnai and the leading Cis-Salween States came under the British flag, the Kengtung Sawbwa should have come with them. There were, however, influences which kept him aloof. The chief who had taken the lead against Thebaw had just died. His son, who was Sawbwa in 1888-9, was a mere boy, only thirteen years of age. The country between Kengtung and Möngnai, through which he would have had to pass to meet Mr. Hildebrand, had been much disturbed and was unsafe. It was well known that his father had invited the Myingun Prince to head the revolt against Thebaw. As the party of resistance to British rule in Burma regarded the Myingun as their leader, it was possible that Kengtung might not be welcomed by the British authorities. These apprehensions, however, would have had little force had it not been for Saw Waing, the ex-Sawbwa of Lawksawk, who, with an armed following, had taken refuge in Kengtung, and had obtained much influence over the young chief. If a representative from the Chief Commissioner could have gone immediately to Kengtung he would have submitted at once; for he had no chance of standing alone, and he knew it. But it took time to decide our policy, and determine the course to be followed regarding the easternmost dependencies of Burma. It was not wonderful that the boy-Sawbwa and his advisers should await events.
South of Kengtung, lying partly between it and the Mekong and partly across that river, was a small State called Chieng Kong. This State was believed at the time to be subordinate to Kengtung and to follow the fortunes of the larger State.
The small districts which were formerly governed directly by Burma had been annexed by Kengtung about the time of his revolt against the King. They were not of importance, except that one of them, Hsenyawt, contained the chief ferry over the Salween and included land on both banks of the river. The other, Hsenmawng, was a small circle entirely surrounded by Kengtung land. These two little tracts had in the King's time been administered by Burmese officials, probably in connection with the customs levied on the ferry traffic.
Kengtung had also appropriated the district of Möngpu, which had belonged to the Möngnai Sawbwa, and an adjoining tract known as Mönghsat, which Möngnai also claimed. So far the questions concerned only the interests of our own feudatories.
Farther to the south, down the east bank of the Salween, lay four small States—Möng Tang, Möng Hang, Möng Kyawt, and Möng Hta. These four districts belonged to the Cis-Salween Sawbwa of Möngpan. Owing to the action of the Siamese officials, who attempted to take possession of them, there was trouble in 1888, and the Superintendent had been sent across to arrange the disputed points with representatives of the Siamese authorities. The Siamese, however, did not choose to appear. They thought, it may be presumed, that having a bad case, or no case at all, they had a better chance of success by diplomatic action. On the spot, and with local evidence at hand to rebut them, it would have been difficult to prove their assertions. Nothing could be done under the circumstances but to inquire and report the facts. This was done. The Government of India were satisfied that these divisions belonged to Burma, and were part of the territory of the Möngpan Sawbwa. The Chief Commissioner was authorised to put Möngpan in possession. Accordingly Mr. Scott visited the districts and formally installed the Sawbwa. He found that the residents were without exception Möngpan Shans. There were no Lao inhabitants.
Until the dissolution of the Burmese authority in 1885, there had been no thought or talk of Siamese interference. At that time, seeing the chance of advancing their frontier to the Salween, an ambition they had doubtless cherished, the Chiengmai officials had ordered the headmen of these States to appear to swear fealty to Siam. They obeyed the order as the only means of escaping destruction. They returned gladly to their hereditary chieftain.
For five weeks after Mr. Scott's visit there was perfect quiet. How it came about that this settlement was again disturbed is not quite clear. The Siamese were bent on advancing their frontier to the Salween up to the southern boundary of Kengtung. Seeing that Mr. Scott had returned and had left no evidence of British authority in the shape of official or garrison, the former game was repeated. The headmen of the four States were again summoned "to drink the water of allegiance." Three of them obeyed. The fourth, Möng Tang, sent a representative and wrote at the same time to the Möngpan Sawbwa excusing his conduct on the ground of force majeure, and promising to return to his lawful lord when order was finally restored.
It was not until some time afterwards that the Siamese made overt demonstrations by sending armed parties to the States, but the people were very much alarmed and ceased all communication with the west of the Salween. This reopening of the matter was not comprehended by the Shans, and it did not help to enhance our reputation in the Shan States.
