RELATIVE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES IN REGARD TO SUPPLIES OF MINERALS
The United States is more nearly self-sustaining in regard to mineral commodities as a whole than any other country on the globe. The following statement summarizes qualitatively our position:
1. Minerals of which our exportable surplus dominates the world situation:
| Copper. |
| Petroleum has belonged in this class until recently. In the future imports will be required (see 5 following). |
2. Minerals of which our exportable surplus constitutes an important but not a dominant factor in the world trade:
| Cement. |
| Coal. |
| Iron and steel. |
| Phosphates. |
| Silver. |
| Sulphur. |
| Uranium and radium. |
3. Minerals of which our exportable surplus is not an important factor in world trade. Small amounts of most of these minerals have been and will doubtless continue to be imported because of special grades, back-haul, or cheaper sources of foreign supply, but these imports are for the most part not essential as a source of supply:
4. Minerals for which the United States must depend almost entirely on other countries:
| Cobalt. |
| Nickel. |
| Platinum and metals of the platinum group. |
| Tin. |
5. Minerals for which the United States will depend on foreign sources for a considerable fraction of the supply:
| Antimony. |
| Asbestos. |
| Ball clay and kaolin. |
| Chalk. |
| Chromite. |
| Corundum. |
| Diamond dust and bort. |
| Garnet. |
| Graphite. |
| Grinding pebbles. |
| Manganese. |
| Mercury. |
| Mica. |
| Monazite. |
| Naxos emery. |
| Nitrates. |
| Petroleum (see below). |
| Potash. |
| Precious stones. |
| Pumice. |
| Tungsten. |
| Vanadium. |
| Zirconium. |
In the past the production of petroleum in the United States has dominated the world petroleum situation; but domestic consumption has now overtaken production, and unless discoveries of oil come along at a rapid rate the domestic deficiency seems likely to increase, with corresponding increase in our dependence on foreign sources (see pp. 128-132).
Some of the minerals of this last class, such as potash, manganese, and chromite were developed under war conditions in the United States to such an extent as to materially lessen the demand for importation; but in normal times domestic sources can supply a considerable fraction of the demand only at high cost and with the aid of a protective tariff.
No attempt will be made here to present the detailed figures on which the above generalizations are based. In view of the present disturbed conditions of production and consumption, any judgment as to future demands or available surplus must take into account several factors which cannot be accurately measured,—such as financial control in foreign countries, possible tariffs, and foreign competition. For this reason the above statement should be regarded as only tentative, though it is the result of a rather exhaustive study of conditions in relation to the world control of shipping. The classes named overlap to some extent, and it is to be expected that some of the commodities placed in one class may in the near future be transferred to another.
In terms of value, the United States has a potential export surplus of minerals about twice as large as that of all the rest of the world put together. Countries which were neutral during the war have the remaining export surplus. Great Britain, France, and Italy have net import requirements considerably in excess of their exports. Germany has almost as large a deficit of minerals as the United States has a surplus.
From the above facts it is clear that, in any scheme of international control or coöperation, the United States would have by far the heaviest stake, and perhaps the most to lose by restriction. It seems equally clear that the preponderance of exportable surplus of minerals over necessary imports justifies the United States in taking a broad and liberal view of the importation of needed minerals. The war-time necessity of making our country as nearly self-sustaining as possible does not seem to obtain in peace times. To carry that principle to an extreme means not only the expensive use of low-grade domestic supplies, but the elimination of the imports which are so necessary to balance our export trade.
These facts also raise the question as to how far the United States is justified in exploiting the rest of the world to add to its already great preponderance of control,—as, for instance, in copper. Any further aggrandizement of our position in regard to such minerals may be directly at the expense of neighbors who are already far less well supplied than ourselves, and is to be justified only on the basis of adding to the world's supply for common use, and of lending our expert assistance to neighbors to make them more nearly self-supporting. To carry out our campaign in these cases without regard to the needs of other countries will obviously not hasten the ideal of a democratic world with equal opportunity for all. On the other hand, the great freedom allowed by our laws in regard to foreign commercial control of our minerals, as compared to the restriction on such control in other countries, suggests the desirability of exerting our pressure for the open door policy in all parts of the world, in the interest of desirable reciprocal relations.
In this connection there has been a tendency to criticise England's post-war activity in securing oil reserves for the future. Self-interest has clearly dictated the necessity for improving England's weak position in regard to this vital energy resource. The success of this movement obviously means a lessening of the future preponderance of the United States in the oil industry, and calls for increased activity on the part of the United States in maintaining the desirable leading position it has long held. From the writer's viewpoint, however, the fair success of a rival does not call for criticism of motives. If there is any just criticism, it applies to methods (see pp. 390-391).
Whatever action may be taken by the United States in regard to international mineral questions, it is clear that the war has brought this country into such world relations that it has become imperative for us to study and understand the world mineral situation much more comprehensively than before,—in the interest not only of intelligent management of our own industries, but of far-sighted handling of international relations. Under the stress of war the government, especially through the Geological Survey, the Bureau of Mines, and the several war boards, found it necessary to use extraordinary efforts to obtain even elementary information on the international features of mineral trade. Much progress has been made, but only a start. The geologist or engineer who fails to follow these investigations may be caught napping in the economic phases of his work.