Again Opportunities for the Allies
In the following year, 1916, Russia once more came forward with her assistance at a critical moment, when the Austrians had broken the resistance of the Italian Armies on the Asiago-Arsiero front, threatening a further development of their offensive in the rear of the Italian Army, in the direction of Venice. At the same time Ludendorf in his memoirs points out how great were the objects which the Austrians were aiming at on the Italian front, and he says plainly: "In Italy it was a question of an operation on a grand scale."
However, the Russian Army in 1916 had no intention of launching an offensive on the Austrian front, and prepared for an offensive in an altogether different place, on the German front. Our General Staff had prepared for the main offensive in the direction of Vilna, and accordingly it was here that troops and munitions were being concentrated. (See Gurko's "War and Revolution.")
Everything was ready when the Italians, crushed by the Austrians, appealed to Russia for aid. An offensive on the Austrian front held no particular interest for Russia, which naturally had in view the crushing of the main enemy—the Germans. Still, Russia, just as on previous occasions, did not hesitate a minute to help her Allies. Notwithstanding that nothing had been prepared for such an offensive, General Brusilov launched it along a front two hundred miles long, with the troops he just happened to have on the spot. Everybody remembers this celebrated offensive of Brusilov, which netted hundreds of thousands of prisoners, a great number of other trophies, and which compelled the Austrians to immediately abandon their offensive in Italy and to begin the transfer of troops to the Russian front. "Austria gradually broke off the Italian offensive and sent troops to the Eastern front," writes Ludendorf. "The Italian Army now started a counter-offensive in the Tyrol," he remarks further on.
Describing the period of Brusilov's offensive, Ludendorf does not conceal the fact that they passed through some very bad and critical moments. "Our G. H. Q. made heavy demands on both groups (group south of Riga and Prince Leopold group) and also withdrew divisions from the West," writes Ludendorf. "Even all the fresh divisions that were thrown in were hardly sufficient to hold the front," says he in describing the situation of the Austro-Germans after the Russian break through at the Dniester. "This was one of the greatest crises on the Eastern front," says he further on, in speaking of the new break by Brusilov at Lutzk.
The effects of Brusilov's offensive proved to be so far-reaching as to affect not only the situation on the Italian front but also that on the French main front. The Allies, in view of the difficult situation of the Germans on the Russian front, launched an offensive at the Somme, and towards fall they had finally cleared the forts of Verdun of the Germans.
So did Russia once more fulfill her obligation towards her allies, as soon as her Army had received some quantity of munitions. This quantity was not yet sufficient in 1916, and it was only in 1917 that the Russian troops were at last more or less provided. The lack of munitions during the period of Brusilov's offensive was pointed out by the Russian Staff, and Ludendorf himself emphasizes it. He writes that the situation was relieved thanks to the fact that "the Russians were also contending against extraordinary difficulty of supply." From this it may be seen that the Russian Army, having obtained only the first consignments of inconsiderable and insufficient munitions, did not hesitate, in 1916, to offer her allies generous assistance on the largest scale.
Still earlier, during the Verdun period, the Russian Army, not yet recuperated from the hard blows of 1915, did by no means stand by as an idle onlooker of the heroic efforts of the French at Verdun. When at the end of February, 1916, French Headquarters appealed to the Russian Army for assistance, preparations were begun for an offensive. "The Russian Army had not lost its spirit after the heavy fighting of 1915," says Ludendorf. On the 16th of March operations were begun by the Russian troops in the territory to the northwest of Dvinsk, continuing until the 26th of March. This partial offensive, solely in aid of the French, was attended by success of a local nature. Ludendorf criticises this operation and says that "it was choked in swamps and blood." Of course, the terrible weather conditions, the rains and the impassable roads, interfered with a broad development of this offensive, but still it had a sufficiently serious effect. "From the 11th to the 21st of March," acknowledges Ludendorf, "the situation of the 10th (German) army was critical."