South-west of these Trans-Salween possessions of Möngpan, and separated from them by a Siamese district called Mueng Fai, lie two districts, Mehsakun and Möngmau, forming part of the territory of Mawkmai. The history of these tracts illustrates the fluid state in which the country on the borders of the Shan States and Siam was in 1887-9, and for some time previously. Perhaps neither Burma nor Siam had any established and acknowledged authority in these regions. In 1823 the chief of Mawkmai, Né Noi by name, who was distinguished by the appellation of the Kolan (nine fathom) Sawbwa, was cast into prison in the Burmese capital. He escaped, and returned to his country through Eastern Karenni, in much the same way as the Hsipaw Sawbwa at a later date. But he could not withstand the Burmese power; and crossing the Salween, with the aid of Shans from Mawkmai he "carved," to use the words of Mr. Scott's report, "the two States of Mehsakun and Möngmau out of the jungle," and settled down there with his own people.
Here he lived for twenty years, until in 1873 he obtained a pardon and went back to Mawkmai, leaving a nephew to govern the Trans-Salween acquisitions. While he was at Mawkmai he was no peaceful neighbour, but made himself feared by the Karennis on his south border and by the Laos on the south and east. So far from being in any way subordinate to the Siamese officials at Chiengmai, he attacked the Siamese district of Mehawnghsawn and drove out the Shan, named Taiktaga San, who had been placed there by the Chiengmai authorities. He bestowed the district on his niece, by name Nang Mya. She was a lady with much force of character, who in England, in the reign of King George V. would have been a militant suffragette, and would have made short work of the ministry by marrying them all out of hand. Nang Mya, probably feeling the need of local knowledge and connections, dismissed her first husband, who bore the not very imposing name of Pu Chang Se, recalled her predecessor, Taiktaga San, from exile, and made him her consort. When the Kolan (nine fathom) Sawbwa returned across the Salween to Mawkmai, she and her new consort transferred their allegiance to the Siamese Governor at Chiengmai, without opposition on the part of the Mawkmai Sawbwa. Mehawnghsawn, it may be explained, is farther from Mawkmai than from Chiengmai, and the Salween flows between.
This transaction, however, did not affect the districts of Mehsakun and Möngmau, which remained under Mawkmai territory without question until 1888.
When the Red Karen chief, after the old Kolan's death, attacked Mawkmai, Kun Noi, who was governing Mehsakun on his uncle's behalf, behaved disloyally to his cousin, the rightful heir to Kolan, and induced the Karenni to make him master of Mawkmai. How Kun Hmon was restored to his position in Mawkmai by a British force has been told above (Chapter XV, p. 184). He was unable, however, to regain the two Trans-Salween districts, and it was not convenient at the moment to send a party across to reinstate him. Kun Noi, having been ejected from Mawkmai by the British, turned his thoughts to Siam and opened communications with the Chiengmai authorities through his cousin, the lady Nang Mya, who governed at Mehawnghsawn, with the view of placing himself under their protection. This was the origin of the Siamese pretensions to the Trans-Salween districts of Mawkmai. They had no foundation in right. It had been for some time their ambition to advance their frontier to the Salween, but as long as Burma had a remnant of strength, they could not. They thought the time opportune when the Burmese power had gone and the British had not yet made good their hold. On the 6th of March, 1889, a band of men, some of whom were militia from Chiengmai, came and occupied Tahwepon, the chief ferry on the Salween in Mawkmai territory, and hoisted the elephant flag of Siam, claiming the whole of the borderland lying east of the river for the King of Siam.
The position of Eastern Karenni has been explained in the chapter concerning events in that country. The people are numerous and all Karen. In the thirty-eight villages in which they live there are neither Shans nor Laos. The territory had been for many years in the hands of the Karenni chief, and was colonized by his people, just as the two districts north of it had been colonized by Mawkmai. It formed the most profitable portion of the Karenni State, by reason of its extensive and valuable teak forests. The capital required to work the timber was found by British subjects from Moulmein, the Karennis furnishing the labour. The timber trade was completely stopped by the Siamese; the elephants employed on it seized and carried off. The floating of the timber which had to be sent down to Moulmein by the Salween was prevented, and communication between the east and west banks prohibited by them. Such a state of affairs was most galling to the Karennis and injurious to the dignity and to the revenues of their chief.
