Russia's Sacrifice
Ludendorf commences his recital of events on the Russian front with the statement that in 1914, in East Prussia, with a force of only two German corps, he destroyed 250,000 Russians—six army corps—under the command of General Samsonov, and that General Rennenkampf, who was only within two or three days' march from Samsonov, had designedly failed to aid Samsonov.
This statement by General Ludendorf is absolutely false from beginning to end. It can be very easily proven that Ludendorf attacked Samsonov not with two army corps, but with more than 240,000 German troops. With this army he attacked not 250,000 Russians, but only two Russian army corps, i. e., 80,000 men—the 1st and the 6th Russian Army Corps. Thus, Ludendorf had a force three times larger than his adversary.
It may be easily seen from this that while Ludendorf gives Samsonov twice as many men as he had in reality, he, at the same time, credits Rennenkampf with three times the number he actually had. His own force Ludendorf puts, on paper, at one-third of what he had in fact.
Rennenkampf knew nothing about the events on the Samsonov front until August 30, whereas the latter was surrounded on August 28. (See Gurko's book, "War and Revolution".)
The cause of the Russian defeat in that battle was not the "genius" of Ludendorf, but lay rather in the fact that the Russian Army, in its eagerness to relieve Paris, advanced too quickly, with not fully mobilized and insufficient forces, and in two separate Armies, coupled with the difficulty of reconnoitering and obtaining information about the enemy in a country where the entire population was in a state of armed belligerency. The death of Samsonov and of a part of his staff and the disruption of liaison were other causes.[3]
In her haste to aid her Allies, Russia risked much, and she lost a battle on account of the precariousness of the operation, insufficiency of forces and an unfortunate accident. But she succeeded in diverting several German corps from France, and the Russian blood shed at Tannenberg thus helped win the First Battle of the Marne.
It may thus be seen from the descriptions of the first battles in East Prussia that Ludendorf, for the sake of German martial glory and probably also for the glorification of his own role, makes use of a very primitive and naive expedient. He multiplies the number of Russian troops several times, and also diminishes his own forces several times. This creates the impression that Ludendorf with "inconsiderable" forces smashed the "many times larger" forces of the Russians. As a matter of fact, however, as we have seen, Ludendorf had in these engagements, 1½, 2, and sometimes even 3 times as many men as the Russians. How excessive this superiority of numbers was may be inferred from the fact that the Germans themselves went to France with but 1½ times as many men and that they considered this sufficient for a decisive victory over the French Army. However, no matter how much Ludendorf may distort the facts in his memoirs, he cannot refrain, albeit only by 2-3 words, from mentioning the strategical catastrophe which overtook Germany through the invasion of East Prussia by the Russian troops. Ludendorf himself admits that "the transfer of the two army corps from the French front to Eastern Prussia had fatal consequences for Germany. The German advance on France was turned into a retreat."
This admission from Ludendorf characterizes the importance of all the events of the first few weeks of the War and it contains an involuntary appreciation of the historic role and self-sacrificing efforts of Russia. The enemy, albeit indirectly, admits that Russian blood was not shed in vain on the fields of East Prussia; it was precisely for this reason that Germany was unable to win the War at the only moment at which she could ever have won, taking advantage of Russia's unpreparedness and the temporary isolation of France.
In conclusion, we must also point out that from a formal standpoint Russia was not bound to fling herself into a risky operation in East Prussia. The Russian Army, like any other Army, was bound to take the field actively only after the completion of her mobilization, and this early assistance was still less her duty as she herself was at the time invaded by Austrian forces.
But Russia regarded her alliance with France from a higher standpoint than mere formal obligations. The justice of History—not the "history" of Ludendorf—will in its own time record how far Russia stood from egotistic politics and egotistic strategy during those tragic days of August and September, 1914, when the German masses, smashing every obstacle in their path, moved through northern France on Paris.