Such was the condition of affairs in 1889, and it became necessary to take action to prevent further mischief. It was decided by the Government of India, in communication with the Foreign Office, to appoint a Commission to survey the frontier and settle disputed points with representatives of the Siamese. Accordingly, as soon as the season permitted, a Commission was formed under Mr. Ney Elias, C.I.E., as chief. The members of the Commission were Mr. W. J. Archer, Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Chiengmai, Mr. J. G. (now Sir J. George) Scott, Major E. G. Barrow (now Sir Edmund Barrow), Captain F. J. Pink (now Colonel Francis J. Pink, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment). A survey party from the Government of India, under Captain H. M. Jackson, R.E., was attached to the Commission. Surgeon J. K. Close was appointed to the medical charge, with Dr. Darwin as his assistant. The escort, commanded by Major Clarke, O.L.I., was composed of two companies of the Oxford Light Infantry, two guns of a Mountain Battery, and a few rifles of the Shan (military police) Levy.
Early in December the Commission met at Fort Stedman, and marching down through Loikaw and Sawlôn, the Karenni capital, encamped near Ywathit, at the ferry on the Salween called Ta Sanglè. Here they had expected to meet the Commissioners who, it was understood, had been appointed by the Bangkok Government to represent it. No one appeared, however, with credentials from Siam. Whether this was a deliberate act of discourtesy, or only a failure caused by the general debility of the Siamese administration, may be questioned. Most probably it was an instance of the common policy of Orientals and others with a weak case, who prefer to plead before a distant and necessarily more ignorant tribunal, rather than to submit their statements and evidence to a well-informed officer on the spot. Perhaps, also, the advisers of the Siamese Government avoided taking part in the inquiry in order that they might refuse to be bound by an unwelcome finding.
Under these circumstances, Mr. Elias was forced to proceed in the absence of the other side. The working season in these latitudes is short, and to have delayed action would have played the Siamese game and given them more time to harass the Karennis and appropriate their property. Although no final decision could be arrived at, the Commission could ascertain the facts, survey the country, and place the matter in a clear light before the Government of India. At least we should acquire an exact knowledge of the case, and be able to say what we were fighting about. The business, therefore, was allowed to proceed.
A standing camp was formed at Ta Sanglè, and three parties, led by Mr. Ney Elias, Mr. Archer, and Mr. J. G. Scott, respectively, started to examine and survey the Karenni country. Ten months had passed since the Siamese had appeared in these parts. The time occupied unavoidably in a triangular correspondence between the Chief Commissioner in Burma, the Government of India in Simla, and the Foreign Office at Whitehall, had not been altogether wasted by the Siamese, who had endeavoured to get the proverbial nine points of the law on their side. They had established a series of posts along the Salween, all of them stockaded and flying the white elephant flag of Siam. In each of these posts were fairly large garrisons of from fifty to one hundred men, some of them well armed Siamese troops, others Laos and Shans—men, these latter, from the west of the Salween, who had sought refuge in Siamese territory from the troublous times of the past years.
It was found that the frontier of Trans-Salween Karenni was clearly defined by a range running from north to south, from fifteen to five-and-twenty miles from the Salween. The inhabitants, almost all Karens, had built their villages on this frontier range. As they live by the rude method of cultivation known as Taungya, they frequently move from one site to another to get fresh ground. The forests are rich in teak, but the timber was worked not by the Karens, but by Shans, or by Burmese traders from Moulmein. Everything went to show that the country had been settled and opened up by the Red Karens, and that the Siamese neither had nor pretended to have any rights over it until the time of our expedition against Sawlapaw. From inquiries made and from the number of their villages the Karen population was estimated at between three and four thousand. The Siamese had taken a very practical method of marking them for their own. All adult males without exception had been tattooed on the forearm with the emblem of an elephant, with a running number added below. At first it was thought that this might help us to compute the number of people in the country. But the tattooing had not been done systematically at the villages where the people lived, but at markets and ferries as they chanced to come from the villages around, to sell their produce or make purchases. Thus while one man in a village might be branded with the number one hundred, his neighbour in the same village might be numbered four hundred. Without visiting every village, therefore, it was not possible to learn the highest number reached, and for this there was not time.
Going north to the districts of Möngmau and Mehsakun, claimed by Mawkmai, Mr. Elias was met by a major in the Siamese army, who claimed to be a member of the Commission representing Siam. This gentleman begged the question in dispute by welcoming Mr. Elias to Siamese territory, but made no further contribution to its settlement. The inquiry having convinced the Commission that the Mawkmai Sawbwa's right to these districts was beyond doubt, he was permitted to resume possession. He brought in his officials with an escort of his own Shans, and the Siamese officers thereupon retired. Mawkmai's possession was not disturbed again.
In the four States claimed by Möngpan events took a similar course. An official representing Siam was found encamped close to Möng Tung, with about one hundred and fifty men. He was requested to leave, as these States were undoubtedly British territory and had been formally so declared. He left without delay or reluctance, and the Möngpan Sawbwa was put in possession, his nephew being appointed governor of the four States, and entrusted with the task of restoring them to order and prosperity. So far the Commission had completed their task. As the Siamese had failed to co-operate, the decisions could not be regarded as final. They were left, as the Bangkok Government may have intended, to be reopened and disputed in London. Much information, however, had been gathered about a country hitherto unknown, and a solid foundation laid for a lasting settlement of our frontier with Siam. Captain Jackson's party had worked with the energy for which he had already won a reputation in three preceding seasons in the Cis-Salween States.
"In this his fourth season," wrote the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States to the Chief Commissioner, "he had an exceedingly difficult region to survey, and he has fixed on our charts an area which would probably have exceeded the powers of any one whose physique was not in equal proportion to his zeal."
Before the Commission had finished the settlement of this strip of country from the south border of Eastern Karenni to the northern frontier of Möng Tung, it had become evident that if they were to complete their task the whole body could not visit Kengtung. Mr. Scott, therefore, was deputed for this purpose, and left early in February. He decided to start from Möngnai, where he proceeded in order to procure transport. The lateness of the season made it above all things necessary to march quickly, impossible with pack bullocks, the ordinary transport of the Shans, which make thirty-four stages from Möngnai to Kengtung. The Panthays (Chinese Mohammedans) with their mules, do the same journey in twelve days. They march from daylight to midday, and after a couple of hours' halt go on till sunset. Mules have the advantage of bullocks in the matter of gear as well as in speed and endurance. The loads are fastened not to the saddle, but to a light wooden frame which fits into grooves on the saddle, and can be lifted off in a minute and as easily replaced. The process of loading and unloading is therefore greatly simplified, and much labour and time saved. Moreover, baggage of all sorts and shapes can be loaded on mules, whereas bullocks cannot carry any that will not fit into their baskets. Then a mule will walk almost as fast as a man in heavy marching-order, and will cover twelve or fifteen miles while a bullock is doing his five; so that instead of waiting for their food after a twelve-mile march until the bullocks hobble in when the sun is low, the men will get their food half an hour after they reach camp. But Mr. Scott has led us away from the business in hand in his enthusiasm for mules.
Panthay mules are not to be found waiting on a stand like taxi-cabs. It is not easy to get them for casual work. Mr. Scott, therefore, was kept some time at Möngnai waiting for mules, and then could not get enough and had to fill the gap with elephants. From Möngnai he went up north by the Nam Teng Valley, crossing the Nam Teng at Ko-up, where a bamboo bridge had been built over the river. The villages on both sides of the river had been raided by the brigand Twet Nga Lu, whose story has been told elsewhere (vide Chapters XV and XVI).
East of the Nam Teng River in the State of Keng Tawng, "the country for nearly twenty miles at a stretch," Mr. Scott reported, "is practically a desert. Yet all along the road old wells and ruinous monasteries and the grass-grown skeletons of former paddy-fields, to say nothing of hill-clearings, showed that formerly there must have been a large population here.... The handful of people who have so far returned to Keng Tawng have settled twenty miles farther south, round the site of the old capital. There is a magnificent banyan-tree, known far and wide as Mai Hung Kan, at Maklang.... The adjoining monastery was burnt by Twet Nga Lu's brigands, and not even the sanctity of the tree which twenty men could not span, under whose branches a fair-sized village might be built, has yet been able to persuade the monks to return. There are not, in fact, enough of the pious in the neighbourhood to support them."
Of the next State entered, Keng Hkam, the same story has to be told. The Nam Pang, a stormy river which rises in the north near Lashio, flows into the Salween near Keng Hkam. The valuable portion of this district consists of an extensive plateau extending along the right bank of the Nam Pang, where tobacco and sugar grow well, and very fine rice-fields and extensive groves of palms made the country rich.
The State suffered greatly in the Twet Nga Lu's disturbances. The old capital was absolutely destroyed, and nothing now remains but the ruins of fine teak monasteries and some ornate pagodas absolutely falling to pieces.
The chief had moved to a new town three or four miles off, but intended, now order had been restored, to build again on the old site. Many families had emigrated to the east of the Salween.
This chief, styled Myoza, accompanied Mr. Scott to Kengtung. His avowed object was to improve his mind by travel, and to learn English modes of procedure. It afterwards, however, appeared that he was attracted more by the fame of the charms of a lady of the Kengtung Royal Family than by a craving for knowledge. "He was successful in his wooing," wrote Mr. Scott, "and it may be hoped that his bride will put an end to the habit which he is developing of making inconsequent set speeches. Otherwise he is in great danger of becoming an intolerable young prig."
It is not possible here to follow the journey to Kengtung march by march. It must suffice to give some idea of the country through which the party had to go. From Keng Hkam to the Kaw Ferry on the Salween, the road was easy enough, the only difficulties being caused by the passage of the Nam Pang, across which, owing to the nature of the bed of the stream, the pack animals could not swim, and had to be ferried over. The Nam Teng, which was one hundred paces wide and twelve feet deep under the eastern bank, would have been a cause of delay had not the Shans thrown a bamboo bridge across the stream. This bridge built by the villagers, in six days it was said, was crossed easily and safely by the loaded transport mules. The bamboo is worth more to the peasants than gold and silver and precious stones. With it a Burman or Shan can do almost anything. For offence or defence, for house or furniture, for carrying water or making a raft, the bamboo is equally good.
Mr. Scott's party crossed the Salween at the Kaw Ferry, which is in the small State of Hsenyawt, which is described as a simple chaos of hills with probably not above a couple of hundred acres of flat paddy-land in its whole area. The village, which exists for the ferry rather than for any other reason, can hardly find room for more than two or three houses in a cluster, and is consequently scattered over a square mile or so of broken ground. On the other side of the Salween it is uninhabited, and the road for some distance is very difficult, climbing along the side of a gorge through which the Nam Leng runs. Mr. Scott tells us that the Panthay traders carry picks and spades to make the road as they go, and it is only their labour which has kept the route open. From the ferry the road runs north-east to Hsenmawng, which is another small State and town under the same man who governs Hsenyawt. There are two routes to Kengtung from this place. One, the northern, through Möng Ping, bears the proud title of Lammadaw (the royal road), and was always used in Burmese times; but landslips had made it dangerous for animals, and fighting between rival leaders, for men. The other road, which kept more to the south, passing through a district named Möng Pu Awn, was perhaps longer but better, and was followed by Mr. Scott. It follows a zigzag course. First north-east, to Hsenmawng, then south-east to Möng Hsen, then north-west again to Kengtung. "East of Hsenmawng," writes Mr. Scott, "is a simple sea of hills, range behind range all the way to Kengtung. The main ridges run nearly due north and south, and they with their spurs and sub-features, can hardly be said to be broken by the valleys of Möng Pu Awn or of Möng Hsen. It is a constant succession of ascents and descents the whole way to Kengtung."
The mountains crossed were often of some height, and between the altitudes of 3,500 and 5,000 feet were covered with pine forest. The main range of Loi[40] Pè Möng, the great divide between the Salween and the Mekong Valleys, which averages 6,000 feet, and rises in many places to more than 7,000, carries no pine forests.
"On the spurs and sub-features, which stretch far away to the west, forming what may be almost called a plateau—a very uneven one certainly, cut up by gigantic gullies, and sprinkled with numerous eminences, but still a rough sort of tableland—pine forest is the prevailing growth, and seems to give place to oak and chestnut above 5,000 feet, which, however, is about the average of this high-land plain. Notwithstanding the ruggedness of the country which is very much like a Brobdingnagian ploughed field, the road is not by any means bad. It is very fatiguing, but for a mule-track it is very much better than the roads at many places in the Western States, where the path climbs straight up the hillside with a Roman directness of purpose, or follows stream beds and rocky gorges with a pertinacity born of an ignorance of shoe-leather. Beyond the Salween the track follows the line of the spurs, with the result that one very seldom has a back-breaking climb. The credit of this natural engineering eye seems to belong rather to the Panthay and Chinese merchants than to the natives of the country; for farther south, where the Panthay caravans pass but seldom, the paths follow the usual Shan system of going straight from point to point." It was through a country of this sort that the little party which was to receive the submission of its chief, and settle his relations with the Sovereign Power, made its way. With Scott were two other white men, Captain Pink, of the Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment, who was a member of the Commission, and Dr. Darwin, a civil surgeon, in the service of the Burman Government. The escort consisted of eighteen old soldiers, Sikhs of the Shan levy which had lately been taken over by the army, and as many untrained recruits of the same corps. There were besides a few Burmese clerks on Mr. Scott's staff, some servants and camp-followers, the transport mules with their Panthay drivers, a few elephants—which were more imposing though less agile than the mules—and lastly the princely wooer in the shape of the Myoza of Keng Hkam, with a tail of rough spear-men to give a touch of romance to the cortège. Not a very imposing embassage, certainly, to represent the majesty of England, and to require the allegiance of a chief who ruled over twenty thousand square miles of country. But the leaders had the right spirit, and not a man with them, from the trained soldiers to the rough mule-drivers, but marched with his head high.
The town of Kengtung is about ten miles as the crow flies from the pass over the Loi Pè Möng.
"It lies in a plain about twenty miles long and perhaps fifteen broad. To the west and north this is perfectly flat and under paddy cultivation; to the east and south are low grassy hills with swamps in the hollows. The town is built on the western edge of this rolling country and overlooks the paddy-lands. It is surrounded by a wall about fifteen feet high, and machicolated at the top." (The wall and a moat were constructed by the Burman King Alompra in the eighteenth century.) "The bricks are insufficiently burnt, the wall is old and therefore crumbled away in many places, so that it is picturesque rather than formidable; moreover, some hills to the south-west would enable field-guns to drop shells wherever they pleased over the enceinte. The wall follows the line of the rolling ground, and to the north and south towers above the plain. To the west it has not this natural advantage, and jungle affords admirable cover up to the dry ditch which protects it on this side. To north-east and south swampy ground covers the approach. The walls measure four and three-quarter miles round, and have ten gates, which used to be covered by semicircular arches. Only two of these arches, however, now remain, both on the eastern face. There is very little level ground within the walls, and only the northern half of the walled town is inhabited. Even this portion is so overrun with trees as to be almost jungle, and there are several large swamps among the houses. These supply the people with water to drink and small mud-fish to eat. There are probably seven or eight hundred houses within the walls, and many of these are very substantial. Some are entirely built of brick; some have brick basements and plank walling; and the number of bamboo houses is very small. All the better-class houses are roofed with small tiles made locally. To judge from the Sawbwa's audience-hall, these tiles are not a very satisfactory protection against rain, but they at any rate prevent the fires which do such frequent mischief in other Shan towns. The monasteries are numerous, and some of them are adorned with elaborate carving and wall paintings. They are much like the ordinary Burmese or Shan Kyaung (monastery) in general architecture, but there is an indefinable suggestion of Tartar influence about them. This is particularly noticeable in the massive gateways which immediately suggest the paifang of China."
There was a very large colony of Shan Chinese to the east of the town. They had large gardens and kept innumerable goats, pigs, ducks, and fowls.
"Their houses are all built of bamboo, and their villages, like those of China, are inconceivably dirty, though in their person the inhabitants are clean enough."
To the industry of these people is due the manufacture of tiles and of the pottery work, which is sold cheap and of great variety in Kengtung bazaar. The inhabitants of the plain in which the city lies were, Mr. Scott estimated, about twenty thousand. There were some military surveyors in his party, but owing to the very critical state of affairs for some time after the city was entered, it was thought better not to send them out to survey.
Such, briefly, was the city of Kengtung when the small British party entered its gates on the 14th of March, 1890. The elephants, although they marched slowly, and may have been execrated at times on that account, undoubtedly added pomp to the somewhat insignificant procession which entered the city. What followed is best told in the words of Mr. Scott's report. (Report on Southern Shan States for the year 1889-90.)
"We were met at the edge of the plain by the Tawphaya, the Sawbwa's cousin and Chief Minister, along with a number of the principal officials, and marched in procession to the town. Great part of the road was lined by villagers, who stood in many places three or four deep to see us pass. We camped on the site of the old Burmese post, and were visited almost immediately after our tents were pitched by the Sawbwa and his half-brother, the Kyem Meung (heir-apparent). The Sawbwa is sixteen, and looks older. The Kyem Meung's age is a matter of dispute between the Ministers, his mother, and himself. Dates vary over three years, but he looks a good deal younger than his brother.
"A formal return visit was paid to the Sawbwa next day. He is building himself a new brick haw (palace), and the old palace, which is a dingy wooden erection, is said to be so rickety that it would have infallibly collapsed with the number of people who were to be present at the reception. We were therefore received in the court-house, which looks rather like a railway goods shed outside, but has been rather highly decorated within. The gilding is now, however, worn and tawdry. There is a large gold throne at the farther end, enclosed within a railing, and reached by folding doors from behind, like the Mandalay Yazapalin, which it otherwise resembles in construction. The Sawbwa and his brother sat on chairs in front of this, outside the railing, and we were placed between them. There was an enormous gathering of officials both of the town and the neighbourhood, and of the prominent merchants of the town, and the conversation was kept up by these and by the Kyem Meung, for the Sawbwa had never a word to say beyond Yes or No. The merchants all talked of the opening up of communications with the West, and particularly of the construction of a railway. Trade at present is entirely with China. The old Chiengmai trade is greatly interfered with, and almost put an end to by taxations, restrictions, and imposts levied at the Siamese frontier posts. The general impression received was that the merchant class and the bulk of the ministers were delighted with the establishment of British authority in Kengtung. There is a huge drum near the door of the audience-hall. It is made of hide stretched on a wooden frame, and is about the size of a puncheon. This is said to have been made by the 'hill-people,' but by what hill-people and where, nobody knew. One stroke on this Sigyi announces that the Sawbwa has ascended the throne; two, that he has left the palace to go through the town; and three strokes summon all officials and armed men within hearing to the palace without an instant's delay. We heard three strokes on this drum a good many times during the next few days.
"On the night of the 16th of March, the second day after our arrival, there was a pwè (a posture dance) inside the Sawbwa's enclosure. Eight of our Panthay mule-drivers, who had been out searching for stray mules, went in after dark to buy cheroots at the usual bazaar. They were set on by the Sawbwa's men. Most of them escaped, but one man was seized, held with his face to the ground and shot in the back by the Sawbwa himself. He was then set free and went back to his camp. Two other shots were heard, and one of the Panthays has never since been seen. The Panthay camp was some distance away in the plain, and before I had got more than the excited account of one of the Panthays, who fled from the palace to our camp, I had demanded, next morning, an explanation from the Sawbwa, and the production of the man who had fired the revolver. I got no explanation, except that the Sawbwa had issued an order that none of our followers were to be allowed to go about in the town wearing arms. In a country where every male above six years wears a dagger, this was an absurdity. The order had not, moreover, been communicated to our people. I therefore demanded the surrender of the offender, and had issued this order before the Panthays managed to summon up courage enough to denounce the Sawbwa himself as the murderer. It was impossible to recede. It was necessary for British prestige and for our own personal safety to settle the case. Our followers expected to be massacred in their beds; the Sawbwa feared that he would be seized in his palace, and filled it with armed men. For two days the suspense was rather trying. I then announced that if my orders were not complied with, I would march down to the haw the next day. This brought up the Tawpaya and several other ministers, with a petition that I would decide the case as it stood. They produced no witnesses, and did not deny that the Sawbwa was the offender. I therefore sentenced him to pay Rs. 500 compensation to the wounded man and Rs. 1,500 if the missing man was not produced within five days alive and well. This sentence, I informed them, was a concession to the low state of their civilization and the ignorance of the Sawbwa. The Rs. 500 were paid a couple of hours afterwards, and the Rs. 1,500 a few days before we left.
"The incident was all the more embarrassing, because none of the details of the Sawbwa's relations with the British Government had been settled. He had been reduced to such a state of fear that it was only by again threatening to march down to the haw that I was able to persuade him to come and discuss the terms under which he received a sanad of appointment from the British Government. When he did come, however, his manner was much more satisfactory, and he accepted in every detail the terms of the sanad and promised to attend future Durbars of the Shan chiefs. Other matters which had to be arranged with him concerning his western frontier were also easily put in train for settlement."
It is impossible to read this brief account without doing homage to the well-considered audacity of Mr. Scott's action, which ended once for all any inclination on the part of Kengtung to resist the British Government.
During the next few days the terms of the Sawbwa's patent of investiture were finally arranged. In his leisure time a wealth of information regarding the province and its wonderful variety of races was acquired by Mr. Scott, which it is regretted for the reader's sake cannot be given here.
On the 29th of March, three days before the time fixed for leaving Kengtung, a Durbar was held for the purpose of formally presenting the chief with his patent of appointment. It was attended by all the officials connected with the Kengtung State. The only foreigners present were the princely wooer from Keng Hkam and the brother-in-law of the Möngnai Sawbwa. But so large is the area of the State that the assemblage was as numerous as if it had been a general Durbar of the Shan States at Fort Stedman. Mr. Scott improved the occasion by impressing on them that British supremacy meant peace and trade.
"As is usual with a speech in the Shan States, a running comment was kept up in different parts of the audience on the various points enumerated, and on the whole it seemed that their comprehension was satisfactory and their resolution praiseworthy. The ministers promised by the Sawbwa complete obedience to the Chief Commissioner in all matters connected with the State; and the Sawbwa himself was divided between admiration for the repeating carbine which he received as a present and a laudable desire to be amiable."
The party left Kengtung on their return journey on the 1st of April, and marched back by a southerly route through the four small States belonging to Möngpan, where some disputes had arisen which required Mr. Scott's orders. These questions were finally settled for the time at least at Möngpan, and Mr. Scott then returned to Fort Stedman, which he reached after an absence of six months, on the 6th of June, 1890. He had been away on this distant work all the open season of 1889-90. Although the Shan States in his immediate charge had not been visited by the Superintendent, there had been no trouble. The Sawbwas as well as the British administrators were putting aside warlike things, and devoting their energies to the things of peace. The Lawksawk chief had done us good service in 1899 by capturing the Setkya Mintha, a pretender who had been a nuisance since the annexation. In 1890 he broke up and captured most of the gang that followed a noted leader Kyaw Zaw. The growth of wheat and other crops occupied the minds of other Sawbwas, while the Chief Commissioner was devising a procedure code to guide the Shan rulers in administering the law. It was necessary to frame rules which should secure substantial justice and at the same time should not be beyond the powers of the Shan judges to comprehend. Communications between the States and Burma were vigorously pushed on, although not quite as fast as the Superintendent wished and in his enthusiasm thought possible.
The work done in 1889-90 was good and lasting. Although, owing to the failure of the Siamese Government to take part in the inquiry, a further Commission had to be appointed to settle and demarcate the boundary, the decisions arrived at by Mr. Ney Elias were practically confirmed, when the final demarcation was made in 1892-3 to some extent by Mr. Hildebrand, but for the most part by Mr. H. G. A. Leveson, of the Indian Civil Service and of the Burman Commission. The only difference of importance was that the minor State of Chieng Kong, which bestrode the Mekong and was supposed to be more or less tributary to Kengtung, was, as regards the eastern or Trans-Mekong portion, of which Möng Hsing was the chief town, assigned to Siam.
But before the Government at Bangkok had had time to receive the homage of the Möng Hsing chief, the French crossed the Menam and obtained the treaty of Chantabun from Siam, by which everything east of the Mekong passed to France and Möng Hsing became French.
As to Kang Hung, in arranging matters with China we transferred all the rights in this State on both sides the Mekong—the whole, in fact, of the Sibsong Panna (or twelve provinces)—to China, on the condition that she should never cede any part of it to another power. With an almost indecent haste, China gave up a portion of the Kang Hung country to France. As a protest, we refused to pay the decennial tribute of gold flowers, which had been conceded to save the face of China after the annexation, and demanded a revision of the eastern frontier of Burma agreed with China in 1894. A new agreement was made in 1897 which gave Burma a better boundary. It is not likely that new difficulties will arise on this side, although the boundary has not been demarcated. Trouble is more probable on the north, where no openings should be left. China does not forget her claim to Burma.
Kengtung showed a proper sense of his duties after Mr. Scott's lesson to him. The present Sawbwa, who was at the Delhi Durbar in 1903, is reported to have said to one of the officers from Burma, "We thought we were great men, but now we see that we are only monkeys from the jungle." So Durbars, like other forms of adversity, may have their uses, and quite as sweet.